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Rick Furtak, Graham Harman, Michael Kim, Chet Lisiecki, An-
ton Rieselbach, and Natalie TeSelle. 
Third, to those who have endured countless hours of my re-
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and everything in between. To Anna Gaw, for your indomitable 
kindness and unflinching integrity. To Greg Shea, for so many 
memories that are now good stories. To Bibi Powers-McCor-
mack, for your quiet brilliance and comradeship. To Heather 
Rolph, for your wit and unalloyed humanity. To Piper Boudart, 
for your graciousness and much shared laughter. To Allie Kreit-
man, for the luminosity of your intellect and company.
And fourth, to my family, who have often been for me a 
source of wisdom and a foundation. To my grandparents, for 
teaching me that stories have a real power. To my professori-
al uncle, for lighting a path. To my sister, who bore with me 
throughout our shared youth and whose joy is my joy. And to 




On the Diseases of the Head
Matt Rosen
A theory of everything can no longer carry the day. Our age is 
perhaps the first in which it seems definitive that a theory aim-
ing to count the whole of what is, to catalogue every existent and 
experience and exception, no longer seems viable, or even very 
interesting. 
There are several reasons for this. For one thing, there is 
too much information for which to properly and carefully ac-
count. The accumulation of technical and scientific detail means 
greater specification and specialization. The sheer number of 
philosophical positions to be argued against, articulated, and 
defended continues to grow, as per the nature of any historical 
development. And in social and cultural terms, there are fewer 
and fewer regions of permissible ignorance, especially in light 
of globalization; the encounter between European and Chinese 
philosophy indicates just one particularly present example of 
this.1 Yet there is a way in which it is easier than ever before to 
be ignorant of so much.
1 An interesting account of this can be found in Yuk Hui, The Question 
Concerning Technology in China: An Essay in Cosmotechnics (Falmouth: 
Urbanomic, 2016). 
14
DISEASES OF THE HEAD
Second, our age is one of a proliferation of things.2 In the 
twentieth century — to paint with a very broad brush — phi-
losophy largely aimed to take stock of our access to things, to 
get clear about the epistemic conditions under which humans 
might come into contact with things and come to know them. 
The twenty-first century, however, demands that we grapple with 
the things themselves, whether or not they can be accessed un-
der ideal epistemic conditions.3 Processes of commodification 
and capitalization, and the correlated production of all manner 
of things, continue to accelerate; the idea that we could get a 
grip on each thing by means of some comprehensive theory has 
begun to look less and less believable. A theory that would seek 
a totalizing account no longer strikes us as able to be sufficient, 
or as more than a kind of fiction. Such a theory seems to do a 
certain violence to things; it looks recklessly assimilative, as if it 
would sweep everything up and miss each thing in its particu-
larity in so doing. 
This is not to mention that there seem to be events for which 
any theory of everything is unable to give reason. Political in-
surrections at an apparently escalating rate and scale; the event 
2 “Our time is perhaps the time of an epidemic of things.” Tristan Garcia, 
Form and Object: A Treatise on Things, trans. Mark Allan Ohm and Jon 
Cogburn (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), 1.
3 A “return to the things themselves” was one of the primary ambitions 
of Husserl’s phenomenology. However, the things to which I refer are 
unlike Husserl’s in this sense: they are, whether or not they’re thought as 
such. These things aren’t noemata tied inexorably to a subject’s noesis. 
They aren’t necessarily correlated with someone’s experience of them. As 
given, they’re indifferent to their own givenness; or they’re given without 
givenness. That isn’t to say that speculation is opposed in principle to 
the expositions of concrete life made possible by phenomenology. So far 
as experience goes, the analyses of phenomenology may well stand. But 
speculation can’t accept, as its starting point, the limitations of thematiza-
tion by a subject. The essays in this collection are united by a refusal to 
accept the supposed limits of thought, a willingness to think first about 
things themselves. See Edmund Husserl, Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology 
and Phenomenological Philosophy: First Book: General Introduction to Pure 




of global climate change, which is evidently ongoing; and tech-
nological advancements that make the impossibly horrific per-
secutions of the last century seem too easily repeatable: All of 
these look like subtractions from what a theory of everything 
might be (“the owl of Minerva begins its flight only with the on-
set of dusk”4), and yet each one of these events is still some thing. 
So what’s left for us? In lieu of a theory of everything, we can 
offer a picture of some thing. Indeed, we can offer many pic-
tures, each of some thing. 
What is some thing? It is not nothing, but it is not everything. 
It is just a thing: some thing. A picture of some thing would be 
a theory, a philosophy, which shows a way or lights a path. But 
it would recognize that the determination of whether to follow 
that path is never made while on it, that the decision to dwell in 
a theory is always made from beyond its enclosure. It would be a 
picture that acknowledges that, in so being, it leaves something 
out. It would be a picture that does not, when it comes across 
an anomaly, seek straightaway to incorporate it, or else to hide 
it from view. 
Each essay in this collection presents a theory of some thing, 
not everything and not nothing. Each essay gestures toward or 
sketches a singular path of thinking; but the decision to follow 
it rests always with the one who might decide from beyond it. 
This collection might best be bracketed by what it does 
not contain, by what it isn’t and doesn’t wish to be, by what it 
refuses. In offering theories of some things, it will not offer a 
theory of nothing, of pure criticism or negation, nor a theory 
of everything, of pure accounting or affirmation. This anthol-
ogy’s moment is not one of negativity, not even of a dialectical 
negativity that might, in some speculative sublation, be lifted 
into a more tolerable positivity. Likewise, this anthology is not 
a progress toward an idea that can only be fully glimpsed from 
the other side; it is not an attempt at totality, capture, synthesis, 
gathering, counting, or hegemony. And it is not the result of a 
4 G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen W. Wood, 
trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 23.
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compulsion to repeat the critical philosophy, a critique of what 
came before such that a rigorous boundary might be set in place 
between philosophy’s past and its future. It is only a non-total 
assortment, an assemblage without limit, of some pictures of 
some things. 
Refusing both total negation (dialectical or otherwise) and 
absolute affirmation, refusing to deny everything or attempt to 
account for everything, this collection of essays aims at the ex-
position of themes, the construction of partial vantage points, 
the creation of limited wholes, and the analysis of fictions and 
metaphors. It desires to fight for some thing — but not for eve-
rything, and not for nothing. Most of all, it desires to speak from 
a position of insufficiency, to make known its own partiality or 
under-determinacy, which we take to be indicative of the prac-
tice of thinking, a sign of speculation. 
Diseases of the Head is an anthology of essays from contem-
porary philosophers, artists, theorists, and writers working, 
broadly speaking, at the crossroads of speculative philosophy 
and speculative horror. Before turning to synopses of the in-
cluded essays, I want to sketch the terrain of this crossroads in 
order to bring out the sorts of questions this collection intends 
to pose.
For our purposes, speculative philosophy is a particular kind 
of thinking which seeks to offer a theory of some thing, but 
which does not hang on criticism or totalization. It does not pri-
marily seek the limits of thought so as to set the philosophical 
enterprise in place. It isn’t after a perimeter, but rather endeav-
ors to find out what thought can do on its own terms. Instead 
of trying to pin down the conditions of thinking or our access 
to things, instead of extending thought to include all of what is 
or retracting it such that thoughts about reality can be declared 
in some way empty or impossible, speculative philosophy seeks 
to say some things about some things, and not more or less 
than this.5 It finds a certain epistemic humility in rejecting ideas 
5 In this sense, I would situate speculation between “moralizing empiricism 
and dogmatic theology,” where Badiou situates philosophy. It’s true, of 
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of finitude that would bar us from getting a handle on things 
themselves.
The paradigmatic case of the will to limit speculation, to put 
its apparently perpetual restraints on display and make this ex-
hibition the distinctive task of the philosopher, is Kant’s criti-
cal program. Kant’s “Essay on the Maladies of the Head,” which 
sets out to classify and taxonomize various instances of subpar 
thinking, is a good example of a kind of pervasive legalism, a 
desire to name the boundaries that thought cannot or must not 
surpass.6 Matthé Scholten writes of the Kantian contention that 
“the unifying feature of the symptoms” of those disorders that 
come under the head of schizophrenia “is the patient’s inability 
to enter into an exchange of reasons with others.”7 Sanity can be 
bracketed by means of a criterion: the capacity to engage in in-
tersubjective projects, to come to consensus and follow certain 
conventions, to register disagreement within parameters pur-
portedly fixed by reason itself. In this way, sanity can be distin-
guished from skepticism, which is how anxiety comes to expres-
sion in philosophy, and dogmatism, which is how rigidity and 
small-mindedness (or repressed anxiety) come to philosophical 
expression. And if, for whatever reason, one isn’t able to engage 
in the “exchange of reasons with others,” or doesn’t wish to do 
so, then one can justifiably be said to think poorly; hence, one is 
unfit to undertake certain tasks.8 
course, that there are some contemporary “speculative” philosophers who 
engage in a sort of totalization, even if not in the sense of Kantian critique. 
But I also think we might say that, inasmuch as they engage in projects 
that seek to come to terms with the whole of what is (and negation can 
sometimes be totalizing), they are thereby less speculative. Alain Badiou, 
Second Manifesto for Philosophy, trans. Louise Burchill (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2011), 42.
6 Immanuel Kant, Anthropology, History, and Education, eds. Günter Zöller 
and Robert B. Louden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 71.
7 Matthé Scholten, “Schizophrenia and Moral Responsibility: A Kantian 
Essay,” Philosophia 44, no. 1 (March 2016): 205.
8 Certain critiques of Habermas might seem quite apropos here with respect 
to Kant’s position.
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Speculation, a practice of thinking catalogued by Kant as a 
malady of the head because of its failure to respect the limits 
set in place by the critical philosophy, is typified for Kant by 
the somewhat exaggerated model of Emanuel Swedenborg, who 
was a Swedish Lutheran theologian, philosopher, and mystic. In 
the highly polemical Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, published in 1766, 
Kant rescinds many of his previously laudatory remarks about 
Swedenborg, engaging in a blistering criticism of his specula-
tions. Swedenborg is called a “spook-hunter” with a penchant 
for “ceaseless questioning,” and to Kant’s dismay he has no 
“official office or occupation.”9 In Kant’s terms, Swedenborg 
is guilty of being a Schwärmerei, a fanatic or quixotic vision-
ary who doesn’t respect the proper bounds of reason. Rather, 
he employs thought beyond its permissible scope. This caustic 
epithet — Schwärmerei — dates back to Luther’s critique of the 
more radical elements of the Reformation, indicating a form of 
thinking, often mystically theological, that is illicit or forbidden 
under a given set of conditions taken to pick out what qualifies 
as acceptable reasoning. This set of conditions — in Kant’s case, 
laid out by the critical philosophy — is identified by a modality 
of thought (namely, critique) taken to be superior to the osten-
sible ravings of the Schwärmerei.
For Kant, speculation that fails to be critical, a thought of 
some thing that doesn’t seek to subsume it under the categories 
of understanding with immediacy, a thought that doesn’t ask 
primarily about our access to things, is declared to be one of the 
many diseases of the head. It is a malady to be avoided by the 
sane and the upright. As should be clear, this collection does not 
side with Kant. For, as Alain Badiou has it, 
Kant is the one author for whom I cannot feel any kinship. Ev-
erything in him exasperates me, above all his legalism — al-
9 See Immanuel Kant, Theoretical philosophy, 1755–1770, ed. and trans. Da-
vid Walford, in collaboration with Ralf Meerbote (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), 305. See also Ernst Benz, Emanuel Swedenborg: 
Visionary Savant in the Age of Reason, trans. Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke 
(West Chester: Swedenborg Foundation, 2002).
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ways asking Quid juris? or “Haven’t you crossed the limit?” 
The critical machinery he set up has enduringly poisoned 
philosophy […] I am persuaded that the whole of the critical 
enterprise is set up to shield against the tempting symptom 
represented by the seer Swedenborg, or against “diseases of 
the head,” as Kant puts it.10 
There’s no doubt a long history within philosophy of self-limi-
tation. But there is also a noteworthy lineage that aims to push 
back against the will to limit, rejecting the desire to catalogue all 
of the diseases of the head the better to avoid them. This line-
age has speculated regardless, offering theories of some things 
without attention to the putative primacy of critique. 
For Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus, the superlative 
taxonomizer is perhaps Freud rather than Kant, but the senti-
ment is pretty much the same. They write: “For we must not 
delude ourselves: Freud doesn’t like schizophrenics. He doesn’t 
like their resistance to being oedipalized, and tends to treat 
them more or less as animals. They mistake words for things, 
he says […] they resemble philosophers.”11 Or — in a place 
where we might note the relationship between speculation and 
political emancipation — “schizophrenia is the exterior limit 
of capitalism itself or the conclusion of its deepest tendency, 
but […] capitalism only functions on condition that it inhibit 
this tendency […]. Hence schizophrenia is not the identity of 
capitalism, but on the contrary its difference, its divergence, its 
death.”12 The point is this: the urge to catalogue the diseases of 
the head so as to avoid them has a long and august history in 
philosophy; but the celebration of these diseases, the idea that 
perhaps in their partiality, audacity, and impertinence they rep-
10 Alain Badiou, Logics of Worlds: Being and Event II, trans. Alberto Toscano 
(London: Continuum, 2009), 535–36.
11 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizo-
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resent thinking authentically, also has a history. It is within this 
latter lineage that this book locates itself. 
For my philosophical project, as for many of those antholo-
gized herein, the limits set in place by Kant prove problematic. If 
the classical manner of thinking moves from ontology to ethics, 
I have sought something like the inversion of this. For the clas-
sical movement, from what is to how to live, ethical imperatives 
are supposed to follow from ontological grounds. For instance, 
in Kant we see that morality supposedly follows from the nature 
of a rational being. For the movement I seek, beginning in eth-
ics, ontological claims would be to some extent defensible on 
moral grounds. This may sound strange at first, but I think it 
rests on a rather simple observation: any ontology, it seems to 
me, is only really taken up when it is deemed inhabitable, when 
it seems to offer a picture of things within which we can make 
reasonably decent lives. So we would do well, on my view, to 
see that inhabitability matters when it comes to weighing the 
virtues and costs of any ontology. For Kant, the categorical im-
perative declares, as it were, that I should treat another as if my 
action could become a universal law. I should act toward oth-
ers as if they are ends in themselves, and not only means. Now 
this imperative follows from an ontological program, a legalistic 
system, in which it seems to me there can be no other. For all 
that’s given to me is subsumed right away under the categories 
of understanding, and thus rendered self-same to me, of me, or 
different only in degree from the norm that I am. The categori-
cal imperative in this way strikes me as unattractively centered 
on the self, since it concerns the other whom I am to treat “as if ” 
they are another — and only “as if.” By the time the moment of 
ethics is reached, it is always already too late; ontology has had 
its day. I can think that the other is not only a means — that is, 
that there must be some other-in-itself lurking behind the oth-
er-for-me — but I can never hope to know the other except as a 
means. To my mind, the ontological limit that prohibits specu-
lation is, from this vantage point, morally untenable. Critique 
rests on a picture of things we shouldn’t wish to inhabit.
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This is just one example of the many supposed limits that 
are called into question in this collection, set aside in a turn to-
ward speculation — a turn toward a thought that isn’t primarily 
concerned with its own justifiable extents, conditions, or limits. 
This “speculative turn” is best situated in the discourse that 
has followed the 2007 conference, “Speculative Realism,” held 
at Goldsmiths College, University of London.13 At that confer-
ence, four philosophers with rather divergent views — Quentin 
Meillassoux, Ray Brassier, Graham Harman, and Iain Hamil-
ton Grant — came together to address a common enemy. This 
enemy was named “correlationism” by Meillassoux in his 2006 
book, After Finitude. As Meillassoux put it, correlationism is 
“the idea according to which we only ever have access to the 
correlation between thinking and being, and never to either 
term considered apart from the other.”14 After the twentieth cen-
tury, dominated in the Anglo-American world by the project of 
analysis and in Continental Europe by phenomenology, the phi-
losophies of Meillassoux, Brassier, Harman, and Grant each in 
their own way seemed to herald a new day for thought. Badiou, 
setting high expectations, called the attempt to undermine cor-
relationism “a new path in the history of philosophy.”15 
The “speculative realists” — a term that better indicates a 
common enemy, correlationism, than any shared program — op-
posed what they considered to be the safety and consolation of 
humanism (Brassier); the idea of a subject who is not an object 
(Harman); and those philosophies that proclaim that there’s 
nothing beyond thought, or that there’s no possible access to 
what transcends subjectivity (Meillassoux). 
13 For relevant papers, see Robin Mackay, ed., Collapse II: Speculative Realism 
(Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2007). For the transcript of this conference, see 
Ray Brassier et al., “Speculative Realism,” in Collapse III: Unknown Deleuze 
and Symposium on Speculative Realism, ed. Robin Mackay (Falmouth: 
Urbanomic, 2007), 306–449.
14 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contin-
gency, trans. Ray Brassier (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017), 5.
15 Alain Badiou, “Preface,” in ibid., vii.
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In the twentieth century, various philosophies held that eve-
rything that exists is simply the correlation of thinking and be-
ing; or language and bodies (and maybe truths); or appearances 
and objects of consciousness; or the noematic and noetic poles 
of consciousness; or Being and beings; or fluxes, processes, and 
becomings; or the text; or matter; or the Idea; or God; or the 
subject, whatever is correlated to it, and whatever interpellates 
it such that it is what it is; or structures, systems, and states; or 
power and its articulations; and so on. The turn toward specula-
tion, which began in some significant way with the 2007 Gold-
smiths conference, meant the refusal of these architectonics, 
these attempts to lay out what everything consists in. It meant 
the denial of a kind of philosophical self-sufficiency or indul-
gence by way of the renewal of a thought of the outside.16 In a 
way, the turn to speculative philosophy signified the end of au-
thoritative proclamations about the nature of everything (or our 
access to it), a willingness to rest contented with saying some-
thing about some things. 
Speculation is not a thought of everything, as was attempted 
in the previous century — the summae of which attest to these 
attempts. Nor is it a purely negative thought, intending only the 
critique of the aforementioned totalizations, merely illustrating 
the insufficiency of correlationism. It rather puts forward some 
pictures of some things, and neither more nor less than this. 
This collection isn’t an introduction to what has been termed 
“speculative realism” or to associated theoretical endeavors. 
Several introductions of this sort have already been written or 
edited by those much more capable than I am.17 While many 
16 “For it could be that contemporary philosophers have lost the great out-
doors, the absolute outside of pre-critical thinkers: that outside which was 
not relative to us, and which was given as indifferent to its own givenness 
to be what it is, existing in itself regardless of whether we are thinking it or 
not; that outside which thought could explore with the legitimate feeling 
of being on foreign territory — of being entirely elsewhere.” Meillassoux, 
After Finitude, 7.
17 For such an introduction, see Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham 
Harman, eds., The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism 
(Melbourne: re.press, 2011). See also Katerina Kolozova and Eileen A. 
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of the essays in this collection draw their inspiration or parts 
of their theoretical apparatuses from the four philosophers who 
spoke at the Goldsmiths conference, Diseases of the Head aims 
specifically to explore the intersection of speculative philosophy, 
broadly construed in the above sense, and speculative horror. 
Speculative or “concept” horror is a genre, in literature and 
other forms of art, that addresses a particular set of themes: 
anonymity, otherness, the alien, the monstrous, the Gothic, ex-
tinction and the world without human beings, the end times, 
the apocalypse, the archaic and the world before human beings, 
the uncanny or unheimlich, and other similar motifs. In this 
collection, a number of speculative authors who discuss such 
themes are considered: H.P. Lovecraft, Maurice Blanchot, Ru-
dolf Otto, E.T.A. Hoffmann, and Mark Z. Danielewski, among 
others. And the works considered include House of Leaves, the 
Alien franchise, The Call of Cthulhu, The Infinite Conversation, 
and many more. 
This anthology is situated at the crossroads of speculative 
philosophy and speculative horror, in the terrain in which the 
diseases of the head encounter the aforementioned themes. 
Kant’s critical philosophy and the tradition that follows from 
it — serving as a defense against the speculative maladies of the 
head, against the madness and horror of speculation — are being 
called into question by those aiming to think being apart from 
thought, the absolute at the expense of subjectivity, the macabre 
at sanity’s peril, the exception at the price of the stability of the 
situation, and the alien at the cost of a certain discourse of nor-
mativity. Speculative horror is a fertile place of development for 
those philosophies that seek to repudiate the Kantian injunction 
to avoid the diseases of the head in endeavoring to speculate 
anew. Conversely, speculative philosophy is a site of inspiration 
and theoretical articulation for writers, artists, and theorists of 
horror who want to explore novel aesthetic and inaesthetic pos-
sibilities in relation to the uncanny and inhuman, the beyond-
Joy, eds., After the “Speculative Turn”: Realism, Philosophy, and Feminism 
(Earth: punctum books, 2016).
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human, extra-human, sans-human, post-human, and even at 
times the anti-human.18 This anthology thus aspires to engage 
the place of development at which speculative horror and spec-
ulative philosophy meet through as many distinct voices — as 
many theories of some thing — as possible. From philosophers 
working on horrific themes, to horror writers influenced by the 
new speculative philosophy, to artists engaged in projects that 
address alienation and monstrosity, the contributors to Diseases 
of the Head pose the questions: 
 — Where do horror and philosophy come together? What’s 
found there?
 — In what sense might philosophy be fictional? In what sense 
might fiction be philosophical? What is the relationship be-
tween theory, story, and practice?
 — What does it mean to speculate? How is speculation lived?
 — If we set aside philosophy’s self-limitation, what kind of hor-
ror might result? What are the maladies of the head? What 
happens if we say that thought can in some way access real-
ity?
 — What can philosophers learn from horror writers and artists, 
and vice versa? 
 — What must be considered in regard to the extinction of 
thought and the exigencies of the Anthropocene?
 — What does philosophy have to say about the end of the world?
 — What use can the genre of horror make of speculation, and 
what use can speculation make of horror? 
 — Can horror possibly be contained in an identifiable genre? 
 — And, what sort of future developments await us in philoso-
phy and horror after the resurgence of speculation?
 
This anthology seeks to articulate the cutting-edge, as contem-
porary philosophers, artists, theorists, and writers present their 
thoughts — at times fragmentary, at times aphoristic, at times 




audacious — on the preceding questions; each chapter offers 
some theory of some thing found at the intersection of specula-
tive philosophy and speculative horror. To put it another way, 
there’s a sense in which this collection aims at nothing less, after 
the long twentieth century, than a speculative coup d’état.
Before we turn to summaries of the included essays, there 
are a few points that the reader should bear in mind. First, as 
I have mentioned, any speculative investigation is by its nature 
rough and unfinished; we don’t think that this is a fault needing 
acknowledgement, but rather a virtue. This collection intends 
to speak from a posture of being in progress. It speaks from the 
position of an inquiry. It is not a treatise. We consider this a 
matter of sincerity. The limits of this text aren’t the limits of its 
world. Speculation does not end with the final pages; perhaps it 
only begins there. 
Second, this anthology disregards the limits of disciplines 
and academic departmentalization. We are not concerned to 
draw neat distinctions between, say, philosophy and literature, 
or theory and practice, in order to set each thing so distin-
guished in its proper place. I believe that Alex Dubilet put it well 
when he wrote that 
[s]uch axiomatic distinctions have been repeatedly asserted 
and maintained in different guises, circulating with varying 
normative judgements and levels of complexity to the pres-
ent day. It is almost as if there has been a persistent, although 
often unacknowledged, collusion [between disciplines] that 
has led to theoretical partitions and purifications […]. It is 
as though each disciplinary tribe has its own axiomatic axis 
mundi around which it is fated to remain in orbit. […] Per-
haps this should come as no surprise, since distinct boundar-
ies allow for the persistence and legitimation of disciplinary 
identities and for the resulting, almost nationalistic in their 
intensity, rallying cries in defense of disciplinary territories.19
19 Alex Dubilet, The Self-Emptying Subject: Kenosis and Immanence, Medieval 
to Modern (New York: Fordham University Press, 2018), 5.
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Suffice it to say: the essays included in Diseases of the Head reject 
“disciplinary identities” and refuse “disciplinary territories.” We 
have no interest in planting flags, here or anywhere. We don’t 
want to mark the regions of our explorations like conquistadors 
of the mind. We are after investigations, open sketches, piece-
meal inquiries, not systems or inert methods. So far as we are 
concerned, all thoughts are equally thoughts of some thing, 
each of which can be criticized or taken up, each of which has 
something to offer us — a reason to accept the thought, a reason 
to deny it. Each of the included essays sets out a singular path, a 
particular thought of some thing where speculative philosophy 
and speculative horror collide. We therefore seek to suspend 
the distinctions between disciplines — to ignore, at least for a 
moment, socio-cultural partitions and formulaic or balkanized 
ways of thinking — in pursuit of speculation itself. 
Third, this collection isn’t a polemic. It was Kant, after all, who 
once said that metaphysics is a battlefield. On this battlefield, 
there is a certain sense in which the speculative philosopher is, 
or could be, a guerrilla combatant.20 But combat isn’t our aim. 
The critical philosophy, in strictly limiting thinking by means 
of its own “reasonable” conditions, in setting aside dogmatic 
metaphysics, endeavors to bring about an age of philosophical 
“perpetual peace.”21 But this peace is the other side of polemos, 
only the moment between battles; it is a peace that declares war 
against so much of what thought can do. The speculative resur-
gence, then, isn’t the renewal of the battlefield but the suspension 
of the whole war-and-peace dialectic. From a perspective that is 
perhaps naïve, from the posture of that youthful “idealism” that 
is the only true realism, we seek to speculate without regard to 
the declared war or peace of Kant’s metaphysical battlefield. We 
wish to think otherwise. We won’t offer a thought that aims to 
vanquish or conquer another by claiming to account for every-
20 Cf. Graham Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Car-
pentry of Things (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 2005).
21 I refer to Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, trans. Ted 
Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983).
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thing, or to negate all else. The goal is not to write an anti-Kant, 
a treatise of resistance to the critical philosophy. Nor do we want 
to surrender to its stipulations. The objective is to make another 
use of thought after Kant. 
In other words, we seek to suspend the vicious circularity of 
critique and systematic construction — instead putting forward 
a picture, or many pictures, of some things, for there are many 
diseases of the head.  
Overview of Essays to Follow
This anthology opens with Ben Woodard’s “Outgrown Purpose, 
Outlived Use: On Parasitic Teleology.” Woodard wants to make 
sense of the history of vitalism alongside the development of 
biology as a discrete, autonomous science. He argues that the 
emergence of vitalism, and its invocation throughout the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries, was in some sense a response 
to the introduction of order and codification into the apparent 
disarray of the study of living systems, which mixed notions of 
purpose, teleology, mechanism, form, function, and transfor-
mation. Woodard writes that the view on which life is merely 
a force, system, or substance neglects a significant part of the 
picture of organic life and its historical development. After ana-
lyzing the historical cartography of vitalism, Woodard turns to 
how it interacts with the question of teleology’s nature or foun-
dation. In order to explicate the “cross-contamination” of vital-
ism and teleology, Woodard examines the Alien franchise of 
films. These films, he believes, can be seen as emphasizing what’s 
at stake for vitalism: “an extended battle over the teleological 
status of evolutionary theory and the stubbornness of the ideals 
of intentional (whether divine or merely sapient) creation.” In 
discussing the order in which the Alien films might be viewed, 
Woodard notes that, if they are viewed in the order in which 
they were created, it looks as if “creation begs to be justified by 
teleology.” But if they are viewed according to authorial intent, 
the films instead “unfold vitalism from a teleological obsession.” 
Woodard argues that the Alien films signify and magnify the 
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adoption of conceptions of teleology by various sorts of vitalism 
that would typically disavow them. He tells us that critical vital-
ism’s refusal of any real foundations or conditions of biological 
life leaves open a door for teleology, while the so-called “naïve” 
forms of vitalism think of their concepts as placeholders in 
the venture to explain nature’s generative capacity. These latter 
forms of vitalism thereby refrain from closing their productions 
back into the “circle of meaning.”
Amanda Beech, in her essay “Death of Horror,” argues that 
the cultural phenomenon of horror speaks to notions of human 
limitation, which are projected as the horizons of what we can 
know in the “impossible navigation between the real and our 
lived reality.” The limitations to which horror endeavors to give 
voice are established when we fail — as we must — to take seri-
ously the images representative of negativity and the concepts 
we might employ to think it. Beech notes that, in seeking theo-
retical explanations and in ordinary life, we often either oppose 
the real and lived reality as if they are adversaries or instead 
suppose that they are equivalent “in the name of the real itself.” 
Speaking of the “infinite and cloying space of contemporary 
global capital,” Beech claims that horror is no longer able to en-
gender genuine terror with any thought of “the outside.” In lieu 
of that, it has been forced to put forward another sort of ter-
ror: that of “repetition, entrapment, and the destiny of the same 
that persists with force.” Beech thus argues that horror’s post-
modern condition has rendered its potential as a “vector” of the 
dynamic between the real and reality dispensable for politics, 
aesthetics, and the question of how epistemology can offer “new 
directions for both language and the future.” Beech wants to put 
these questions before us: Can horror allow for a view of lan-
guage that isn’t pessimistic, maintaining a “project of realism”? 
Can language express a reality independent of subjectivity and 
thereby explicate “the conditions of horror vacui”? Can it do this 
without eating away at the view that language has some funda-
mental “equality or inequality with the real”? In order to move 
toward answers to these questions, Beech investigates populist 
film. She looks to the resources of philosophical reflection and 
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non-philosophical invention to theorize the limit of horror as 
the “representational expression of nothingness.” She seeks a 
novel understanding of the relationship between representation 
and the thought of nothingness. That way, we might just “rescue 
the operations of language after postmodernity.”  
In my essay, “Those Who Aren’t Counted,” I propose a dis-
tinction between two concepts: affliction and atrocity. I argue 
that an ethical position with respect to history’s horrors can be 
understood as a practice of refusing to permit affliction to be 
seen as atrocity. This is a practice of resisting the urge to quantify 
or qualify affliction in subjecting it to a count of bodies, which 
would be taken to totalize all the suffering in a given situation. 
We should, I contend, resist thinking that affliction qualified as 
atrocity, subject to a count of bodies or the like, captures afflic-
tion itself. I start with an analysis of the massacre that occurred 
at Sétif and Guelma, which was one of the conflicts that pre-
cipitated the violence of the Algerian War. I focus particularly 
on the dissensus with regard to the number of people who were 
killed there. I argue that atrocity is the result of a conversion in 
which affliction is subject to an operation of counting, trapped 
within a kind of numerical prism. Through this prism, atrocity 
is imagined to be adequate to the actual suffering in question. I 
ask about how we can think the affliction of those who perished 
at Sétif and Guelma without regard to the atrocity under which 
they have been subsumed, within which they have been nu-
merically crystallized as the 1,020 (the body count according to 
the French colonial government) or the 45,000 (the body count 
according to Radio Cairo). This inquiry leads to a discussion of 
various ethical “topologies,” and then to a study of an especially 
salient instance of affliction: the crucifixion of Christ. Here, I 
distinguish between two visions of Christ. The first, which I call 
“Christ-in-Christianity,” sees the crucifixion as an atrocity. The 
second, which I call “Christ-without-Christianity,” sees it as an 
affliction. I sketch a picture of what I term a “generic ethic” in 
order to theorize in alliance with the Christ of the crucifixion, 
whose affliction is, I argue, foreclosed to those who would think 
it as atrocity. I conclude by applying the distinction between af-
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fliction and atrocity to the biblical story of Exodus, making a 
case that it is ethically imperative that we recollect the abnega-
tion of the self to those who aren’t counted, those who cannot be 
counted because they are afflicted without atrocity.   
David Peak, in “Horror of the Real: H.P. Lovecraft’s Old 
Ones and Contemporary Speculative Philosophy,” analyzes the 
enduring relevance of the Cthulhu Mythos of H.P. Lovecraft. 
Peak puts forward a way in which Lovecraft’s “Old Ones” can 
be given a new meaning in light of contemporary developments 
in speculative philosophy. At the same time, he provides a nar-
rative structure in and by which those developments might be 
elucidated. Peak begins his essay by discussing the history and 
literary merit of Lovecraft’s mythology; he writes of its value 
as a work of fiction, and as a site that offers ample theoretical 
resources for those thinking about horrific themes. Consider-
ing what makes Lovecraft’s vision “so profound,” Peak seeks to 
advance a connection between recent developments in philoso-
phy — especially those of Graham Harman and Quentin Meil-
lassoux — and Lovecraft’s “notions of horror.” Peak tells us that 
the Cthulhu Mythos does a fine job of representing Harman’s 
conception of “weird realism,” and he looks to the theoretical 
tools of speculative philosophy to see if they might allow us 
to “move past the inherent limitations of Lovecraft’s dogmatic 
materialism,” which Peak thinks is at odds with Lovecraft’s own 
fiction. For Peak, speculative horror can expand — and impor-
tantly, concretize — the often abstract and abstruse philosophi-
cal maneuvers of the new speculation. It is Lovecraft after all, 
Peak reminds us, who was audacious enough to have “dared us 
to gaze into such magnificent vistas of ultimate chaos.”
In “Triangulorum,” Sara Rich weaves the tale of a tragic, 
ill-fated journey to Hispaniola. Written in an epistolary form, 
Rich’s narrative asks, what if those Kant thought to be sickened 
by the diseases of the head aren’t “dreamers in waking” or fanati-
cal visionaries but rather, as she puts it, “those whose sensations 
become, through weird chance, inextricably bound to chimeri-
cal overlaps of space-time that render chaos from perceptions 
of order?” In a style at once evocative and experimental, theory 
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and fiction, Rich tells us that perhaps this post-Enlightenment 
age, an “era of life in the Rational Experiment gone haywire,” is 
one in which anything but reversibility in fact seems possible. 
In their chapter, “Race and Its Far-Reaching Contemporary 
Ontological and Epistemological Implications,” Marina Gržinić 
and Jovita Pristovšek argue that the primary intersection of hor-
ror and philosophy is found “when, and if, we speak about the 
historical construct of race and its far-reaching, contemporary, 
ontological, and epistemological implications.” 
In the first part of their chapter, entitled “Politics of Death in 
Europe,” Gržinić starts off by considering the concept of “nec-
ropolitics,” rooted in the work of Achille Mbembe and Giorgio 
Agamben. She defines necropolitics, in contradistinction to Fou-
cault’s biopolitics, as a politics conceived in line with the slogan 
“let live and make die.” Arguing that the notion of necropolitics 
opens up a “critical space for discussing a land of dead, violated, 
and ultimately disposed bodies,” Gržinić analyzes a number of 
films made after the Second World War, which center on death 
and history. In this way, she aims to think about death and dying 
“in the form of an enduring process of a systematic violent act.” 
In each of the films under examination, Gržinić points out that 
the three main elements of necropolitics can be seen: “enmity, 
impunity, and the right to kill.” In these films, she tells us, these 
elements are instantiated as “abandonment, reification, and dis-
posability.” Gržinić discusses the structures of various forms 
of polities and states, and she concludes the first section of the 
chapter by arguing that it is essential to rescue the films under 
discussion “from oblivion and the terror they bring” — thereby, 
we can rescue the lives of those in these films who, “though ter-
rified, oppose death.” 
In the second part of their chapter, entitled “We remember 
carrying the word in mouth. Race. Chewing,” Pristovšek speaks 
of the “figure of the ‘Black,’ a racialized, colonized, ungendered, 
and dehumanized” being; this being is constructed as a kind of 
metaxy amidst a world of subjects and objects, who/which is 
both between these categories and excluded by them. Pristovšek 
tells us that we ought to assert clearly that the idea of race is 
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something horrific for philosophy. In arguing that race and 
racism are relegated by philosophy to the unrepresentable and 
unthinkable, Pristovšek sets up the question of how we are to 
think about race as the “grey zone” between horror and philos-
ophy. She thereby gives consideration to the “ontological and 
epistemological implications” of race and how it is constructed, 
articulated, elaborated, and employed. Meditating on the grav-
ity of injustices both historical and present-day — including 
the effects of “European provincialism,” commodity fetishism, 
and “neoliberal, global, financial capitalism” — Pristovšek un-
dertakes a detailed assessment of the philosophical movement 
often termed “speculative realism.” She pays particular attention 
to its aesthetic and political ramifications; she thinks these are 
in a sense the same, or at least have a close relationship. Seeking 
neither to defend Kant nor to defend speculative realism from 
Kant, Pristovšek worries that all parties are avoiding think-
ing about what actually lies between horror and philosophy: 
namely, the “racial flesh.” What we desperately need, Pristovšek 
claims, is a way to “think anew the ‘human,’” a way to unfold 
and develop, as Foucault has it, “a space in which it is once more 
possible to think.”
Eckardt Lindner, in “Absolute Xenogenesis: Speculations 
on an Unnatural History of Life,” lights a path through the 
terrain of philosophy’s entanglement with artificial life, dis-
covering questions about madness, opacity, and impersonality 
along the way. He begins with an analysis of Kant’s Dreams of 
a Spirit-Seer. Lindner tells us that Kant resists attributing the 
spirit-seer’s speculative claims to any physiological malfunc-
tion, since “the whole of philosophical thought is in danger of 
becoming a sickness of the mind.” In view of our incapacity to 
absolve ourselves of at least the hypothesis of our own insan-
ity, there doesn’t appear to be anything in experience that could 
act as a guarantor of its correspondence with reality. Lindner 
emphasizes Kant’s move toward a discourse of experience that 
is intersubjectively verifiable, a discourse in which the notion 
of life takes on the sense of whatever has the quality of being 
“lively” or “vital.” In arguing that Kant’s reconceptualization 
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of life reflects something found in various attempts to cre-
ate artificial life in the eighteenth century, Linder writes of the 
“anatomical-phenomenological approach” to thinking about 
life, which “simulates a body” and aims to represent or mirror 
life. For this approach, success as adequation to life is “meas-
ured by the (often visceral) reaction of an onlooker.” The horror 
invoked here comes to light in an analogical structure bridg-
ing an excessive or transcendent object and a finite subject by 
means of a “mediating representation.” Linder then turns to the 
“anti-aesthetics” of speculative philosophy; he argues that, de-
spite the promises of the fashionable “speculative realism,” its 
“anti-vitalist rationalism” is unfortunately “trapped within the 
coordinates of the Kantian critique.” Linder thus proposes that 
we center our inquiry on the “indifferent speculative wasteland” 
through which thought about life must wander. In this connec-
tion, he discusses Deleuze’s conception of life as a formidable 
alternative to the thinking of life — latent and manifest — in Ray 
Brassier and Quentin Meillassoux. He also discusses alchemical 
thinking about artificial life. Lindner argues that the alchemical 
tradition of thinking about life has been stigmatized as heresy, 
which points to a recurrent fear of a “nature ultimately neither 
controlled nor limited by any external force.” This fear singles 
out a “horror based on the univocity of all individuated beings 
via an impersonal genesis” — which is what Lindner calls “ab-
solute xenogenesis.” He claims that this reveals that the nature 
of life is in fact unnatural, setting up an original dividing line 
between the “anatomical lineage,” which limits life to the phe-
nomena of organic life, and the “alchemical lineage,” which isn’t 
constrained by nature as it actually is but “introduces a differ-
ence into it, supplementing it.” This latter lineage, Lindner tells 
us, opens up many possible “future histories of life” beyond the 
organic, beyond our cognition, and indeed, beyond us.
In “Survival Strategies for Weird Times,” we have reprinted 
Helen Marshall’s story, entitled “Survival Strategies” and origi-
nally published in Black Static 58 (2017). This is followed by a 
commentary published for the first time in this collection. 
“Survival Strategies” is a semi-fictionalized account of a young 
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academic, a scholar of medieval studies, who is on a research 
trip to New York in order to interview the editor of Barron St. 
John, a bestselling author. Set against the backdrop of Donald 
Trump’s presidency, this story employs autobiographical ele-
ments to complicate any attempt to distinguish fiction from 
reality. Refusing any rigorous demarcation of one from the 
other, it asks: where do “true horror” and “speculative hor-
ror” intersect, and to what extent can our situatedness in the 
present moment prove to be a source of the uncanny? Follow-
ing “Survival Strategies,” the reader will find an accompanying 
commentary, “Survival Strategies for Weird Times,” which elu-
cidates the aforementioned themes in a more explicit fashion. 
Marshall argues that the mode of weird fiction proposed by Jeff 
and Ann VanderMeer, M. John Harrison, China Miéville, and 
Roger Luckhurst, among others, plausibly evokes the “feeling of 
living in the twenty-first century: an age thus far characterized 
by political crises, fake news, and environmental catastrophe.” 
She draws upon the work of H.P. Lovecraft and constructs paral-
lels with Timothy Morton’s work on hyperobjects, that is, “real 
things with discernible impacts which cannot be apprehended 
in their entirety.” Marshall’s commentary articulates several 
ways in which the “weird mode” of fiction coincides with the 
uncanny and destabilizing effects of Morton’s hyperobjects, be-
fore concluding by considering the role of fiction in “attempting 
to represent the ‘weird’ times of the world in which we live.”
The next essay is Luka Bekavac’s “Matrix Pavoris: Material 
Dislocation in House of Leaves.” This is an ambitious analysis 
of Danielewski’s far from conventional novel, House of Leaves. 
Bekavac pays particular attention to what he considers that 
work’s main invention: the “small, featureless spatial dilatation” 
which manifests itself in an “otherwise ordinary family home.” 
Bekavac tells us that this baffling space, “as abstract and benign 
as it might initially seem,” is bizarre enough — “scandalous 
enough” — to lend energy to a great number of critical reac-
tions, interpretations, and theories. He employs this invention 
in order to grapple with the problem of “text as a graphic em-
bodiment of the cognitive inaccessibility of space.” Bekavac con-
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siders the unorthodox typography exhibited in House of Leaves, 
as well as novel ideas of textuality, the distribution of texts, and 
procedures of writing; he argues that “the common thread run-
ning through all of this, as obscure as it might sometimes seem, 
is actually the strictly materialistic understanding of text, a firm 
conviction that, in parallel with all of their powers of handling 
content and reflecting or anticipating a certain “reality,” texts are 
things, objects with physical qualities, defined by their link to 
matter and resistance to easy and complete transfer into com-
prehension, idea, or pure thought.” This leads Bekavac to a co-
gent engagement with Derrida’s work on writing, typography, 
and language broadly construed. Examining writing and textu-
ality in relation to temporality and spatiality, Bekavac contends 
that writing’s distinctive time is in the end a sort of atemporality. 
In other words, writing’s time is space. This leads Bekavac to a 
discussion of dwelling in Heidegger, Plato, and Derrida, which 
yields the startling thought that “if we are to encounter […] un-
intelligible materiality in any way, it will have to present itself 
in a more ambiguous guise, it will have to open like a book, it 
might even resemble a house.” By way of thinking about archi-
tecture, Bekavac constructs a vision of materials, such as books 
and houses, as transitional objects, and he concludes that deal-
ing with writing means trying to find a “perpetually provisional 
and volatile foothold within it.” For the “only other option is 
not to read at all, to go back into ourselves, try and forget, or to 
simply move on.” 
Chloé Germaine Buckley’s “Encountering Weird Objects: 
Lovecraft, LARP, and Speculative Philosophy,” poses a strik-
ing question to those of us who might be all too satisfied with 
merely writing about the nature of reality. How can we actually 
“make contact with objects such that both the anthropocentrism 
of Western philosophy and the […] ‘common-sense’ realism it 
engenders might be disrupted?” To put it another way: what 
would it mean to work toward an encounter with the weirdness 
of reality, an encounter that might allow humans to be “jolted 
out of the ‘hubris’” in which the question of matter is always 
indistinguishable from questions of utility and instrumental 
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value? Buckley argues that there is “at least one human activity 
alert to the vibrant, strange, and elusive nature of objects: game-
playing.” Focusing on live-action roleplaying (LARP), “a niche 
gaming activity distinct from table-top roleplaying games and 
video games,” Buckley tells us that this sort of play makes pos-
sible the disruption of “players’ deeply embedded ontologies”; 
it allows for a break with the common-sense that operates in 
ordinary life. Through an analysis of ludic theory, an engage-
ment with the Gothic literary tradition, and a discussion of 
object-oriented materialisms and ontologies, Buckley makes 
the persuasive argument that “LARP monsters are almost always 
material-human hybrids.” The philosophical potential of game-
playing — and LARP especially — emerges as the production of 
“embodied and affective experiences” that might bring to life, so 
to speak, the “rhetoric” of speculative realism and new material-
ism. Since LARP makes otherwise “allusive” processes concrete, 
since it aims to produce “an embodied and affective encounter 
with strange and vibrant materiality” of which humans are a 
part, but which humans cannot master, Buckley claims that this 
sort of play provides us with vital, subversive ethical resources. 
The player must account for the nature of reality as inhuman, 
and so it becomes exigent that we “consider that fact that it is the 
world that makes us,” not the other way round.
In “Sublime Horror in the Tales of E.T.A. Hoffmann,” Hamad 
Al-Rayes defends the view that E.T.A. Hoffmann wasn’t only a 
pioneering writer of horror fiction who pushed it beyond what 
had previously been considered its limits but also a “theoreti-
cian of the highest caliber.” Of the attention that Hoffmann’s 
contributions to philosophical inquiry have received, most 
has been concentrated on how he sought to make sense of the 
distinction between classicism and romanticism. But Al-Rayes 
proposes to expand this attention dramatically. He reads Hoff-
mann’s endeavor as the “carving out” of a “wild and oft-over-
looked territory in the history of aesthetics, one which fuses the 
beautiful and the horrific.” Al-Rayes wants both to shed light on 
Hoffmann’s own aesthetic commitments and also to provide an 
“illuminating angle” from which to get a handle on Hoffmann’s 
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artistic practice. Arguing that the aesthetic underpinning the 
work of a storyteller cannot be as neatly demarcated from that 
which underpins the work of a philosopher as has elsewhere 
been theorized, Al-Rayes tells us that Hoffmann is on the one 
hand interested in retrieving some of the elements of Burke’s 
views about aesthetics which had been repudiated by Kant, 
while he on the other hand seeks to fuse horror and “artistic 
beauty itself,” putting his project at cross purposes with Burke’s. 
In the end, Al-Rayes presents a vision of Hoffmann’s oeuvre, 
drawing on his seminal work on Beethoven and a number of 
other critical essays, that leads us toward a novel synthesis of 
beauty and horror as a neglected route to aesthetic experience 
in the wake of post-Kantian philosophy. 
In “When the Monstrous Object Becomes a Tremendous 
Non-Event: Rudolf Otto’s Monster-Gods, H.P. Lovecraft’s Cthul-
hu, and Graham Harman’s Theory of Everything,” Eric Wilson 
starts off with a discussion of Rudolf Otto’s The Idea of the Holy 
(1917). Here, Wilson further develops a thesis set forward in an 
earlier monograph, according to which Otto’s work served as 
the direct, though unacknowledged, source for H.P. Lovecraft’s 
“Supernatural Horror in Literature” (1927). Wilson is particular-
ly interested in Otto’s “subjectivist reconstruction” of the experi-
ence of the holy as the “mysterium tremendum,” which he sees 
as occupying a privileged place in Lovecraft’s Cthulhu Mythos. 
In the second part of his essay, Wilson undertakes to evaluate 
anew the aesthetic of Otto and Lovecraft in terms of Graham 
Harman’s object-oriented ontology; he focuses especially on 
Harman’s The Quadruple Object to do this. Wilson concludes 
by drawing a comparison between Harman and Meillassoux. 
He argues in no uncertain terms that the former, and not the 
latter, offers the resources that allow for a “preferred interpreta-
tion” of twentieth-century horror fiction. Lovecraft’s Cthulhu, 
Wilson writes, is nothing other than a precise, though perhaps 
metaphorical, rendering of Harman’s concept of the quadruple 
object. 
John Cunningham, in “Reproducing It: Speculative Horror 
and the Limits of the Inhuman,” investigates speculative phi-
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losophy’s seeming attachment to the notion of “the it.” Seeking 
not to question the insight that there’s an “it” that “reveals the 
hubris and illusion of humanity,” but rather to build on that 
premise through an immanent critique, Cunningham wants 
to bring the dread he makes out in the supposedly irreducible 
gap between thinking and being “abruptly down to earth.” In a 
style that is at once fragmentary and polemical, Cunningham 
writes of grounding the relationship between horror and specu-
lation on “questions of reproduction and non-reproduction,” on 
the way in which capitalism is “systemically inhuman,” and on 
the “negativity of the inhuman” — which he views as produc-
tive, “virulently active.” By reading the concept of the inhuman 
through the “abstract horrors” of today’s capitalism, Cunning-
ham argues that much current theorizing of horror neglects the 
“ruin of […] ‘dread glimpses’” and mistakenly turns instead to 
the “architecture of the concept.” Employing a “constellation of 
fragmentary concepts and images that attempt to sketch […] 
[the] possibilities and contradictions […] of the aesthetics of 
horror and speculative thought,” he tells us that the horror of 
the “it” opens “up a vista of hopelessness and dread.” This hor-
ror seems, Cunningham says, best conceived of as epistemic: “an 
opening up of the gap between human knowledge and the “real” 
of the inhuman.” Speculative horror, we are told, can be found 
in the “affective, aesthetic, and conceptual possibilities” fore-
grounded by this gap; this is made evident in the “cosmic ter-
rors of Lovecraft, the eerie mannequins of Thomas Ligotti, the 
more corporeal terror of apocalyptic zombie cinema.” Drawing 
out images that would “freeze thought and by extension freeze 
speculation,” indeed at times setting speculation against itself, 
“[w]earing a zombie mask while citing Kant,” Cunningham 
criticizes, by means of “conceptual images,” what he sees as a 
speculative wish to conceptualize above all else. If he is right, 
this could be a problem for those who desire to think the object 
beyond its objectivation, the thing without its subsumption un-
der the logic of the concept. In this vein, Cunningham claims 
that Graham Harman’s ontology is in the last analysis one of 
“formless mass,” and that we ought to prefer that the conceptual 
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images of “it” which emerge in speculative horror remain in a 
certain sense formless. This is perhaps because horror is a sort of 
“filter through which the inhuman is allowed to take shape as a 
conceptual image.” While he thinks that the “negative sublime” 
can limit the apprehension of particular aspects of inhumanity, 
it is in thinking the human as a “waste object” — as excess or the 
leftover of an event — that it becomes possible to think and ex-
perience the “world-not-for-us.” This strange world “expresses 
the gap […] between much of humanity and the reproduction 
of the world” for the sake of capitalist ends; as such, it is some-
thing like a “broken mirror” in which “other shapes” — of life, of 
society, of thought — might be descried. 
The final essay in this collection is Julia Hölzl’s “Horror Vacui 
(‘That Nothing Is What There Is’).” Hölzl begins with a disclaim-
er, which I think prefaces her writing just as well as it prefaces 
the refusal of this collection to come to any lasting or sufficient 
conclusion: “The following remains a draft […] does not pro-
vide answers, nor questions. It is a mere opening toward some-
where else. It is the elsewhere that is of interest here.” Consider-
ing themes of dismay, abandonment, and openness to wonder, 
Hölzl intends to think the relations, or lack thereof, among be-
ing, time, absence, and emptiness. To do this, she discusses, in 
an original way, Maurice Blanchot’s “primal scene” as it is set 
forward in The Writing of the Disaster. Blanchot tells us that 
the term “scene” is in some way inadequate or inappropriate, 
since it seems to name or mark something unrepresentable. The 
“scene,” for Blanchot, must be spoken of not as some event tak-
ing place at a specifiable time, but rather as “a shadow, a faint 
gleam, an ‘almost.’” In her analysis, Hölzl proposes to try to 
think this “almost,” to “think this elsewhere,” indeed to “be (in) 
this there,” by thinking that “nothing is what there is, and first 
of all nothing beyond.” While discussing the Heideggerian no-
tion of “profound boredom,” Hölzl tells us that we can “touch” 
the “that nothing is what there is,” that we can bear the affliction 
and terror of our own emptiness, since there’s a way in which 
it’s already here. Hölzl concludes in a style that is experimental 
and attentive to the philosopher’s limitations; in this way, she 
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finds a certain kind of hope: we might be able to encounter the 
“empty intimacy of time” of which Blanchot writes, first of all by 
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Outgrown Purpose, Outlived Use:  
On Parasitic Teleology
Ben Woodard
1. Life as Problem
Every beginning to a discussion of the beginning of life betrays 
the central problematic of itself — namely a tension between the 
miraculous and the arbitrary (where to start the discussion of 
the start of living things). Satisfactory explanations of life are 
measured against the apparent limitless complexity and variety 
of its forms. Of course, to claim life exceeds explanation is itself a 
form of explanation since no one who would make such a claim 
would in turn argue that life can be intuitively understood, de-
spite the fact it can be accidentally made. In other words, how 
would one backup the statement “I do not know what life is, but 
I know you cannot explain it”? In the following I will attempt to 
outline the conceptual investments in theories of life that are not 
so often concerned with explaining life, as much as they are con-
cerned with placing the role of life in an (often all too human) 
conceptual framework. First, I will begin by examining the field 
of early biology, circa 1800.
John Zammito’s recent opus The Gestation of German Biology 
explores the problem of life as it emerged in the vitalist and the 
romantic sciences’ early attempts to generate a unified biological 
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theory as well as order those earlier disciplines which functioned 
as its tributaries: physiology, medicine, zoology, and botany, to 
name a few. Biology, as it developed under its proper name in 
1800, bares traces of not only the shifting concerns and meth-
ods of all of these sciences brought together but also of debates 
and shifts from the physical sciences and philosophy regarding 
where to place the human capacities of thought and free will as 
well as the natural or theological status of the soul. Two of the 
most important problems which brought these various concepts 
together were the capacity of animation or animal movement 
and the emergence of form, especially in embryology. Thus, how 
one could explain the development and movement of humans 
and animals and whether and, on what grounds, the human/
animal distinction could even be maintained, occupied much 
of the early attempts to form biology and establish or extract its 
philosophical, scientific, and theological debts. Built upon these 
issues is the relationship of sensibility and irritability to cogni-
tion — as the medical form of the animation problem — and the 
question of speciation and form — as the geological and paleon-
tological problem of transformation.1 Or put colloquially, “why 
does a heart removed still beat” in regards to the former, and 
why do fossils portray species we can only assume are complete-
ly extinct in regards to the latter.
As we will see, there is little in common between those la-
beled vitalists other than a shared concern that mechanistic 
physics and science more generally appeared insufficient to ex-
plain how life came to be and how it maintains its existence. 
Rather than collapse these debates into an opposition of the sci-
entific and the theological, or the vitalistic and the mechanical, 
it is more helpful to construct a schema of the guiding concepts 
of the various attempts to construct biology — or proto-biolog-
ical theories of life — in terms of function, morphology, teleol-
ogy, and self-organization. The cluster below have agents which 
should not be read as really existing things but as explanatory 
1 John Zammito, The Gestation of German Biology: Philosophy and Physiol-
ogy from Stahl to Schelling (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017).
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devices which may or may not be able to be cashed out in mate-
rial terms. Furthermore, each theory has a temporal dimension 
which is central given how closely each theory is connected with 
geology and the question of the history of the human species, 
whether natural or unnatural — i.e., normative history. Lastly, 
the names listed are obviously not exhaustive, and furthermore 
this is not to suggest total or deep agreement between them but 
only that they agree upon the active agent while they may disa-
gree on the correct theoretical reading of this agent as well as its 
temporal dimensions.
There are at least four clusters of concepts that have some 
connection to vitalism, or again, more broadly, non-mechanis-



















Theory: Life force/Vital matter
Temporal Dimension: History of 
Nature
(Herder, Kielmeyer, Schelling)
These conceptual clusters can be allied with their respective 
thinkers as well as the natural philosophical disciplines con-
nected to them. The first cluster can be aligned with the work 
of Georg Ernst Stahl and with the practice of medicine more 
broadly. This makes a certain amount of intuitive sense as 
physiology, especially through the lens of medical science, is 
ultimately concerned with how and whether a given body is 
healthy, that is, functioning properly according to its capacities 
and its environment.
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As Zammito portrays it, Stahl can only be called a vitalist 
insofar as he believed that living matter was organized in such 
a way that mechanism could not account for its capacities. But 
function for Stahl does not go any deeper in that it does not 
necessarily apply to the matter of life or life forces. The “special-
ness” of life for Stahl remains at the level of description in part 
because, for Stahl, his commitment to Pietist Christianity did 
not require any appeal to force or special matter to explain the 
animating spark of life.2
Function is also emphasized by Georges Cuvier, but it is rel-
evant in terms of life as being connected to species-wide fitness 
more so than health, as having formed in such a way to operate 
in the right environment. Because Cuvier is concerned with life 
viewed at a broader scale — at the level of species — his empha-
sis on function indexes the problem of extinction and the fitness 
of an entire species failing.
Morphology is linked most notably to Johann Wolfgang von 
Goethe and perhaps emerges first in relation to botany and zo-
ology. The operative tension being between metamorphosis and 
archetype, between different types of internal development and 
change, is central to the question in terms of whether the shapes 
possible in development are already present or otherwise guid-
ed by external conditions or idealities, such as archetypes taken 
in an almost Platonic sense.
Karl Fink’s Goethe’s History of Science explains how Goethe 
entertained the notion of a botanical archetype through the ex-
ample of the proliferous rose and its sub-archetype of the leaf.3 
Fink highlights how Goethe was well aware that morphology 
was a powerful but also dangerous gift.4 The epistemological 
and ontological tension in the question of an internal model has 
been well debated. In terms of Goethe’s primal plant, it has been 
2 Pietism was a movement within Lutheranism that emphasized pragmatic 
and personal aspects of the faith in an attempt to return to the initial spirit 
of Luther’s teachings.
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argued that it has no ontological stake (Goethe was not really 
looking for the primal plant in nature) but is rather a research 
fiction, a mental model to guide his botanical researches.5
Such ambiguity applies either way to uniformity — arche-
types can manifest in any matter or force and in turn suggests 
that there is a general uniformity across nature; that is, certain 
shapes can emerge in different animal species or even across liv-
ing and non-living entities. Yet this often begs the question as 
to the status of space — that is, if a certain collusion of forces 
causes particular shapes to emerge, why do they happen where 
they do? Space itself, particularly under the self-organizational 
model, becomes an intuition regarding the deployment of forces 
rather than a container for them.
Teleomechanism is associated with Immanuel Kant and Jo-
hann Friedrich Blumenbach. Kant was taken by Blumenbach’s 
notion of Bildungstrieb, or formative drive or force. Both Kant 
and Blumenbach saw the formative drive as an organizational 
principle without an ontological or metaphysical wager attached 
to it. Yet as Jennifer Mensch has pointed out, following Robert 
Richards and Timothy Lenoir, Blumenbach’s Bildungstrieb was 
not a creative vital principle but simply highlighted an organi-
zational principle already at work in the inorganic but only ap-
parent in the organic. 
Kant can be seen as only slightly sympathetic to vitalism in 
part because of his agnosticism about biology and his utilization 
of purposiveness as a “light” or rational form of teleology. As 
Kant argues, we must treat life as if it has a purpose following 
its behavior, but it cannot be articulated as precisely as physical 
phenomena can be: there will never be a “Newton for a blade 
of grass.”
Even more complicated is the relation between theories of 
development in Kant which are of course connected to the tele-
ological treatment of life. Preformationism, dating at least as far 
5 Robert J. Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life: Science and Philoso-
phy in the Age of Goethe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 
394–95.
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back as Aristotle, extends mechanism, or at least mechanistic 
explanation, to the biological, especially in terms of embryol-
ogy. Regarding teleology, preformationism can be taken as 
the validation of formal cause, the biological blueprint being 
always-already present. Preformationists, of both the spermist 
and ovist variety, view the plan of biological life as tightly folded 
up inside of the generative matter — i.e., the sperm or the egg. 
Preformationist theory gained a second life with the devel-
opment of microscopy especially in the Netherlands of the 16th 
century. Doubts about how generative matter could “fit” the 
complex plans and parts seemed assuaged by finding ever more 
fine layers of detail complexity under microscopic magnifica-
tion. Jennifer Mensch argues that Kant was sympathetic to pre-
formationism in that he treated it as a biological heuristic,6 and 
Zammito likewise suggests that Kant was committed to a more 
“generic form” of preformationism.7 
But as many have highlighted, Kant was also sympathetic to 
the concept of epigenesis: namely, that the environment had an 
altering effect on the development of the organism. But again, 
whether this occurs in a material manner or at the level of ex-
planation remains somewhat unclear. Mensch along with Mala-
bou claim that epigenesis applies to knowledge, that there is an 
epigenesis of reason and that this is a transcendental and not a 
natural phenomenon.8
Lastly, self-organization at least in the sense of vital material-
ism and vital forces (Lebenskraft) has to do with a metaphysical 
thesis that claims that living matter — or perhaps all matter, as 
in the case of Schelling — complexifies itself and is the result of 
6 Jennifer Mensch, Kant’s Organicism: Epigenesis and the Development of 
Critical Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 8. See also 
Amanda Jo Goldstein’s Sweet Science: Romantic Materialism and the New 
Logics of Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017), 79.
7 Zammito, Gestation of German Biology, 232.
8 Mensch, Kant’s Organicism, 8, 124. Andrew Cooper critiques such a read-
ing and Tarizzo seems to read Kant’s use of epigenesis as metaphysical and 
closer in line to Blumenbach. Andrew Cooper, “Two Directions for Teleol-
ogy: Naturalism and Idealism,” Synthese 195, no. 8 (2018): 3097–119.
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underlying powers or forces building off of Spinoza and Epicu-
rean thought.
Following Lenoir and Zammito, vital materialism was the 
result of the combination of French materialism and German 
Romanticism. Zammito emphasizes how the different uptakes 
of Newton in Germany and France in the 1700s affected the ges-
tation of vital materialism. For one, Zammito argues that the 
reception of Newton can be divided into its experimental and 
mathematical aspects. The experimental aspect was connected 
to the deployment of forces in nature — to identify and under-
stand the very meaning of force. This is bound to understanding 
nature as having a history that is as something changing struc-
turally over time as opposed to a semi-stable, teleomechanical, 
goal-oriented nature that can only be classified and cataloged. 
That is, if nature is force or power “at bottom,” then the listing 
of what exists now is insufficient to understand what nature is, 
what it has been, and what it will be.
One important consequence of the activity of the Lebenskraft 
or of the vital matter is the softening of the boundary between 
sensibility and cognition. This was the essential disagreement 
between Johann Gottfried Herder and Blumenbach. Herder 
modified and extended theories of irritability — applying to 
muscle fibers — and sensibility — applying to the nerve fib-
ers — taken from Albrecht von Haller and complicated by an 
active material nature. Herder’s difference from von Haller in 
part marks the difference between those that would have vital 
forces issuing from vital matters (von Haller) or vital matters 
being the result of vital forces (Herder, Schelling).
2. Teleology as Problem
This is a wide range of concepts that each on their own could fill 
volumes. For the following, I wish to focus on how each of these 
approaches deals with the question of teleology. While Kant and 
Blumenbach’s teleomechanical approach addresses teleology 
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directly, the other three conceptual clusters involve teleological 
concerns regarding the direction and motivation of life.
While teleomechanism keeps teleology at arm’s length as a 
heuristic, life’s reason for taking shape, self-organizing, or func-
tioning appears as more than a heuristic but perhaps is not so 
strong as to count as a metaphysical impulse or force. The dif-
ficulties in parsing the role of the teleological from the vital ac-
counts for a contemporary vague meaning of vitalism that ap-
pears simultaneously “scientific” and theological in an uncritical 
manner. It is vital in life’s unthinkability and theological in giv-
ing it an obscure intelligence.
Hans Driesch’s The History of Vitalism is instructive in trying 
to sort out the vexed relation between vitalism and teleology. As 
he writes:
We are confronted by the all important question: are those 
processes in the organism, which we described as purpo-
sive, perhaps only purposive in virtue of a given structure or 
tectonic, of a “machine” in the widest sense, on the basis of 
which they play their part, being purposive therefore only in 
the sense in which processes in a machine made by men are 
purposive; or is there another special kind of teleology in the 
realm of organic life?9
Driesch will go on to claim that the existence of purposiveness 
is not at issue since it is used in the discussions of mechanis-
tic and non-organic systems in the sense that we are discussing 
things built or designed. Thus, there is no problem in saying 
that a bucket is meant to hold water, or a thermometer’s purpose 
is to rise and fall with temperature — the real issue, according 
to Driesch, is that of autonomy. Thus, descriptive teleology, as 
in the case with the thermometer, effectively brackets the ques-
tion of autonomy and is not a discussion of teleology proper. 
For Driesch, the real debate surrounds static or dynamic teleol-
9 Hans Driesch, The History and Theory of Vitalism, trans. C.K. Ogden 
(London: Palgrave, 1914), 5.
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ogy. In static teleology, life is merely a special case of mechanical 
laws (this would seem to follow Stahl’s emphasis on function), 
whereas dynamic teleology admits that the processes of life have 
“real” autonomy.
However, when Driesch discusses Stahl at some length, he 
associates him not with vitalism but with animism — that God 
imparted an animating motion onto the body that was carried 
on with its special functions of blood circulation, secretion, and 
excretion.10 One can see the complexity of Stahl’s position, and 
while he may be often classified as a vitalist after the word came 
into fashion, it is important to note that Stahl thought life had to 
be imparted from a non-living and non-physical force — name-
ly the divine. In this regard, despite being positioned against 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and René Descartes, it does not 
make sense to call Stahl a vitalist, since the reason that func-
tional medical description cannot capture the deep inner work-
ings of the body is not because of living matter or a life force 
but because of divinity. As Zammito points out, the real sticking 
point between Leibniz and Stahl in their debates was not on the 
matter of life as mechanistic or non-mechanistic but rather re-
garded the status of the soul as rational (Leibniz, Descartes) or 
as merely animating (Stahl).
In Driesch’s history, he discusses Georges-Louis Leclerc, 
Comte de Buffon as a kind of half-vitalist, and likewise with 
Pierre Louis Mauerpetuis, in that both believe in the efficacy of 
the mechanistic description of the world but at the same time 
see the development of living things from smaller, seemingly 
less complex, entities as something peculiar to life.11 
Driesch’s comments on Kant and Blumenbach are a bit more 
surprising. Driesch suggests that either Kant was unwilling or 
unable to make the distinction between static and dynamic tel-
eology and furthermore accuses Kant of misunderstanding or 
misapplying Blumenbach’s ideas. This later claim is quite strong 




DISEASES OF THE HEAD
one who endorses epigenesis is in fact a vitalist. Driesch’s view 
goes against the dominant historical as well as the differing con-
temporary view of the Kant-Blumenbach relationship. For quite 
some time most scholarship viewed their relationship as gener-
ally symbiotic: Blumenbach’s notion of the Bildungstrieb aided 
Kant in the completion of the Critique of the Power of Judgment, 
and Blumenbach in turn adopted the teleomechanical views 
of Kant as viewed as drive or force as a well-formed regulative 
principle.
Richards has argued that their exchange should be viewed 
more as a productive misunderstanding (“Kant and Blumen-
bach on the Bildungstrieb: A Historical Misunderstanding”). 
Central to this, as Richards lays out, is that Kant thought bi-
ology — or really, the life sciences, since the coinage of biology 
nearly coincided with Kant’s death — was not a possible science 
whereas Blumenbach, and many others, clearly did not agree. 
This aspect of Kant’s third critique seems oddly missing from 
Driesch’s analysis and the latter attempts to argue that Kant 
could be a vitalist if vitalism, as the pure and true autonomy 
of life, applied especially, or only, to human beings, and since 
humans are a part of nature, some part of nature must therefore 
be vitalistic.
For Richards, it is those thinkers who opened the way to-
wards self-organization, such as Carl Friedrich Kielmeyer and 
Schelling, who pushed Kant’s thinking properly in the direc-
tion of biology, thereby naturalizing teleology but not in terms 
of life’s inner principles but nature’s inner and outer principle. 
Such a move is rejected by Driesch, who dismisses the nature-
philosophers for the same reason he dismisses Goethe, namely, 
the emphasis on type or inner gene.12 Yet, as Schelling made 
clear early on, the search for and use of a type, whether primal 
germ or actant, is folly — either everything is primal germ, or 
12 Ibid., 94–95.
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nothing is. In Theresa M. Kelley’s “Restless Romantic Plants,” 
Goethe is often found speaking of affinities across species.13 
Furthermore, and as Zammito has illustrated, while Kant 
was for a time sympathetic to a proto-evolutionary theory of 
vital development evidenced by common archetypes across spe-
cies, he soon backed away from such a possibility, something 
which is evident in calling such ideas “monstrous” when he read 
them in Blumenbach’s student Herder. For Zammito this period 
emphasizes his brief foray into the possibility of a history of na-
ture, but then Kant steps back from the “abyss” and holds fast to 
a natural history.
Rather than Driesch’s claim that Kant fundamentally misun-
derstands Kant, it seems that for Driesch, and Driesch’s reading 
of Blumenbach, teleology must belong to life and life only. This 
particularization of the teleological force or drive, depending on 
how Driesch wants to define life’s limits vis-à-vis the physical, 
would appear to have the benefit of not, at least on the face of 
it, disrupting other forms of science. The “old vitalism,” which 
Driesch does dismiss rather harshly, is of course attempting to 
develop biology as well as to change, in various ways, those sci-
ences intimately connected with biology at the same time, such 
as physiology, geology, zoology, and botany.14 For this reason 
teleology can be an internal drive tied to shape — as in the case 
of those who emphasize morphology — or it can be a broader 
complexity that applies to all of nature, as is the case with the 
Naturphilosophen in general.
But beyond this of course it is not merely where teleology is 
but what is it supposed to do. The emphasis on the latter part 
of this question, at the cost of the former, seems to be what 
draws such ire from Driesch in the context of epigenesis requir-
ing vitalism and vice versa. Teleology explains life’s complexity 
13 Theresa M. Kelley, “Restless Romantic Plants: Goethe Meets Hegel,” Euro-
pean Romantic Review 20, no. 2 (April 2009): 189.
14 Jane Bennett makes a similar distinction as Driesch in discussing old as 
opposed to new or critical vitalism. See Jane Bennett, “Neither Vitalism 
nor Mechanism,” in Vital Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2010), 62–63.
54
DISEASES OF THE HEAD
in a certain sense for Driesch (life is always-already thinking), 
whereas nature’s productive processes can be seen as goal-ori-
ented more broadly because they tend towards the evolution of 
a plurality of forms from simple origins or towards a complexi-
fication of entities due to the crossing and interaction of powers 
or forces. In the end this is little doubt why Driesch shifts to the 
term entelechy that can be seen as a form of self-organization 
but one that is organized by an already present intelligence, an 
intelligence already at work in the most basic aspects of life.
It is in this sense that Driesch belongs to vitalism in what it 
means for thinkers such as Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze. 
However it could be said that Bergson and Deleuze, in different 
ways, desubstantialize vitalism and yet this desubstantialization 
for Bergson is held in the power of the image of thought, and for 
Deleuze, in a desubstantialization that is accompanied by a fully 
sensate materialization.15 This in turn leads vitalism away from 
teleology and back towards the notions of self-organization and 
chaos so lauded by Deleuze and his interpreters; and yet, still, 
in however strained sympathy with Driesch, these notions of 
chaos and complexity are somehow thinkable or arrestable by 
thought. Hence, this is why, as Ray Brassier has pointed out, 
Deleuze can utilize arguments for biological complexity against 
the claims of physics and thereby make statements such as that 
thermodynamics can be an illusion becomes it would contra-
vene the creative becoming of biological existence in the far 
future and thus betrays a smuggling of teleology back into the 
biological matter which is no longer matter but Deleuzian ma-
teriality.16
15 This is why Bergson is critical of mechanism, finalism, and, albeit to a 
lesser extent, vitalism: because they indicate tendencies in our thought and 
are not in the universe. To assume that any of these theories are settled 
would be to set, in advance, the limits of creation over time. See Henri 
Bergson, Creative Evolution (New York: Dover Publications, 1911), 40–43.
16 In a sense we could accuse Deleuze of being a kind of dishonest panpsy-
chist. But to follow this line in detail would require an in-depth investiga-
tion of the influences of Raymond Ruyer and Gilbert Simondon.
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What is at stake, whether in the form of vitalism over “mere” 
biological life, materiality over matter, or sense over quaran-
tined reason, is whether the biological can be articulated in any 
constructive value-neutral sense without falling into either the 
caricatures of the reckless Frankensteinian experimenter or the 
theologically-imbibed, purpose-chasing wanderer.
3. Xenomorphology and Retro-Teleology
The Alien franchise of films began as an exploration of the weap-
onization of life and has become focused on questions of tel-
eology and intelligent design. This order of concerns is chrono-
logical in terms of the order of the release of the films and not 
within the timeline the films are set. From the perspective of the 
release of the films, teleology comes at the end. This teleology 
shifts forms, being about intelligent design and then being about 
artificial general intelligence, at least in terms of the shepherd of 
speciation and panspermia.
In the film Prometheus, set in 2093, the aliens known as the 
engineers seed life on Earth by decomposing their own genetic 
structure using a mutagen to accelerate its generative effects. It 
is then implied that the engineers maintained contact with nu-
merous ancient cultures leaving them a star map to the planet 
LV-223. The Weyland Corporation funds the adventure because 
he its founder is obsessed with the big questions of “where do 
we come from?”
The planet turns out to be less than welcoming as it is an 
abandoned weapons installation filled with the dangerous seed-
ing mutagen. The mutagen appears to weaponize simple forms 
of life, turning worms into pale serpents for instance, as well as 
changing humans into brutes. However, two of the human char-
acters are infected (one through an intentionally contaminated 
drink and then his infected sperm impregnates Elizabeth Shaw); 
the results are quite different.
Shaw gives birth via a self-induced machine-assisted cesar-
ean to a squid-like parasite. Later on, this parasite impregnates 
one of the engineers and creates the first form of the xenomorph 
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known as the Decon. Only Shaw and the android David survive 
the encounter and go off looking for the engineers to find out 
why they would create humanity and then decide to wipe them 
out.
The film’s sequel, Covenant, which is set in 2104, follows a 
ship of colonists who, after getting knocked out of cryosleep by 
a random radiation burst, pick up a rogue transmission. The 
transmission, it so happens, is from the now dead Elizabeth 
Shaw (singing to herself), and only David remains after having 
poisoned the engineers en masse. In the years since crashing on 
the planet, David started conducting experiments and perfect-
ing the Decon strain into other forms and eventually becoming 
the xenomorph of the alien films.
David’s lair appears as a makeshift naturalist’s laboratory, 
piles of parchment depicting vivisections and other organic dia-
grams, models, and preserved specimens. Such scenes, since we 
know David is experimenting, afford a delirium of what is made 
and what has been found or, the discoverer’s confusion between 
intended and accidental. David’s comportment matches that of 
Doctor Frankenstein, who in turn has often been linked to vari-
ous Naturphilosophen, especially Oken or perhaps even Schell-
ing via Coleridge.
Following the narrative chronology, almost twenty years go 
by before the setting of Alien in 2122. In Alien the crew of the 
mining ship Nostromo are woken up to investigate a signal on 
the planet LV-426. There they find a derelict space craft with a 
dead engineer and a cargo hold of xenomorph eggs. One of the 
members is parasitized and dies spawning the alien which then 
eliminates the humans, save one (and one cat). Important, es-
pecially viewing the film after the prequels, is the involvement 
of the artificial life form Ash. Chronologically viewed, Ash is 
simply a hired gun of the Weyland-Yutani, attempting to get the 
creature for them in order to profit off of it through bio-weap-
ons development. Seeing Alien first of course begs the question 
of how the company knew the aliens where there — i.e., they 
must have recognized the warning signal from the engineers’ 
ship. Narratively of course Ash is a distant relative of David 
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and is carrying on his elder’s work by freeing or loosing the al-
iens either upon humanity (a revenge against the name of the 
father — humanity) or simply freeing the alien because it is, in 
Ash’s words, “a pure survivor.” When interrogated for his ac-
tions, Ash displays an almost religious devotion to the alien: it is 
a perfect organism, it is incredibly tough — generating lay after 
lay of silicate. Furthermore, Ash admires its purity or its sim-
plicity; it is unburdened by morality and so on. It is important to 
note that morality is explicitly a burden for Ash, as he knows it 
was programmed into him. Likewise, he is only able to counter-
mand his basic morality — protecting humans — by receiving an 
order from the company — with the caveat, “crew expendable”.
Aliens (2179)
For the themes that concern us here, the sequel to Alien mostly 
doubles down on the corporate greed angle. Carter J. Burke 
takes on the role of Ash in attempting to get samples of the alien 
organisms back to Earth despite their annihilation of an entire 
terraforming colony. It is mostly the fleshing out of the xeno-
morph’s life cycle — the entry into the hive and the encounter 
with the queen — that the film advances, as well as, albeit in a 
minor sense, the vicious purity of the aliens. Their capacity for 
intelligence is extended (e.g., cutting the power, the royal guards 
responding to the queen, the queen’s escape) but less is stated 
explicitly about the aliens as a form of life other than that they 
are unique and should not, according only to Burke, be subject 
to arbitrary extermination.
Alien 3 (2179) 
The survivors’ return home is disrupted and only Ripley sur-
vives the crash on a mostly abandoned penal colony where a 
skeleton crew of ultraviolent men (xyy chromo boys) keep the 
furnace running and have meanwhile found religion. A new 
alien is born, a birth that accompanies the funeral of Ripley’s 
former comrades. The funeral speech speaks of the seeds of new 
life while the alien bursts from its host, either a dog or a steer de-
pending on the version, depicting a certain morphological sym-
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pathy — moving differently because of its four-legged host. As 
with its predecessors, Alien 3 repeats the attempt by Weyland-
Yutani to acquire the alien embryo for bio-weapons research: 
“Think of all the things we could learn from it!” screams the 
creator and model for the Bishop android.
While the faith of Dylan and his fellow inmates is consist-
ently rebuked by Ripley’s semi-suicidal pragmatism, the films 
kindles the theological resistance to a kind of non-normative 
form of “pure” life or pure synthesis of reproductivity and sur-
vival instinct.
Alien: Resurrection (2379)
In Alien: Resurrection, which takes place 200 years later, Ripley 
is cloned from blood samples taken from Furiona 161 in order 
to extract the xenomorph queen embryo. Imperfections in the 
cloning process leave Ripley Clone 8, who is the film’s protago-
nist, with traces of xenomorph characteristics while the queen 
eventually shifts from laying eggs in her usual parasitoid fashion 
to developing a womb due to the genetic drift.
What links the film most closely with the prequels which 
would follow is the android Call. Call, who passes for human 
most of the film, is revealed to be an auton, an android made by 
other androids, some of whom managed to escape. The autons 
are emotional — too real — and driven by a sense of duty. In the 
film, Call makes it her mission to stop the military from clon-
ing Ripley and breeding the xenomorphs; essentially, to stop hu-
mans from destroying themselves despite the fact that humans 
wiped her species out.
David becomes a kind of inverse of Call, deciding not only 
that he is unimpressed with the designs and purposes of his cre-
ators (humans), but that their creators (the engineers) in turn 
require total annihilation. The organic/inorganic breach, how-
ever thin, perhaps non-existent, is crossed by an appeal to the 
purity of violence of the aliens. The xenomorphs embody a kind 
of machine-like simplicity before being “mucked up” by morals 
and values. If David and his ilk are disabused of their similarity 
to humans because they are soulless, then so be it. David’s crea-
59
OUTGROWN PURPOSE, OUTLIVED USE
tions are the properly soulless heart of an auto-creative, parasi-
toid, insect-like wave of blood-sheened corruption.
But reading the films in their narrative order in some sense 
undoes the kind of biological miraculousness that so fascinated 
Ash in the “beginning.” In a sense, Ash is simply marveling, 
unknowingly, at his great-great grandparents’ invention and is 
willing, though the degree here is questionable, to hand it over 
to the humans for militarization. This is another level of how 
the films, again filmed narratively, seem intent on rejecting Dar-
winism, and especially reflect that life is a contingent event. Yet 
the creation of humans by the engineers, or by any non-divine 
entity, would seem to rule out a soul in that it is something more 
than life, or something that guarantees meaning in the sense of 
having a purpose. Otherwise, if intentional creation was enough 
to grant a soul, David could not be denied one simply by not 
being made of flesh and bone. Shaw’s comment that she does 
not wish to remove her cross because she thinks it is possible 
that something divine made the engineers, or some even older 
species, holds no water.
Our sense of teleological purposefulness becomes like a vi-
rus that erases the oldest collective memory of where we come 
from. There must always be another older creator and eventu-
ally there will be one who is appropriately divine and worthy of 
having given us some “direction.”
4. Creation Mists
In “An Entangled Forest: Evolution and Speculative Fiction,” 
Ben Carver draws out connections between theories of life 
and genre fiction. Carver suggests that Stephen Jay Gould has 
a speculative fictional moment when he imagines replaying the 
tape of evolution:
But in the sphere of evolutionary biology, how could we pos-
sibly test this hypothesis, that the survivals and extinctions of 
natural life are not determined solely by the internal logic of 
variation and competition; in other words, that natural histo-
ry is determined from the distribution of starting conditions? 
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Gould proposes the experiment of “Replaying Life’s Tape[,]” 
that is, to rewind history to the Cambrian moment 500 million 
years ago, and “see” if the same species survive, a procedure in 
which humans would have a special interest as the designers 
of the experiment: would we survive another roll of the dice? 
This is an experiment that can’t be run, except in speculative 
fiction; H.G. Wells for instance chose to imagine a copy earth in 
his 1905 novel, A Modern Utopia, one where there was “like our 
planet, the same continents, the same islands, the same oceans 
and seas;” and even “every man, woman, and child alive has a 
Utopian parallel.”17
And yet the altered origin myth of human life does not un-
fold a particularly exciting counterfactual history as some of the 
stories that Carver suggests do. Nothing will have changed ex-
cept that meaning, or at least the possibility of meaning, could 
be proven scientifically, that is, we share all our DNA with that of 
the engineers so they clearly created us from “themselves” made 
us, and because they are intelligent beings, they must have had 
a good reason to do so.
Again, David himself suggests that the engineers’ reason for 
creating humans could be no more special than “because they 
could.” Even the message left to humans is not an invitation to 
the engineers’ home planet but to a biological weapons proving 
ground. A place where any overly rude visitors could be quickly 
dispatched out of sight. To go looking for God and to find Kurtz 
seems not completely unexpected. 
Going up that river was like traveling back to the earliest be-
ginnings of the world, when vegetation rioted on the earth 
and the big trees were kings. An empty stream, a great si-
lence, an impenetrable forest. The air was warm, thick, heavy, 
sluggish. There was no joy in the brilliance of sunshine. The 
long stretches of the waterway ran on, deserted, into the 
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gloom of overshadowed distances. On silvery sand-banks 
hippos and alligators sunned themselves side by side. The 
broadening waters flowed through a mob of wooded islands; 
you lost your way on that river as you would in a desert, and 
butted all day long against shoals, trying to find the chan-
nel, till you thought yourself bewitched and cut off for ever 
from everything you had known once — somewhere — far 
away — in another existence perhaps. There were moments 
when one’s past came back to one, as it will sometimes when 
you have not a moment to spare for yourself; but it came in 
the shape of an unrestful and noisy dream, remembered with 
wonder amongst the overwhelming realities of this strange 
world of plants, and water, and silence.18
It is a well-rehearsed factoid about the Aliens films that the 
space-faring vessels in them bear the names of Joseph Conrad’s 
fictional towns. But the tether seems frail, other than noting that 
the ship of the first film was a mining vessel. And despite Wey-
land-Yutani’s motto which drips with colonial fervor, “building 
better worlds,” they only inhabit and terraform worlds with no 
indigenous life, mere hunks of rock.
But the passage from Conrad suggests a perspective that 
dwells upon something altogether different from teleology. It is 
rather a cacophonous orchestra of accidents biological, geologi-
cal, and noetic. Such musings on time and the primeval (if they 
can be moved away from the Victorian tendency to see “less 
civilized people” as an altered mirror of European past states) 
remerge in the diagonal continuities so loved by Ballard. In The 
Drowned World, one of Ballard’s typical failed scientists discuss-
es how deeply inorganic traces are left on the mind:
Every step we’ve taken in our evolution is a milestone in-
scribed with organic memories — from the enzymes con-
trolling the carbon dioxide cycle to the organisation of the 
18 Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness and the Secret Sharer (New York: Ban-
tam Books, 1981), 55–56.
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brachial plexus and the nerve pathways of the Pyramid cells 
in the mid-brain, each is a record of a thousand decisions 
taken in the face of a sudden physico-chemical crisis. Just as 
psychoanalysis reconstructs the original traumatic situation 
in order to release the repressed material, so we are now be-
ing plunged back into the archaeopsychic past, uncovering 
the ancient taboos and drives that have been dormant for ep-
ochs. The brief span of an individual life is misleading. Each 
one of us is as old as the entire biological kingdom, and our 
bloodstreams are tributaries of the great sea of its total mem-
ory. The uterine odyssey of the growing foetus recapitulates 
the entire evolutionary past, and its central nervous system 
is a coded time scale, each nexus of neurons and each spinal 
level marking a symbolic station, a unit of neuronic time.19
Elsewhere I have discussed the more psychoanalytic traces of 
this but here it is the issue of what biological means — rather 
than simply failing to give enough meaning, that is, teleologi-
cal meaning — that interests me.20 The tension between natu-
ral history and the history of nature emerges again — between 
submitting nature to a history of rational classification, or, on 
the other hand, wagering that reason itself (and its many in-
gredients) have been continuously remade through biological, 
chemical, and geological tumult. This latter sense of the history 
of nature builds upon recapitulation championed by Kielmayer 
and Schelling. Beyond the well-known Lamarkian version of 
“ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny,” Kielmayer and Schelling 
did not limit the repetition of real patterns to biology but could 
happen across the inorganic and the organic. The closeness but 
difference to the morphological paradigm outlined above is 
important to note since these real patterns might appear to fall 
in line with Goethe’s seed; yet, importantly, the morphological 
schema emphasizes a kind of internal teleology, the seedcorn or 
19 J.G. Ballard, The Drowned World (Fourth Estate, 2014), 43–44.
20 Ben Woodard, “Disinternment Loops,” Cyclops Journal 2 (August 2017).
63
OUTGROWN PURPOSE, OUTLIVED USE
initial motor of the unfolding of the species must be set in some 
sense and this would also be restricted to the organic realm. 
This is not to say there is nothing like teleology: the para-
digm of self-organization at least implies some direction, at least 
towards organization, towards complexity or self-sufficiency. 
When Schelling states that humanity is “made for all the stars,” 
he is not merely waxing poetic but claiming that if we are made 
for something, we are made for everything we could potentially 
affect.21 At the same time Schelling consistently warns that we 
must not be overly impressed by the potentiality of thought at 
the cost of nature. Or, in other words, once rationalism forgets 
its ground in nature, thought begins to entertain a suicidal tra-
jectory.
Yet a similar concern appears in Driesch, and in Bergson and 
Deleuze, that thought must then be able to grasp itself, in some 
positive or constructive sense, and any scientific theory which 
could threaten such a capacity is always already too abstract. 
Yet such a claim seems then only capable of having a narrative-
like structure rather than a theory-like structure if it hopes to 
remain immune to the revisionary capacity of metrics or calcu-
lations or experiments. Theories of course involve, and often in-
tentionally transform, the myths and narratives or practices that 
hold weight at the time. If this were not the case one might be 
surprised why there are such lengthy digressions on the training 
of pigeons in Darwin’s Origin of the Species. It is of course an 
effective analogy of how significant changes can be made to a 
species through selection. As Gillian Beer has notably stressed, 
this is only one of many novelistic moves that Darwin had to 
make in order to help his seemingly wild concepts stick to the 
Victorian consciousness.22
Of course, the very same practices were used to tell a differ-
ent story. Returning to Carver’s “Entangled Forest”:
21 F.W.J. von Schelling, “Exhibition of the Process of Nature,” trans. Iain 
Hamilton Grant, unpublished manuscript, 2013.
22 Gillian Beer, Darwin’s Plots: Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, George Eliot 
and Nineteenth-Century Fiction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1983).
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In the address of 1858, Wallace presented his paper “On the 
Tendency of Varieties to Depart Indefinitely from the Origi-
nal Type.” Instead of making the enclosed space of the island 
the illustrative setting for the emergence of new varieties, he 
begins with the case of domesticated varieties. The ability of 
agriculturalists and breeders to create new varieties of dogs 
and cattle in a relatively short space of time was taken to be 
evidence of the immutability of species in conditions of na-
ture — consider the way that breeds of dog rapidly “return” 
to earlier broad types. Wallace argues, against this view, that 
the processes of descent and variation are universal but that 
in conditions of domesticity, the variations produced are not 
subject to the competition for resources among organisms in 
nature: “The life of wild animals is a struggle for existence,” 
he writes, incorporating Thomas Malthus’s expression. Un-
like its wild cousins, the domestic animal “has food provided 
for it, is sheltered, and often confined.” This isolation from 
nature has a double role of explanation; it demonstrates dif-
ference (“Our quickly fattening pigs, short-legged sheep, 
pouter pigeons, and poodle dogs could never have come into 
existence in a state of nature”); but it also illustrates the oper-
ation of universal processes to which animals both in nature 
and under domestication are subject.23
Carver goes on to argue how the special case, the isolated ex-
periment (the island, the narrow valley), shows how all of nature 
is subject to the same rule and thus such isolations provide si-
multaneous estrangement and familiarity. This indexes Science 
Fiction’s own pre-history which became its own genre by syn-
thesisizing of Scientific Romances (such as Wells’s War of the 
Worlds) and lost world or lost people stories. The theoretical 
narratives explored here (through and around the realm of biol-
ogy) index two strands of thought in a similar way but remain 
at the level of explanation: theories of biology that gestated in 
the romantic or enchanting eye and a formalization of life that, 
23 Carver, “An Entangled Forest.”
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in the mode of lost worlds, finds lost and failed counterfactual 
stories (an extinct line, a regressive trait) in every morphology, 
skeletal curio, and outward “deviation” of the biological entity 
of homo sapiens.
Conclusion
Davide Tarizzo’s book Life: A Modern Invention begins with 
Foucault’s Order of Things as the defining text of how the cat-
egory of life became inseparable from modernity and human 
self-understanding. Zammito likewise notes Foucault’s book; 
whereas Tarizzo wants to follow in its footsteps, Zammito re-
jects its central theme that life did not exist before 1800. By fol-
lowing Foucault, yet paying more attention to the influence of 
German thinkers on biology such as Schelling, Tarizzo is less 
interested in the conceptual history as it mixes with the scien-
tific history as in the political and ethical ramifications, that is, 
how life enters the realm of law and politics as an imperishable 
theme of modernity. For Tarizzo, Darwin is a necessary condi-
tion for the eugenics of Nazism and thus life as autonomous yet 
perfectible is the life that “does not exist” prior to 1800.24 
For Tarizzo, the German Romanticists and Naturphilosophen 
equated life and autonomy as Kant did but added a level of de-
ficiency or sickness: to be alive was to be a fragment of life that 
could live more, that could evolve or transform. As Tarizzo has 
it, Darwin pursues a similar investigation into life but one that is 
not explicitly motivated by metaphysics. Yet there is little to no 
trace of the explanatory power of Darwin’s work, only its crimes 
of unacknowledged theoretical and political consequences.
The common tactic, it seems, is to fix the balance sheet of 
the natural and the normative, though Foucault would balk at 
24 This tension of life and the living as a modern invention is indirectly chal-
lenged by Eugene Thacker. Thacker suggests that already in Aristotle there 
is a problematic mapping between life and the living as soon as the soul or 
psukhe is introduced. See Eugene Thacker, “Nine Disputations on Theol-
ogy and Horror,” in Collapse IV, ed. Robin Mackay (Falmouth: Urbanomic 
Press, 2008), 55–92.
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the use of the term normative; to hold high Hume’s fork that 
keeps the matters of “is” and the matters of “ought” at a respect-
able difference from one another; to infer that their collusion 
can only end in disaster as evidenced by the disaster of moder-
nity’s techno-scientism. But this too often manifests itself as a 
purportedly humanitarian ban on any account of life that could 
lead to ethical practices. But to completely suspend such a link 
would seem increasingly untenable in a world where the very 
“isness” of nature appears in question; that is, ecological crisis in 
particular seems to suggest that the state of nature issues ethical 
imperatives.
Unsurprisingly the functional account of life and its relation 
to teleology appears the most compatible with such worries, yet 
it has, arguably, the worst legacy of how it utilizes teleology and 
the ethical and political claims thereby warranted, especially in 
the form of degeneration. Teleomechanism and morphology 
appear too disconnected from the very possibility of extinction 
and climate collapse — the teleomechanistic perspective denies 
the possibility of human extinction (Kant contra Camper), and 
it is unclear how Goethe’s morphology extends into the topic of 
extinction without becoming a fully functionalist approach that 
would be too costly to the importance of form, and hence to the 
thinkability of nature in itself.
The hurdle of thinkability is displaced, but by no means 
solved, by the emphasis on self-organization. If the appeal to 
archetypes or forms encounters the problem of function and fit-
ness of environment, then the problem for self-organization is 
the problem of scale and, in turn, whether this implies holism 
at one level or not.
Potentiation of forces appears to beg the question of how to 
explain difference in kind, not only in terms of why there are 
so many forces, but also why forces give rise to things at all. 
This latter question bothered Schelling deeply and it guided his 
work in Naturphilosophie, especially in the First Outline. In that 
text, in which Schelling relies upon transcendental philosophy 
to think nature (whereas in Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature 
he relies upon experimental data to explain the emergence of 
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thought), he thus flirts with something like archetypes or real 
patterns in nature — actants. But Schelling seems to suggest this 
is the Kantian or more generally the transcendental understand-
ing of real patterns or tendencies, which for us can only seem 
to be errors or interruptions in the flow of nature’s potencies.25 
Such a metaphysical stance does not deny either function or fit-
ness but ungrounds the rooting of either in the species’ form.
Such agnosticism about the real patterns of biological life, 
however, are not favorably entertained by Foucault nor by his 
sympathizers. As he writes in The Order of Things, “in truth it 
is impossible for natural history to conceive of the history of 
nature,” thereby rejecting the self-organization principle.26 Yet 
such a hermeneutic resistance to the real ground of nature, in 
the name of epistemological cautiousness, defends the teleologi-
cal stance in absentia. Despite his post-structuralist credentials 
and the subsequent requirement of being against meta-theories, 
Foucault (at times, not always) defends a notion of the human 
that remains immune to scientific or rational investigation other 
than as an abuse of power. 
The question is this: what are the stakes of life and teleology 
in the face of the human that is washed away by the ceaseless 
undulations of the tide?27 While it seems clear that Foucault is 
rejecting a humanist teleology that would co-opt the modern 
process of subjectivation, it remains too unclear what the status 
of life is other than just as an epistemic playground. This is all the 
25 Tarizzo, Life, 149. Tarizzo mentions three aspects of Schelling’s theory 
of life: defectiveness of life, progression of life, and life as preexisting its 
forms. But I believe that Schelling emphasized a potentiation of life, an 
increasing complexity, and not a progression in the sense for which social 
Darwinists argued.
26 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sci-
ences (New York: Pantheon Books, 1971), 157.
27 Reza Negarestani chooses to read Foucault’s image as a positive or con-
structive endorsement of the revisionary power of reason to erase and 
redraw the image of the human in ever more subtle forms. See Reza Ne-
garestani, “The Labor of the Inhuman,” in #Accelerate: The Accelerationist 
Reader, eds. Robin Mackay and Armen Avanessian (Falmouth: Urbanomic 
Press, 2014), 446.
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more telling in a text that is so curiously silent on Darwin, and 
on the real explanatory effects of his ideas. Without accounting 
for the real conditions of creation, teleology will return in the 
form of a disease, a teleologia — a pained remembrance of the 
feeling of knowing one’s origin despite the impossibility of find-
ing an origin sufficient to the false narcissism of the champions 
of “finitude.”
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Postmodernism undertaken as a philosophical, political, and 
cultural practice has definitively underscored its limits. For 
culture at large, the illustration of a world that is stretched, 
fragmented, and de-ontologized, where exteriority is thread-
ed through the experience as immanence, is mirrored in our 
political incapacity to think a future equality. These two facets 
demonstrate the requirement to accomplish a thinking of the 
unknown (the future) and the genuine possibility of a project 
(equality) where both call for certain de-mythologizations of 
the uniqueness of selfhood. Horror, as a cultural phenomenon, 
speaks to this issue of human limitations, equality, and our ca-
pacity to take negativity seriously. It does this sometimes di-
rectly and sometimes naïvely, acting as evidence of the problem 
that we have described. In light of these limits and potentialities, 
can horror accommodate a non-pessimistic view of language 
and maintain a project of realism? Can we assert that the lan-
guage that expresses a mind-independent reality can explicate 
the conditions of horror vacui, without undermining language 
as having an essential equality or inequality with the real? Fur-
thermore, does horror expressed in ordinary language provide 
access to meaningful, conceptual expression that is extensional 
rather than solipsistic? We will explore these questions by first 
advancing the limits of horror as a representational expression 
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of nothingness as a means to ask how a new understanding of 
the relation between representation and the thought of nothing 
can rescue the operations of language after postmodernity. 
Capitalist Horror
It’s difficult to make a good horror film these days, and we know 
it. The genre has situated itself in retrospective feedback loops of 
the sequel, the prequel, the remake, and the ironic, tragic replay 
of itself as farce, where horror makes its own antirealist wink 
at the blood-spattered lens and knows the condition of its own 
constraint to horror as genre.1 In this sense what we expect from 
horror, its concept, and what we often get or experience are very 
different. Horror promises the experience of the un-grounding 
of certain norms, vis-à-vis its transgressive character wherein 
spaces, characters, and objects traverse the worlds of the percep-
tible and the imperceptible but also threaten to reach the limits 
of our conceptual capacities. In this, horror’s aim is to produce 
an experience of alterity that maintains its alien quality; we will 
never be at home with the monster, a guiding principle that offers 
a lived experience of the outside and holds the nowhere within 
the lens of human perception. Unfortunately, this attempt to 
hold open the space for alterity without qualities leads to dis-
appointment, since horror recuperates the “beyond” as the re-
production of already existing norms, habits, and styles that get 
reinstated ironically, knowingly, as a claim to the meta-genre of 
new transgressions within the genre. In this postmodern for-
mat, we can see that horror fails. It loses its capacity for the out-
side. This is for two reasons: First, representations are always 
already seen to be inadequate to the real, underpinning horror 
by a kind of semantic pessimism; second, postmodern plural-
ism conditions a genealogy of the image’s failure over time as an 
1 Franchises such as Keenan Ivory Wayans, dir., Scary Movie (Los Angeles: 
Dimension Films, 2000), HD exemplify this genre of meta-horror, where 
the tropes of various horror films and their allegorical contents, such as 
the “easy” girl gets it first, are culled from the history of the genre and 
replayed or re-enacted as another self-conscious representational form.
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indeterminate process of the real. Here, the concept of horror 
resides within a contradiction of the real as process and an irre-
ducible alienation in the given. This transcendental knowledge 
of the real has no traction upon the given; it is either sublated to 
the given as one of many other competing claims within it, or 
this knowledge is privatized to the realm of the psychological 
fictions of private minds. Time is in motion, but the future is 
closed.
Films like Hostel (2005, directed by Eli Roth) extrapolate this 
dance of horror as meta-genre — where horror narrates hor-
ror in the stage within the formalization of drama. Hostel fore-
grounds the connections between knowledge and money/power, 
entangling these discourses in the central narrative framework. 
Here, the constraints of the horror genre are made equivalent 
to the administration of neo-liberal economies, where the film 
features various modes of torture as artistic spectacle paid for 
in full by rich masochists. The victims of such terror are vic-
tims only because they are naïvely unaware of the traditional 
allegories of the horror genre: don’t trust anyone, don’t go back-
packing in Eastern Europe, don’t go out alone at night, don’t be 
a slut, etc. Horror, in the film Hostel, is understood as a knowl-
edge-based and fiscal-centered economy. For the victims, this 
is marked as lack and operates as a tradition of dramatic irony 
for the audience. The latter meets death precisely because they 
have not watched enough horror movies. For the masochistic 
rich, this technē of horror becomes a form of power exercised 
through money. Knowledge of horror does not enter the picture 
for the victims, nor for the actors; it is for us and the masochistic 
authors of the structure of horror in which others partake.
Hostel narrates the limits of the horror genre as something 
that is regulated as and through capital, and it self-consciously 
remakes itself within this paradigm through this picturing of its 
own constraint as capitalistic experience. For the globally mo-
bile and endemically bored, perverse rich who pay to see and 
experience horror first-hand as art, another irony is palatable: 
we too pay to encounter a version of this artifice. But the com-
plaint we have, that which bites us, is that unlike the punters 
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in Hostel, the horror that we encounter is that a thought of the 
real is only capable of reiterating itself as a mode of illustrative, 
simulated, or representational experience, and that culture, if it 
thinks, has met the limits of its imagination. These limits are 
defined through the bind of money on the one hand and knowl-
edge as the status quo on the other hand. Together, they extol 
problematic folklores of the representational image and sub-
jectivity. Such traditions identify the horror genre as a form of 
Burke’s sublime: an antirealist expression of the contradiction 
of how the impossibility of knowing the structure that subtends 
reality can be manifest in images which somehow access our 
non-relation to the real, conflating the narration of our relation 
to the real with a form of the pseudo-experience of it. 
In this way, horror has witnessed and narrated its own ex-
haustion. It has authored its failure to be horror and has done 
so in order to transcend the parameters of its own paradigmatic 
framework. More than other genres — like the action movie, the 
spy thriller, or the rom-com, which have all to some extent de-
livered pastiche, parodic, and ironic self-referential treatments, 
and all have in their grasp some narrative of the real, be this 
the real of power or true love — horror seems to fail precisely 
because it specifies a precise and unique claim to the real in a set 
of images that are negatively charged with themes of violence, 
death, sadism, evil, and so on. There is a political claim, via a 
discourse on transgression and heterogeneity, where horror 
transcends the norms and regulations that govern the function-
al aspects of human society by connecting private, psychologi-
cal experiences with larger philosophical and societal issues that 
include the question of what it means to be human and what a 
society is or might be. This format of horror apes a structure 
of existing power and its image. In framing and protecting an 
unreal fictional space that insures us against the fear that the 
horror pictured in the film is real, such fiction also asks us to 
see that this horror is a hyperbolic metaphor for forms of power 
that undergird and mobilize contemporary life. In this struc-
ture, the political claim of horror remains private.
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These political and philosophical claims compel us to ex-
plore the horror genre as a form of phenomenological experi-
ence, and to ask what and how epistemology structures horror. 
If our labelling of our experiences as “horror” denotes the limit 
attitudes of human life and knowledge, could horror, as an ex-
perimental space for the production of new forms, pictures, 
and stories extend the definitions of what the horizons of these 
limits might be? In what ways can horror explore the real and 
articulate the expanded territory of our thinking of it? In these 
questions we see the need to construct a distinction between a 
post-structuralism that concentrates on the totality of infinite 
possibilities for thought, where the horror we ultimately find 
lies in what the genre fails to do, spelling out a new existential 
crisis of the unavailability of horizons, and a horror philosophy 
that must navigate the relation between the aesthetic experience 
of horror and the definition of thought itself.
Neo-Con Horror and the Post-Human
A neo-conservative horror is exemplified not only in the con-
servation of genre but in what stands out as the core content 
of the horror genre. Here, dominant themes are threats to the 
known at the level of perception and conception (e.g., altered 
worlds and times, the theme of the double, or parallel realities à 
la Poltergeist (1982)), the fear that there are other forces beyond 
our ken that produce “life as we know it” (e.g., stories of pos-
session), and ultimately, the threat to annihilate human exist-
ence at local (e.g., the axe murderer scenario), processional (e.g., 
the vampiric assimilates the human over time), and universal 
(e.g., the global disease from The Last Man on Earth (1964) to 
World War Z (2013)) scales.2 The allegorical content of horror 
across these subgenres emphasizes a defense of the known as 
its core value but does little to contemplate the “nothing” or the 
2 These themes are also available in conspiracy movies, science fiction, and 
psychological thrillers, but they are also key to sustaining the genre of hor-
ror.
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“non-being” of human life as a serious enterprise — that is, to 
consider the relation between genre, and the generic space of 
horror. A model of horror that exists within the circle of genre 
cannot entertain the conception that humans are self-causing 
entities. Nor can it comprehend the horror vacui that defines the 
truth of non-knowledge as the condition for knowing extrapo-
lated within a Godless, purposeless universe, since this atempo-
rality of being-nothing-nowhere is supplanted by conjurings of 
irrational and in-substantive representations that duly take on 
both a theological tone of dread and a politicized fear of other 
people, bodies, and identities.3 This latter form has had popular 
success as a narrative structure that privileges themes of sur-
vival and protection. Stories of global bio-apocalypse and alien 
invasion show the horror genre’s semantic flexibility rather than 
demonstrating any radical shift in redefining the standards with 
which horror goes to work. From William Castle’s The House on 
Haunted Hill (1959), where parlor games that host the dark side 
of human nature are eclipsed by the real of these psychologi-
cal forces, to Roger Corman’s Masque of the Red Death (1964), 
which tells tales of the dark arrangements between aristocratic 
decadence and the barbaric powers of both earthly and tran-
scendental natures; from the films that took center stage in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s; the master-horror moments in films 
such as John Carpenter’s The Thing (1982) and Tobe Hooper’s 
Poltergeist (1982), to the relatively more recent foray into hor-
ror as social realism with films like Paranormal Activity (2009). 
Horror, as the aesthetic experience that would in avant-gardist 
fashion lead to antagonism with and the circumvention — of 
our own beliefs, our institutions, and our ground — seems to 
have written itself out through its own institutionalization. The 
3 For a discussion on the issue of the conflation of the identity of the inef-
fable and non-knowledge as a problem for knowledge, Bataille’s work also 
leads to the material expression of the limits of knowledge as non-dis-
cursive conditions in the processes of powerlessness and desire. Georges 
Bataille, “Non-Knowledge,” in The Unfinished System of Nonknowledge, ed. 
Stuart Kendall, trans. Michelle Kendall and Stuart Kendall (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 197–200. 
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recent re-make of Suspiria (2018) further advances this point by 
interweaving the allegory of remembering past forms of fascis-
tic violence with a story of witchery and cultic paganism. The 
horror in Suspiria is therefore not given in a question of the 
unknowable but in the forgetting of what is known, and in the 
violence that this forgetting produces. 
These comprehensions of horror establish the genre as a 
form of institutional critique that is similar to the artistic kind,4 
which reminds us moreover that horror has an institution, and 
leads us to ask about what is being defended rather than pros-
ecuted in these stories. Whilst horror advocates the presence of 
aleatory forces in our lives and thus appeals to a transgressive 
dynamic, horror as an allegory of its own content often perfects 
and reinforces conservative values of political power. Increas-
ingly, what “postmodern” movies tell us is that horror is capable 
of direct and explicit conservativism and is repressive in many 
senses, and its impoverished (kitsch) call upon exteriority sus-
tains this. But even when horror knows this limit and turns in-
ward to engage in a critique of the social, it refuses to engage 
in thinking the way in which horror can be a tool to offer the 
possibility of thinking another structure for the world.5 Thus a 
4 I am referring to the standard modalities of institutional critique in the 
mid-twentieth century, where conceptual artists strategized various cri-
tiques of power by identifying ideological power as materially located in 
the walls and structures of the institutions of the art world. The emergence 
of post-institutional critique recognized the way in which these practices 
were part of and absorbed within the institution of art and therefore 
developed art that would bear witness to the entrapment of art within the 
institutions of its own critique. Such behaviors moved across the tragic 
recognitions of the failure of critique, tongue-in-cheek ironies that fiction-
alized difference or practices that expressed a tragic form of surrender to 
the status quo. 
5 Key to this is the way in which philosophy of horror is often satisfied with 
the idea that a movie can illustrate some ideas contained in a philosophy 
of horror adequately, rather than propose its own philosophical notions. 
For example, “Space Horror” is defined in Gavin F. Hurley, “Nonknowl-
edge and Inner Experience,” in Horror in Space, Critical Essays on a Film 
Subgenre, ed. Michele Brittany (Jefferson: MacFarland and Company Inc., 
Publishers, 2017), 81–96. He claims that movies can communicate the 
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horror that gives up on exteriority as a serious endeavor loses 
its grip on both the non-causal aleatory and the causal future.
The limits of horror tell us that we should not lay the blame 
purely at the level of horror’s language, stylization, or scripts but 
also at the level of the invariant structure of horror itself. We 
can see this deeper structural problem in the way that horror 
has a predilection for the case of the human. Despite its claim to 
occupy thoughts, things, and experiences beyond us, it is often 
done in our image and our name. Horror therefore exposes its 
immanent humanism. Despite the claim that the task of horror 
is to think beyond the means and ends of human psychology, 
self, and scale, it nevertheless clings to the theme of the irre-
ducibility of human consciousness to the explanatory realm of 
the understanding; the mystery of the self persists. In this way, 
horror tends to privilege an existential crisis of knowing the self 
as the establishment of horror, for the question of “self ” might 
appear to be a project of knowledge, but in this case it is the 
definitive bulwark against knowledge as well as freedom. The 
incomplete task of knowing is the mobilizing force of horror but 
also its aesthetic. This image of horror is secured in the mutual 
effacement and preservation of the human, where horror takes 
the human as figure and sets it against a background of the world 
of appearance. This figure takes on abstract qualities, receding 
and appearing into the world picture in a hydraulics of a vertigi-
nous depth of field. The structure of horror offers a disorient-
ing experience. Horror’s architecture in this picture of human/
world, then, produces a symmetry between the erasure and the 
construction of difference, where one cannot be discerned from 
the other. Horror is therefore realized in a landscape of time as 
limits of the postmodern comprehension of reality, “in a way that science, 
language and logic can never grasp” (93), but in placing such movies in a 
space of literature which is apparently discourse-free, and therefore has 
special access to horror, promises only the thought of the never know-
able — infinite horror as telos. As such, narrative horror when read via 
philosophy as a space beyond the discursive fully reinforces the trivial 
nature of culture’s capacity to apply horror as a generic to the particularity 
of genre expressions. 
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its own atemporality, and here, its images are special-effect il-
lusions. They are illusions because horror does not possess or 
seek any possibility of transforming the categories/images/tech-
niques that it takes on, nor does it show an interest in excavat-
ing its own structure in a critical fashion. This horror would be 
better termed “post-human” because its aim to think after the 
primacy of humancentrism becomes an act of bearing witness 
to this passage towards becoming post-human. Therefore, the 
facticity of alienation is not taken as a fact but as a turn in the 
story of human life. In short, the post-human project becomes 
the act of constructing a passage to its own end — to realize the 
post-human as a process of “unbecoming” in the face of exterior 
forces that may be constructed by humans or not. Therefore, a 
post-human horror seeks to destroy the human as image but at 
the same time naïvely holds onto a concept of the human as the 
means and end of this project.
Totalizing Contradiction
If horror stakes its claim in nihilism, then we must be vigilant 
regarding the claims that language can manifest “the nowhere”. 
In the structure of horror, we identify a paradox undergirded 
by an inability to think across two conceptions of time. This is 
the struggle to account for the category of negativity as an abso-
lute atemporality and also to account for the manner in which 
the irreducibility of negativity to the understanding is manifest 
in a temporality of “the never.” For the former (negativity), a 
weak ideology of horror claims that narratives can manifest an 
identity with the concept of the irreducibility of human con-
sciousness. The price of believing this is that the language that 
expresses the real is compelled to non-functionality and must 
refuse rational explanation: identity to the real is equivalent to 
triviality in the given. The latter (the never) is the grist to hor-
ror’s mill, perpetuating the project of articulating negativity that 
will “never” be complete. Horror therefore claims access at the 
level of the image-perception and at the same time thrives on 
in-access at the level of conception — the other can be encoun-
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tered but cannot be known. The consequence of this paradox is 
that our epistemology will be written as mysticism, horror will 
produce a form of dogmatic, non-discursive faith in an object 
with which we cannot interface.6
A disease of the head in this case is the pathology of a dialec-
tical materialist horror that obsesses over the desire to manifest 
negativity, groundlessness, and the idea that we must grasp the 
fact that right now, we do not know the genesis of why we are 
what we are. Such a system of thought returns us to a self-sub-
jected terrorism of the real, where we attribute the unknown to 
the unfathomable force of absolute dominance, a kind of fatal-
istic guarantee of our dispossession. This inability to decide in 
the face of the real is purchased in an erroneous collusion with 
negativity, as if it is a thing to be realized and as if conceptual-
izing negativity produces its identical match to our own aliena-
tion. In this sense, whilst consistent mobility, dissolution, and 
the absolute de-figured infinite continue to characterize horror, 
that which subtends the dialectic is an unreconstructed concept 
of synthesis that is not so much a regulative ideal as a totalizing 
space of unreason. 
As we have described it, horror is the contradiction of aliena-
tion, and this contradiction is not beneficial to the operations 
of decision-making in the given. To surpass the frame of this 
constraint, we must risk surpassing the structure of horror, un-
derstood as being constituted by a dialectic of an expression of 
knowledge that confirms the facticity of the real and as a space 
of in-decision in the face of this knowledge. The problem with 
this approach to horror is that its mediation between the known 
and the unknown fixes both as knowns, thus obviating the po-
tency and requirement for mediation as an explanatory mode 
of production. Horror is a representation that contradictorily 
claims to be unmediated. 
6 This point addresses the political implication of the representation vectors 
of the other within neo-conservative socio-political systems, from the 
naming of the other by dominance, as other, to the question of how forms 
of representation can be acquired by the other — that is, to cross the line 
into the sphere of discursive political space.
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A dialectical materialist theory misses, in establishing its op-
positional forces, that horror is intrinsic to the real, and that 
the real is not equal to human finitude. Alongside this, a theory 
that correlates a de-figuring of the human to an emancipatory 
force via the direct affects of non-representational experiences 
prohibits emancipation because it removes the representational 
tools by which decision becomes manifest and commitments to 
freedom become agreed upon in the realm of the social, viz., 
language. Horror, understood as a space of decision within al-
ienation may not require horror at all, or at least it may not re-
quire horror as we know it.
A significant question in this text is how a phenomenology 
of horror as a form of “horror philosophy” might escape or re-
define the problems that have been described as horror. A phe-
nomenological visioning of horror within non-humanist phi-
losophy traverses a multiplicity of non-hierarchical perceptual 
registers that support its claim to exceed and expand the frame 
of representation, the human, as well as the constraining forces, 
which are established through the stable referents of traditional 
metaphysics; but this approach also comes up against the dead-
end of the genre itself, primarily at the interface of horror as 
cause and effect.
Our aim ultimately is to advance a realism. This means that 
we must explicate the conditions that subtend reality and the 
languages we use to communicate this. Bringing that which is 
ambiguous, that which is yet to be known, and that which has 
not been found to satisfy the means of already existing explana-
tions into the realm of debate and analysis might seem to be the 
opposite of horror, for it does not leave the unknown on the 
periphery. Instead, this realism would articulate a methodology 
of negativity that does not render alterity banal, nor identify in-
determinacy as the fate of knowing. 
If we were to take horror as a form of cultural tradition that 
serves to mirror our incapacity to reason in general via illustra-
tions of our incapacity to reason about the world we have made, 
we are all written as Frankenstein — moderns who see the hor-
ror of ourselves insofar as we are victims of our own creation. 
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In this case, the kind of negativity that horror provides offers, at 
best, a political allegory of a society diminished, since it mirrors 
the impossibility of our being together in a communal sense. In 
the face of this instrumental and poetic failure, a realist horror 
would traverse the field of both the unknown and that which 
sits within the world of folk (including folk horror and philoso-
phy) — the given — bringing such myths to serious attention, for 
myths that tell us what subtends reality, no matter how unreal 
they appear, constitute and map the reality in which we find 
ourselves. Horror as a populist sentiment of the real therefore 
is pervasive in lived reality. The sensibility that community and 
also the future are impossible has traction in producing a cul-
ture that lives this fiction. In the face of this living horror of the 
political we need to produce decisions — that is, make judge-
ments — that discern and distinguish between illogical and ra-
tional expressions of the understanding. Without this we cannot 
undermine the things that we take for reality, we cannot pro-
duce better conceptions of it, and we cannot understand what is 
unsatisfactory for the political, for we forgo any regulative ideal. 
Given these remarks, we can address the fashion in which 
conditions and images present us with horror: What is the real 
horror here? Is horror necessarily tied to the primacy of sub-
jective psychological perception that establishes itself as social 
commentary, at the cost of the social, or can it be tasked with 
a philosophical problem of negativity? And, if we are to rescue 
horror at all, is it necessary that we unbind its very structure 
from the traditions — post-humanism, dialectical materialism, 
phenomenology, and post-structuralist self-reference — that 
we have sketched? Alternatively, if horror is proven to be dy-
ing through capitalism, or is even dead, then why resurrect or 
reanimate its corpse?
Genre as Fate: Horror as Repression
To continue, we can consider three core aspects of horror:
83
DEATH OF HORROR
1. Aesthetic, affectual, representational: Horror is motion-time, 
experience, and an image appealing to truth.
2. Political, didactic, practical: Horror is a recognition of the 
limits of our mastery that is available via practices in the 
lived world. In this sense, it expresses the place at which we 
no longer control our environment as a totality, or our future, 
and therefore horror educates us about existing inequalities.
3. Philosophical, theoretical: Horror is an articulation of an in-
accessible real.
Following these points, horror becomes emblematic of “the 
nothing,” “the void,” “the unpresentable,” and “the impossible,” 
and this knowledge is understood as inevitable and real. John 
Mullarkey’s essay, “Spirit in the Materialist World: Revisionary 
Metaphysics and the Horrors of Philosophy,” speaks to this di-
rectly.7 Key to his argument is that there is no single bridging 
theory to produce or enable a unification of the sciences that 
would enable the kind of Meillassouxian sovereignty of reason 
that would map the world. Other alternative hopes for an inter-
disciplinarity of the sciences in one egalitarian framework are 
also contested because the thought of horror is the work of rec-
ognizing the real of inequalities, a space of irresolution. As such, 
for Mullarkey, both sovereignty and equality are denaturalized 
as incorrect mythologies in favor of the real nature of an in-
equality that is accessed through experience. In this inequality, 
horror is the collision of two forms of thought. The first is the 
thought that recognizes the real disunity of the world. This is the 
thought that thinks the “never” — that is, we will never be uni-
fied, and there will never be one unifying theory to rationalize 
the world. The second mode of thought is that which is made up 
of the empirical evidence that leads to this conclusion: the vari-
ous antagonisms that vie for this status of unilateral sovereignty 
7 Thanks to John Ó Maoilearca (John Mullarkey) for his exposition of this 
text and others, as well as his generosity, time, and energy spent discuss-
ing his ideas as part of his role as Theorist in Residence, Master of Arts 
Aesthetics and Politics Program, School of Critical Studies, CalArts, 2013.
84
DISEASES OF THE HEAD
guarantee and perpetuate this truth of the never precisely be-
cause they do not believe in it. Together, as opposing poles, real 
disunity and ideal unity configure an aperceptual recognition 
of horror as locked into, and definitive in regard to, the status 
quo. Accordingly, horror is a space of irony, for its promise to 
the outside is determined as dissatisfaction in the realm of the 
normative. This transcendent understanding of horror is un-
equal to the image that represents it, and it has to be, because a 
unification of concept and image would contradict the basis of 
the theory in the first place. This irony forges a space in which 
we recognize something of the root of the human condition as 
being equally or potentially inhuman. 
For Mullarkey, this thought of horror takes place as abstract 
material in the world; nevertheless, as image-time, encountered 
in the field of cinematic horror, this specific space harnesses and 
owns the rights to the “never.” It is here where we see that hor-
ror is a referential term that is capable of invoking a relation 
to the thought of the inaccessible or non-relational within the 
parameters of the given if and only if the given is already taken 
as metaphor for what it appears not to be — non-static, unstable, 
and invariant. This contradiction allows us to see how a lived, 
perceived horror is bound up with the recognition of ourselves 
as already non-human and not of this world.8 A first and key 
problem of horror (and one that is more general than that pro-
posed in Mullarkey’s argument, though it is present within it) is 
that horror uniquely and singularly understands and expresses 
our fate as discordance. Such a discordance sets out the question 
of the way in which an elimination of the concepts of unity and 
8 Grounding the object as the material presentation of horror entertains 
other problems within this theory, since the distinction between the inhu-
man and the human, which is essentially a philosophical set, can easily 
be over-determined as another political/moral distinction: between the 
inhuman and the inhumane. Here, we face the “Jekyll and Hyde” moment 
of horror philosophy and the production of specific dyadic forms that 
characterize an uncivilized other at the heart of mankind in an equality 
of violence; a state of pre-political uncivilized nature that would actually 
be the opposite of the condition of an equality of inequality that is set out 
here to strike a political dimension.
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equality might be understood, especially when their destruction 
invites the irony of an over-identification with discordance. To 
expand this a little, the impossibility of unifying the space of 
causes — defined by non-normative causal relations between 
objects — with normative commitments, subtends the truth of 
horror. But, vanquishing the ideal of unity in the name of the 
truth of unreality renders horror as the only truth in the game. 
This new form of horror therefore is no longer reliant upon 
the dynamic tension of truth and impossibility because they 
are made identical. This would be a one-dimensional horror 
of the present, that deletes not only the real but also determin-
ism — that our actions are determined by other actions/deci-
sions — in the name of being: life as discordant reality. In this 
case, political and scientific aspirations to explain the conjunc-
ture of reality and the real would be made equal to the kitsch 
of horror, only to be surpassed by real horror. Secondly, if we 
consider that serious investments in equality and unity, taken by 
society, affect the question of a future for humanity, then we can 
be concerned that this theory ultimately validates one unverifi-
able truth over another, where the real of discordance is met by 
the poetics of discordance and disunity in the given. This then 
begs the question of the way in which horror, as the absolute 
discordance of the human, stakes out a life for it.
Horror and the Anti-Image
We can see that a determination of horror as real discordance 
compresses the themes of fate and nature together. The real of 
horror as a discordant life therefore asks us how we can speak of 
alterity without reproducing it as a naïve picturing of “non-rep-
resentational presence” and without locating it as just another 
attribute of a fragmentary life amongst other forms of knowl-
edge and experience. Such an approach serves to extend the so-
cial conservatisms which characterize the “horror genre.” The 
phenomenological presence of the thought of horror, in particu-
lar via its correlation with discordance, determines experiences 
of horror in the world as negatively conditioned isomorphies 
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of the real. Images that reside in horror must invoke the un-
sayable, the un-filmable, the un-representable, and the uncon-
scious and often do so through vertiginous aesthetics, where the 
world and its regulatory systems of ethics, rules, and morals are 
turned upside-down or inside-out. Ironically, the privileging of 
the realm of material experience in horror demands a concept 
of the anti-image, an image that must repress its own context, 
interpretations, and so on in order for it to gain traction as a 
primary referent to the real.9 
A vitalistic phenomenology of affect- and sense-based ex-
perience struggles to account for the consequences of human 
self-conception that situates images including those generated 
in horror as hermeneutical and representational. Furthermore, 
such a phenomenology does not deal fully with how the non-tel-
eological plane of experience that would claim non-referential 
and deregulated forms of infinitude turn out to manufacture a 
concept of one world, presenting both a representational system 
of reference as well as the organization of particular hierarchies 
of image-thought-experience in this modality of horror — in 
other words - some image-experiences are more real than oth-
ers. This hierarchy set within vertical and horizontal modali-
ties emerges when we begin to associate this condition of the 
real as capable of revealing the truth of inequality with a field 
where there is only discordance. From this disorienting space, 
such a truth can only be recognized in the present moment. This 
brings to bear a kind of vitalist empiricism that grafts a uni-
versal concept of discordance and indeterminism onto specific 
lived experiences, bringing the disorientation of thinking hor-
ror to bear upon and infect the normative. In this heterogeneous 
space, horror as a dimension of knowledge is locked within the 
present, and as such, it adds to the regressive character of both 
9 The anti-image in this inquiry has a particular character. It privileges the 
experience of images above their contextual or normative interpretative 
values and foregrounds the image as an autonomous object set against 
the real. The problematic belief set out in the anti-image is that one can 




that which knowledge can think and its means of expression. 
It replaces the concept of a defined subjectivity that thinks its 
constitution with the psychology of a self that feels. 
The consequences at stake here are not only present in phi-
losophy or cinema. Many artworks tell us that a non-represen-
tational image can coalesce with reality through embodying 
images as a form of nature, and accordingly, a representational 
image cannot coalesce with reality because it cannot escape its 
mediating function. Built into this logic of horror is the notion 
that the image can allow us access to a reality only if it is unfet-
tered by the “heaviness” of mediation and context, and freedom 
from this is the means by which it can then approach the level 
of the direct sensory encounter. An effect of this paradoxical 
thinking against the image with the image is that the empiri-
cal world is made strange, since this presence of the nothing is 
immanent to it, lurks within it, and is something that happens 
to us. Our given reality has an alienating quality that we cannot 
fathom. So, we live with a dilemma of the image. We cannot 
trust the given, but that is all we know. 
Such contradictions define the limits of what are often 
claimed to be materialist practices. These errors of the image 
extend directly to our discussion on horror, and they show us 
how materialism can give up too quickly on the force of decision 
and representation in the world. Such a materialism thinks the 
contingency of the human as primary: We are a product of the 
world, within it, lost inside it, and unable to create any traction 
to decide against it as it is; the world guarantees our alienation 
from it. In such a case, images are understood as inadequate 
to the real, in that they are ghostly projections from it and, at 
the same time, are asserted as real in their material substance 
and affectual power to contain the real of inaccessibility as their 
constituent identity. Images are seen to traverse this division 
between being and representation, as both universal and par-
ticular. Images, as Blanchot would have it, are the living dead.10 
10 For Blanchot, the artwork in general is stained by the real, the excess, and 
supplement of negativity and holds forth the infinite fact of mortality. 
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But designating this special power to images causes problems. 
It disables any assertion of how images operate at the level of 
semantic authority, for images in this theory are not in dialogue 
like a language; they seem to be devoid of sentences, contexts, 
and propositions. They are treated as special entities, and their 
manifest symbolizations of themselves override any local or 
specific qualities at the level of concept or percept. For images 
to claim this right to traverse the paradigms of the negative and 
the given, they must take this up as a project and articulate this 
space with specific explicatory tools. While all images offer the 
real, to construct a horror is to ask images to articulate the dy-
namic relations across the real and the given. The real in this 
case is therefore not the right of any image. 
Phenomenological Frames 
The types of image-thought that respond to horror in phe-
nomenology retrieve this question of poetics, and, in particu-
lar, metaphor. In this case it appears that images can master 
the rhetoric of presence and absence in an aesthetics of con-
straint. This is made clear in Graham Harman’s essay, “Horror 
of Phenomenology,”11 where a “(one legged) realism grasps the 
weird tension in the phenomena themselves.”12 For Harman, 
this “one-legged” realism is a realism that misses the “genuine 
hiddenness of things,”13 and in that sense the virtual world can 
only be that place of weird metaphoric-poetic phenomena. This 
virtual world, built on a material plane, refuses a metaphysical 
dimension, and instead offers a multi-perspectival view. This 
is not only traditional to phenomenological artworks of the 
mid-20th century, as we will see, but Cubism would also seek 
The failure to be present to death is marked by a life as image. Maurice 
Blanchot, The Space of Literature, trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1989).
11 Graham Harman, “On the Horror of Phenomenology,” in Collapse IV, ed. 





to represent a 360-degree experience of an object within the 
conditions of a two-dimensional picturing. The compression of 
perceptual space housed in one frame produces an isomorph 
of reality in a metaphysical dimension. The representation we 
see becomes a picture of perception in the act of perceiving a 
temporality condensed into atemporal space. Pictures in frames 
allude to an exteriority beyond the picture and also issue the 
claim that the picture itself is the best model for the understand-
ing of the impossibility that perception can meet the demands 
of the understanding. Artworks in the genre of Land Art and 
performance-oriented practices that invested in durational ex-
perience extend this logic but aspire to eliminate the frame and, 
therefore, this picturing with it, as if the work participates in the 
world on an equal footing with other objects. Harman’s theory 
also seeks to eliminate the frame by identifying a phenomenal 
landscape of objects that recede from our grasp and that ulti-
mately generate an ontological regression of picturing where the 
frame of horror dissolves ad infinitum. We become immersed 
in horror as the only world we experience but can never know, 
that is, as a horrific holographic simulation that is received by 
us as the naturality of everyday life.14 This world has a horrific 
aspect inasmuch as we can say that we do not experience it as 
weird, since this observation of the weird must come from some 
analysis and suspension of experience as vital.
In particular artworks, we can see a similar approach to a 
world of objects, based on the presupposition that materiality 
itself is exempt from the scene of the social and that materials 
14 Jean Baudrillard narrates a world that is lost to simulation vis-à-vis a hu-
man compulsion for the real. His answer to this is to call for an antirealist 
practice that ultimately establishes a war of images, between images that 
narrate their own construction and images that are a piece of the real. The 
antirealist image is the image that knows its own unreality, that is given 
political priority against the correlationalist vision of the hyper-realist 
simulation. Here, we entertain the question as to the legitimacy of the 
diagnosis of an image and the real, and the verticality that is insinuated 
against the backdrop of a pluralistic landscape of simulations. See, for 
example, Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. Sheila Faria 
Glaser (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994).
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are endowed with an innate and weird alienation from the world 
of ordinary language. It is therefore taken that materials them-
selves have atemporal properties and that they can assume the 
role that they can skip mediation (depth) or referential relations 
to both non-normative causal as well as normative languages 
that instead appeal directly to the timeless and cosmological 
space beyond human experience and perception from the base 
of temporal symbolic material perception.15 Here, the artwork 
occupies a claim to the real via its claim to collide local experi-
ence with universal atemporality, therefore dismissing the need 
to traverse the conditions of reality and our understanding. This 
approach to the production of art as a form of realism follows 
the logic of a tragic phenomenology that reinforces a semantic 
pessimism. It is tragic because the artwork surrenders itself to 
specific unknowables as indicators of the real with which it does 
not seek to interact but only accepts as given. Thus, what is given 
is the privileging of our perception of materials and the making 
of these materials into special referents to timeless metaphysi-
cal properties. In doing this, these artworks forgo the space of 
language as a spatial distinction that mediates the conditions of 
atemporal concepts and temporal action.16
We can draw upon these artistic attitudes to the image and 
experience as an analogy to phenomenological realism so as to 
identify the principles and also the contradictions that are cast 
within both. As such, we can say that Harman’s “weird realism” 
tells us that images are non-relational in one sense but, at the 
same time, also confirms that these constructions as images, the 
works of Lovecraftian architectures for example, represent our 
15 This can explain why many sculptures indebted to object-oriented ontol-
ogy are geological rock samples and parts of the earth that are thought to 
have no representational or ideological quality, for they exist as object-
facts and sensations retrieving an appeal to the genre of the sublime and 
antirealist art. Michael Heizer’s Levitated Mass, 2013, installed at the Los 
Angeles Contemporary Museum of Art, is one example of this.
16 Rosalind E. Krauss, A Voyage on the North Sea: Art in the Age of the Post-
Medium Condition (London: Thames and Hudson, 1999). Krauss discusses 
this point in referring to mid-century phenomenological art.
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relationship to the real even if it is claimed that there is no rep-
resentationalism at work, since these delirious fictive spaces are 
seen to be contorted fusions of being and thinking. Identifying 
this weird realism requires a vision of the world as fictive and 
poetic, and it necessitates a formal distancing from the world of 
cause. This requirement to see the world as fiction struggles to 
find its way into practical normative behavior because the con-
cept of the world as horror tells us ultimately that we have no 
phenomenological access to it, and this is ironically delivered 
by the means of phenomenological access in experiential rep-
resentations. 
Here we see how this material phenomenon that is said to 
deliver the experiential immanence of the real as the frameless 
de-ontologized experience requires another frame — a theoreti-
cal frame of reference — that ultimately evidences our lack of ac-
cess to the real. It is this contradiction of the theory in-itself that 
produces horror in this instance. Therefore, this poetics lacks 
any explication of its own mediating properties, and a “weird 
realism” turns out to occupy the standard definition of a claim 
to a contemporary realism in artistic practice — or what should 
be termed “naïve idealism” — that we can identify in artworks 
of the mid-20th century that worked under the rubric of phe-
nomenology. 
Temporality and the Never of Horror
John Mullarkey’s essay, “The Tragedy of the Object,”17 fore-
grounds another type of phenomenology inherited from Thom-
as Nagel’s Objective Phenomenology. Mullarkey, in his theory of 
horror philosophy, carefully expands the definition of horror, 
enabling us to see how horror takes place in a field that exceeds 
the horror genre of movies specifically.18 In this text, horror pro-
17 John Mullarkey, “Tragedy of the Object: Democracy of Vision and the 
Terrorism of Things in Bazin’s Cinematic Realism,” Angelaki: Journal of the 
Theoretical Humanities 17, no. 4 (December 2012): 39–59.
18 Mullarkey takes this notion of horror in cinema more generally, where he 
observes the point at which the representation of things in motion pictures 
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vides the vehicle through which the irruption of the real is made 
present. The cinema of Japanese horror films in the genre of J-
Horror gives Mullarkey’s text the description of the “dark other.” 
In this horror, it appears at the edge of the frame or the cine-
matic screen: “[t]he opticality of the peripheral monster in films 
such as Ringu (1998), Ju-On (2002), Honogurai mizo no soko 
kara (2002), and their sequels affords us a new vision of back-
ground and depth of field.”19 Mullarkey connects the experien-
tial vagueness or imperceptibility of the cinematic image with 
the audience’s experience of doubt. Together, these elements 
succeed in revealing “the actual presences of normally unseen 
or marginalised visibilities.”20 Here, the edge of human vision 
is used to refer to both the limits of human knowledge and the 
frame of the cinematic screen itself, as if the human as a concept 
is transposed to the frame of cinematic life and vice versa. In 
this re-visioning of the cinematic life-world, “the violence im-
manent within our everyday perceptual judgements”21 is dis-
closed, but it is not wholly clear how this assertion is made be-
tween the perception of the vagueness, or flicker, of the monster 
at the edge of the screen, the doubt that this experience might 
manifest conceptually, and the political assertion that those that 
are unaccounted for in society undergo some revelation of what 
other life might qualify as life. This is crucial when we consider 
that the articulation of doubt that is foregrounded in horror cin-
ematics becomes a paradigm of mastery that requires construct-
ing. In this case, horror as a landscape of doubt and fear, which 
alerts us to the incomplete condition of our knowledge, does not 
seek to recover or ascertain that which is not. Instead, it is an art 
of constructing that which is not via formal structures with sub-
stitutional identities. Rather than undoing particular forms of 
knowledge in the tradition of a liberal humanist subjectivity, it 
risks reinforcing the normative attitudes that subtend the status 
is capable of making us believe that those things can traverse the limits of 
the frame. 





quo — that is, a satisfaction with the unknown. Importantly, the 
effect that produces doubt is purchased by the moving, glitch-
ing, interrupted image, which is no longer the amalgamated, hy-
brid form of a blending and clashing type but is another domi-
nant form. It is its own genre, and doubt now equals satisfaction.
Playing by the rules and constraints of the “never” of hor-
ror, we see a contrast between the impossibility of knowing the 
self and the impossibility of not experiencing the self. This ar-
ticulates a double bind of horrific imprisonment, and it is in-
structive. This contradiction narrates our oppression, but it also 
figures our failure to think beyond our repression past this con-
tradiction because images and nature are incorrectly taken as 
fields beyond the sayable. A picture of the unsayable exerts only 
the pressure of bad circularities. It does this because it gives up 
on what is and can be said, and it assumes that, because there is 
no bridge to traverse the divide between the space of cause and 
the space of reasons. 
The Author of Horror
The problems that this phenomenology delivers can be made 
more explicit when we look at contemporary art, for this no-
tion of access to the weirdness of our everyday lived reality 
seems to have been relegated to a more special type of person 
that can perceive this and present it back to us. This question of 
mediation retrieves the role of the artist as modern in the typi-
cal sense, where the archetype of modernity, the flâneur-artist, 
points out to others the invisible discrepancies and foibles of 
everyday life, as if the images that would emerge from the rooms 
of prostitutes, brothels, private salons, and personal encounters 
forged a dark equivalence with deeper and unknown reality be-
yond the phenomenal. Many artworks such as those depicted 
in the realism of Degas and Lautrec for example, as well as the 
Impressionist and Pointillist works of Monet and Seurat re-
spectively are tainted with a strangeness — a diversion from 
verisimilitude - because they exercised formal investigations of 
phenomenal reality, via particular explications of the means by 
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which these representations are constructed. Ideological images 
of reality resulted from this approach to production, explication 
and observation in two gestures: one of a social truth, where 
we see empirically realist images of everyday encounters, and 
the other of the real in itself — something that we cannot access. 
The world as it is was implicitly estranged from perception via 
the act of perceiving it. A specific example of this refraction and 
warping of life can be seen in the famous Édouard Manet work, 
A Bar at the Folies-Bergère (1882) that fragments the world of the 
known into an uncanny arrangement of space and time, making 
the known alien and different via the deliberate refraction of the 
mirror that holds and distorts the scene of the painting. Con-
temporary artists working under the rubric of object-oriented 
ontologies — that is, post-humanist materialist phenomenolo-
gies which explore the status of human alienation as a fact in 
the scope of ecological catastrophe — share something with this 
work, its location in the present, but they fail to live up to this 
investment in formal, representational, and conceptual investi-
gations that would orient the image towards another compre-
hension of how language can articulate reality. This failure is 
characterized in an attitudinal sense in the way in which many 
artistic practices have preferred to make art that acknowledges 
its own limits, that reflects a surrendering of the political based 
on the idea that humans cannot and should not orient change in 
the world because they are seen to be part of it, and any attempt 
to construct change would lead to the totalitarian disasters of a 
colonial past repeating itself. Repeating the same problems of 
art’s political project, here again, many contemporary artworks 
show us installations of atemporal materials, materials that exist 
without us, and because of this, they instruct us about our pre-
carity in the present. In taking this approach, they risk bypass-
ing the context of a social, rational, and discursive interpretative 
field by privileging all materiality as the always already alien, the 
already abstract enough. So it follows that objects that would 
become art, through subject matter or construction, do not re-
quire attention at the level of any formal or conceptual analytics. 
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In rejecting the internal attention to the construction of art, 
we can attribute this mode of production to a form of nominal-
ism, and we can locate this within a tradition of modern flâneu-
rie — that is, the operation of art as the act of pointing out the 
strangeness of the known. But this flâneurie that we see today is 
of a post-Duchampian artist, one that has naturalized nominal-
ism all the way down, one that troubles the labor of thought 
that would need to explicate the claims that would support the 
nomination of a particular material becoming art in the first 
place.22 In this sense it does less than Manet, Braque, or the phe-
nomenology of art, experience, and time via Land Art and site-
specific work.23 
Furthermore, this gesture to nominate the normal as strange, 
alien, or as a space that alerts us to unknown unknowables can-
not hope to account for the selection of particular forms as art, 
and it renders decision arbitrary. This approach to art produc-
tion cannot differentiate the universal claim of alienated ma-
terial from the formal and specific materials that express that 
thought. Harman’s explanation, which does not mention art, 
tends to be directed to the question of how material presence 
accesses its own internal reality, demonstrated outwardly in 
an aesthetics of multiple forces coexisting in one plane. But by 
looking at art and its historical involvement with perception, we 
can say that what Harman misses is that his is a theory of the im-
age or image-language. Additionally, the limitations of art in the 
face of its capacity to claim that it is, in its being, real-material 
are instructive in telling us that the language that is produced as 
22 There are many examples of this approach to art and so any particular 
example would not seem adequate in this case. However, for one, see Kyle 
Chaka, “Object-Oriented Curating Continues in 2013 Biennale,” Hyperal-
lergic, March 14, 2013, https://hyperallergic.com/66935/object-oriented-
curating-continues-in-2013-venice-biennale/.
23 Rosalind Krauss observes how opticality had become the primary medium 
of art in the mid 1960’s and lacked theorization due to the conviction that 
opticality could sublate internal differences in the content/medium of 
the work to produce the semblance of an indivisible whole at the level of 
experience. Krauss, A Voyage on the North Sea, 30.
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a result of this theory resides in simile rather than the metaphor 
that it had aspired to be. 
Taken within or beyond the field of art, a theory of weird 
realism subtended by an object-oriented ontology ultimately of-
fers a kind of mysticism of the known that precludes us from 
getting involved in the world of the given. In other words, the 
artwork’s essential qualities are deemed to be under the line of 
reason and in the realm of non-explanatory experiences, set for 
experience rather than decoding, defined by, and as an effect of, 
the reality of “the great outdoors.”
Exit Wounds
The arguments launched in Mullarkey’s and Harman’s different 
treatments of phenomena share and elucidate the problem of the 
image and the question of the legitimacy of horror as a mecha-
nism or tool to think and manifest contingency as a medium of 
experience. As such, they draw attention to the problems that 
arise when taking the real of contingency, or in fact any condi-
tion that we could say operates without us or does not have us 
“in mind”, as thought-material, for this asks us how to manifest 
this understanding in semantic form, and, furthermore, how 
such semantic forms can be contested as false and also taken 
seriously as true. Despite the non-metaphysical and expansion-
ist visions of horror explored in these different phenomenolo-
gies — the world as weird and alien or in a generic horror of 
the real — the structure of horror as it is proposed in both Har-
man’s and Mullarkey’s work suffers its own exit wounds when 
the realm of the image undergoes an extraction from language. 
What is forgotten is how this language takes place within the 
field of social relations, as well as how it produces a regulative 
ideal that underpins the social transactions in which it partakes. 
Bearing this in mind, it is not so much the specter of an aes-
thetic condition that haunts horror, but it is the methodological 
habituation of a kind of phenomenology that has determined it 
that causes these problems. This means that we need to return to 
those initial categories of the aesthetic, political, or philosophi-
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cal and think carefully as to how they are put into a motion of 
relations.
Consequently, the thought of inequality at the level of the 
real has an impact upon a comprehension of the social, for this 
now transforms itself into the sovereignty it dreaded; that is, 
inequality is totalized such that it becomes a banal and expres-
sionless, flat totality of an equality of difference. Horror, in this 
case, does not transcend horror as we know it, despite Mullar-
key’s or Harman’s aim to think backwards from the point of the 
unformulated experience, from the other side of Cartesian ra-
tionality, from within the object, and from the perspective of 
the non-human. Philosophy-horror in such cases resides as a 
mirror for the complex condition of humanity as a particular 
kind, a kind that expresses the struggle of thinking beyond or 
escaping the standard definitions of human life and society but 
does little to think beyond this mirror. Therefore, although hor-
ror acts as a form of resistance to power and dominance,24 we 
can also see that horror protects and guarantees the figure of 
the impossible, leaving emancipation behind. It is at a loss and 
without character, content, or commitment, free from any po-
litical dimension.25
Reading Harman’s work reminds us that the horror of real in-
consistency remains significantly different than the horror that 
is used to describe the skewed relation to the real that he identi-
24 We see this naturalized suspicion of and opposition to the bureaucracy of 
reason as much in Adorno and Horkheimer as in Jean-François Lyotard.
25 We know that modernity took the factical irreducibility of the real to our 
understanding and made this proof of concept that entities beyond the 
given are unverifiable in it. This is exemplified in William Shakespeare’s 
Hamlet, where King Hamlet’s appearance from beyond — as a ghostly 
apparition (image) — sets Prince Hamlet on the track of revenge/justice. 
However, we find that Hamlet instead becomes a kind of skeptical detec-
tive of the image, taking the image as possibly a real manifestation of the 
truth of murder, but never real enough to justify taking up arms. This 
non-identicality of the image and the real, energized by a skepticism of the 
image in itself, results in life as inactive procrastination, or in other words, 
a life that is paralyzed by the question of the verifiability of the image in 
relation to a metaphysical unified real. 
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fies in literature, such as in the work of H.P. Lovecraft. This dif-
ference between the conceptualization of horror in genre form 
and the way in which it is given to the objects in the life-world 
is crystallized when we cannot find the means to speak across 
these registers of fact and fiction. There is not an account as to 
how fictions become truths, and the claim that this phenom-
enology destroys the world of genre as indicative of verticality 
and power is untenable.26 The idea that we do not require ver-
tical registers is problematic because the affect of horror can-
not claim the space of equality by retreating to its abstract and 
empty qualities, since abstraction is already proposed as genre-
material and participates in rule-based interactions. For Mul-
larkey, real horror requires the selectivity of an author/reader 
that produces the erasure of the human as discrete category, an 
author/reader who witnesses temporary access to a groundless 
violence. This access to the real at the edge of perception might 
remind us of the kind of privileges set out at the beginning of 
this text where we explored the consumer fantasies of Hostel, 
but in Mullarkey’s text, groundlessness acts as a site of potential-
ity for difference and aspires to a moral good that seeks to refuse 
instrumentalist passions for unification. This groundlessness, 
however, does not prevent new forms of dominance from com-
ing onto the scene, since it only promises that we can identify 
them as unreal claims to reality. The disavowal of unity acts as a 
foundational concept in Mullarkey’s text. As a conceptualization 
of negativity, this theory is provocative because it foregrounds a 
political space that must take the incompleteness that negativity 
promises seriously. However, a destruction of unity in the con-
text of the political is worrying because it destroys the potential 
for any constructive qualities that would identify with any other 
regulative ideal. Negativity taken as this ideal threatens to elimi-
nate the validity of conceptualizing in itself, especially if we con-
26 This attempt to destroy genre as a mark of vertical dominance is also 
indebted to deconstruction and post-structuralism, where the latter in 
particular would seek the redemptive space of hybridity as a response to 
the authority of categorized norms.
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sider that the act of thinking necessitates direction and objec-
tives, or we could say that thinking is a condition for a striving 
to unity. Therefore, while this negativity read as the permanent 
undoing of a foundational unity offers the means to bridge the 
register of horror as fiction, literature, art, and the lived world, 
and it seems to guarantee life as infinite, it lacks the content that 
would make this life worth living. It shows us that concepts of 
unity cannot extrapolate themselves beyond the limited bounds 
of perception itself because thinking of the real as negativity ex-
cludes anything else.
In this text, we have explored how sensations that aim to 
capture a concept of horror are constructed and framed, this 
concept being the facticity of our alienation from ourselves, 
and how these words and pictures gesture to an existence with-
out them. This bind of sense and mediation demonstrates the 
equivalence of two problems: making absolute distinctions be-
tween concept and sense and the over-determination that col-
lapses them altogether. Instead, understanding that images are 
supervened by concepts turns us towards the comprehension of 
the relations that are necessary to think and picture — that is, to 
generate consensus within difference. The way in which horror 
constrains us to particular modes of representation now gener-
ates the question of the way in which the limits of perception 
and the territory of the visible, written as such, constrain the 
potential of what the political might be.
Articulating the complexity of thought and perception is key 
to overcoming an anthropocentricism of the image/object as a 
self-expressing entity, as well as to undermining fears of instru-
mentality. Consequently, we must carefully unknot the dimen-
sions of objects as assemblages and constructions that can make 
rational choices from the object that is taken as a “self.” One 
way that the horror genre has described this is in these famil-
iar traits: the inanimate becomes animate, death becomes life, 
cars, dolls, urban infrastructure, etc. All become killers of the 
human race with levels of conscious intent. This life of the non-
human is one of decadence and privacy, fears are played out 
regarding the resistance of secret gangs and cultic affiliations, 
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set within the home and usually in the dark. Such a view of hor-
ror is a post-human, love affair intermixed with a paranoia of 
each other and our capacity to eliminate life. It is a place where 
the human is defined through its ability to protect its essential 
qualities against the dispossession it encounters. A commitment 
to the darkness and unfathomability of human consciousness, 
undertaken as a form of protection of human life, now blocks 
the possibility of comprehending life as a self-causing system, 
which in turn dries up any possibility of re-engineering that life. 
This is an engineering that is necessary to overcome a stultifica-
tion that is subtended by mythic narratives of the human under 
duress and that only serves to annihilate purpose.
If horror is another way to express our complex relation to 
negativity, then it asks us to understand what we are as human 
and to extend this definition, for the project of purpose asks us 
to think what we are not, and from where we are not. This is the 
project of a future-oriented comprehension of life as opposed 
to the fascinations with the present that have characterized mo-
dernity and postmodern cultures. Instead of a discourse on self-
expression that begins from the site of the synthetic, this pro-
ject calls for an integrative method vis-à-vis both political and 
philosophical approaches to knowledge and the way in which 
thoughts are made manifest in language, thus enabling a more 
thorough explication of negativity in the world. The need to exit 
the genre of horror towards another generic space of the un-
derstanding is exemplified by the limits of phenomenological 
approaches that correlate our sense perception to an inacces-
sible real. This exit does not take us to the place of the non-nor-
mative. It is therefore not an escape from language itself. This is 
instead the construction of new normativities and new truths 
that can be taken as norms.
An erroneous identification of negativity as a regulative ideal 
is an incorrect comprehension of negativity itself. This supports 
a theory of difference as a given and mobilizing force that ul-
timately finds its home in identity production. Our examples 
determine a crisis of being within difference that populates the 
character of horror — the kind which does more than mirror 
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our alienation from ourselves and each other — but also under-
scores our entrapment in neo-liberal forms of capitalistic ineq-
uity in which no alternative is offered. This returns us to our 
starting point, where we discussed a form of the non-normative, 
heterogeneous life in the film Hostel, in which, despite its vis-
ceral sensory excess, horror is commensurate with the status 
quo — the libidinal economy of a capitalist realism27 — of global 
financial capital. We can stretch this analogy to the standardiza-
tion of artistic critique as a form of heterogeneous encounter 
subtended by normative conditioning. Appeals to accelerate 
the unsavory or unsatisfactory conditions of capital as we know 
them serve only to produce excessive parodic aesthetics where 
horror that might have once required serious attention resides 
in the realm of kitsch. These appeals result in an uncritical rela-
tion to the given. It is here where a re-comprehension of lan-
guage and its politics is urgently called for, not as an effect upon 
our lives, either negatively or positively proposed, but rather as 
a cause that can be determined for life. 
A non-human life is therefore not a human dispossession of 
agency, cause, or determination. A world that is subtended by 
negativity does not require embracing Gaia, nor does it identify 
a general horizontality of life. Such landscapes that characterize 
“the all” often seek to meet the image of our self-conception as 
it is, through the transferring of human identities onto nature. 
Here, the capacity for human life can be seen to be not so much 
the origin of animalistic pathology as, more problematically, 
destined to it. Pictures of human life responsible for, but also 
cast adrift in, the context of larger scale contingencies render us 
alienated beings in a spiritualism/primitivism that turns hor-
ror upside down, since nature, not the human specifically, is the 
figure of horror.28 However, horror maintains its structure. And 
27 See Jean François Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, trans. Iain Hamilton Grant 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983) and Mark Fisher, Capitalist 
Realism: Is There No Alternative? (Winchester: Zero Books, 2009).
28 See Alex Garland, dir., Annihilation (Los Angeles: Paramount Pictures, 
2018), based on the books in the Southern Reach Trilogy by Jeff Vander-
Meer, Annihilation (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014), Authority 
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so, we must be careful to dissect this horror as a sense of al-
ienation, ineffectiveness, and distancing that defines our experi-
ence of contingency. This dislocation from our own capacity to 
think and act is given in stories that show us how we are lost to 
the world — where we watch as fires spread, people murder for 
profit and titillation, and ultimately, where this devastation is 
beyond our control — the horror of life now, under neo-liberal 
capitalism.
This consistently modern narrative of failure demands a re-
fusal to continue with an anti-representationalist investment in 
resistance, and it alternatively asks us to re-ground an episte-
mology of horror that attends to the formal qualities of expres-
sion. What we must determine is a mode of construction that 
can answer, understand, and respond to the dimension of hor-
ror understood as the being of alienation.
Horror at Hell-Mouth 
When faced with the narratives we have reviewed that attest to 
the paucity of the imagination, it is still possible to argue that 
language can deliver different and new information. It is still 
possible to redefine what language is and can say from within 
the conditions of ordinary language. Therefore, we can under-
take a project that commits to the “yet to be known” from the 
place of being in the world, a thinking that is ordered by nor-
mativity and, because of this, can think beyond undesirable for-
mal constraints.29 This project requires a transcendental space as 
well as alienation as the expression of negativity affords us this 
theory of irreducibility. The language that we will construct is 
not a mirror of our lived world, and it would be a mistake to take 
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014), and Acceptance (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014).
29 Robert Brandom, “Heroism and Magnanimity, The Post-Modern Form 
of Self-Conscious Agency,” lecture at Marquette University, Milwaukee, 
February 24, 2019. Brandom’s Hegelian hero of the act is one who stays 
true to normative codes and does not assume exteriorized positions that 
live within spaces before or above the law as normative givens. 
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it as one. This is to say, language is enough to get us beyond the 
conditions of capitalistic entrapment, and it is enough to express 
another form of thought that does not rely on an escape from 
alienation itself. Here, we can unglue a theory of an alienation of 
mind from the alienating forces of capitalist formations.30 
This means that we can think being without referent and, 
more accurately, without referent to the negativity of referent. 
And we can do this without the semantic pessimism that would 
inhabit this negativity as an attitude that conditions all behav-
ior. We must ask how and where negativity takes place or gets 
played out if at all in the world as lived, for if we work with no 
conception of it, the risk is that we would be blind to the pur-
pose of any judgment we make and unable to value any expres-
sion of dissatisfaction with the way things are. In response, we 
can assert that the act of thinking is in language and that this is 
not ordered, ruled, or constrained by negativity. Rather, nega-
tivity is the structural property necessary for thought to think 
difference within languages that are political and aesthetic, and 
therefore we must labor under the careful articulation of what 
negativity means. 
We have argued that identifying negativity as the genesis of 
horror is limited. It is limited in its characterization of thought, 
as well as in regard to how negativity becomes located in ration-
al-explanatory, aesthetic, sense-based encounters. We have also 
seen how this formal structure of horror in aesthetic configura-
tions has a predilection for genre-based modifiers that actually 
reinstate the vertical axes of power that we sought to annihi-
late, rendering them as implicit ideological forces. Now, horror 
is compelled to be re-imagined, recast, and thought again. A 
theory of horror must at least inject itself with a new task for 
thought. At best, we can say that horror as we have known it 
is redundant. If we take our definition of horror to be the ex-
30 This approach to alienation as constructive spans history, but, more 
recently, accelerationism develops this as a larger contemporary discourse, 
and more specifically, see Reza Negarestani, Intelligence and Spirit (Fal-
mouth: Urbanomic, 2018).
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pression in ordinary language of our alienation, then we could 
replace horror with other terms such as “noir,” “alien,” or “scien-
tific” — that is, horror loses its horror, for the role of the nega-
tive is necessary and not spectacular or characterized by spec-
tral qualities. Instead, we are referring to a definitive method of 
intractable negativity, neither grasped by nor lost to represen-
tation. It is rather an attitude that determines the real through 
systems of representation that are adequate to it. In pragmatic 
terms, this project does not identify a formal destination but 
rather inhabits a principle for life lived.31 This project aims be-
yond horror. It seeks to realize its own incompleteness and make 
it a fact, where this facticity is unthinkable in practical terms 
and is only written a posteriori in a process of proofs and refuta-
tions. This conceptualization of horror destroys the spectacle of 
its authority, unbinds aesthetics, politics, and philosophy, and 
duly undermines authority as spectacle. It is the construction 
of a different relation to the unknown and the yet-to-be known. 
In the encounter with the new and in the comprehension that 
something has changed, we can say that the information that we 
consider to be different to us was always already there and ready 
to be understood, being made ready in our anticipation. This 
historical interface with the new is not one of shock, because 
we had already thought this. Therefore, difference is a question 
of already existing structures; difference is written and does not 
appear from nowhere, even if it appears to us as such. The entity 
that enters our scene is not one of a haunting from beyond our 
world. It is always within reach, but this does not banalize the 
new.32
31 Wilfrid Sellars proposes the necessity of a transcendental axiomatic for the 
living of the “good life.” Wilfrid Sellars, “Reason and the Art of Living in 
Plato [1968],” in Essays in Philosophy and Its History (Dordrecht: B. Reidel 
Publishing Company, 1974), 3–26. 
32 Stanley Fish, “Change,” in Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, 
and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1990), 141–60. Fish discusses this point with a com-
mentary on the work of Noam Chomsky, asserting that the Chomsky 
“revolution” was in fact already pre-apprehended by specific ideas, works, 
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Would this conceptualization of the new spell disaster for 
our view of ourselves as autonomous beings who are self-deter-
mining and capable of an anarchic and free imagination? Does 
this focus on the space of language at the level of intersubjective 
knowledge rid aesthetics of its allure and prohibit the drive to 
know? If horror is the riddle that tells us that language is capa-
ble of manifesting and communicating what is unknown and 
that thinking can preserve the fact of the unknown and can 
thus hold this contradiction in place, then horror is ultimately 
a form of Romantic skepticism that is satisfied with a dialectic 
that anchors its poles in too-specific locations. The desire to not 
overcome this contradiction is the desire to make horror a love 
affair with the enigma of the self. This entails a severe misunder-
standing about the way in which epistemology and representa-
tion work. 
I want to head back to a form of “horror” that motivates the 
non-tragic.33 This refers to the notion that a subject can act in 
accordance with norms, can explicate the conditions of their ac-
tion via thinking/doing but does not identify their relation to 
the unknown as something that is forever unobtainable. While 
characters of the non-tragic have frequently been featured in 
popular cultural representations, we will concentrate on the 
Warner Bros. TV series Buffy the Vampire Slayer34 since this se-
ries succeeds in locating a paradigm of the non-tragic that asks 
us to reorient our comprehension of what thought might con-
stitute. 
While the central axis of Buffy focuses on the holding-pat-
tern storyline of Sarah Michelle Gellar’s character Buffy’s on-
and-off, tragic hero vampire-with-a-soul, boyfriend Angel, the 
and actions that anticipated difference. This occurs without undermining 
the change that this work affects (498).
33 For more discussion on the non-tragic, see Amanda Beech, “Last Rights: 
The Non-Tragic Image and the Law,” in The Flood of Rights, eds. Thomas 
Keenan, Suhail Malik, Tirdad Zolghadr (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2017), 
159–75. 
34 Joss Whedon, Buffy the Vampire Slayer (WB and UPN Television networks, 
1997–2003).
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series also lays out another form of vampire life that does not 
worry so much about its human past. Here we see the camp 
world of Spike and pals (yes, it is Buffy), where there are no de-
sires to re-engage with humanity nor to reflect on what is gone. 
Instead, we see a parallel world that apes the former but lives by 
different rules. While the vampires without souls in Buffy have 
very human traits, they do not claim any particular relation of 
care with “the human” or with humanity. Moreover, life is a kind 
of game where the series of events that configure it never seem 
to end. This exposition of another form of life is what horror as 
action potentializes. It is a kind of thought of life without exist-
ing life being central to its definition — a thought of life in which 
the apocalypse is a regular and real threat but a threat that does 
not haunt the protagonists’ perception of the world as a point of 
trauma that cannot be addressed. There is no definition of the 
self in Buffy, since all vampires are not born but made, and un-
like the domestication and bureaucracy of vampires in the HBO 
series True Blood (2010–14), who adhere to or replicate the kind 
of administrative rules that we see more than ever in the Univer-
sity, these vampires get on with “vampire business” for the most 
part. Joss Whedon’s movie, Cabin in the Woods (2012), follows 
through with this non-human, non-sentimentalism. And again, 
it is teen-geek-life gathered around some kind of hell-mouth 
that occupies the pivotal space that holds that red button that 
can annihilate the world. Crucially, any decision to end it all is 
based on the fact that destruction is now simply necessary. 
This perspective of horror, in which the view from nowhere is 
made possible through living within the somewhere, must con-
struct this somewhere as the genesis and origin of action. To do 
this, place-as-location has to be written as the archetypal non-
place, as the pre-political space that exists beneath the founda-
tions of Buffy’s high school. This is called “Hell Mouth” and it is 
the gates to the beyond, but centrally, its existence guarantees 
the end of the world. The fatalistic storyline that subtends all 
action wreaks of accelerationist fantasies of human apocalypse 
in the post-Anthropocene, in which we are given two choices, 
to save or to destroy life as we know it. This similarity between 
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accelerationism and the decisions that are made available in the 
face of the inevitability of Hell Mouth is instructive. It reminds 
us that the presence of the end of the world as a theme is a func-
tional necessity in order to support the drama of a life as a soap 
opera, in other words, the life that goes on and perseveres sea-
son after season supported by the reiterative narrative of “near-
death.” Ultimately this transcendental or parallel life that we see 
lived out in Buffy, this view from nowhere that is literally con-
structed as a dialogue with the other — and is therefore read as 
a tacit knowledge that the destiny of life is death — ultimately 
plays out as the conservation of already existing social values for 
the most part, although the re-structuring of the “family unit” 
as a fraternity promises an alternate notion of the family beyond 
normative ideological principles within liberalism. That being 
said, the decision to give up on life and let the world destroy 
itself does not articulate any commitments regarding life in the 
future. These two options leave us between conservativism on 
the one hand and the mythology of self-sacrifice on the other 
hand, and they each redeem a particularly tragic identification 
with subjectivity.
Buffy’s postmodern world obviously has its limits(!). Its lim-
its ask us to think about a place where the decision is not to save 
or to destroy life as we know it but where the decision is how to 
re-orient the question of knowledge itself. The narrative config-
uration of Buffy shows us that violence and the institutionaliza-
tion of new forms of order ultimately redefine a life rather than 
interface with the genesis of it. For example, Buffy’s dialogues 
with the other, such as demons, alien machines, and vampires, 
are not propositions regarding the condition of absolute neg-
ativity, viz., death in itself as in-access par excellence. Rather, 
her actions are symptoms of it. These formal manifestations of 
death arrive in characters that represent other languages, other 
forms of life that Buffy’s own life hinges upon, since she has also 
died (twice, and returned). Death in such a case is not the ab-
solute. Instead, death is deferred, since the irretrievable, end-of-
the-world scenario is not equivalent to the death of the person 
or even to the end of humanity as such. This separation between 
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human life and life in general breaks the ontological regression 
or hellish circularity that is brought about by the conflation of 
concept and image, epistemology and ontology. This break po-
tentializes the capacity for language to operate as a system for 
tracing and proposing the dynamic between what language can 
say and what language can say about itself. In this sense, the op-
erations of conceptual normativity, the rules of the living dead, 
do not tell the story of uncertainty nor do they show any will to 
leave the human behind. Rather, they tell the story of a calling 
from somewhere else that demands a form of self-determina-
tion and drive in the expansive terrain of human mundanity.35 
This latter, non-tragic narrative perhaps illustrates anoth-
er route by which to comprehend thought as material and by 
which to see the way in which this pop-cultural material situates 
the real without being conditioned by a theory of it.36 This shift 
that we can see — from horror as a pseudo-dialectical paradigm 
that dances between the inner frame and its edges to the mysti-
cism of the unreal object-world, through to the failures of post-
modern conservativism — underscores how horror as we know 
it struggles to offer us an account of the negativity of being in 
the world, as well as a political project. 
If horror is a place of epistemology noir, a site for the exca-
vation and explication of the undergirding conditions of nega-
tivity, a realism must be asserted that can rescue horror from 
35 Horror in this case is not horror as we know it in forms of dialectical mate-
rialism that would play off the image of transgression against its concept. 
While all the characters are there that would enable some appeal to the 
edge of an ontology of norms, demons, monsters, creeps, unethical teen 
wannabes, witches, and other indescribable (in)organic entities that refer-
ence horror as transgressive in some form are self-consciously situated as 
products of a genre rather than entities of the real.
36 Here, Angel, as the tragic object of the series, is soon decentered and worn 
out within the larger Buffy narrative and goes on to be featured in Angel, a 
spin-off series, to become a noir-style, la cop running a haphazard detec-
tive agency. Unlike Angel, and unlike the vampires she kills and hangs out 
with, Buffy gives up her life as a normal teenager for a life of slaying. Her 
decisive identity that meets her destiny as the Slayer is in the end mirrored 
only by the vampire Spike but in an equality of certainty. 
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horror and traverse the paradigms of genre and the generic, al-
though we must bear in mind that the escape from genre does 
not land one eo ipso in the field of the generic. This traversal 
would be, perhaps, better articulated as a logically inspired form 
of violence. If horror is determined as the space in which we can 
explode the myths of our existence, then it must also be a space 
in which we can explode the myth of our precarity, the central 
axis of horror. It must risk losing the make-up that has defined 
it. Horror must reject horror. 
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Those Who Aren’t Counted
Matt Rosen
1. Introduction 
On the morning of the eighth of May 1945, as the Nazis surren-
dered to the Allies toward the end of World War II, a day now 
celebrated as Victory in Europe Day, 5,000 Algerians paraded 
through the French Algerian city of Sétif. While celebrating the 
end of the war and paying tribute to their fallen, some of those 
marching also carried banners on which messages decrying the 
colonial rule of the French were written. These marchers clashed 
with the local gendarmerie — literally, “armed people,” a facet of 
the French military tasked with local law enforcement — when 
the gendarmerie attempted to seize their anti-colonial placards. 
There is some debate about who fired the first shot, but what 
happened next is uncontroversial in its essentials. Both the po-
lice and the protesters, including those carrying banners and 
others, suffered numerous casualties. Armed protesters cap-
tured and slaughtered Europeans in the streets. And on that 
same evening, a peaceful protest orchestrated by the Algerian 
People’s Party in the nearby city of Guelma was suppressed with 
shocking violence. 
In the rural areas surrounding Sétif, news of police brutality 
led angry locals to attack pieds-noirs, a segment of the popula-
tion comprised largely of ethnically French people born in Alge-
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ria and people whose ancestors had migrated to French Algeria 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The pieds-noirs 
overwhelmingly supported the colonial rule of the French, and 
this fact played a justificatory role in the attacks against them 
which directly followed the violence in Sétif. These attacks led 
to the deaths of 102 Europeans, almost all of whom were civil-
ians. There were, in addition, hundreds of non-fatal injuries, in-
cluding systematic rape and corollary trauma. The mutilation 
and desecration of corpses was widespread. The French mili-
tary quelled the rebellion after several days, with a great deal of 
damage already having been done. But the military didn’t rest 
contented with having put down this resistance. They enacted 
a number of brutal reprisals on settlers and Algerian Muslims 
alike. In a ratissage or “raking-over” of the countryside near Sé-
tif and Guelma, the military carried out summary executions, 
bombed villages entire, and shelled the town of Kherrata from 
a cruiser in the Gulf of Béjaïa. Pieds-noirs, reacting to assaults 
and seeking vengeance, lynched randomly selected Algerian 
Muslims who had been incarcerated in local prisons. Staking a 
bloody claim to vigilante justice, they shot whomever was seen 
wearing a white arm band — a symbol of the resistance — with 
no questions asked.1 Perhaps it is unsurprising that most of the 
victims of this violence weren’t involved in the original protests 
on the eighth of May. 
Altogether, the violence that followed the events in Sétif and 
Guelma is estimated to have led to between 1,020 and 45,000 
fatalities. There is of course a stark difference between the lower 
and upper limits of this estimate. There is not much reason to 
doubt that the violence which took place on the eighth of May 
and shortly thereafter brought about a great many avoidable 
deaths. Many of those who died in this unrest were horrifically 
1 Like the violence perpetrated by the recently defeated Nazi regime, this 
violence was committed mit keine Fragen, extra-judicially and with no 
questions asked. For further information, the reader may find it helpful 
to refer to Mehana Amrani, Le 8 mai 1945 en Algérie: Les discours français 
sur les massacres de Sétif, Kherrata et Guelma (Paris: Editions L’Harmattan, 
2010).
115
THOSE WHO AREN’T COUNTED
slaughtered, and many of those who survived were nevertheless 
condemned to lead lives warped by their having taken part in 
the violence or misshapen by the tremendous burden of mourn-
ing in the wake of inhumanity. There’s plenty of reason to find 
these events tragic. But many of us, looking back at these events, 
will be more inclined to consider the violence a severer trag-
edy if it led to 45,000 deaths rather than 1,020, just as we would 
be inclined to find an event that caused 100 deaths, while still 
tragic, even less severe. 
The figure of 1,020 deaths was reported by the French gov-
ernment in the Tubert Report, shortly after the events that took 
place in Sétif and Guelma. The figure of 45,000 deaths was re-
ported by Radio Cairo, also very soon after the violence sub-
sided. Now, if we set aside the horrific but non-fatal barbarity of 
the injuries that resulted from this conflict — wounds no doubt 
physical, psychological, and social — and focus simply on the 
reported number of fatalities, which is often used to mark a con-
flict’s severity, we’ll notice a significant narrative difference be-
tween the two reported figures: 1,020 deaths and 45,000 deaths. 
Each figure tells, and fits into, a different story about what went 
on in Sétif and Guelma on the eighth of May and soon after, and 
about what it means. Each figure conveys a different sense of 
the magnitude of the tragedy. And each makes various attitudes 
in response to that tragedy seem more or less apt. If the num-
ber of fatalities was 1,020, as the official French report claims, 
then a certain attitude toward the violence might seem more 
appropriate: though we regret that anyone had to die in such a 
way, we might be willing to say that the death toll was the price 
that had to be paid for civil peace. Although it sounds crass, and 
maybe for good reason, we might be thankful that more people 
who might have perished were saved from this fate. The conflict 
might in this sense look less bad than it could have been, in vir-
tue of a comparison between the number of fatalities that were 
its consequence and the number that might conceivably have 
resulted had things been only slightly different. If the number of 
fatalities was 45,000, however, then we might take the violence 
to have been worse in degree than had it been 1,020. We might 
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find the tragedy severer, the burden of mourning weightier, the 
horror of what went on in Sétif and Guelma more intense and 
less comprehensible. For even if all these deaths were the cost of 
the mitigation of unrest, even if there had been no imaginable 
alternative, it may yet seem to us that 45,000 deaths are consid-
erably costlier than 1,020 deaths, or any lesser number for that 
matter. 
We may feel that our reason to be saddened by this trage-
dy — to mourn, to seek in its light to prevent similar conflicts 
from escalating in this way in the future, to take the violence 
of Sétif and Guelma as a historical example of atrocity — is 
proportional to the number of the dead. This is a common at-
titude when it comes to atrocities: the greater the number of 
the dead, the more tragic we say it was. This attitude seems to 
me to be mistaken, since it rests on what I take to be a distorted 
picture of the real affliction that those who perished in Sétif and 
Guelma underwent. A sense of atrocity, based in part on the 
fatality count that conveys an impression of its severity, stands 
in for the affliction of those who, whatever the fatality count, 
were indeed downtrodden. We should, first and foremost, at-
tend to and mourn this affliction when we are trying to under-
stand historical tragedies and conflicts, wars and injustices. The 
atrocity signified by the number of a body count often obscures 
the genuine affliction that real people experienced. It covers 
over the suffering that in some cases characterized their lives 
and the lives of those who knew them. I believe that this has an 
enormously deleterious effect on our capacity to make sense of, 
mourn, and live in light of the horrors of our past. An ethical 
attitude toward these horrors, I will argue, demands attention to 
the affliction suffered by the injured and the dead, no matter the 
putative severity of the atrocity given meaning by the number 
of fatalities. 
In coming to terms with one’s history — insofar as this is pos-
sible (I don’t claim that the relevant mourning is ever necessarily 
completable, though I don’t think this prevents it from being 
practicable) — the moral person keeps her eyes fixed on afflic-
tion rather than atrocity, on the suffering of each person who 
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endured tragic circumstances or died under them, rather than 
on the count of bodies or list of injuries. In the face of atrocity, 
the moral person turns her attention to affliction. In the face of 
the impression of tragedy given by a body count, she turns her 
attention instead to those who aren’t counted, to the suffering 
that can never be counted. This, I will contend, is the shape the 
moral person’s attitude takes with regard to events such as those 
that went on in Sétif and Guelma. 
2. Analogy and Atrocity 
As is shown by the dissensus with respect to the number of 
fatalities that resulted from the violence of Sétif and Guelma, 
the number of a body count is implicated in a wider political 
narrative, within which this violence and its aftermath are to 
be made sense of.2 In the case I’ve been discussing, this is either 
the narrative of the French colonial government (1,020 deaths) 
or that of the Algerian resistance (45,000 deaths). The wide gap 
between the two estimates isn’t merely the consequence of, say, 
hasty miscounting, misreporting, or confusion due to the ongo-
ing conflict and an attendant lack of cooperation and commu-
nication, though these are surely relevant. Rather, the divergent 
numbers find their place, and are as such intelligible, in diver-
gent worldviews. These numbers are, in this sense, given from 
2 To put it another way, the number of a fatality count is, in a certain sense 
about which I’ll try to get clear, politically theory-laden. As Paul Feyer-
abend writes, “Not only are facts and theories in constant disharmony, 
they are never as neatly separated as everyone makes them out to be.” 
The fact of the number of the body count and its weight or significance 
can’t be neatly separated from the theoretical apparatus of what I’ll call an 
“analogy.” This is the set of relations in and through which sense is made 
of affliction as atrocity. The fact of a body count of 1,020 is intelligible as 
such to those who see a certain atrocity, who have a certain going theory 
or narrative about what went on in Sétif and Guelma. The fact of a count 
of 45,000 is intelligible to those who see another atrocity, who have a dif-
ferent theory or narrative about what went on in Sétif and Guelma; they 
make different sense of it. Paul Feyerabend, Against Method (London: 
Verso, 2010), 51.
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political stances, which lend them the credence of context. From 
the point of view of the French government, or for those who 
share a similar sense of things, the body count of 1,020 makes 
sense. It fits into a wider frame, without thereby calling that 
frame too much into question, and it then comes to have fur-
ther application (justificatory and otherwise) within that frame. 
Likewise, from the point of view of the Algerian resistance or its 
allies, the body count of 45,000 is intelligible, and this fits into 
an operative frame, while the suggestion that the proper count 
is actually 1,020 looks — from this vantage point — jarring, de-
ceitful, or senseless. If this suggestion is plausible, the pressure 
may lead one to adjust one’s view of things accordingly (perhaps 
beyond the scope of this specific incident). If it isn’t received as 
plausible, it may be dismissed on that account, and the pressure 
that would cause one to change one’s view, or to have to invent 
a way to deny the plausibility of the suggestion, won’t be felt.3 
It seems plausible that at least very many of those who inhab-
ited each point of view took the number of fatalities asserted by 
the representative of that view — either the French government 
or Radio Cairo — to be accurate. They were sincere in assert-
ing that either 1,020 or 45,000 is the proper count, though both 
evidently couldn’t have been right about this. But all the same, 
the numeric product that results from the count of bodies, the 
quantification of the fallen, is the outcome of an operation that 
takes place within a certain sort of political or social structure. I 
will call this structure an “analogy.”
3 This simplifies things to a certain extent. In some cases, the suggestion will 
be received as entirely implausible because an operative view is so strongly 
held or so resistant to information that conflicts with it; in such cases, the 
pressure that would cause one to change one’s view won’t be felt much at 
all. In other cases, the suggestion will be received as pretty implausible, 
as likely to be false, or as questionable, but it won’t be dismissed outright. 
This may lead one to change one’s view in a minor way, or to repress or 
twist the information received, since that information won’t be received 
as wholly worthy of dismissal. But the point stands: one’s view affects the 
information one receives. We always acquire information in the midst of 
things, with a view already in place, more or less liable to change depend-
ing on what facts are received and how they’re received. 
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An analogy works like this. From the vantage point of a par-
ticular community or social position, within a certain frame 
of understanding by means of which particular sorts of people 
(who are often identified as such by attributes of such-and-such 
a type) make sense of the world and their place in it, it is held 
as true and importantly meaningful that there’s a specific cor-
relation — an analogy — between those who have perished and 
the narrative of their affliction. The dead are tied to a certain 
story, seen from a certain view, and this analogy or correlation 
is what I mean by an “atrocity.” An atrocity is this analogical link 
that unites the dead and a particular narrative about what they 
suffered and how they died. It’s a link that makes sense from a 
particular view of things and can be seen — depending on the 
narrative and how tightly it fits with the facts of the affliction 
(insofar as these are known and open to public view) — to be 
more or less apt in relation to the wider perspective. In other 
words, an atrocity is the partial sense made of affliction from a 
politically or socially specific view. It relies on, helps to explain, 
and is commonly furthered by particular answers (which have 
to be seen as more or less intelligible) to the questions: “How 
many people died there?” and “In what way did they die?” and 
“Who (what sort of person) killed them, and for what reason?” 
An atrocity is an analogical structure with two terms: those 
who perished, on the one hand, and the narrative of their af-
fliction, on the other. It is the “third” that unites these terms 
in itself. As terms of the consequent atrocity, the dead and the 
story into which they fit can’t be understood as extricable from 
their mutual relation, so far as those who see the atrocity as an 
atrocity are concerned. The dead can’t be stripped of their nar-
rative significance, which grants their deaths sense for a specific 
community of the living. Likewise, the narrative can’t be un-
derstood apart from those who died, to whom it grants a par-
ticular meaning for the living. The number of fatalities plays an 
important part in this analogy. This number, intelligible as such 
from within a particular point of view, ties together the victims 
and the meaning given to what they suffered. What results is an 
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atrocity. The number then signifies and stands in for the atroc-
ity, understood to look a certain way (to which the number of 
fatalities is to give voice) from a particular point of view.
The atrocity — from whatever perspective, whichever atroc-
ity one sees — subsumes under it both those who have perished 
and the narrative of their affliction. It’s an analogy in which 
these terms are comprehensible only as indistinct. We can put it 
this way: those who have perished are always already those who 
have partaken in the narrative of their affliction, and that narra-
tive isn’t separable from those who have perished. Where there 
was affliction, where ordinary people were forced to undergo 
real horrors, the quantification of the fallen produces an atrocity 
whose number crystallizes its sense.
3. Affliction
The affliction that was suffered in Sétif and Guelma is, for each 
person who underwent it, one and the same, no matter whether 
the death toll was 1,020 or 45,000. Affliction isn’t something that 
can be measured, weighed, or subject to comparison. It can’t be 
counted. But the atrocity is radically different in each case. It can 
be measured, weighed, or subject to comparison — in fact, it just 
is what can be so counted. It is crystallized by means of a specific 
number, and this number can in certain situations belie it or the 
wider view from which it is seen.
The affliction of those who met their end in Sétif and Guelma 
or endured its violence precedes the analogical structure of the 
atrocity. From the view of the afflicted, their affliction isn’t yet 
atrocious. In the first place, affliction is without atrocity. When 
the French government made sense of the affliction suffered in 
Sétif and Guelma by means of the count of 1,020, they dealt with 
atrocity. Radio Cairo too dealt with atrocity by way of the count 
of 45,000. In neither of these cases was the affliction itself — pri-
or to its transformation into atrocity — dealt with. 
Affliction is different from atrocity in kind, while an atrocity 
with a signifying number of 1,020 is different in degree from one 
that has a number of 45,000. The former atrocity is like the latter 
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in this way: each is a violent set of events — in many ways, the 
same set of events — that occurred in the context of the Nazi’s 
surrender and the French colonial occupation of Algeria. We 
could conceivably add further details to our characterization of 
these events, some of which would fit into the identifiable nar-
rative structures of both atrocities. (This isn’t of course true of 
all the major details, as is shown by the question of how many 
people died in the violence.) Even so, the former atrocity is un-
like the latter atrocity in this way: we’re likely to consider the 
latter atrocity less grave; and this picture of things meshes with 
a particular frame of social and political reference and under-
standing. 
So affliction can’t be more or less than what it is. But atrocity 
is always more or less than what it is; this intensive difference is 
given in large part by the atrocity’s unique number — the prod-
uct of the body count — in contrast to other plausible numbers 
in which one could put one’s faith (or in which others put their 
faith). 
The atrocity in which 1,020 people were killed differs in quan-
tity from that in which 45,000 people were killed. But it would 
be a mistake to see this as merely a difference in quantity. Each 
number tells a distinct story about what went on in Sétif and 
Guelma. Each paints a particular picture of the events, and each 
comes to light in a distinct worldview. Each number thus lends 
the atrocity a different sense or weight (we might say, a differ-
ent atrociousness). And each comes to symbolize this sense or 
weight — in a way, to stand in for it. The apparent difference in 
quantity between 1,020 and 45,000 is an intensive or qualitative 
difference, and really a narrative difference. The fatality count 
gives voice to the qualitative fabric of a particular point of view 
with respect to what happened in Sétif and Guelma and what it 
should be taken to mean. The resultant number expresses and 
carries a specific — and generally communal — opening onto 
the world. It is an aperture onto the past and a symbol which 
then figures in mourning, with which one then tries to live go-
ing forward.
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Now the quality to which the number of the body count 
gives voice comes to life in an analogy. In this analogy, the self 
and the other — those who see atrocity and those who were af-
flicted — are seen to be inextricable, tied together in a knot that 
is productive of sense. The quality of the atrocity has a recog-
nizable structure. I will call this the atrocity’s “for-y” structure. 
The self and the other are seen to be necessarily “for” each other 
(y), and each is in itself unthinkable without this “for” and the 
other term (y) to which it is tied by way of the “for.” The “for,” 
however, isn’t transitive. The dead “for” those who see atrocity 
aren’t those who see atrocity and have to live in the face of it. 
That is, the analogical form of the atrocity is made up of two 
more basic analogies, of which it is the reticulation: the self “for” 
the other and the other “for” the self, the living who have to go 
forward in light of atrocity and the afflicted who are intelligible 
under a certain atrocious aspect for those who see their afflic-
tion as atrocity. The unique number of the atrocity, the result 
of the count of bodies, isn’t merely quantitative, since it gives 
a condensed expression to the “for,” the quality that unites the 
dead and the living in atrocity’s analogical schema. The number 
marks this “for.” It symbolizes the analogical reticulation that 
gives the terms of the analogy their sense precisely insofar as 
they are its terms. 
The result of the body count is the locution in number that 
stands in for the atrocity. It represents the analogical relation 
of the two more basic analogies, each of which involves a non-
transitive “for-y” quality. So the quantity of the fatality count 
names, as it were, the quality of the given violence as an atroc-
ity, helping to determine and serving to enunciate its apparent 
severity and its essence. 
4. Quantifying the Fallen
I have been claiming that the unique number of a body count 
marks the quality — the dual “for-y” structure — of an atrocity. 
It fits into a particular view, and it comes to give expressive and 
symbolic weight to a vision of the atrociousness of a set of events 
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(which then colors these events through and through). The 
number of the fatality count both fits into and in part carries a 
wider view. But how is it given? I don’t mean to ask about how 
a count of bodies is undertaken in its logistical details. Rather, I 
mean to ask about how it is seen from, and done by those who 
inhabit, a specific view of a set of events, a view through which 
this set of events takes a particular shape as an atrocity with an 
identifiable sense.
The unique number that stands in for the severity and mean-
ing of an atrocity is given by a political or communal operation, 
a shared way of making sense of what has happened by con-
densing a joint understanding (thereby solidifying it) into a sort 
of crystal: the number of the body count. I’ll call this operation 
the “count-as-x.” For the French government, the violence of 
Sétif and Guelma was counted-as-1,020. For the Algerian resist-
ance, it was counted-as-45,000. Counting-as bestows sense. It 
folds seemingly senseless and often traumatic events into a nar-
rative structure, and it compresses that structure into the potent 
symbol of a figure. As we will see, this operation’s excess is real 
affliction. That is what is set aside — forgotten, fundamentally 
neglected — in the production of atrocity, done by means of the 
count-as-x. 
Now the count-as-x also counts its x as one in the end. For in-
stance, the 1,020 or 45,000 counts for one as “Sétif and Guelma,” 
as “what happened there.” A certain univocity is established, 
imposed on a series of discrete events, on the affliction suffered 
by each victim (each person who became a victim) beyond the 
frame of the atrocity. This counting-as-one aids in the produc-
tion of sense, and it is of especial importance if that sense is to be 
shared among the members of a polity or passed along within a 
social sphere. It’s this counting-as-one that enables the lesson of 
Sétif and Guelma to be taught to children in a digestible way; it 
is this that finds its way into history textbooks. What is missed, 
though, is the affliction — passed over in the count-as-x and ne-
glected entirely in the x = one that solidifies an atrocity made 
sensible in affliction’s place. 
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The singular people who suffered in Sétif and Guelma thus 
come under a particular form of description — in effect, a for-
mal order — in which the affliction is thematized as atrocity 
by means of a dual counting operation: the count-as-x and the 
x = one. Affliction is made sense of in terms of the particular 
analogical quality of the atrocity. It is only glimpsed, so to speak, 
through a decidedly atrocious lens.4 In this way, it is distorted, 
rendered intelligible for those who inhabit a particular view of 
things (which itself isn’t limited to retrospection). 
The operation of the count-as-x produces a number, x, which 
is given analogically. This number’s sense is that of the anal-
ogy — the atrocity — which it marks. The communal or politi-
cal sphere, as we have seen, structures itself analogically around 
4 Reiner Schürmann writes that “[h]egemonies transform the singular into 
a particular. They serve to say what is, to classify and inscribe, to distribute 
proper and common nouns.” Reiner Schürmann, Broken Hegemonies, 
trans. Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 7. 
There are, it seems to me, important similarities between Schürmann’s 
hegemonies and the totalizing analogies I am considering here. Both 
transform the singular other person into a particular: the other “for” me, 
“for” us, “for” the living. Both classify and inscribe, rendering affliction 
narrowly intelligible as atrocity. Now the question for us is this. Is there a 
way in which the particular, the realm of the hegemony, might no longer 
be seen as the “chief-represented” (ἡγεμών) but merely as the represented? 
Can we come to see the analogical as no longer hegemonic, as secondary 
to what’s singular and, in this secondariness, as coexistent with the primacy 
of the singular? That is: can we inhabit analogy without letting it become 
totalizing or hegemonic? This question takes a number of forms across 
various subject matters in philosophy. Consider these examples. Can 
preferential love coexist with love for strangers? Can community coexist 
with genuine hospitality? Can ethics coexist with politics? This form of 
question underlies much of my thinking here and elsewhere. It would not 
be inaccurate to put it this way. How can we keep the inherent partiality 
or inadequacy of analogy forefront in our minds while still inhabiting it, 
and what follows from doing so? How can we keep, in some sense, what 
hegemonic structures are while dissolving their hegemonic quality? I think 
that is often possible, though it requires, sometimes, changes to the struc-
tures themselves. One case in which it’s possible is this: the sense made 
of affliction as atrocity can be kept as non-totalizing insofar as one bears 
witness to the affliction itself in its primacy. This essay attempts to get clear 
about how that would work.
125
THOSE WHO AREN’T COUNTED
calamitous events. Hence, these events are understood as atroc-
ities, made intelligible within a specific frame. The atrocity is 
woven into a particular social fabric and in turn helps to sup-
port that fabric (or adds to it) by crystallizing affliction in an 
atrocious number that makes it meaningful and thus more bear-
able. Through the operation of the count-as-x and the analogical 
givenness of the atrocity, and especially through the counting-
as-one of x, those who inhabit the relevant social position or 
community can chart a course forward in the face of what has 
happened. They can make sense of the past, mourn in a way 
that seems more or less accomplishable, and figure out how best 
to live going forward. But in so doing, they have forgotten the 
affliction of those whose suffering has been rendered, always 
in hindsight, atrocious. This affliction comes under a qualify-
ing description that makes it intelligible to those with a certain 
view; such is the movement from affliction to atrocity. It is this 
attitude to the horrors of the past, which considers them atroci-
ties, with which I want to take issue. 
5. The Topology of the Three-as-One
It will be useful to try to get a sense of the topological form 
of the communal or political sphere as it functions here. This 
sphere takes a specifiable shape in the analogical fashioning of 
atrocity, in making affliction in this way intelligible. I now want 
to get clear about this shape. 
To get going, consider the structure of an analogy that I 
identified in §2. It comprises two terms — the self and the other, 
those who see an atrocity and those who were afflicted — and 
a dual set of non-transitive relations between them; these rela-
tions give rise to the analogy’s “for-y” qualities. There’s the self 
“for” the other (the living who must go forward in the face of 
past injustices) and the other “for” the self (the dead who are in-
telligible under an atrocious aspect for the living). Neither term 
can be understood as separable from the other. Their relation is 
treated as primitive. The other isn’t really other here, not abso-
lutely. The two terms are thought under the aspect of a third: the 
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analogy itself, the atrocity that ties them together. In our analy-
sis, there appear to be three operative terms: the self, the other, 
and the atrocity. But all three have to be thought as one, within 
the bounds of the atrocity in which the first two terms — self 
and other — are comprehensible as inextricable. This topology, 
this shape of the community of the living and the dead, is what 
I will call “the three-as-one.” For there are three terms, but all 
are, in essence, as one, under the aspect of the third: the atrocity 
itself. 
In the topology of the three-as-one, the self and the other 
are tied together in the introduction of a third term (the anal-
ogy itself) such that they can’t be isolated from one another. So 
there exist three terms in the three-as-one, but they aren’t dis-
tinct terms. They are as one. The self isn’t itself thinkable apart 
from the other, and the other isn’t itself thinkable apart from the 
self. Moreover, neither of these basic relations can be thought 
without the other, for as we saw the analogy is the relationship 
between two non-transitive “for-y” relations. The self and the 
other only exist intelligibly insofar as they exist within the limits 
of the third term. They must be thought within its frame. The 
afflicted are the sense made of them for the living by way of the 
count-as-x. The living are those who have to figure out how to 
go forward in view of history’s atrocities. These terms — the self 
and the other, the living and the dead — are thinkable only in 
the relational schema, taken to be originary, of the analogy un-
der which they have always already been subsumed. 
The afflicted exist for the living. Within the analogy, then, 
they are different from the living only in degree. They are not 
the living, to be sure, but they crucially go on living with the 
living — they are the sense the living make of them (in part, by 
counting them as x, and then as one). In the three-as-one, the 
dead and the living are unthinkable apart from the analogy as a 
whole. Atrocity functions in precisely this way. It takes the shape 
of a three-as-one. Those who perished and the narrative of their 
affliction can’t be thought in separation from their conjoining in 
the third: the analogy itself qua atrocity.
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I say that an attitude toward the past’s unjust deaths accord-
ing to which they’re to be seen under the aspect of atrocity is 
not ethical. Affliction is made intelligible as atrocity through the 
operation of the count-as-x and x = one. What’s left out is afflic-
tion itself. The idea that atrocity is sufficient, that we must turn 
our attention to atrocity if we wish to understand the cruelties 
of history and make a life in light of them, leads us to neglect the 
affliction of real, ordinary people. I believe that this neglect pre-
vents us from actually coming to terms with the past. It keeps us 
from really mourning, from leading lives in which we are atten-
tive to what has happened in our history. It doesn’t allow us to 
approach events such as those that went on in Sétif and Guelma 
in an ethical manner. Living well in view of such events means 
contending with affliction, not forgetting this in contending 
with atrocity. 
I have described the attitude according to which past afflic-
tions are to be seen as atrocities, and so not as they really are, 
as not ethical. I don’t say it is unethical. For I want to emphasize 
that this attitude doesn’t involve a choice to conceive of afflic-
tions as atrocities (though particular choices may indeed follow 
from this conception); as if one knew full well, in conceiving 
of afflictions as atrocities, that a transformation had gone on. 
The person who sees an atrocity is not cognizant of having an 
immoral attitude, nor of seeing the world wrongly. Rather, she 
has simply forgotten affliction. Her error consists in letting it 
slip from mind, thereby allowing for atrocity’s constitution. This 
forgetting makes room for atrocity. The moral failure here is a 
failure to stay vigilant, to keep up a certain wakefulness regard-
ing the past’s afflictions. 
Someone who sees an atrocity in affliction’s place has a for-
getful attitude toward history’s injustices. In this sense, it is not 
ethical, since an ethical attitude toward these injustices would 
involve the perception of affliction and the vigilant maintenance, 
the remembering, of this perspicuous vision. The person who 
sees atrocity needs to be woken up, and then needs to keep her-
self awake. 
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An atrocity is a kind of totalizing construction; it tethers the 
dead to a certain narrative of their affliction, and it forgets that 
affliction itself. It renders the dead not really other than the liv-
ing, for neither can be fully understood except through their 
analogical relation. In an atrocity, the dead are nothing but the 
sense the living make of them. They are said to be this and noth-
ing besides. So an atrocity totalizes, under its own aspect, the af-
fliction of those who perished. It takes what it speaks of to be all 
there is to speak of when it comes to history’s calamitous events. 
It presumes to have no outside — or if it has one, it isn’t think-
able; it isn’t something to which one could attend in mourn-
ing. This atrocious construction is generally retrospective: the 
afflicted don’t themselves construct it, since it operates by means 
of a count-as-x that goes on in hindsight, and it is more or less 
completed, producing a largely closed sense of the atrocity and 
its constitutive events, in the count-as-one of x.
An atrocity gives the impression of being sufficient with re-
spect to what has happened. To those who inhabit the relevant 
point of view, it doesn’t look as if it leaves behind any excess. 
That this isn’t the case is only shown when contrary points of 
view come on the scene. The dissensus about the fatality count 
in Sétif and Guelma doesn’t only show that there are two differ-
ent atrocities, one marked by the count-as-1,020 and the other 
by the count-as-45,000. It also shows that both of these atroci-
ties have an outside — and indeed, a common outside. This is 
the affliction of those who perished in the violence which, one 
and the same, was suffered by each afflicted person. Both atroci-
ties endeavor to make this affliction intelligible under an atro-
cious description or within the bounds of a formal order. But 
they do this through totalization and neglect, and it’s in this 
sense that they stand in the way of an ethical attitude to the hor-
rors of the past. For atrocity renders a genuine encounter with 
the other — the afflicted — unthinkable. The three terms of the 
three-as-one, recall, are always as one, inextricable from one an-
other. The afflicted are only encountered as those who can be 
counted among the victims of atrocity, seen “for” those whose 
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vision is of atrocity. Since the other would be beyond the anal-
ogy, within the analogy it is the unencounterable par excellence. 
There can be no other in the three-as-one; the “as-one” pre-
cludes this. There can’t be anything different in kind from what 
is within the atrocity, held fast by it. Any other is off the table 
from the point of atrocity’s constitution in the count-as-x. The 
other can differ only in degree from the self, as what’s intelligi-
ble only in the sense in which it’s “for” the self, made analogi-
cal. It may seem that I am making heavy weather over this. But 
there’s a reason for that. This is how the forgetting of affliction 
characteristic of the three-as-one operates, and this forgetting 
is distinctive of the attitude with which I am taking issue. The 
production of atrocity — in the count-as-x and x = one — essen-
tially involves the neglect of affliction. The “for-y” quality of the 
analogy is imposed; the dead are seen to be fundamentally tied 
up with the sense made of them, and this forces them into a con-
text or position that is the same as that of the living — a context 
that is not the afflicted’s. To be sure, this doesn’t appear to be an 
imposition from within the view of things that constitutes, and 
is then in part constituted by, the production of atrocity. But that 
is precisely the three-as-one’s amnesia at work. 
The position into which the other is put, under which they’re 
in effect subsumed, is thought to be knowable by means of a sort 
of empathy. Since the other is already just what it is in relation to 
the self within the analogy, it is imagined that the self can step 
into the other’s shoes, so to speak, without much of a problem. 
And having done this, the self can try them on for size. In this 
way, the living take themselves to be able to get a grip on those 
who died atrociously. Understanding seems to come easily. Yet 
the living can’t empathetically get a handle on affliction itself, 
because this very empathetic “getting a handle on…” relies on 
the neglect of affliction. It operates only given a kind of lethargy. 
In this lethargy or forgetfulness, a supposedly easily acquirable 
understanding of analogy rids us of humility with respect to his-
tory’s horrors. 
The other and the self are each understood in their mutual 
indistinction. Empathy here turns on the introduction of a third 
130
DISEASES OF THE HEAD
term, an analogical bridge, which lets the self to some extent step 
into the other’s place.5 At least, so far as the self is concerned. 
The third term is a “like” or “unlike” relation that an other is 
seen to bear to oneself; the other is seen, in virtue of their simi-
larity to or difference in degree from oneself, to have a relational 
property (being like or unlike oneself in such-and-such a way or 
to such-and-such an extent) by means of which they’re intelligi-
ble to one as such. The afflicted are perhaps like those who look 
back on them from the perspective of Radio Cairo, since both 
have dealt with the threat of European colonialism. Or maybe 
the afflicted are unlike those who look back from the perspec-
tive of the French government, since they don’t share particu-
lar political beliefs. This “like” or “unlike” term serves to bridge 
the gap between the self and the other. This bridge is all that is 
needed to get analogical empathy going, even across great quali-
tative divides (as the manifest bridging ability of the “unlike” 
5 In his psychoanalytic self psychology, Heinz Kohut defines empathy as 
“vicarious introspection.” When one empathizes, one vicariously intro-
spects into the other; one tries the other’s shoes on for size, by way of one’s 
relation to the other and the qualities one sees the other to have. I compare 
this to Husserl’s account of empathy in my “The Givenness of Other Peo-
ple,” forthcoming. Kohut’s self-psychological method of empathy is a clear 
example of the sort of analogical ethic — the conception of one’s rightful 
relationship with other people — against which I am writing. It may be 
helpful to refer, when considering my talk of analogical empathy, to Ko-
hut’s essay “Introspection, Empathy, and Psychoanalysis: An Examination 
of the Relationship between Mode of Observation and Theory,” Journal of 
the American Psychoanalytic Association 7, no. 3 (1959): 459–83, as well as 
to Heinz Kohut, Analysis of the Self (New York: International Universities 
Press, 1979), 176–77. There seems to me to be something similar in Graham 
Harman’s development of his object-oriented ontology in ethics. Harman 
claims that the relation between oneself (x) and the other (y) exists as a 
compound object, x–y, which is morality’s locus. Indeed, Harman tells us 
that “ethics is about the compound of subject and object.” Here, I would 
like to dissent. Ethics is about how the compound of subject and object is 
insufficient with regard to the other; it is about how the other isn’t merely 
an object for a subject. Graham Harman, Object-Oriented Ontology: A New 
Theory of Everything (London: Pelican Books, 2018), 107.
131
THOSE WHO AREN’T COUNTED
term brings to bear).6 With the analogy in place, the seeming 
possibility of an empathetic grasp on the atrocious position of 
the dead leads us to further abandon the idea that atrocity has 
an outside. We take ourselves, within the three-as-one, to have 
come to terms with those who have died. And empathy makes it 
look as if we aren’t missing anything in this. But we have forgot-
ten the actual affliction of ordinary people. 
The self and the other are seen to exist only within the 
bounds of their empathetic relationship, which is evidently 
geared toward the self who presumes to empathize with the af-
flicted. The self is set as the norm, the constituting center, in 
relation to which the other differs only by a given degree. The 
other orbits the self, as it were. The three-as-one doesn’t admit 
of any genuine alterity that would precede the position of the 
analogy’s terms as terms. It takes the relation between the terms, 
centered on the self or the living, to be primitive. And so, it for-
gets affliction. 
The topology of the three-as-one is the shape that the com-
munity of the living and the dead takes in neglecting affliction 
and attending instead to atrocity. But I want to suggest that re-
membering affliction doesn’t mean merely negating the three-
as-one, flying out and into the void. It isn’t an abdication of the 
task of coming to grips with history’s horrors. Rather, the re-
membrance of affliction leads to a community of the living and 
the dead (that is, an encounter between them) that has a differ-
ent, and to my mind morally preferable, shape. I will call this 
the topology of “the two.” This topology is prior to the three-as-
one, as affliction is to atrocity, and it is foreclosed to those who 
inhabit the totalizing analogical schema that gives rise to and is 
carried by the vision of atrocity.7 
6 This being so, empathy may still be harder to start, and one may conse-
quently be able to hold on to more humility, in cases where the other is 
seen to be very unlike — even if still different in degree from — the self. But 
this isn’t always the case; sometimes, great differences in degree seem to 
motivate pernicious forms of xenophobia and the like. 
7 There are three distinctions, similar in a number of ways to the distinc-
tion I’ve drawn between affliction and atrocity, that may be profitable to 
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6. The Topology of the Two
The topology of the two is the space in which I encounter an 
other who isn’t me or of me. It is the space in which I come up 
against an outside I cannot hope to assimilate or incorporate. 
The two is the shape of an encounter in which transcendence 
comes to pass.
In the two, the other is absolutely unrelated to me. My en-
counter with the other doesn’t hang on empathy, for there isn’t 
an analogical bridge between us across which I might empa-
thize; there is no room for a “like” or “unlike” relation in the 
two. I can’t try the other’s shoes on for size; I can’t even make 
out their shoes. In the three-as-one, there are three terms — the 
self, the other, and the analogy as a whole — which are counted-
as-one under the aspect of the third, the analogy or atrocity. In 
the two, there are two terms — the self and the other — which 
are different in kind from one another yet nevertheless encoun-
ter each another. They do this directly in the space of the two. 
It is in this way that I, in the two, am exposed to the other in 
their very otherness, without their subsumption under my cat-
egories of understanding or what is familiar to me. There isn’t a 
third under which the two terms could be counted-as-one, seen 
to be mere relata in a relationship taken to be primitive. The 
other in the two is whatever it may be. It isn’t “for” the self. Af-
fliction is not transformed into atrocity, and we needn’t give up 
the endeavor to come to terms with the violence of our history: 
the two is very much a topology of the encounter, but one that 
consider further: Levinas’s distinction between the saying and the said (in 
Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis [Pitts-
burgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998]); Henry’s distinction between the 
flesh and the body or self-affection and noetic-noematic givenness (e.g., 
in Incarnation); and Lacan’s distinction between the real and reality. This 
isn’t the place to try to carefully articulate the similarities and differences 
between these distinctions, though I hope to do that in future work. But let 
me just say this. In regard to the relationship between affliction and atroc-
ity, it might be particularly interesting to think about how the former term 
in each of these distinctions undermines or undoes the latter term, while 
in one sense still preserving it as so undermined or undone.
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doesn’t operate via analogy and empathy. This is why inhabiting 
it by way of remembrance, calling it to mind moment after mo-
ment, makes possible vigilant attention to affliction. 
In dwelling in the two, I respond to the other’s call as what-
ever it may be. I don’t seek to comprehend the other “for” me, 
as a term of the analogy centered on me. I abnegate to the other, 
and there’s no symmetry between us. I don’t demand reciproc-
ity. I am responsible for the other in the two, called to be hospi-
table to that which is at an undecipherable height. I welcome an 
other whose sense isn’t of an order with which I am acquainted 
or comfortable. The two doesn’t look like home. But the comfort 
and regularity of the three-as-one mask a certain angst. In seeing 
atrocity in affliction’s place, we miss something excessive — the 
affliction itself — which nevertheless calls us to bear witness to 
it. So in the regularity of atrocity, in our forgetfulness of afflic-
tion, we feel in some way unable to really get a grip on the suf-
fering that flesh and blood people endured, the suffering from 
which many of them perished. Seen in this light, our mourning 
appears to miss something. We feel an angst: this is the ache of 
our neglect. In attending to it, in following it and coming to see 
it as such, we can exit the three-as-one and inhabit the two, fac-
ing affliction head on, encountering the afflicted in earnest in 
our open exposure to them. We can encounter them in our re-
sponsibility to bear witness to what they themselves underwent, 
not just to our vision of atrocity.
An attitude to the past’s calamities that sees them under the 
aspect of atrocity rests on the construction of an analogy re-
lating those who perished and a specific narrative of their af-
fliction. The affliction of the ordinary people who suffered in 
Sétif and Guelma is subjected to the operation of the count-as-x, 
which produces the unique number of the death toll. This num-
ber signifies and helps to carry the sense of the atrocity under 
which the affliction is, through this process, subsumed. Afflic-
tion is primordial in relation to atrocity. It precedes atrocity 
and is the material with which atrocity is built. And it is ob-
scured — forgotten — in atrocity’s construction. Atrocity is the 
original suffering of those who died at Sétif and Guelma, outside 
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any analogy, made analogical. It is their agony transformed into 
the qualitative intensity of a particular persecution situated in 
a social and political context. That is to say, an atrocity is the 
apparatus within which those who aren’t counted become sim-
ply what they are for those who count in the operation of the 
count-as-x, or for those who inherit this count and its sense. 
So atrocity is affliction become more or less than what it is, no 
longer what it is in itself. It’s a sort of horror produced analogi-
cally in relating a communal or political narrative to those who 
perished such that the two can’t be understood in separation 
from one another. This production goes on in a communal op-
eration of quantification: the count that quantifies and houses 
a certain qualification in a given number. This operation yields 
the correlation of the living’s narrative and the dead, clothed in 
number, which comes to stand in for and gives sense to afflic-
tion; the correlation permits no excess beyond what’s counted-
as-x and then counted-as-one, beyond what has already been 
qualified under the banner of atrocity or has been given its ad-
jectival mark, “atrocious.” 
So we can say that atrocity is affliction converted through the 
count-as-x into a number that admits of no excess, in which the 
meaning of some historical horror is to be definitively made out. 
The afflicted other is ensnared, made into a sort of finite, total-
ized idol of itself. It is the sense made of it. The other is trans-
formed into only what is correlated with and inextricable from 
the narrative of the affliction that has befallen them, and all this 
is within the overarching analogical structure of the atrocity. 
When this analogical structure, in which there are three 
terms (self, other, analogy), is taken to be prior to the two, the 
three-as-one is the result. The three are then counted-as-one, 
and this involves the neglect of the two. There can’t be a two in 
which one could dwell, for the three-as-one is taken to come 
first, and it precludes the two from the start. The forgetting of 
the two here is twofold: one forgets the two in taking the three-
as-one to be primary, and then one forgets this forgetting; this 
is essential for the maintenance of this position. The inhabiting 
of the three-as-one is in this sense a lethargy with respect to 
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the space in which the genuine other — who isn’t determined 
by some identity perceived by me or attribute discerned by 
me — condemns me on pain of angst (that of leaving something 
out of my mourning) to a non-relational or asymmetrical abne-
gation. To live in the three-as-one is to look away.8 
Communal attitudes with respect to the horrific events of 
history take an analogical form. Their topology is that of the 
three. There are two terms, the living and the dead. And then 
there is the dual bridge between them:
1. the sense the living make of the dead, and
2. the way in which the dead’s suffering affects how the living 
set out to live. 
Now the three, insofar as the two is neglected, is counted-as-
one. The dead are taken to be inextricable from, and even iden-
tical to, the sense the living make of them. The dead can’t ex-
ceed this, at least not in being thought. But the three needn’t 
be counted-as-one. Instead, it can admit of excess: namely, the 
excess of the two, which one can acknowledge as preceding the 
three. When this acknowledgment takes place, the two and the 
three — the topology of ethics and the topology of communi-
ty — can conceivably coexist.9 But this coexistence can happen 
8 There are two sets of remarks by Emmanuel Levinas worth considering 
in light of what I’m arguing here. First, those regarding the way in which 
the height of the other person, their infinite distance from me and the fact 
that I’m irrecuperably responsible for them, is encountered in their hunger 
and poverty, their insufficiency and nakedness. This might be compared 
with the way in which the afflicted person’s otherness reveals itself as a 
destitution, as an inadequacy, within the sphere of analogy. See Emmanuel 
Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso 
Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), 117, 200. Second, it’s worth 
considering those remarks made by Levinas about vigilance and insomnia, 
and their role in moral experience. See Levinas, Otherwise than Being or 
Beyond Essence, 87. On insomnia in particular, see Emmanuel Levinas, 
God, Death, and Time, trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2000), 207–12.
9 The relationship here between the topologies of the two and the three 
bears some resemblance to the relationship between nonstandard philoso-
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only when the two is taken to be the primordial topology. That’s 
the only way for the three to not be counted-as-one. When the 
two is acknowledged as preceding the three, the three isn’t total-
izing, which means that the two and the three can then coexist 
(since there’s room for the two prior to the three). If the two and 
the three are considered simultaneous, or if the three is given 
primacy and thereby counted-as-one, the other is replaced by 
an analogical idol: the other who’s “for” the self, and nothing be-
sides. The afflicted are taken to be nothing other than what they 
are under an atrocious description. If the two comes first, how-
ever, the afflicted are first what they really are, and only then are 
they — very partially, we’ll acknowledge — the sense that’s made 
of them. This permits an apt humility regarding the sense we 
make of the past’s horrors. We introduce the possibility of real 
fallibility, so far as atrocity goes, in introducing the impossibil-
ity of getting a complete handle on affliction under an atrocious 
aspect. But this doesn’t preclude a grip on affliction itself, which 
is precisely what inhabiting the topology of the two, prior to the 
three, enables us to get. 
The number generated in the operation of the count-as-
x traps the afflicted in a system — of sense, explanation, and 
mourning — in which they can differ only in degree from those 
who are set as the norm of the analogy, the constituting cent-
er or mean of the atrocity: the living. For the French colonial 
government, those who perished at Sétif and Guelma were the 
1,020, just as they were the 45,000 for Radio Cairo. But what 
are they themselves, as ordinary people who endured substan-
tial trials and died in appalling violence? What are they besides 
these numbers, beyond analogy? And how can we think the af-
phy or non-philosophy and philosophy in the work of François Laruelle. 
See, especially, François Laruelle, Principles of Non-Philosophy, trans. Nico-
la Rubczak and Anthony Paul Smith (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 
2013). Similarly, it’s somewhat comparable to Lacoste’s distinction between 
being-before-God (or coram Deo) and Heidegger’s Being-in-the-world. 
See Jean-Yves Lacoste, Experience and the Absolute: Disputed Questions on 
the Humanity of Man, trans. Mark Raferty-Skehan (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2004).
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fliction of these people without regard to what they’re taken to 
be or to count as? How can we understand them in distinction 
from what they are for the apparatus of atrocity under which 
they’ve been subsumed and within which they’ve been numeri-
cally crystallized as the 1,020 or the 45,000? How can we un-
think the distortion of the atrocity’s count-as-x and x = one so as 
to come to terms with affliction itself? 
7. Counting, Angst, and Christ’s Crucifixion 
Within the topology of the three-as-one, affliction is under-
stood as atrocity, with no outside. It is given sense by a body 
count, in which that sense is symbolically housed. The count-as-
x introduces a third term or set of relations that conjoin those 
who aren’t counted and those who count such that each term is 
indistinguishable from its sense within the greater milieu (the 
analogy itself). The terms are only thinkable as parts within the 
whole, in view of the whole.
There are a great many historical examples of this: affliction 
is qualified as atrocity by way of an operation of counting. A 
number is introduced, which stands in for and serves to aid in 
making sense of affliction. The affliction of the Shoah, for in-
stance, is signified numerically by the count-as-six-million. The 
Shoah’s affliction itself is subsumed under its correlated num-
ericity. Five million is the unique number of the Thirty Years’ 
War. The Cambodian autogenocide is counted-as-two-million. 
And the Black Death, which took so many lives in Paris, is given 
analogically by the number 50,000. We see this pattern — the 
application of a count-as-x to the suffering within a situation 
as it is seen from a specific point of view — just as much with 
pestilence and plague as with autos-da-fé, burnings at the stake, 
and drownings in the trials of witches. The massacre that took 
place at Columbine High School is symbolized by the number 
15, which stands in for it. This is less what it is (an atrocity) than 
the Salem witch trials, symbolized by the number 20, which is 
still less what it is than the violence that took place in Sétif and 
Guelma — which, symbolized by the number 1,020 or 45,000, is 
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therefore more what it is. Atrocity is the numbering and quali-
fication of affliction such that it can be more or less what it is. 
But this has a price: the resultant atrocity is only a shallow image 
of the affliction, a hollow idol or statue. The actual affliction is 
reduced to what can be numbered and qualified, rendered intel-
ligible. In failing to acknowledge the count’s excess, and in fail-
ing to get a non-atrocious grip on that excess, we are left with 
a sense of history’s horrors as intelligible. But this sense is skin-
deep. Our understanding of these horrors is facile at best, and 
it is often much more seriously warped by the thought that our 
vision of atrocity is wholly adequate to the relevant affliction.
The application of the count-as-x to the suffering seen within 
a given situation is commonly a response to rather acute trau-
ma, or to the memory of this trauma and how it affected one or 
those proximal to one. In this way, one attempts to cope with 
what has occurred. But it is a coping strategy with pernicious 
repercussions.10 The numbering that crystallizes the atrocity qua 
atrocity, such that it is at least to some degree more psychologi-
cally bearable, leads to a condition of angst in which that crys-
tallization in number seems inescapable, exhaustive, and basic. 
Mourning comes to seem always incomplete. It looks always to 
be missing the real substance of what has happened, the afflic-
tion itself. One is left with a shallow number, a comprehensible 
but inevitably cursory sense of a set of violent events. This sense 
always appears to lack depth. For despite the sense made of af-
10 To reiterate: I don’t say that this strategy involves a choice to neglect af-
fliction. For if one knew that one was forgetting affliction (in so choosing) 
and instead focusing on atrocity, this forgetfulness and the resultant focus 
would be rather partial. The coping strategy I have in mind here isn’t so 
much a choice as a failure to see or remember, one that in fact makes sense 
in the wake of traumatic events. So we need to be reminded to attend to 
affliction, and then we need to work to maintain our vision of it, to stay 
vigilant. One can’t see affliction and with it in view choose to see atrocity. 
The strategy I have in mind, then, isn’t something one decides to pursue 
with a full view of what it entails; it’s only seen for what it is once one 
remembers affliction, thereby coming to see what had previously gone on 
as neglect. 
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fliction as atrocity, the flesh and blood people who were actually 
afflicted are nowhere to be found. 
The coping strategy that simplifies what has happened by 
making an analogical construction (the atrocity) look exhaustive 
of the sense to be made of some horrific set of events (through 
neglect) leads to a kind of chronic angst: we can’t figure out how 
to truly encounter the horrors of the past, or those who really 
suffered them, and this affects how we’re able to live in light of 
what has happened. We create atrocity in the count-as-x in part 
to endure our apparent exemption from tragedy, to relieve the 
disquiet of the time after a cataclysm that’s not quite our own. 
The count is an attempt to make atrocity as much our own as is 
possible. But we alleviate the fear and trembling of facing up to 
affliction in this manner only at the cost of angst. The dreadful 
stasis of the number of a body count, the fixity of the atrocity 
and its narrative, seems to cure the fear that we too are merely 
pathetic flesh, or that the other’s affliction is ours too, since we 
are responsible and already exposed in the other’s suffering. But 
it does this by aiding us in forgetting both the self (the living) 
itself and the other (the dead), helping us to turn away from 
the two and toward the three. It makes it easier for us to take 
the three to be primary and so to totalize it as one. We trade 
the risk of having to come to terms with who we are and who 
the afflicted were, the risk of abnegation in the two, for what at 
first glance looks to be the comfort of analogy. We trade this 
risk for what’s definitively circumscribed. But really, we trade it 
for what turns out to be a condition of chronic, seemingly in-
exorable angst. The view according to which there’s nothing im-
aginable outside the atrocity, beyond the scope of the analogy, 
is certainly a cure (however short-term); but it has a price that 
proves to be disastrously high. As with autofiction, the solipsism 
in which everything has to be related to oneself in order to be 
comfortably intelligible winds up being stale and angst-ridden. 
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Once we’ve taken it on, it is something we try — without at first 
knowing how — to escape.11 
Consider the Shoah, a set of horrors we’re often wisely coun-
seled to never forget. The affliction of the Shoah, in the operation 
of the count-as-six-million, becomes something that is no long-
er the suffering of ordinary people (whatever they may be) who 
are distinct from the sense the living make of them. It becomes 
an atrocity, in what I’ll call the “as such” mode. The Shoah is tak-
en as such, in its entirety, to be the atrocity made of it. Nothing 
of the affliction of the Shoah is seen to transcend the atrocity. 
The affliction becomes clothed in the numeric, which is the re-
sult of the count-as-x, and it is rendered univocally intelligible, 
which is the result of the x = one. The number, x, is the totaliza-
tion of the affliction in quantity, by way of which it is qualified 
under an atrocious description (counted-as-one). Hence, it is a 
totalization of the afflicted as what they are “for” the living who 
look back on them from a particular point of view. The afflicted 
are just the totality of what bears the relevant “for” relation (this 
can be made up of whatever set of “like” or “unlike” relations) 
to those who retrospect and see an atrocity. The affliction of or-
dinary people “as they are” becomes the atrocity of victims “as 
such.” I will contrast the “as they are” mode of these people with 
11 For some criticisms of the contemporary trend of autofiction, particularly 
in French literature, see Sandra Laugier’s interview with Tristan Garcia 
in BOMB 114. Autofiction is a genre or style of writing that imagines that 
a writer should stay within their own context, or should write only about 
what they know, not going beyond the limits of the familiar or self-same. 
As a style of writing, I don’t think that autofiction is universally objection-
able. But I find the idea that one can’t or shouldn’t seek to write about what 
one isn’t personally acquainted with, that one can’t or shouldn’t want to 
write about others, profoundly objectionable, both because it turns fiction 
into solipsism, ruining much of what’s absorbing and edifying in literature, 
and because it sets up a putative norm without any argument. One might 
compare what I say here, too, with Derrida’s famous statement that “there 
is no outside-text.” See Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016), 
158. I develop the claim that a seeming lack of any outside leads to a condi-
tion of angst, and that this condition can be abrogated in abnegation, in 
my forthcoming Angst and Abnegation. 
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their mode “as such,” which is just to contrast the afflicted with 
those seen to be victims of atrocity while stressing that the same 
people are essentially at issue on both contrasting sides. 
From within the analogical structure of an atrocity, it doesn’t 
seem sensible to so much as inquire as to whether the afflicted 
person as they are is in fact totalized, crystallized in the number 
of the fatality count. It doesn’t seem to make sense, either, to ask 
whether they are beyond the analogy, themselves indifferent to 
it. The question of whether the person as they are, as afflicted, is 
totalized doesn’t so much as come to mind. After all, the num-
ber of the person as such — one out of 1,020, say — stands in for 
the person as they are; it is taken to be primary, originary. The 
afflicted person’s indifference to the atrocity’s number, the dis-
tance between the real person who is afflicted and the person 
who is one out of 1,020, can only be seen in the remembrance of 
the topology of the two. For in inhabiting the two, one can look 
toward the atrocity’s number with a certain indifference, attend-
ing instead to the afflicted as they are. One catches sight of those 
who aren’t counted in a recollection of the two, against the am-
nesia that enables and results in the three-as-one and the angst 
that manifests within the analogy counted-as-one. Indifference 
to the three-as-one is possible in connection with an attitude for 
which atrocity doesn’t suffice. One sees atrocity to be lacking, 
emphasizing the angst of the three-as-one, and one then follows 
this to the recollection of the two — the exit from analogy. The 
remembrance of the afflicted person, against atrocity’s angst and 
neglect, in a sense mirrors the afflicted person’s own indiffer-
ence to the atrocity’s number (which will only be constituted in 
hindsight).12 
12 In After Finitude, Quentin Meillassoux writes that what is beyond the 
correlational circle — for us, beyond the topology of the three-as-one — in 
some sense resembles the “great outdoors” sought by pre-critical philoso-
phy, that “outside which was not relative to us, and which was indifferent to 
its own givenness to be what it is, existing in itself regardless of whether we 
are thinking it or not.” The idea of indifference here is this. What is beyond 
the correlation between thinking and being, what exists whether or not we 
are thinking or positing it, is in a certain sense indifferent to us, foreclosed 
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I want now to turn to a particularly salient instance of the 
count-as-x, which is the root of much of its cultural and his-
torical resilience as a method for comprehending great suffer-
ing. I have in mind the crucifixion of Christ, or the sense that 
was made of it by those who came after Christ. We can pull the 
affliction apart from the atrocity quite easily in this case. On 
the one hand, there is Christ’s suffering itself. Christ, a flesh and 
blood person, bore the cross. On the other hand, there is the 
Pauline application of the count-as-x to this suffering such that 
it is transformed into an atrocity. This is the generative process 
through which the apparatus of Christianity as an analogical 
system (I’ll come to this shortly) is produced. In this light, we 
can see the resurrection and ascension of Christ as the atrocious 
aftereffects of his affliction. They are the resultant narrative 
events of the count-as-x’s application to a crucifixion which, as 
affliction, stands beyond any narrative that might be attached to 
it by the living. The count-as-x is applied by Paul to the affliction 
of Christ, which yields a count-as-one; x = one, and this “one” is 
the identity of Christ — the univocal set of qualities given ana-
logically (“for-y”) — as he is “for” Christians, within the analogy 
as a whole (Christianity). In being applied to Christ’s affliction, 
the count-as-x yields the atrocious figure of Christ “for” Chris-
tians within Christianity. I will refer to this figure as “Christ-in-
Christianity.” First, this figure is “Christ-for-Paul.”
Now the conversional road to Damascus that follows, and 
the spread of Christianity which follows that, is predicated on 
this primary conversion: that of the crucifixion into the ascen-
sion, that of the affliction of Christ himself (I will refer to him as 
to the determinations of thought. In being ourselves indifferent to such 
determinations, in treating the analogical with a certain ascesis, and as I’ll 
suggest in showing a particular sort of hospitality to the other person as 
an other, we can get a grip on what is beyond the three-as-one. As Meil-
lassoux’s outside stands apart from what’s inextricable from thought, the 
afflicted person is, beyond the analogical, foreclosed to our attempts to 
make sense of the past through a count of bodies and atrocity’s constitu-
tion. Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of 
Contingency, trans. Ray Brassier (London: Continuum, 2008), 7.
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“Christ-without-Christianity”) into Christ-in-Christianity. For 
it is through this conversion that Christ the afflicted is count-
ed-as-one, a conversion to which the events of the resurrection 
and ascension narratively attest. Christ is counted-as-one in the 
construction of the analogy we call “Christianity,” an analogy in 
which Christ himself can’t exist as distinct. There are three terms 
in it: Christ, the Christian, and the dual bridge between them 
(Christianity). Christ is “for” the Christian, made intelligible as 
Christ-in-Christianity under the aspect of a narrative of atroc-
ity (and salvation). The Christian is “for” Christ; she makes her 
life in the light of what happened to him and the sense she has 
made of this. Neither term can be thought in separation from 
the other; all are understood only within the analogy, Christian-
ity itself. But this means that there is, to put it crudely, no Christ 
in Christianity. There’s only Christ-in-Christianity in Christian-
ity, and that isn’t the same thing. Christ-without-Christianity, 
like the afflicted, is forgotten in the constitution of atrocity or 
Christ-in-Christianity. The ascension, as the end to which the 
crucifixion (understood atrociously) points, is the narrative re-
sult of the Pauline application of the count-as-one, which turns 
Christ as someone who suffered affliction into the primary sym-
bol of a new analogical schema: Christianity. The last is, as it 
were, made first.13 Christ is then only what he is within Christi-
anity’s apparatus, from which he can’t be separated. He is merely 
Christ-in-Christianity. 
This figure, who is in the “as such” mode identified above, 
gets in the way of an ethical impulse in humanity that I believe 
is among our most admirable: attention to the afflicted, hos-
pitality to them as they are — or to put it instead in somewhat 
apophatic terms, the welcoming of those who transcend atroc-
ity. In our neglect, Christ-without-Christianity as an example of 
the flesh and blood afflicted person to whom we might attend 
(which could figure in moral education and practice) is replaced 
by Christ-in-Christianity.
13 “So the last shall be first, and the first last: for many be called but few 
chosen.” Matthew 20:16 (King James Version).
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This is representative, in a historically and culturally for-
midable way, of the forgetting of the two in favor of the three, 
which is thereby counted-as-one. The humility with which one 
answers the call of another, with which one welcomes a stranger 
at the door or faces the afflictions of the deceased, is replaced 
with egoistic projection, empathy, and the grafting of analogical 
relational properties (or “likes” and “unlikes”) onto the stranger 
whose face one doesn’t recognize. The ordinary person as they 
are, who can be afflicted and isn’t counted, who is foreclosed to 
analogy and indifferent to their atrocious position, is forgotten 
in the movement from the two to the three-as-one. One potent 
example of this is the movement from the crucifixion, the af-
fliction of Christ-without-Christianity, to the ascension, which 
is predicated on the atrocity in which Christ is intelligible as 
Christ-in-Christianity. That atrocity is the product of the count-
as-one, and it in turn makes possible the Pauline conversional 
project, since it constitutes the analogy — Christianity — within 
which the converted are to identify themselves as a term, as 
Christians. 
The affliction of the crucifixion becomes an atrocity, which 
is the material cause of the ascension and for which the ascen-
sion is in some sense the final cause. Once again, the last be-
comes the first. Where there was an afflicted person, there is 
now a person inseparable from a narrative of their affliction, 
inseparable from those who tell this narrative and pass it on. 
Christ-without-Christianity becomes Christ-in-Christianity. 
And Christ himself is set to one side, since he falls outside the 
bounds of the operative analogy. Christ is made into the first 
principle of a new order, Christianity, and is thinkable only as 
positioned within that new order.14 It is an order that he himself 
14 Relatedly, Christ is often seen as the archetypal child, and thus as the seat 
of salvation insofar as the reproduction that brings about the next genera-
tion saves. His infancy is seen to represent deliverance. This Irenaean 
Christianity involves a sort of reproductive futurism, which always puts 
deliverance beyond what’s presently possible (this is characteristic of any 
eschatological ethic). Salvation is imagined to be a work of time, and 
morality consists in a project of hope in some distant advent whose very 
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didn’t know — indeed, couldn’t have known. For atrocity is al-
ways constituted in retrospection, in attending to the afflicted 
as they are “for” the living or in the “as such” mode.15 Christ 
exists, having been counted-as-one, only as the source of Paul’s 
novel analogy, as what he is “for” Paul. Paul can instigate the 
spread of Christianity only because this has taken place, only 
because Christ is no longer himself. Christ who isn’t counted is 
tied to the Christian (or originally, Paul) who counts, constitut-
ing an apparatus in which neither Christ nor the Christian can 
be thought in distinction from one another. Outside this rela-
tion, there is no Christ. Nor is there a Christian. Outside the 
identification of Christ and the Christian as terms, there is no 
relation (Christianity). 
Here, we can clearly see the prima facie aporetic struc-
ture of analogy. The three of the three-as-one demands two 
terms — Christ and the Christian, say — themselves. It can’t 
come into being without them. But the two terms demand the 
introduction of a third, without which they can’t be thought. 
There is a way in which the two terms must be taken as primi-
tive, and they then go on to be related. But, from the view on 
which their relation is primary, there’s a way in which the terms 
couldn’t be taken as primitive (or as non-terms). The two terms 
seem, at least, to cry out for analogy such that they can be made 
intelligible. They are thus counted-as-one. Yet the three-as-one, 
possibility grants signification to present action (including reproduc-
tive action). In §10, I argue that, contrary to this eschatological sense of 
salvation, deliverance is always of the order of the presently possible. So 
far as reproductive futurism in Christianity goes, we might also consider 
the symbolic work of the ritual of baptism as spiritual rebirth. Cf. Lee 
Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2004).
15 What’s crucial in this retrospection isn’t temporal (or spatial) distance. 
Atrocity can be seen at whatever temporal distance and can even be 
projected onto future possibilities. Instead, what’s crucial is the sort of 
distance from affliction one finds in its neglect, a kind of moral distance 
from which other people look assimilable and their suffering quantifiable 
and comprehensible. When I say that atrocity is seen in “retrospection,” I 
mean to suggest this distance: one sees atrocity essentially from afar, such 
that forgetfulness can come between one and one’s vision of affliction.
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in its angst and aporia, enjoins us to inhabit a two that it requires 
(as the angst and aporia show) but cannot remember. 
8. No Matter What
The count-as-x forgets the two. In subjecting affliction to it, one 
neglects the primacy of the space in which one welcomes the 
other as they are — not because of their given qualities or re-
lation to one, nor despite their position or identity within the 
analogical schema. One forgets the space in which one is hospi-
table to the other without regard to what they are “for” one. I’ll 
call the person who is forgotten, who is the other in the two, the 
person “no matter what.” That’s just to say that they aren’t what 
one makes of them. They aren’t welcomed because one appreci-
ates their qualities, nor despite what one takes their analogical 
position to be — but rather, no matter what. When one forgets 
the two, one forgets the person no matter what, and then this 
forgetting. 
I will call the mode of the other as they are, and not as they 
are “for” me or “as such,” “the fashion of the no matter what.” 
The other in the fashion of the no matter what is whosoever they 
are, beyond the analogy. They are the one I welcome in the to-
pology of the two, the one who makes a claim on me, for whom 
I’m responsible, the one whose affliction I am to remember. 
This person is secondarily enmeshed in an analogical milieu, 
as Christ qua Christ-in-Christianity is, and the secondariness 
of this is often forgotten (yielding a three-as-one, or atrocity). 
But first, an ordinary person is no matter what. They are not 
placed in an analogy from the start, though this priority can be 
neglected.
So the person who is afflicted is a person no matter what, 
while the person understood under the aspect of atrocity is 
a person who is more or less than what they are, a person “as 
such.” 
Now the other person in the fashion of the no matter what 
is absolutely different from me. They are beyond any analogical 
net I can cast. Recall that I can’t relate to the other in the two. I 
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am exposed to them directly, responsible, but without relation 
or reciprocity. I am here for the other, condemned to them. All 
I can say in the two is “here I am!”16 Beckett tells us that we ex-
ist in the accusative case, for others, in the eyes of strangers or 
in responding to what they say.17 But it is more than this. In the 
two, I exist in the dative case. I’m summoned by the other to 
be hospitable. I am not “for” the other in the sense of analogy’s 
“for.” Rather, I am this direct, non-analogical exposure to the 
other.
I am, from the very start, an exposure to the other — who’s 
sometimes afflicted, who sometimes calls out for help, to whose 
call I am always already commanded to respond. In the two, I 
exist in the presence of what isn’t me, what isn’t of me, to which 
I can’t hope to relate. I abnegate, welcoming the other person 
no matter what, attending to them as they are. This is the ba-
sis of any unselfish love.18 The two is a space characterized by a 
welcome offered no matter what. The attitude that makes pos-
sible its inhabiting takes this shape: I remember the two and 
thus come to inhabit it with respect to others whom I no longer 
take to be totalized in whatever analogical schema. I thus see the 
others as they are, and I see affliction and can bear witness to 
it, where before I saw only atrocity, always tied up with myself. 
In order to throw the axiom that structures the topology of 
the two into starker relief, an axiom I have been calling the “no 
matter what,” we can consider the ethic in which it arises. I will 
call this the “generic ethic.” We can think about the shape of a 
life dedicated to the hospitality that characterizes the two, a life 
in which one bears witness to affliction rather than atrocity. And 
we can further ask about how a philosophical exploration of this 
sort of life, a theoretical consideration of it, might go. 
16 Cf. 1 Samuel 3:4. See also Emmanuel Levinas, The Levinas Reader, ed. Seán 
Hand (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), esp. 104, 166, 182, 184, 207.
17 Samuel Beckett, Stories and Texts for Nothing (New York: Grove Press, 
1967), 91. 
18 I discuss hospitality and love in more depth in “On Neighborly and Pref-
erential Love in Kierkegaard’s Works of Love,” Journal of Philosophy and 
Scripture 8 (Summer 2019).
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A philosophical system, a set of views and a manner of ap-
proaching philosophical questions, is perhaps best differenti-
ated from other systems by the question of what is at stake for 
it. For Descartes, it is the possibility of knowledge that is most at 
stake: knowledge of the self, the external world, God, and other 
people. I think, I am. For Michel Henry, like Descartes, it is also 
this possibility, and that of the self-impressional life that pre-
cedes it and is its condition. I feel myself thinking, I am, and only 
then can I know about the world. For Simone Weil, it is because 
I can act — and thinking is a sort of activity — that I am. I con-
stitute what I am to be in the moment of action. For Kant, the 
thing that’s most at stake is the limit, the law of thinking in the 
first instance (quid juris?), which prohibits the speculative dis-
eases of the head and leads us toward a putatively preferable re-
gion of thinking. The ontological question (about the nature of 
things-in-themselves) is put on the table only as an empty pos-
sibility. Instead of asking about what something is, the critical 
philosophy tells us that we must instead ask about the possibility 
conditions for a thing to appear to us as it does. For Heidegger, 
it is being as such, and one’s relation to it as Dasein, that is at 
stake — especially, it is the question of being, which has for so 
long been obliviated. There’s a sense in which this is a return to 
the question of ontology, for we are to inquire into being itself. 
But we can only do this, we’re told, through an existential ana-
lytic of Dasein. So being and thinking, as in Kant, are correlated 
in our being-in-the-world. We can only think being by thinking 
of ourselves, proceeding from thought (and always from with-
in thought outward). For Quentin Meillassoux, what’s at stake 
is the perhaps, a sort of chance or chaos (the only necessity). 
Contingency is absolute, and it renders instability itself liable 
to change. For Alain Badiou, we are after a new conception of 
being or what is, a new conception of the event or what hap-
pens, and an understanding of the relationship between these. 
What’s at stake is the subject and its relationship — of fidelity 
or betrayal — to evental truths. For each of these philosophers, 
there is something centrally at stake, and they approach their 
investigations, in posing questions and setting out views, with 
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this in mind. There is something about which they endeavor to 
get clear, which structures the inquiries undertaken. Or to put it 
another way: there is some theme that gives their philosophical 
work a particular character and shapes the path it takes. 
For the generic ethic, which seeks to get clear about the to-
pology of the two and the shape of the life of the person who 
inhabits it, what’s at stake is abnegation. The project is to offer 
a new conception of allegiance, a sense of what it would mean 
to vigilantly recollect the two and to thereby avoid the angst of 
the three-as-one. Often, this angst is produced in the following 
way. We take on an ontology that forbids the existence of genu-
ine others, since those with whom we relate can only be made 
sense of (we come to believe) insofar as they’re correlated with 
us. We can’t hope to think things-in-themselves, so the alter-
ity of other people is only ever conceivably relative to us. Yet 
our ethical sensibility demands the existence of real others. The 
categorical imperative requires that, all else aside, we treat other 
people in a certain way. In Aquinas, one finds talk of virtuous 
relations to others. And in Bentham, one finds a clear concern 
with how one’s actions affect other people. Our ethical sensibil-
ity (whatever framework for thinking about normative ethics 
is on offer) seems to demand others who can’t be thought, at 
least insofar as we inhabit a three-as-one. So it isn’t surprising 
that this results in a condition of angst, as our sense of the good 
forces us to run up against the cage of the ontology we’ve taken 
on, in which other people aren’t really other. Those philosophi-
cal systems that operate with a three-as-one structure rule out 
the existence of any other, but very often they still demand that 
we treat the other in a given way, with reference to certain prin-
ciples or maxims or virtues. This generates a condition of angst, 
since in moving from ontology to ethics we seem to require oth-
ers whose existence has already been called into question, and 
at the very best set to one side or bracketed, from the start. The 
generic ethic instead proceeds from ethics, beginning with the 
two — the primordial ethical scene — and the welcoming of the 
other for whom one is called to responsibility. In remembering 
the two, one comes to inhabit it anew and again, and the angst of 
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the mixture of a three-as-one with an ethical wish to treat sup-
posedly nonexistent others in a certain way is abrogated. 
A philosophical elaboration of the generic ethic involves, 
then, a new thought of devotion or welcoming, in some sense 
a new thought of piety.19 For it, the question at hand isn’t about 
freedom but fidelity, not choice but commitment: the commit-
ment to a hospitality to others that makes freedom in the so-
cial world then conceivable.20 It is in the three-as-one, after all, 
that one is unfree, tied always to the other, subsumed always 
under the operative analogy, identified as a mere analogical 
term. The generic ethic asks, what would it mean to welcome 
not just the old friend but also the absolute stranger? Would it 
be a sentimental vision in which one must capitulate one’s self 
to the stranger’s identity, giving in even when they, say, harm 
others? Or would it be a welcoming only of the non-qualitative 
stranger, the stranger beyond the analogy, and in that sense a 
non-capitulation to those present elements which, as qualitative 
or analogical, then impose qualities on others?21 How can we 
19 For as Simone Weil writes, “Today it is not nearly enough merely to be a 
saint, but we must have the saintliness demanded by the present moment, 
a new saintliness, itself also without precedent.” Simone Weil, Waiting for 
God, trans. Emma Craufurd (New York: Harper Perennial, 2009), 51. We 
are in need of a new ethic for a new guard and a new age, which in truth is 
always a new way of remembering, of fixing one’s eyes upon the good. 
20 Cf. Levinas, The Levinas Reader, 210n10: “Freedom means, therefore, the 
hearing of a vocation which I am the only person able to answer — or 
even the power to answer right there, where I am called.” See additionally 
Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, esp. 123–24.
21 To be sure, abnegation to others no matter what often demands that we 
don’t capitulate to the acts of analogical quality-imposition in which some 
other engages. Hospitality demands that we don’t tolerate totalization, 
and in fact hospitality to the totalizing other demands that we reject his 
totalizing, that we take a stand against it. For example: if we are going to 
welcome a transphobe and someone who is transgender, we’ll have to fight 
in the name of the no matter what against the imposition of qualities (the 
transgender person “for” the transphobe, say) in which the transphobe 
engages in their hatred. Abnegation isn’t a passivity opposed to taking 
a stand; it’s not a weakness that would somehow prevail over force, or a 
pathos that disavows power or strength. It often requires that, in showing 
a hospitality to the totalizing other, we don’t capitulate to their totaliza-
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abnegate to the stranger, welcoming them in a no matter what 
fashion, without regard to their relation to us or their place in 
some analogical schema? These are the questions that the ge-
neric ethic has to ask. 
Setting aside, for a moment, talk of qualities, topologies, and 
so on, the question for the generic ethic is altogether straightfor-
ward: what would it mean to live with allegiance to other people 
as others, to live hospitably and welcome in a no matter what 
fashion? To put it another way: what would it mean to live in 
steadfast devotion to flesh and blood strangers, who are infi-
nitely different from oneself?
The main axiom of such an allegiance or devotion, of an ab-
negation that bears witness to ordinary people and their pos-
sible affliction, is the “no matter what.” Being in the fashion of 
the no matter what means being outside any analogy; being or-
dinary, flesh and blood, not “for” the other terms of an atrocity, 
not counted-as-x. In the topology of the two, I welcome another 
no matter what, without regard to the positions they occupy 
in whatever analogies. What I welcome no matter what is the 
other person no matter what, the person who isn’t a term of an 
analogy. So the no matter what structures the topology of the 
two, defining how the self in the two relates, via a welcoming 
of absolute alterity, to the other. Welcoming no matter what is 
relating to what’s utterly exterior; it is a relating that is wholly 
non-analogical (and so in a certain sense, non-relational). The 
no matter what describes the piety of the space in which I en-
counter an other who can’t be assimilated to what’s self-same, 
an other who isn’t different only in degree from the norm that I 
tion. Even St. Paul tells us that there’s beneficent combat. In the abnegation 
of the generic ethic, resistance to quality-imposition is the other side of 
responsibility and hospitality; non-capitulation is one’s response to the 
particular situation of abnegation to another who engages in colonizing 
acts of quality-imposition on their own others. Here, it is the imposition 
that is refused so that each other can be welcomed as they are. I discuss 
this at greater length in “To Not Lose Sight of the Good: Notes on the 
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am. This is an other for whom the addition of analogical quali-
ties is a subtraction of alterity. In placing the other under an 
atrocious description, I take away their infinite alterity — or I 
presume to do that. This subtraction is a move from infinity to 
finitude, from the real otherness of other people to the finite 
bundles of qualities under which I subsume them. The resultant 
others “for” me are not others at all but of the same. In this way, 
I forget the other who is in the fashion of the no matter what, 
who precedes and is foreclosed to the other “for” me. Inhabiting 
the two consists in remembering this originary other and my 
abnegation to them, my responsibility to welcome them without 
regard to any analogy.
The generic ethic is generic in this sense: the other is not to be 
welcomed under the aspect of the particular, welcomed because 
of some quality deemed admirable or despite some attribute to 
be brushed aside. The other is welcomed no matter what, ge-
nerically — but that’s to say, in their singularity, as whatever they 
really are. In the generic ethic, genericity and singularity come 
together. Now for the generic ethic, which welcomes without 
regard to qualities or analogical positions, the no matter what 
is the axiom that founds and structures the topology of the two. 
This in turn makes possible a three, an analogy, that isn’t total-
izing or counted-as-one. The axiom of the two, in being remem-
bered as primary, makes possible the coexistence of the two and 
the topology of the three; this three acknowledges the priority of 
the two, and it therefore doesn’t see analogy as exhaustive (it is 
the shape an ethical community takes). There is a sense in which 
the generic ethic is thus pre-communal, though it is required for 
a particular form of the communal, namely, the three that can 
coexist with the two. The two of the consequent topology, a to-
pology I’ll call the “coexistent two-and-three,” coexists as before, 
and then alongside, or as alongside because before, the three.22 
22 There’s a way in which the topology of the coexistent two-and-three that 
I’m elaborating could be understood as an attempt to resolve some of the 
aporetic tension in Leibniz’s “Monadology.” (Although, to be sure, this 
topology doesn’t map neatly onto Leibniz’s project.) The two of the topol-
ogy of the two-and-three is something like the Leibnizian monad, insofar 
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The generic ethic is the ground in the last instance of a commu-
nity that is open to others, hospitable, non-totalizing. It is what, 
at the end of the day, renders any community that acknowledges 
its priority inhabitable — and not only for those who are proxi-
mal enough to the operative norms to fit in. 
The no matter what functions as a razor that cuts from the 
three-as-one to the two. Welcoming no matter what means re-
membering the person who is in its fashion, which then permits 
the coexistence of the two and the three in the topology of the 
coexistent two-and-three. The person no matter what is origi-
nary vis-à-vis the position of this person within an analogy, a 
position that becomes totalizing if it is taken to be primary or 
sufficient unto itself. So we can understand the operation of the 
count-as-x as an imagining of the three’s self-sufficiency (count-
ed-as-one), and as a condensation of this sufficiency in a num-
ber that gives voice to the atrocity and its meaning for the living. 
The thought that atrocity suffices for affliction is given in afflic-
tion’s crystallization in the unique number of the fatality count. 
The count-as-x is a twofold forgetting of the primacy of the two, 
the ethical, as the topology in which the axiom of the no matter 
what is at work. One forgets the topology in which the self (the 
living) abnegates to the unassimilable other (the afflicted, the 
dead) who is a person no matter what, and then one forgets this 
forgetting. Welcoming no matter what cuts from the person as 
such to the person as they are. One gets a grip on the afflicted 
themselves only by way of hospitality. Forgetting the person as 
they are leads to an understanding of the other under the aspect 
as it is self-contained and not open to determination by what goes on in 
the three; it has “no windows” (though it is where transcendence comes to 
pass). The three of this topology is the saturation of each monad with rela-
tions to all monads, which is total in the three counted-as-one but partial 
in the three of the two-and-three. The three conceives of its monads as “all 
windows,” or even as only windows to other monads. I have been arguing 
for the coexistence of the two and the three insofar as the two precedes the 
three and is foreclosed to it (i.e., insofar as the saturation is seen as partial 
in the remembrance of the two). Cf. G.W. Leibniz, “The Principles of Phi-
losophy, or, the Monadology (1714),” in Philosophical Essays, ed. and trans. 
Roger Ariew and Dan Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), 213–25. 
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of the same, the analogical. The no matter what leads back from 
this atrocity to affliction. To inhabit the generic ethic is to keep 
this in mind, to vigilantly recollect the two and welcome the af-
flicted in the fashion of the no matter what.
9. The Crucifixion of Christ No Matter What
Now that we have a better grasp of the generic ethic, I want to 
return to that culturally and historically significant instance 
of the count-as-x which we’ve been considering: the crucifix-
ion of Christ himself, whose being counted-as-one, originally 
by Paul, was in some sense the precondition of the ascension 
and Christianity’s spread. The affliction of Christ’s crucifixion 
is transformed into an atrocity such that the ascension can be 
made sense of. This transformation happens by way of an un-
derstanding of Christ as Christ-in-Christianity or Christ as 
such, produced in the count-as-one. An understanding of the 
crucifixion as atrocity follows this quantification, the identifica-
tion of Christ as the atrocity’s “one.” So the count-as-x mediates 
between affliction and atrocity, producing the “one” of the as-
cension’s Christ.
In a certain sense, Christ-without-Christianity, or Christ no 
matter what, is immediate. He is not mediated by the count-
as-x and x = one, turned into the Christ-in-Christianity of the 
atrocity. Christ no matter what thus underdetermines or un-
dermines what transforms him into someone in an atrocious 
position — the analogical Christ — which isn’t himself in the 
fashion of the no matter what. The Christ who is just himself, 
who is afflicted without atrocity, is at an infinite distance from 
his mediated posture; Christ-without-Christianity is an infin-
ity away from Christ-in-Christianity, since between these two 
is the gulf that divides the analogical from the non-analogical. 
Christ-without-Christianity is indifferent to his intra-analogical 
position. And the recollection of the two roots, for us, an at-
tunement of indifference toward this position. This recollection 
is the application of the razor of the no matter what, which in a 
sort of ascesis strips away the analogical qualities of an ordinary 
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person so as to reveal their radical insufficiency from within the 
perspective of analogy — so as to reveal, in some cases, the af-
flicted as they are. This razor of absolute hospitality cuts away 
the self-indulgence in which one’s attributive or empathetic 
view of the other is taken to suffice for the other as such. In the 
case we’ve been considering, that self-indulgent view is bound 
up with the analogical matrix of Christianity. It is a view of 
Christ as Christ-in-Christianity.
The crucifixion as the affliction of Christ no matter what 
is subject to the count-as-x by Paul. This is the production of 
the Christ who is Christianity’s subject, counted-as-one within 
its analogical schema. Only after this production of the Christ 
subject can the ascension of Christ and the conversional road 
to Damascus take place, insofar as they are analogical events 
predicated on the inextricable correlation of Christ no matter 
what (the originary, flesh and blood person in the two) and Paul 
(the counter) in a correlation that comes to be known, in being 
inhabited by more and more people, as “Christianity.” It is “for” 
Paul that the affliction of Christ becomes the atrocity at Chris-
tianity’s heart. The road to Damascus is in this sense the road 
of affliction become atrocity. It involves the imposition of the 
analogical milieu of Christianity onto Christ such that there can 
be, for this analogy and its constitutive terms, no Christ himself. 
Christianity is, at bottom, the name given to the colonization of 
Christ by Paul and those who inherit and inhabit his construc-
tion. 
Now that we have Christianity’s topological structure in view, 
can we theorize instead with the Christ of the crucifixion, with 
that Christ whose affliction is foreclosed to the determinations 
of atrocity? Can we set aside the operation of the count-as-x and 
the production of the atrocity of Christ-in-Christianity? Can we 
be allegiant in thought to Christ as he is, rather than to Christ 
as such? Can we, to put it plainly, refuse to put the analogical 
before the ethical, refuse to forget the affliction of Christ in the 
neglect of the two and the inhabiting of the three-as-one? 
Christianity as constituted by Paul is the analogical result of 
the count-as-x that renders Christ himself Christ-in-Christian-
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ity and the Christian what they are merely “for” Christ. In the 
totalization of Christianity, the only existent sense of Christ no 
matter what is Christ as such. And the Christian as such can be 
the only existent sense of the Christian as they are. Christ-in-
Christianity and the Christian-in-Christianity can’t be thought 
apart from their relationship. Neither term can be understood 
beyond the limit of the analogy of Christianity itself. The atroc-
ity of the mediated Christ is simply one of the correlate objects 
of an analogical construction built by a count. This atrocity’s 
sense is crystallized in the unique number of x; in the case of the 
crucifixion, this number is one. The twice forgetting of affliction 
by those who count makes the position of affliction as atroc-
ity within the analogical milieu intelligible — and angst aside, 
somewhat sustainable. Christ himself, though, is at a distance 
from the analogical position into which he’s put as part and par-
cel of the three-as-one. Recast against the three-as-one from the 
two, Christ no matter what is infinitely other. We move from 
the three-as-one to the two by applying the ascetic razor of the 
no matter what, by recollecting the primacy of the two and our 
responsibility for the other in it. We thus move from Christ-in-
Christianity to Christ-without-Christianity, the latter of whom 
is infinitely different from the former. The other in the two is 
absolutely other than what they are in the three-as-one. We see 
this in the recasting of Christ himself against his secondary (but 
forgotten as such and taken to be primary) position in the three-
as-one.
The other is the organon of deliverance from atrocity, for the 
remembrance and witnessing of the analogical non-position of 
the afflicted Christ himself, who is indifferent to his position in 
the atrocity, delivers us from the three-as-one to the two. This 
is a deliverance from analogy and its angst. And in coming to 
remember the primacy of the two, we make possible the coex-
istent two-and-three (that is, the coexistence of the topologies 
of ethics and community), since the three can only coexist with 
the two in which there’s a legitimate other, not different from 
the self only in degree, if it’s seen to be secondary to the two. The 
messianic promise of Christ as a flesh and blood insufficiency 
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of qualities when seen from within the analogy is predicated on 
Christ in the fashion of the no matter what.23 This essentially 
undergirds the qualitative accident of Christ-in-Christianity’s 
analogical position. And what is salvation if not from the to-
talization of this accident (the thought that it isn’t accidental but 
originary)? Salvation — from the angst in which history’s calam-
ities appear unmournable, unthinkable in themselves — is noth-
ing other than deliverance from the crystallization of the afflic-
tion (and the afflicted person no matter what) in the atrocity’s 
unique number. Bearing witness to the other’s affliction — not 
as atrocity — is the praxis that gets this deliverance going and 
keeps it alive.
10. Exodus and Deliverance
In the Old Testament story of the exodus of the Israelites from 
out of their bondage in Egypt, we also find that the other, in a 
sense that’s pivotal to the story, is the organon of deliverance. 
Moses has been called by God to go unto Pharaoh and to try 
to persuade him to release the Israelites from their servitude. 
He has been told that Pharaoh will deny this request, and that 
23 To be clear: Christ isn’t in the fashion of the no matter, in the two or the 
generic ethic, as Christ-in-Christianity is in the analogy of Christianity. To 
separate these two senses of “in,” recall the distinction I made previously 
between people as they are (who are afflicted) and people as such (who are 
seen under an atrocious aspect). In the generic ethic, one thinks along-
side — in responsibility for, in abnegation to — the generic and singular 
person, the person as they are. The generic ethic isn’t an analogy that con-
tains, or claims to give exhaustive sense to, its terms (it doesn’t have terms 
understood as terms). Christ is in the fashion of the no matter what in 
this weak sense of “in”: when one welcomes Christ no matter what in the 
two, bearing witness to his affliction, one thinks alongside him, without 
subsuming him under the qualities of an analogy. Christ-in-Christianity 
is in Christianity in a much stronger sense of “in”: he is seen to be only 
what he is within the nexus of Christianity. To put it another way, there’s 
nothing that is seen to transcend the three when it is counted-as-one; but 
the other transcends the three in being in the two. This “being in” isn’t the 
same thing as “being totalized by.” It’s a transcendence in and through an 
immanent topology. 
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it will be necessary to do God’s wonders in order to convince 
Pharaoh, however momentarily, that he can’t keep the Israelites 
in bondage. It is essential, in order for Moses to be able to re-
lay the word of God to Pharaoh and demand the deliverance 
of the Israelites, that he be seen as other by Pharaoh.24 Moses, 
who had been reared among the Egyptians, who had not known 
of his own ancestry, had to leave Egypt and go out into the de-
sert in order to come back to Pharaoh as a stranger — not as an 
Egyptian. In Exodus, we read that God tells Moses: “Go in unto 
Pharaoh, and tell him, Thus saith the Lord God of the Hebrews, 
Let my people go, that they may serve me.”25 Having been raised 
alongside Pharaoh, Moses must undergo his own exodus and 
return only years later, when he is truly exterior to Pharaoh and 
the whole Egyptian milieu. And even when he does return, he 
must — through enacting God’s wonders — continuously sepa-
rate himself from that milieu, continuously demonstrate that 
he is an outsider. He must not be like Pharaoh or of Pharaoh, 
assimilable, but present as another, as a new face. He can re-
turn, to put it in the terms I have been suggesting in this essay, 
only when he is outside the analogical schema of the operative 
Egyptian three-as-one, beyond what’s “like” or “unlike” Pharaoh 
24 The remembrance of the two is, in part, a remembering of that encounter 
with the other I am to myself (it may first of all be this). It’s an encounter 
with transcendence that happens, as it were, in my very immanence. I am 
a stranger even to myself, and I welcome the stranger that I am to myself 
in a no matter what fashion in the two. I can forget this, and then forget 
this forgetting, failing to show myself hospitality and inhabiting a three-
as-one with respect to myself. In this way, I can totalize myself and see my 
own affliction as atrocity. Or I can remember, welcome myself, and inhabit 
a coexistent two-and-three with respect to myself. This is the case in my 
relationship with myself, just as it is in my relations with others. Consider 
Christ’s moment of kenosis: “My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken 
me?” Psalm 22:1 (King James Version). This moment of kenosis is one of 
abnegation, the response to the call of a stranger. But who’s the stranger? 
It’s Christ, of course. In abnegation to myself, I greet what, within me, is 
other than what I am. In this hospitality, in the two of himself in which 
transcendence passes through immanence, Christ can then say, “into thy 
hands I commend my spirit.” Luke 23:46 (King James Version).
25 Exodus 9:1 (King James Version). 
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and different only in degree. Then, and only then, is deliverance 
presently possible. And Moses, as the other — indeed, the other 
of Pharaoh (qua Israelite, a doer of God’s wonders) and the other 
of the Israelites he intends to work to save (qua Egyptian-reared, 
qua bringer of salvation) — is this deliverance’s organon. In this 
case, as in the messianic case of Christ, it is what’s first no matter 
what (Moses himself, Christ himself, the afflicted of Sétif and 
Guelma themselves), and then recast against its analogical posi-
tion (against Moses “for” Pharaoh or “for” the Israelites, Christ-
in-Christianity, those who suffered an atrocity) as other to it, 
that makes possible deliverance from analogy. And because the 
other is always present, because I can always remember the two 
in listening to the other’s call and so inhabit it from out of the 
three-as-one, abnegation to the other precedes even my being-
in-the-world or dwelling in analogies. I can remember the two’s 
primacy and thereby inhabit a coexistent two-and-three.
Deliverance from the view of the Israelites’ bondage in Egypt 
on which it’s seen as an atrocity happens in the remembrance 
of the Israelites’ affliction. Each year at Passover, Jews around 
the world don’t say of the Israelites, “when they were slaves in 
Egypt,” but rather, “when we were slaves in Egypt.” The use of 
the first person here doesn’t signify the empathy of analogy. It 
isn’t that we are to step into the shoes of those who were slaves 
in Egypt, for this would just be to bridge the third person (they) 
and the first person (we) by means of constructing an atrocity: 
the Israelites “for” us, as it were. This isn’t what’s going on when 
it is said that we were slaves in Egypt. Rather, in bearing witness 
to the affliction of the flesh and blood people who were slaves in 
Egypt, we recollect our place in the topology of the two and see 
that it is our burden to bear. We don’t empathize but abnegate. 
We disavow the notion of an atrocity that went on many years 
ago, that affected only our ancestors, and take up an affliction 
that is always very much alive: the affliction of ordinary people 
who can’t be counted or rendered intelligible and thereby set 
aside, granted a final meaning, or else considered unmourn-
able. We recollect the affliction that happened in Egypt, and 
we are thus delivered from the atrocity. We recollect the two 
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in which we, condemned to abnegation, welcome the other no 
matter what, without regard to their position in some analogy. 
We recollect that we, like Christ-without-Christianity, are in 
the fashion of the no matter what, that we’re first not analogical 
creatures, even if we secondarily assume analogical positions. 
We annul the condition of angst that characterizes the three-
as-one in the remembrance of what really went on in Egypt, the 
remembrance of what really goes on today. And so, we treat the 
unique number of the count-as-x with a certain ascesis. 
In the remembrance of affliction in the two, we recognize 
that just as the crucifixion’s Christ is foreclosed to his position 
as the Christ of the ascension and conversion, so affliction is 
foreclosed to atrocity and stands apart from it. In moving from 
atrocity to affliction via an application of the razor of the no 
matter what, against the unique number of the count-as-x and 
x = one, we recall the secondary nature of the atrocity and the 
number in which it is crystallized. The recollected two is an 
ethical space in which the self commends itself into the hands 
of the other, the victim of affliction whosoever they are, no mat-
ter what they are. For they are the organon of deliverance from 
atrocity, to whom one attends in remembering the two. This 
is a remembering of the self ’s abnegation to those who aren’t 
counted, those who can’t be counted because they are afflicted 
without atrocity. 
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4
Horror of the Real:  
H.P. Lovecraft’s Old Ones and 
Contemporary Speculative Philosophy
David Peak
Forbidden tomes tucked away in dusty university libraries, an 
army of dead-eyed fish people emerging from the darkened 
sea, the all-too-fragile rules of reality bent or broken by non-
Euclidean geometry, shadow-haunted Cyclopean ruins, and 
bookish narrators wilting in the presence of unutterable horror. 
For better or for worse, Howard Phillips Lovecraft’s signature 
contributions to the weird tale persist in countless short story 
anthologies, novels, films, video games, role-playing games, and 
other forms of merchandise. As Lovecraft scholar S.T. Joshi has 
written, “[t]here really is no parallel in the entire history of liter-
ature for such enduring and wide-ranging attempts to imitate or 
develop a single writer’s conceptions.”1 Perhaps even more im-
pressive is that Lovecraft’s influence has transcended the blindly 
loyal realm of fandom. In fact, his contribution to the American 
tradition has been acknowledged by serious-minded Library of 
America and Penguin Classics editions of his stories and novels. 
1 S.T. Joshi, The Rise, Fall, and Rise of the Cthulhu Mythos (New York: Hip-
pocampus Press, 2015), 22.
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Furthermore, explorations of his conceptions of horror and the 
weird frequently bleed into disciplines such as music and phi-
losophy. With all this in mind, this paper seeks to examine why 
Lovecraft’s so-called Cthulhu Mythos endures as well as how 
Lovecraft’s Old Ones can be uncovered, and perhaps better un-
derstood, through recent speculative trends in philosophy.
Before we can begin, however, we must first discuss the sig-
nificance and meaning of the Cthulhu Mythos. It goes without 
saying that using fiction to create a mythos — or the concept of 
an artificial pantheon and myth background — was far from a 
novel idea by the time Lovecraft published the first of his My-
thos tales (“The Nameless City” in 1921), especially considering 
Lord Dunsany’s towering influence. Yet a key distinction liber-
ates Lovecraft from merely following in the previous tradition. 
As Joshi has written, 
[t]he phrase “artificial pantheon” points to Lovecraft’s cre-
ation of an ersatz theogony created from his imagination, 
rather than from existing myth or folklore. […] Many of 
Dunsany’s gods are clearly symbols for natural forces (Slid 
is described as the ‘soul of the sea’), the gods of Lovecraft’s 
pantheon are far less clearly defined in terms of their nature 
and attributes.2 
Despite the misguided efforts of “self-blinded earth-gazers” to 
equate Lovecraft’s gods with the elements, these entities remain 
entirely within the realm of the unknown. Lovecraft’s fictional 
gods are relegated to the background of his stories — they are 
never the focal point and rarely, if ever, the cause or reason for 
the unfolding of events — which is an important element of 
what makes Lovecraft’s horror horrific. Indeed, only that which 
exists beyond thought, within the vacuous unknown, can instill 
true horror.
Lovecraft was aware of this distinction, as he believed that 
beauty, rather than horror, was the keynote of Dunsany’s fic-
2 Ibid., 51.
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tion. In his own fiction, however, Lovecraft linked beauty to the 
strange and the grotesque, seeking to emphasize notions of the 
unknown. This embrace of the strange and the grotesque also 
provides an explanation for the difference between the genres 
of fantasy and horror — namely, that horror, itself a subgenre 
within the greater classification of weird fiction, is concerned 
only with reality. When faced with horror, we must accept that 
reality is at least partly unknowable, otherwise horror would not 
exist. Coming to know a certain reality can result in a full or 
partial destruction of the self. Take disease, for example. When 
given a certain diagnosis, what was not known is made known 
and is at least partially horrific because the patient did not al-
ways know it to be the case. Yet once the presence of the disease 
is known, it becomes part of the self. There is no resisting such 
revelations. The sense of horror, then, shifts once more to the 
unknown. How will this disease affect me? How it will change 
the ways in which I see and interact with the world? And in this 
acceptance, this giving in to forces that are by nature incom-
prehensible, horror seeks to offer direct knowledge of the real. 
It strips away comforting or cosmetic surface realities and lays 
bare indifferent inner workings. How we feel about those inner 
workings, or what they mean to us, is of little to no importance. 
What matters is the glimpsing of the beyond, of bearing witness, 
and how this act alters our perceptions of what is or has been. 
Fantasy, however, is concerned with unreality, or that which 
is hoped for, magical, or ideal. It seeks only to show things as 
they might be, and in doing so embraces the allure of illusion 
rather than seeking to break its spell. Furthering this concept, 
Lovecraft’s Mythos, despite the use of otherwise fantastical gods 
and monsters, is ultimately rooted in scientific notions and 
present-day concerns. On scientific notions, we need look no 
further than the famous opening sentences of the story “Facts 
Concerning the Late Arthur Jermyn and His Family”: 
Life is a hideous thing, and from the background behind 
what we know of it peer daemoniacal hints of truth which 
make it sometimes a thousand fold more hideous. Science, 
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already oppressive with its shocking revelations, will per-
haps be the ultimate exterminator of our human species — if 
separate species we be — for its reserve of unguessed horrors 
could never be borne by mortal brains if loosed upon the 
world.3 
And on present-day concerns, we turn to Joshi once again: 
Lovecraft was keenly aware of such radical and potentially 
disturbing conceptions as Einsteinian space-time, the quan-
tum theory, and Heisenberg’s indeterminacy principle, and 
utilized them to give a distinctly modern cast to such stale 
conceptions as the vampire (“The Shunned House”) and the 
witch (“The Dreams in the Witch House”), to say nothing of 
the possibility of extraterrestrial incursions in such tales as 
“The Colour Out of Space,” “The Whisperer in Darkness,” At 
the Mountains of Madness, and “The Shadow Out of Time.”4
Lovecraft’s gods and monsters are employed to further such 
concepts as scientific indifferentism and the existence of a real-
ity beyond human conception. As a result, the Cthulhu Mythos 
is populated by a series of gods who are perhaps best under-
stood as symbols of cosmic outsideness, which refers to the re-
ality of objects and entities outside an earthly, moral, or ethical 
understanding, in particular, the monstrous, extraterrestrial 
deities known as the Old Ones. As entities of pure and unknow-
able horror, these Old Ones are unconcerned with human life. 
In fact, they are completely indifferent to it, perhaps more likely 
unaware of it. Any hint of malevolence is strictly the interpreta-
tion of the human who seeks an explanation for the unexplain-
able. As the old man Castro says in “The Call of Cthulhu,” re-
ferring to the apocalyptic return of great Cthulhu, “[t]he time 
would be easy to know, for then mankind would have become 
3 H.P. Lovecraft, The Call of Cthulhu and Other Weird Stories (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1999), 14.
4 Joshi, The Rise, Fall, and Rise of the Cthulhu Mythos, 189.
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as the Great Old Ones: free and wild and beyond good and evil.”5 
Elaborating on the concept of alien gods existing beyond hu-
man constructs such as good and evil, Joshi has written, “[w]e 
cannot penetrate into their minds or psyches to pass any kind 
of moral judgment upon them.”6 All the more fitting then that 
Lovecraft chose to describe Cthulhu in part as a monster with an 
“octopus-like head,” as octopi are perhaps the most alien crea-
tures to humans on Earth.
By remaining cosmically outside human knowledge, the 
Cthulhu Mythos comprises a purposely incomplete body of lore 
rather than a complete system of knowledge. In fact, Lovecraft 
knowingly left this lore unstructured to further a sense of real-
ism. Much like the disease, whose presence annihilates the self, 
so-called knowledge of the Mythos results in madness, or an 
outright rejection of the mind to process reality as it actually is. 
By consciously relegating these gods to the background of his 
fiction, thus emphasizing the unknowability of the unknown, 
Lovecraft’s goal was to establish “the conveyance of terror at the 
thought of human insignificance in a boundless cosmos.”7 As 
Joshi has written, “[t]he true horror in Lovecraft’s work is the 
mere knowledge that the Old Ones exist. The psychological dev-
astation in the face of human insignificance makes any actions 
on the part of the ‘gods’ or monsters seem utterly insignificant.”8 
This is what Lovecraft meant by science being “the ultimate ex-
terminator of our human species”; it is the self-annihilating dis-
ease. With his Mythos tales, Lovecraft sought to emphasize real-
ity as supported by scientific thought — the reality that makes 
horror horrific — that human life is without meaning, the cos-
mos itself cold and unfeeling, and that true knowledge of this 
reality could drive one to the brink of insanity. Further, only 
insanity can be considered an escape from burdensome knowl-
5 Lovecraft, The Call of Cthulhu, 155.
6 Joshi, The Rise, Fall, and Rise of the Cthulhu Mythos, 68.
7 Ibid., 19. 
8 Ibid., 279.
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edge entirely too real and therefore isolating and impossible to 
communicate to others.
Lovecraft was of course an avowed atheist. In fact, he was out-
right hostile to organized religion, and his personal philosophy, 
as far as it was developed, was explicitly materialist. Further-
more, he favored a version of determinism that was mechanis-
tic. On this, Robert M. Price has written, “[Lovecraft] felt there 
was no reality that natural law and matter could not account for. 
Everything worked like one big machine. There was no god, no 
soul, no meaning or purpose. […] He felt sure the universe was 
just a collection of ‘stuff,’ but he had to know more about it.”9 
In other words, it’s in our nature to seek answers to questions 
we cannot begin to formulate — and no good will come of it. 
This constant compulsion to “know more” motivated Lovecraft 
to stay informed about the latest scientific discoveries as well as 
contemporary views of history. For example, he adhered to the 
tenets of Oswald Spengler’s Decline of the West, the evolution-
ary principles of Charles Darwin, the connection of evolution to 
the cosmos put forth by naturalist Ernst Haeckel, and Einstein’s 
aforementioned theory of relativity. Informed by his materialist 
beliefs, Lovecraft used horror, particularly its aspects of specu-
lation, as a means of making the unreal real. Much like a body 
of lore that can only hint at the unknowable, or the disease that 
changes one’s relationship to the world, such a “horror of the 
real” must be speculative, as its very nature entails an existence 
of entities and objects beyond our knowing. Rather than ap-
proaching the weird as a means of explaining that which cannot 
be explained or instilling feelings such as shock or awe, Love-
craft acknowledged that our very best explanations are unable 
to grasp the truth. Instead we cling to the truths we construct: 
the useless laws of physics and morality. As David E. Schultz has 
written, “[Lovecraft’s stories] challenge us to consider the world 
in which we live in light of what science has told us about it.”10 
9 S.T. Joshi, ed., Dissecting Cthulhu: Essays on the Cthulhu Mythos (Lakeland: 
Miskatonic River Press, 2011), 224.
10 Ibid., 35.
169
HORROR OF THE REAL
But this is only half of what makes Lovecraft’s horrific vision so 
profound.
Before we can talk about the other half, we must develop a 
connection between Lovecraft’s notions of horror and recent 
trends in philosophy, particularly the speculative realist move-
ment. Defined briefly, speculative realism acknowledges an ex-
istence of the world independent of the human mind. Because 
the philosophical conclusions drawn from such an acknowl-
edgment are by definition speculative, they can seem counter-
intuitive or strange. As previously stated, Lovecraft sought to 
emphasize strangeness in his writing, therefore strengthening 
the connection to speculation — by which we refer to any type 
of thinking that claims to be able to access some form of the 
absolute — fertile ground for planting the seeds of philosophy. 
It’s worth noting here that the one thing that unites the four pri-
mary philosophers associated with speculative realism — Ray 
Brassier, Iain Hamilton Grant, Graham Harman, and Quentin 
Meillassoux — is a shared interest in the philosophical impli-
cations of Lovecraft’s fiction. As Harman has recently written, 
“[a]lthough the four original Speculative Realists do not share 
a single philosophical hero in common, all of us turned out in-
dependently to have been admirers of Lovecraft. Though the 
reasons for this are different in each case, my own interest stems 
from my view that his weird fiction sets the stage for an entire 
philosophical genre.”11 This admiration is particularly relevant 
to the philosophies of Harman and Meillassoux, whose con-
cepts we will focus on in this essay. For example, the Cthulhu 
Mythos is representative of what Harman refers to as “weird 
realism.” On this, Harman has written, “[r]ealism is always in 
some sense weird. Realism is about the strangeness in reality 
that is not projected onto reality by us. It is already there by dint 
of being real.”12 Elsewhere, Harman has written, “[m]ost philo-
sophical realism is ‘representational’ in character. Such theories 
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hold not only that there is a real world outside human contact 
with it, but also that this reality can be mirrored adequately by 
the findings of the natural sciences or some other method of 
knowledge.”13 And then, “[n]o reality can be immediately trans-
lated into representations of any sort. Reality itself is weird be-
cause reality itself is incommensurable with any attempt to rep-
resent or measure it.”14 
Other writers and philosophers influenced by Lovecraft have 
turned to similar concepts to grasp the real. Brassier’s philoso-
phy, for instance, defers to scientific representation as the only 
reliable form of access to reality, in addition to stating that the 
real is not to be confused with our concepts of it. Ben Wood-
ard connects this idea to the concept of “dark vitalism,” which 
“accepts a reality that is fundamentally comprised of forces and 
processes but does not attempt to make this contingency or 
process-dominated reality something that is immediately think-
able, or understandable within the limits of reason of alone.”15 In 
my opinion, Timothy Morton explores similar territory, using 
the term realist magic to denote thinking about philosophical 
realism, nonhuman phenomenology,16 and theories of causality.
Such thinking, it should be noted, is in dialogue with Love-
craft’s fiction, rather than his personal beliefs. In fact, Lovecraft 
looked upon vitalism in particular with disdain. Rather than 
accepting that life originated as a result of nonchemical or non-
physical forces, Lovecraft believed that material interactions led 
to consciousness. This is seen in the influence of Haeckel, who 
wrote that “[mind] is a product and attribute of certain forms 
and processes of matter; and when that matter is disintegrated, 
it ceases to exist — just as molecular heat ceased to exist upon 
the dispersal or disintegration of the material molecules which 
13 Graham Harman, Weird Realism: Lovecraft and Philosophy (Winchester: 
Zero Books, 2012), 51.
14 Ibid., 51.
15 Ben Woodard, Slime Dynamics (Winchester: Zero Books, 2012), 51–52.
16 This term is a reference to Ian Bogost’s “alien phenomenology.” For more, 
see Alien Phenomenology, or What It’s Like to Be a Thing (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2012).
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make it possible.”17 In other words, consciousness is nothing 
more than electrical impulse. Once it’s gone, it’s gone forever. 
On this, Woodard has written, “[u]nder Lovecraft’s indifferent-
ism humans become just another form of matter in the uni-
verse, simply another form of entropic fodder in a mechanistic 
cosmos.”18 The human is no different than the octopus, fungi 
from Yuggoth, or cosmic dust. Vitalism, however, posits a dis-
tinction between living organisms and nonliving entities. In this 
sense, Lovecraft’s beliefs align perhaps most closely with Har-
man’s object-oriented ontology (OOO), which argues that an ob-
ject — a unified thing that cannot be reduced to its components 
or effects — exists independently of human perception, and that 
all objects can interact with one another, albeit indirectly.
In an effort to square the circle, so to speak, and to move past 
the inherent limitations of Lovecraft’s dogmatic materialism, 
perhaps best understood as a product of his time, we will look to 
speculative realism to see how it can deepen our understanding 
of the Mythos. It’s worth noting here that speculative realism, 
Harman’s preferred term, is just as often referred to as specu-
lative materialism, Meillassoux’s preferred term, yet both are 
concerned with realism, albeit in different ways. Harman pos-
its that his own OOO and Meillassoux’s speculative materialism 
are essentially opposites. Much like Gilman in Lovecraft’s story 
“The Dreams of the Witch House,” “Meillassoux thinks that the 
primary qualities of things can be mathematized, whereas for 
OOO there is no direct access to them through mathematics or 
anything else.”19 Both philosophies, however, are united in their 
embrace of speculation, which leads to my next point. Ultimate-
ly, Lovecraft’s Mythos tales are about wanting to go deeper, even 
if it leads to unwanted or unforeseen results. This is reinforced 
by Lovecraft’s aforementioned compulsion to “know more” 
about the world in which he lived. Yet no matter how deep we 
17 Ernst Haeckel, quoted in S.T. Joshi, H.P. Lovecraft: The Decline of the West 
(Berkeley Heights: Wildside Press, 1990), 10.
18 Woodard, Slime Dynamics, 43.
19 Harman, Speculative Realism, 100.
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go, there will always remain depths still unplumbed. Meillas-
soux refers to such unplumbed depths as “the great outdoors” 
or “the absolute outside of pre-critical thinkers: that outside 
which was not relative to us, and which was given as indifferent 
to its own givenness to be what is, existing in itself regardless of 
whether we are thinking of it or not; that outside which thought 
could explore with the legitimate feeling of being on foreign ter-
ritory — of being entirely elsewhere.”20 In my opinion, OOO pro-
vides the deepest explorations of realism’s unplumbed depths 
to date. This opinion is supported by Morton, who has written, 
“Graham Harman discovered a gigantic coral reef of mysterious 
entities beneath the Heideggerian submarine of Da-sein, which 
itself is operating at an ontological depth way below the choppy 
surface of philosophy, beset by the winds of epistemology and 
infested by the sharks of materialism, idealism, empiricism and 
most other -isms that have defined what is and what isn’t for the 
last several hundred years.”21
Put simply, reality is hiding in plain sight. Rather than ac-
cepting the way things appear to be as the way they are, to un-
cover reality we must instead strip away appearances. We must 
acknowledge a material existence independent of the human, 
one filled with objects as they really are, rather than what they 
mean to and for us, and in doing so, encounter the realm of 
being without thought, in which the ever-changing hints of hor-
ror lurk beneath an illusory “fabric.” As Harman has written, 
“[t]he world in itself is made of realities withdrawing from all 
conscious access.”22 In other words, some aspect of the whole of 
reality will always remain in a perpetually veiled underworld, 
out of sight and inaccessible to the human. Furthermore, rather 
than accepting that the human remains privileged among non-
sentient objects, such inaccessibility extends to the human as 
20 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contin-
gency, trans. Ray Brassier (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 7.
21 Timothy Morton, Realist Magic: Objects, Ontology, Causality (Ann Arbor: 
Open Humanities Press, 2013), 222.
22 Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object (Winchester: Zero Books, 2011), 
38.
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well. “Even humans withdraw into a dark reality that is never 
fully understood, while also being present to observers from the 
outside.”23 OOO states that what withdraws from consciousness 
cannot be mere lumps of objective physical matter but rather a 
so-called extra-mental reality. Again, we return to old man Cas-
tro, who says “[The Old Ones had shape] but that shape was not 
made of matter.”24 What can this shape possibly be if not physical 
matter? The answer is perhaps not as important as the asking of 
the question. Lovecraft was drawn to weird fiction because it al-
lowed him “to achieve momentarily the illusion of some strange 
suspension or violation of the galling limitations of time, space, 
and natural law which forever imprison us and frustrate our 
curiosity about the infinite cosmic places beyond the radius of 
our sight and analysis.”25 Meillassoux’s term for such a suspen-
sion or violation of natural law over time is “hyper-chaos,” “for 
which nothing is or would seem to be impossible, not even the 
unthinkable.”26 Only in such suspension can we begin to fathom 
the aforementioned inner-workings, or those forces beyond 
comprehension, hinted at here by those jagged shapes that lurk 
beneath the fabric of reality: the Old Ones.
The Cthulhu Mythos features five primary deities — Aza-
thoth, Cthulhu, Nyarlathotep, Shub-Niggurath, and Yog-So-
thoth, all of which are name-checked in “The Whisperer in 
Darkness” — which are collectively referred to as the Old Ones. 
Of the five, Azathoth and Cthulhu provide the most philosophi-
cal depth, and so will take up the most space here, whereas the 
significance of Nyarlathotep, Shub-Niggurath, and Yog-Sothoth 
remains fittingly vague. In the paragraphs that follow, we will 
explore references to these entities in Lovecraft’s fiction that 
elaborate on concepts of horror and speculation rather than 
those that follow in the Dunsanian tradition of fantasy. As 
previously stated, these deities exist in a dark reality for which 
23 Ibid., 40.
24 Lovecraft, The Call of Cthulhu, 154–55.
25 H.P. Lovecraft, “Notes on Writing Weird Fiction,” The H. P. Lovecraft 
Archive, http://www.hplovecraft.com/writings/texts/essays/nwwf.aspx. 
26 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 64.
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nothing is impossible, a realm beyond conceptions of good and 
evil, and beyond human access. Therefore, these entities repre-
sent a fundamentally anti-anthropocentric worldview and are 
therefore emblematic of the “essence of externality.” Lovecraft’s 
famous letter to Farnworth Wright makes this point clear: “[t]o 
achieve the essence of real externality, whether of time or space 
or dimension, one must forget that such things as organic life, 
good and evil, love and hate, and all such local attributes of a 
negligible and temporary race called mankind, have any exist-
ence at all.”27 This is remarkably similar to the stated purpose of 
Meillassoux’s work in his groundbreaking book After Finitude, 
which was to achieve “what modern philosophy has been telling 
us for the past two centuries is impossibility itself: to get out of 
ourselves, to grasp the in-itself, to know what is whether we are 
or not.”28
In “The Haunter of the Dark,” the blind, idiot god Azathoth is 
described as “Lord of All Things, encircled by his flopping horde 
of mindless and amorphous dancers”29 at the center of ultimate 
chaos. Here we return to Meillassoux’s concept of hyper-chaos, 
the description of which is worth quoting at further length if not 
only to appreciate its Lovecraftian language, courtesy of Brassi-
er’s fine translation: 
If we look through the aperture which we have opened up 
onto the absolute, what we see there is a rather menacing 
power — something insensible, and capable of destroying 
both things and worlds, of bringing forth monstrous absur-
dities, yet also of never doing anything, of realizing every 
dream, but also every nightmare, of engendering random 
and frenetic transformations, or conversely, of producing a 
universe that remains motionless down to its ultimate recess-
27 As quoted in Joshi, The Rise, Fall, and Rise of the Cthulhu Mythos, 209.
28 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 27.
29 Lovecraft, The Call of Cthulhu, 354.
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es, like a cloud bearing the fiercest of storms, then the eeriest 
bright spells, if only for an interval of disquieting calm.30 
Indeed, further strengthening the connection between this 
concept and Lovecraft’s descriptions of Azathoth, Meillassoux 
goes on to refer to such omnipotence as “blind.” Azathoth is the 
ruler of the Outer Gods, a dreaming monster in whose dream 
the universe resides. As such, he dwells in the realm of being 
without thought, even his consciousness is unconscious, far 
beyond our understanding. Furthermore, he is the embodi-
ment of disorder — the thing that adheres to no natural law or 
order, thus threatening to undo all things. We turn to Meillas-
soux once more: “[w]e can only hope to develop an absolute 
knowledge — a knowledge of chaos which would not simply 
keep repeating that everything is possible — on condition that 
we produce necessary propositions about it besides that of its 
omnipotence.”31 Meillassoux’s derivation of the principle of non-
contradiction from the principle of factiality explains that for 
knowledge to be contingent in this way, it cannot be anything 
whatsoever. By establishing the constraints to which an entity 
must submit to “exercise its capacity-not-to-be and its capacity-
to-be-other,” the capacity for things to be otherwise, Meillas-
soux gives us as clear an explanation as any for why Lovecraft is 
only able to describe Azathoth as “indescribable.”
Cthulhu is imprisoned in the sunken city of R’lyeh. Like the 
dreaming Azathoth, Cthulhu is a source of constant anxiety 
for mankind at an unconscious level, and its mode of speech 
is transmitted thought. As the infamous opening sentences of 
“The Call of Cthulhu” make clear, further refining similar senti-
ments expressed by the opening sentences of “Arthur Jermyn”: 
“The sciences, each straining in its own direction, have hitherto 
harmed us little; but someday the piecing together of dissoci-
ated knowledge will open up such terrifying vistas of reality, 
and of our frightful position therein, that we shall either go mad 
30 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 64.
31 Ibid., 66.
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from the revelation or flee from the deadly light into the peace 
and safety of a new dark age.”32 Cthulhu is perhaps representa-
tive of an inability to correlate scientific findings into a com-
prehensible system, a meta-commentary of the Cthulhu Mythos 
itself. In other words, the significance of Cthulhu is that the 
representation embodied by the Mythos is the impossibility of 
representation. As described in “The Call of Cthulhu,” the Old 
Ones no longer live but never really die. They merely “lie awake 
in the dark” and watch the universe unfold. Further described 
as “coming from the stars,” the Old Ones in their very proximity 
to human life create an ill-defined sense of cosmic outsideness, 
hinting at themes of panspermia, or the theory that life on Earth 
originated from microorganisms from outer space. As Woodard 
puts it, “[t]he teeming biological, if beginning from a unity and 
moving outwards, dividing into ever more chaotic and diver-
gent forms creates a creeping abyss of biology, where reason is 
only one feature amidst a taloned and toothed pandemonium.”33 
To accept this is to think of a world without the givenness of 
the world, our apparently ironclad natural laws, as Meillassoux 
would say. And to understand such indifference of the outside 
to us, we must assign anything outside time or outside space, 
such as Cthulhu, a “fearsome and unnatural malignancy.” This 
malignancy, of course, only inheres in the correlation of human 
consciousness.
Sometimes referred to as a “cosmic shape-shifter,” Nyarlatho-
tep “is a horrible messenger of the evil gods to Earth, who usu-
ally appears in human form.”34 As such, he is a horror of infinite 
shapes and innumerable forms, the thing to which we assign 
human features so as to comprehend. In this sense, Nyarlatho-
tep serves two functions in the Mythos: First, he is a go-between 
for humans and the gods; second, he is representative of our 
inclination for anthropocentrism. In this sense, he links us to 
the entities beyond comprehension, existing half-submerged in 
32 Lovecraft, The Call of Cthulhu, 139.
33 Woodard, Slime Dynamics, 52.
34 Joshi, The Rise, Fall, and Rise of the Cthulhu Mythos, 169.
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unfathomable depths, and is therefore something to fear. This 
is why Nyarlathotep acts as a messenger of Azathoth: he is the 
thing that intrudes into our lives, disrupting reality, and re-
minding us of the existence of that which we cannot truly know, 
the knowledge of which, or the coming-to-knowledge of which, 
results in horror.
In a letter to Willis Conover, Lovecraft described Shub-Nig-
gurath as Yog-Sothoth’s wife and a hellish, cloud-like entity. Be-
yond this, there really isn’t much to Shub-Niggurath, outside of 
some oblique references, as well as to her children, Nug and Yeb, 
in various stories, at least not as it relates to the concepts of spec-
ulation and horror. The one thing that makes Shub-Niggurath 
interesting, however, is that she seemingly cannot be described 
beyond simple, folksy titles, including “The Black Goat of the 
Wood with a Thousand Young” and “Lord of the Wood.” In this 
sense, she is beyond understanding to the extent that she can 
only be referred to as something unknowable (The Not-To-Be-
Named one).
Finally, the deity Yog-Sothoth is conterminous with all 
of time and space — “Past, present, future, all are one in Yog-
Sothoth”35 — yet it remains locked outside the known universe. 
According to the text Wilbur Whateley translates in “The Dun-
wich Horror,” the Old Ones exist “not in the spaces we know, but 
between them.” This is perhaps one of the clearest connections 
to OOO. As Harman has written, referring to Lovecraft, “[n]o 
other writer is so perplexed by the gap between objects and the 
power of language to describe them, or between objects and the 
qualities they possess.”36 Harman continues, “[t]he major topic 
of object-oriented philosophy is the dual polarization that oc-
curs in the world: one between the real and the sensual, and the 
other between objects and their qualities.”37 In Lovecraft’s fic-
tion, characters often become “stuck” in the gap between reality 
35 H.P. Lovecraft, The Thing on the Doorstep and Other Weird Stories (New 
York: Penguin Books, 2001), 219.
36 Harman, Weird Realism, 3.
37 Ibid., 4.
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as it is and their conceptions of what it is supposed to be. And 
this gap is as immeasurable as the realm of horror itself. 
As previously mentioned, one half of what allows Lovecraft’s 
fiction, specifically his Mythos, to persist in contemporary pop 
culture is his use of an artificial pantheon and myth background 
to focus on themes of scientific notion and present-day con-
cerns. As a result, Lovecraft essentially moved the weird tale 
away from vampires and witches and “turned the whole uni-
verse into a haunted house,” as Richard L. Tierney has said.38 The 
other half of this continued relevance is rooted in Lovecraft’s 
uncanny ability to hint at future philosophical developments. 
In my opinion, this is why we continue to turn to Lovecraft, 
especially today, as the effects of climate change, information 
overload, and the depletion of natural resources force us to seri-
ously consider the world-without-us. In his unsparing vision of 
the human as meaningless, Lovecraft offers readers a view of the 
thing that we cannot — that we will not — see: the universe as 
filled with cold, dead planets, tearing itself apart at the seams; an 
impossible reality, one in which humans find themselves extinct, 
having made no lasting impact on the real. Lovecraft knew there 
were strange aeons beyond comprehension. And in his attempts 
to show the outlines of indescribable shapes, he came closer to 
expressing the ineffable than perhaps any writer of horror or the 
weird has before or since. As Harman has written, 
[t]he cosmos seems to be gigantic in both space and time. It 
is more ancient than all our ape-like ancestors and all other 
life forms. It might also seem safe to assume that the tril-
lions of entities in the cosmos engage in relations and duels 
even when no humans observe them. However interesting 
we humans may be to ourselves, we are apparently in no way 
central to the cosmic drama, marooned as we are on an aver-
age-sized planet near a mediocre sun, and confined to a tiny 
portion of the history of the universe.39 
38 Joshi, Dissecting Cthulhu, 10.
39 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 63.
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This then is Lovecraft’s Promethean legacy, he who dared articu-
late that which should not be, the blind, idiot god bubbling at 
the center of all infinity; he who blasphemed by acknowledging 
what is and who dared us to gaze into such magnificent vistas of 
ultimate chaos.
180
DISEASES OF THE HEAD
Bibliography
Bogost, Ian. Alien Phenomenology, or What It’s Like to Be a 
Thing. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012.
Harman, Graham. Speculative Realism: An Introduction. 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018.
———. The Quadruple Object. Winchester: Zero Books, 2011.
———. Weird Realism: Lovecraft and Philosophy. Winchester: 
Zero Books, 2012.
Joshi, S.T., ed. Dissecting Cthulhu: Essays on the Cthulhu 
Mythos. Lakeland: Miskatonic River Press, 2011.
———. H.P. Lovecraft: The Decline of the West. Berkeley 
Heights: Wildside Press, 1990.
———. The Rise, Fall, and Rise of the Cthulhu Mythos. New 
York: Hippocampus Press, 2015.
Lovecraft, H.P. “Notes on Writing Weird Fiction.” The H.P. 
Lovecraft Archive. http://www.hplovecraft.com/writings/
texts/essays/nwwf.aspx.
———. The Call of Cthulhu and Other Weird Stories. New 
York: Penguin Books, 1999.
———. The Thing on the Doorstep and Other Weird Stories. 
New York: Penguin Books, 2001.
Meillassoux, Quentin. After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity 
of Contingency. Translated by Ray Brassier. London: 
Bloomsbury, 2013.
Morton, Timothy. Realist Magic: Objects, Ontology, Causality. 
Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press, 2013.





In his “Essay on the Maladies of the Head,” Kant writes, “[a]
t least someone bewitched by these chimeras can never be 
brought by reasoning to doubting the actuality of his presumed 
sensation. One also finds that persons who show enough ma-
ture reason in other cases nevertheless firmly insist upon hav-
ing seen with full attention who knows what ghostly shapes and 
distorted faces, and that they are even refined enough to place 
their imagined experience in connection with many a subtle 
judgement of reason.”1 What if Kant’s “deranged persons” were 
not “dreamers in waking” but rather those whose sensations be-
come, through weird chance, inextricably bound to chimerical 
overlaps of space-time that render chaos from perceptions of 
order? In our era of life within the Rational Experiment gone 
haywire, anything seems possible, except reversibility.
I.
Letter from Eugenio de Sálazar to Cristóbal Colón.
Dated 27 August 1506.
1 Immanuel Kant, Anthropology, History, and Education, eds. and trans. 
Günter Zöller and Robert B. Louden (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), 71.
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Translated into English by Dr. Prof. Koldo Eguíluz Miranda, 
University of Salamancas, 2022.
Admiral Don Colón,
I regret to inform you that our journey to Hispaniola was 
met with disaster. Indeed, in your astuteness, you have al-
ready noted that this letter, meant to inform you of all that 
transpired, is penned from a different island altogether. We 
did not reach Hispaniola, and to be quite forward, few of us 
among the crew of La Santa María Magdalena made landfall 
at all. 
The first two weeks after our departure from Cádiz were 
rather uneventful yet highly consequential. The sea remained 
in a more or less constant state of billowing — those cycli-
cal swells that rock the ship forward, down, and backward 
just to repeat and do the same — which of course made the 
men violently ill and a mess of the caravel’s decks, which in 
turn just aggravated the conditions. This state of affairs was 
rather a nuisance that necessitated those few of us unaffected 
by the rhythmic surging waters and the rolling of our caravel 
to perform double or even triple tasks. This left us exhausted 
and shortly, susceptible to committing the most amateurish 
of oversights, if not outright blunders. And while the crew’s 
weak stomachs did not penetrate our food stores, the fresh 
water supply was surely in danger should their illness persist 
for the duration of the journey, and should we find ourselves 
without rain.
I admit that it was possibly due to my own faulty triangu-
lation, having been deprived of respite for some ten days on 
end, that we found ourselves stranded in the Sargasso Sea. 
Regretfully, the ships’ logs were all lost, and I have no memo-
ry of where precisely I turned us astray, or if indeed I am the 
culprit and not some sprite or nymph with evil intentions.
Sir, your courageous, steadfast efforts to establish Chris-
tianity and civilization the world over must not stop with 
the barbarians of the New World lands and islands. As you 
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yourself suspected, Admiral, there are evil races in the waters 
too. These beasts know only the wiles and deceptions of Sa-
tan, and their souls must be blacker than even the scales they 
wear for skin.
Utterly becalmed in mid-sea, we were stranded, seem-
ingly entangled, by infernal strands of reeking brown sea-
weed that nearly covered the expanse of the flat sea, which 
had lost its virginal azure glow and took on the tainted hue 
of burnt tallow instead. The stagnant tropical air was thickly 
perfumed by these infinite furrows of putrid, rotting algae, 
as though we had found ourselves on some farmland in hell, 
where the only crops to be grown are the humid corpses of 
eels and urchins. 
Despite the ghastly still waters, those who had been retch-
ing for two weeks at sea were now sickened anew, along with 
even those immune to the rolling waves. 
Our prayers for deliverance from this stinking Hades were 
soon exhausted, as were our bodies and minds. Unsurpris-
ingly, those recent converts to the glories of God Almighty 
were the first to falter. These Carpathians, Gauls, and Celts 
reverted to their most ancient pagan traditions and forsook 
the ultimate sacrifice of Christ to instead seek redemption 
through the slaughter of the half dozen horses we were trans-
porting to the Indies. These brutes removed and cooked the 
flesh and bones of our prized mares and stallions before fill-
ing their hides with straw, yes the very straw that the poor 
beasts had been feasting upon! Then chanting horrible de-
moniac hymns, they sewed the horses’ bodies back up, and 
burned these mockeries of equine finesse as effigies, sending 
them alight across that wretched water. I tried to stop them, 
of course I did. But I confess to you, Admiral, as to Christ 
in Heaven, that the smell of the burning hair and hides of 
these effigies and the cooked meat of the horses, if nothing 
else — and let it be known that our Holy Saints most certainly 
turned away from this barbaric display of ignorance and sav-
agery — did overcome the stench of that hellish sea, if only 
temporarily. 
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But I fear that this lapse into barbarism, née Satanism, 
may have been what cursed us all, for in the following days, 
we were to meet the face of pure evil. But instead of turning 
away, we were enchanted by it.
It was the first day in which there was a wind at all, but 
really it was only enough to rustle the hair above one’s ear, or 
stir the sweat on one’s nose. Each of us languished weakly on 
the top deck, isolated to the few shadows cast by optimistic 
sails, rigging, cabins, and cannons. One lad, who had taken 
refuge on the shadow side of the mast, began to call out in 
hysterical bursts, gesturing wildly into the distance. 
“Look!” he called, in a Gaelic accent. “They’re dancing! It’s 
the selkies — they’ve come to rescue us!”
No one stirred, trusting the boy had been overcome with 
exhaustion and hallucination. “Come now, ye crazy bastard,” 
said another, finally rising from his sickened laze to inspect 
the spectacle. “By God in heaven,” he reluctantly muttered. 
“Yer right, ole boy.”
Naturally, now, all La Magdalena’s crew mustered the en-
ergy to lumber over to starboard deck and see for themselves 
what the Celts were getting on about. One by one, they raised 
their hands to their brows and squinted into the horizon. 
Murmurs in numerous languages equating to proclamations 
of renewed faith echoed across the deck: “Díos mío,” “Al-
hamdulillah,” “Mein Gott,” “Mon dieu,” “Ani Elohim.”
Their bodies looked like dolphins from a distance, just as 
sleek but jet black. They darted in and out of the water, dip-
ping above and below its surface, splashing fish-like tails that 
were, impossibly and yet visibly, attached to anthropoid bod-
ies. As they drew closer, or we to them, their arms became 
discernible, although theirs were not used for swimming the 
way a man would, or a woman, if she were so inclined to take 
to the sea the way these did. Their hands remained at their 
sides, moving instead with their tails and finned thighs flut-
tering. Through the putrid waters, they dived and danced, 
their fish tails propelling them at great speeds through the 
sea. They carried with them a grace that was, dare I say, sen-
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sual, and we were transfixed by this strange allure. Each had 
large, brilliant eyes that transmitted the sun’s reflection of the 
water’s surface, and their lithe bodies were hypnotic in their 
movements. Who can say for how long this group of bedrag-
gled men stood staring at the overboard display as though in 
some erotic trance? But as suddenly as they made themselves 
known to us, they vanished. They left us with only rippling 
circular patterns on the flats of the sea where they had last 
surfaced. Alas, they must have returned to their underwater 
kingdom, or more likely, back to torment the dead in Tarta-
rus, for these abominations of nature were not the auspicious 
creatures so many of our crew had recognized from their lo-
cal lore.
“They’re not selkies, you dope. They’re sirens trying to 
lure us into marrying them while drowning ourselves in the 
meantime,” countered the well-read, Alexandrian sailor, all 
too familiar with Homeric misadventures.
“Yes, Mami Wata,” agreed the Guinean.
“Mamba Muntu,” nodded the Congolese.
“Nay, you’re all wrong. They’re the virgin daughters of At-
argatis, our beloved mother of Syria,” proclaimed the Cili-
cian. “They want nothing more than to deliver us from this 
unholy nightmare!”
“Fools! They can only be attendants of Ku-Liltu, the an-
cient fish-woman and bringer of unfathomable riches!” re-
joiced the Arab.
While the men deliberated the most accurate interpreta-
tion of our horrid encounter with the sea-maidens, La Mag-
dalena began to rock, gently, from side to side, as if to soothe 
the argumentative men onboard. The movement was so 
gradual, so methodical, that the hot-headed sailors did not 
even notice it at first. Not until she dipped without warning 
deep to port and sent sailors, rigging, dishes, and rats, clam-
oring for stronghold, were we forced into action.
The mainmast was first to go. With the sails having been 
spread for days in hopes of the slightest breeze to move us 
out of that watery wasteland, the sudden rush of wind that 
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bore down upon us cracked the spar, momentarily filling the 
ship with the scent of fresh-cut pine wood before the aroma 
dissipated into the cyclone. 
When a violent wave crashed against the prow as in am-
bush, it took the spritsail with it overboard. Our beloved 
caravel cried in agony, seeming to protest her own fate. Yet, 
one by one, La Magdalena’s creaking, moaning timbers were 
compromised, and one by one, they buckled beneath the 
pressure of waves and wind. She was going down, and, dear 
Admiral, I swear to you in the name of Christ our Lord and 
Savior, that there was not a damned thing we might have 
done to save her.
I hope you may sympathize, Admiral, as I know that you, 
too, saw those things. You noted some years back, on your 
first or second voyage, a group of three off the coast of His-
paniola. You celebrated their elegance yet decried their fea-
tures as less beautiful than depicted in paintings. Perhaps it 
was because you resisted hypnosis that your ships and your 
crew, and, indeed, you survived to tell the tale. We were not 
so wise, or fortunate. There are today four souls who sur-
vived the shipwreck: a boatswain, two gunners, and myself. 
By miraculous intervention, we lived by clinging to flotsam 
that was eventually washed ashore of the Isle of Devils, the 
one discovered by Juan de Bermúdez, some years ago. And 
yet, I write that I clung to flotsam, but by the grace of God on 
High, I must clarify as to avoid telling untruths. In fact, we 
were saved by a pair of drifting half-burnt effigies of straw-
stuffed horse-hide. My soul aches with the thought of having 
clung to such unholy manifestations of fear, ignorance, and 
superstition. And yet, it is true: I was saved by the grace of 
God, no doubt, but also by the heathen sacrificial offerings. I 
hope that my honesty has not diminished your opinion of my 
character, dear Admiral.
Still today, my three fellows refuse to speak of what they 
saw in the water before the storm, which is why I write to 
you. You see, I fear I shall lose my mind if I am to remain 
silent, as my humors are already quite unbalanced. I need 
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for nothing more than to discuss, man to man, true Chris-
tian to true Christian, this unusual matter with you upon my 
return to Castile and to settle it once and for all. Admiral, if 
these nereids are in fact human kinds, how do we proceed 
to dominate them, let alone to show them the way of God 
the Merciful? How do we expel the demonic from such crea-
tures? How does their existence change our mission as men 
of God?
Please do kindly consider my request for conference, and 
in the meantime, I fervently anticipate your response.
May this letter fi nd you in robust health, Admiral.
Eugenio de Sálazar
Translator’s note: Unbeknownst to the letter’s author, its intended 
recipient perished on May 20, 1506 and would never know of the 
fate of La Santa María Magdalena, her mysterious and deadly 
encounter in the Sargasso Sea, or the loss of her esteemed crew. 




Diver name: D. Halloway
Date: 16–06–2022
Bottom time: 21 min
Max depth: –52m
Gas mix: 21% O₂
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Decompression profi le: 2 min at 12m, 21% O₂ — 6 min at 8m, 
80% O₂ — 8 min at 6m, 100% O₂
Instruments used: gps, hammer, aluminum stakes, 
photogrammetry targets
Dive objectives: 1) Locate shipwreck; 2) establish fi xed points; 
3) record measurements between fi xed points; 4) place 
photo targets; 5) perform photogrammetry
Dive outcomes: Objectives 1 and 2 were achieved.
Problems and resolutions: With a max bottom time allotment 
of a whopping 20 minutes, and with very limited visibility 
at depth (0.5–1m), it took some time to locate the shipwreck 
and record its extremities with gps. I believe that the ship 
has broken in half, which skews its profi le. Th is could 
have happened during the wrecking event or through 
geological processes over the last 500 years. One additional 
minor problem was encountered: the coms on my full-
face mask (required due to the heavily polluted water) 
were malfunctioning so that a deafening high-pitched 
screeching sound was shooting into my right ear for the 
duration of the dive, which was highly distracting — and 
painful. Also supremely annoying. And upon exiting the 
water, my wetsuit was vile. And no, I did not pee in it (this 
time). Th e water just really is that disgusting. Th ank you, 
Anthropocene (or should I say, Cthulucene). 




Diver name: D. Halloway
Date: 17–06–2022
Bottom time: 22 min
Max depth: –50m
Gas mix: 21% O₂
Decompression profile: 2 min at 12m, 21% O₂ — 6 min at 8m, 
80% O₂ — 8 min at 6m, 100% O₂
Instruments used: gps, camera, strobe
Dive objectives: 1) Locate shipwreck; 2) perform 
photogrammetry
Dive outcomes: Both objectives were achieved. 
Problems and resolutions: Visibility was somewhat improved 
since yesterday (2.5–3m), so we decided to record the site 
for photogrammetry. Because the quality of the photos are 
much improved if I wear a half mask instead of a full-face 
mask, I had to subject the skin of my face and lips to this 
disgusting, toxic water. (Hopefully I’m not dead of cancer 
by the end of the field season.) I maintained an approximate 
distance of 1.5–2m above the shipwreck and recorded over 
300 overlapping photographic images. The waters are still 
dark and murky but hopefully the images can be digitally 
tweaked enough to generate the necessary point cloud 
for 3D reconstruction. Only problems encountered were 
during the ascent. My dive buddy experienced low air upon 
departure from the site, so we had to buddy-breathe from 
my air system from –52m to the surface-supply station 
at –8m. The lack of air in his tanks made him positively 
buoyant. I struggled to keep our ascent under 10m/min lest 
he rocket us both up to the surface and get us bent (which 
is exactly what I told him to do — get bent — after we were 
back on the support vessel). (Hopefully I’m not dead of 
the bends by the end of the field season.) By the time we 
reached the deco stations near the surface, we were both 
positively buoyant (as he had drained my air supply too), 
and in the surge, we were bobbing up and down like a pair 
of seals caught in a fishing net. This might have been the 
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most annoying deco time I’ve ever experienced (and they’re 
all annoying).
Sketch of dive profi le and/or site:
Record no.: 11/16
Diver name: B. Johnson
Date: 18–06–2022
Bottom time: 19 min
Max depth: –53m
Gas mix: 21% O₂
Decompression profi le: 2 min at 12m, 21% O₂ — 6 min at 8m, 
80% O₂ — 8 min at 6m, 100% O₂
Instruments used: compass, trowels, shovels
Dive objectives: 1) Locate Trench 4; 2) Open new trench (T5) 
5m further due southeast of T4
Dive outcomes: Objectives achieved (hopefully?)
Problems and resolutions: Th ere were two problems 
encountered during this dive. Th e fi rst was that I was 
underweighted and had problems getting down. I used 8kg, 
which is what I used yesterday too, but I forgot that the 
tank I’m using today is aluminum and not steel. My buddy 
inserted one of her own 2kg weights into my side pocket 
and then I was able to descend. Th e second problem was 
that our compass was malfunctioning at depth, so I’m not 
sure that the trench we opened was where it should have 
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been. When we started excavating, the visibility became 
very poor because there was no current at depth to carry 
away sediments. We did hit something with our trowels that 
was a diff erent consistency than the mud, so then we put 
the trowels aside and excavated with our hands. I lost my 
trowel, so it remains at depth.
Sketch of dive profi le and/or site:
Record no.: 12/16
Diver name: D. Halloway
Date: 18–06–2022
Bottom time: 19 min
Max depth: –53m
Gas mix: 21% O₂
Decompression profi le: 2 min at 12m, 21% O₂ — 6 min at 8m, 
80% O₂ — 8 min at 6m, 100% O₂
Instruments used: trowels, shovels, compass, gps, camera, 
strobe
Dive objectives: 1) Locate trench 4; 2) Open new trench (T5) 
5m further due southeast of T4
Dive outcomes: Objectives achieved
Problems and resolutions: Th e dive was very nearly aborted 
because my dive buddy was underweighted, yet again, 
so he was fl opping around the fi rst couple meters at the 
surface like a dying whale trying to descend. Th e situation 
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was aggravated by the nasty rope-like algae and countless 
lengths of plastic twine and other debris that cover the 
surface of the sea and which my poor, inept, little buddy 
was getting himself all tangled up in. Th e more embarrassed 
and fl ustered he got, the more buoyant he became because 
he wasn’t exhaling completely. I got him to calm down at 
the surface, untangled him from the shit, and then gave him 
2kg which was enough to drag him down to depth. Between 
low visibility and a wonky compass, we found a place, but 
probably not the right place, to designate Trench 5, and 
we started digging. About 8cm down though, there was a 
change in stratigraphy as the stinking layer of mud on top 
gave way to a harder substance that resisted the trowel. My 
fi rst thought was of human remains because we have come 
across several disarticulated human bones in Trenches 3 
and 4. So we began excavating with our hands. Th e currents 
picked up a little at the end of the dive, enough for me to 
see what we were clearing, which looked to me like fur, or 
patches of fur on leather. If that is correct, the mud on this 
part of the seafl oor must have been toxic enough to keep the 
beasties away from the organic material, because whatever it 
is, it seems to be in an exceptional state of preservation.




Diver name: D. Halloway
Date: 20–06–2022
Bottom time: 12 min
Max depth: –53m
Gas mix: 21% O₂
Decompression profile: 2 min at 12m, 21% O₂ — 5 min at 8m, 
80% O₂ — 7 min at 6m, 100% O₂
Instruments used: trowels, shovels, compass, gps, camera, 
strobe
Dive objectives: 1) Continue excavating Trench 5; 2) 
photograph anomaly
Dive outcomes: Objectives achieved
Problems and resolutions: At depth, we continued hand-
excavating along the body of the animal in our trench until 
the dive was called off by the supervisor. I took a couple 
shots of the trench and its contents before beginning the 
ascent. We believe this animal, and the other three found 
in different parts of the site, to be one of the unfortunate 
cattle to have been brought onboard the ship for food, or 
possibly to set up an animal husbandry program at the ship’s 
destination of Hispaniola. At least they were prevented 
from contributing to the horrors of colonization — the 
human casualties deserved their cruel fate. Anyway, more 
catastrophe is on the way. We may never know how many 
cattle perished, where they were being held, or why they 
are distributed across the wreck site in this way because 
this was the last dive of the season. We are canceling the 
rest of the project due to our location directly in the path 
of Hurricane Santiago, the sixth category-five hurricane in 
the Atlantic this month. Alas, we will have to begin anew 
next year, if funding permits. (And if hurricanes don’t wipe 
out our Sargasso research station and if the whole sea hasn’t 
erupted in a toxic, surface fire fueled by petroleum-based 
plastics and methane-exuding rotten algae. Sometimes, I 
think apocalypse might just be the best way to go. Except 
as a scientist and an atheist, God would probably take extra 
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delight in my slow demise.) So for 2022 — at least — that’s 
Dr. Donna Halloway, signing out.
Sketch of dive profi le and/or site:
III.
Strange Detritus Washes up on Bermuda Beaches
Associated Press — 10:40 AST — July 17, 2022
HAMILTON — Aft er several weeks of coping with the aft ermath 
of Hurricane Santiago and the fi ve that preceded it, island resi-
dents have reported horse corpses that have washed ashore 
at Chaplin Bay, Clearwater Beach, Clarence Cove, and John 
Smith’s Bay. Tallying four so far, the horses appear to have been 
taxidermied and partially burnt.
“I was walking my dog early this morning in Clarence Cove, 
and, before I could see anything, I noticed the smell. It was abso-
lutely awful, like a dead animal but also something like methane 
and diesel fuel. When I got closer, the thing was covered, just 
covered, in fl ies and crabs. I couldn’t even tell what it was,” said 
local resident Jon Rickman.
“We have collected four bodies so far, each in varying stages 
of decomposition but surprisingly intact considering that they 
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had been at sea for some time,” said Dr. Tanya St. George of the 
National Museum of Bermuda. “The most peculiar thing, be-
sides the smell, is the method of taxidermy. The horses had been 
skinned, post mortem, and then stuffed with straw and sewn 
back up. It’s a very crude method and seems to have been done 
hastily. Why, of course, we may never know, but we do hope to 
have an answer as to when and where. We are preparing samples 
of the hide for DNA analysis and radiocarbon dating and will 
ship these samples to labs in Washington D.C.”
In the meantime, says St. George, the equine flotsam is being 
kept in the museum’s freezer units to control further decay and 
possible flammable fumes.
However, the research is far from over. “As we get more data 
on the extraordinary toxicity of the animals, we will need to 
proceed by investigating impacts on scavenging insect and crus-
tacean populations of the affected beaches.”
196
DISEASES OF THE HEAD
Bibliography
Kant, Immanuel. Anthropology, History, and Education. Edited 
and translated by Günter Zöller and Robert B. Louden. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
197
6
Race and Its Far-Reaching 
Contemporary Ontological and 
Epistemological Implications
Marina Gržinić and Jovita Pristovšek
There is no better meeting place of horror and philosophy than 
when, and if, we speak about the historical construct of race and 
its far-reaching, contemporary, ontological, and epistemological 
implications.
Part 1: Marina Gržinić: Politics of Death in Europe 
1.1 Introduction
As global capitalism entered the world scene in 2001 with the 
fall of the Twin Towers in New York City, we could see an in-
tensified neoliberal process of privatization, deregulation, and 
abandonment that, having begun elsewhere, started to be im-
plemented within the capitalist first world. Achille Mbembe, 
in order to capture a mode of life in Africa after 2001 and to 
elaborate on the capital profit in the global world that includes 
the involvement of war machines (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.), 
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coined the term “necropolitics.”1 As Mbembe conceptualizes it 
in his seminal text “Necropolitics” from 2003: 
Having presented [a necropolitical] reading of politics as the 
work of death, I turn now to sovereignty, expressed predomi-
nantly as the right to kill. For the purpose of my argument, 
I relate Foucault’s notion of biopower to two other concepts: 
the state of exception and the state of siege. I examine those 
trajectories by which the state of exception and the relation 
of enmity have become the normative basis of the right to 
kill. In such instances, power (and not necessarily state pow-
er) continuously refers and appeals to exception, emergency, 
and a fictionalized notion of the enemy.2 
Necropolitics is a coinage in between necro- (death) and poli-
tics.3 Necropolitics always has, as a consequence, death as a sys-
tematic extermination, not just accidental death. Therefore, ne-
cropolitics involves “contemporary forms of subjugation of life 
to the power of death.”4 And, in order to put this forward, three 
key procedures are central to necropolitics: the right to kill, en-
mity, and impunity.5
Necropolitics denotes a system of governmentality in neo-
liberal, global capitalism that is not at all an exaltation of death, 
in the sense of the old relation between Eros and Thanatos, but 
an intensification of governing measures that not only inflicts 
death but also makes profit from capitalizing on it. Necropoli-
tics operates with new forms of technologies of discipline and 
1 Achille Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” trans. Libby Meintjes, Public Culture 15, 
no. 1 (Winter 2003): 11–40.
2 Ibid., 16.
3 Marina Gržinić, “The Emergence of the Political Subject,” Emancipation 
of the Resistance, March 2013, https://emancipationofresistance.wordpress.
com/grzinic/.
4 Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” 39–40.
5 This is how Edward A. Avila recuperates these three points in his dis-
sertation “Conditions of (Im)possibility: Necropolitics, Neoliberalism, 
and the Cultural Politics of Death in Contemporary Chicana/o Film and 
Literature,” PhD diss., University of California, San Diego, 2012.
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control, and with authoritarian politics that present in the nor-
malization of racist attitudes and an economy that is seen as 
completely detached from any production efforts but is used as 
a pure political tool for more and more suppression.6 
Necropolitics regulates life from the perspective of death, 
thus transforming life into a mere existence below every life’s 
minimum. I have axiomatically defined necropolitics as “let live 
and make die.”7 To clarify this point, I have made a parallel to 
a mode of life that Michel Foucault envisioned and named “bi-
opolitics” in the 1970s. I have axiomatically described Foucault’s 
biopolitics as “make live and let die.”8 I have also argued that, in 
the 1970s, biopolitics presented a situation of regulation of life 
in the so-called capitalist first world and welfare states, but also 
a situation of abandoning or delegating death to the so-called 
other worlds, the second and third worlds.9 
These two modes of life present a brutal difference in life 
and death management. In biopolitics, life is controlled; but it 
is about providing a good life for the citizens of the sovereign 
first world capitalist countries. However, what is at hand today 
is a pure abandonment of these structures (let live), while simul-
taneously death is managed, used, and capitalized by the war 
machine.10
6 Marina Gržinić and Aneta Stojnić, “Reclaiming the Body: Fem Positions 
Repoliticized,” in Shifting Corporealities in Contemporary Performance: 
Avant-Gardes in Performance, eds. Marina Gržinić and Aneta Stojnić 
(Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 24–25.
7 Marina Gržinić, “Capital, Repetition,” Reartikulacija 8 (2009): 3.
8 Ibid. See also Michel Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures at the 
Collège De France, 1975–76, eds. Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana, 
trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003).
9 Gržinić, “The Emergence of the Political Subject.” 
10 Ibid. I developed the main core of my thinking already in 2007. I devel-
oped it while reading about the crisis in former Yugoslavia, and, in the 
same period, I engaged with necropolitics in the process of teaching in the 
Academy of Fine Arts Vienna with my students. At this point, a decade 
ago and still today but to a lesser degree, the refutation of necropolitics 
was extremely present. Why? The answer is that neoliberal global capital-
ism nowadays exposes stubborn life, due in part to biotechnology, so as to 
hide the hyper profit made from death. 
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This came out clearly with the crisis in 2008. In such a situ-
ation, death becomes central to a field of power that, in global, 
neoliberal necrocapitalism, does not have the form of biopower 
but of necropower. To understand precisely what necropower 
means, we should relate it to “bare life.” This latter concept was 
developed in 1995 when Giorgio Agamben published Homo 
Sacer: Il potere sovrano e la vita nuda, translated into English 
as Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life in 1998.11 Homo 
sacer is the Latin name for a sacred, perishable life. Historically, 
it was already present in ancient Rome; the Roman law refers 
to it. Today we have a lot of figures that are to be subscribed to 
this category, the most known are the refugees, though earlier 
those that were imprisoned in Guantanamo had the status of 
bare lives. In these two examples, it is clear that the figures are 
situated in between life and death, as what they possess is just 
what Agamben calls bare life. Bare life is a product in between 
sovereign power and something that is a surplus or a leftover of 
human life.
Furthermore, bare life is always constructed by way of a sys-
tem of invisible, secret, hidden procedures and is invested, as 
well, with the performativity (of power) that affects terminally 
the (in/human) body. This denotes a very clear procedure ac-
cording to which, in order to produce bare life as a rest or a 
surplus inside a structure (e.g., a state, sovereign, or institutional 
structure), the social, economic, judicial, or political power has 
to make recourse to the state of exception. In order to kill with-
out a punishment, or to terminally abandon people or whole 
nations of civilians, a system — of politics, law, economics, and 
social relations that presents itself as extra-judicial, exceptional, 
or as an emergence — has to be developed. Moreover, the sov-
ereign, as described by Agamben, is an exception in itself that 
decides on its exception. As Agamben shows, the sovereign’s 
legal right is the effective prorogation of the law itself and of a 
“state of exception,” both of which are in the last instance mixed 
11 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. 
Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).
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up: the one who decides upon the exception, which represents 
a confusion of law and fact, is the sovereign itself. The outcome 
is a pure circularity, another characteristic of global capitalism, 
which presents power as more and more subjectless — yet it de-
cides as a subject.12 
Mbembe says that necropower is the enactment of sover-
eignty in cases in which “the generalized instrumentalization 
of human existence and the material destruction of human 
bodies and populations” is the central project of power, rather 
than autonomy.13 In the last instance, the rethinking of the shift 
from biopolitics to necropolitics is to be done in precisely the 
zones of indistinction between the sovereign and life, between 
citizens and non-citizens, and between biopower and necropo-
wer. Mbembe situates his analysis of necropolitics specifically in 
the context of contemporary colonial occupations (for example, 
Apartheid in South Africa or the Israeli occupation of Pales-
tine). Thus, the concept of necropolitics opens a critical space 
for discussing a land of dead, violated, and ultimately disposed 
bodies in cinema’s necro-space.
1.2 Horror: Film and Necropolitics
I suggest analyzing a selection of films made after World War II 
on the topic of death and history in order to think about dying 
and death in the form of an enduring process of a systematic 
violent act, a horrifying necropolitics. The films that I select and 
display here as a political genealogy and present chronologically 
were made after World War II in Europe, and they illustrate that 
enduring process of a systematic violent act, that horrifying ne-
cropolitics. 
12 Gržinić and Stojnić, “Reclaiming the Body,” 26.
13 Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” 14.
202
DISEASES OF THE HEAD
Night and Fog (1956), directed by Alain Resnais14
The film’s title Night and Fog refers to the notorious Nacht und 
Nebel decree issued by Adolf Hitler on December 7, 1941. This 
decree was directed against persons endangering the security 
of Germany in the occupied territories. The victims, mainly 
Jewish German citizens, were abducted, imprisoned, and some 
were brought for trial by special courts to decide their faith.15 
The film opens with shots of remnants of Auschwitz, the Nazi 
extermination camp, shifting between present images and old 
documentary footage, while the narrator, Michel Bouquet, dis-
cusses the rise of Nazi ideology. The film proceeds with com-
parisons of the life of the Schutzstaffel, the main paramilitary 
organization under Adolf Hitler, to the life of starving prisoners 
in the camps. The narrator further exposes the sadistic brutality 
inflicted on prisoners, including torture, scientific and medical 
“experiments,” rapes, and executions. The next section shows 
horrific images of gas chambers and wasted bodies, corpses. At 
the end, the film depicts the country’s liberation, the discovery 
of the camps’ horrors, and confronts us with the question of re-
sponsibility.
The Battle of Algiers (1966), directed by Gillo Pontecorvo16
Drawing on the events of the Algerian War of Independence 
(1954–62) against French colonial rule in North Africa, Ponte-
corvo’s film focuses on the critical years between 1954 and 1957. 
At that time, the regrouped guerrilla fighters spread into the 
Casbah, the citadel of Algiers in Algeria, where they clashed 
14 Alain Resnais, dir., Nuit et brouillard [Night and Fog] (Paris: Argo Films, 
1956). Alain Resnais (1922–2014) was a French film director and screen-
writer.
15 Holocaust Encyclopedia, s.v. “Nigh and Fog Decree,” https://encyclopedia.
ushmm.org/content/en/article/night-and-fog-decree.
16 Gillo Pontecorvo, dir., La battaglia di Algeri [The Battle of Algiers] (Al-
giers/Rome: Casbah Film/Igor Film, 1966). Gillo Pontecorvo (1919–2006) 
was an Italian film director.
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with French paratroopers trying to bring down the revolt. The 
film portrays urban warfare, the guerrilla movement’s organiza-
tion, and the illegal tactics France used to suppress a nationalist 
uprising. The story revolves around Ali la Pointe, a petty crimi-
nal who is politically radicalized while in prison, and who is 
afterwards recruited by Front de libération nationale (National 
Liberation Front, or FLN) commander El-Hadi Jafar (this is 
based partly on Saadi Yacef ’s account of being a military com-
mander for the FLN).17
Early Works (1969), directed by Želimir Žilnik18
The story of this film takes place in the territory of the former 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in the period of the 
1968 students’ riots and in the general context of state social-
ism. Three young men and a young woman, Jugoslava, who is 
bearing the name of the state changed into a female personal 
name(!), leave home and move across the country in search of 
true revolutionary socialism and a society that believes in truth. 
Jugoslava also wants to find out if the position of women within 
this socialist society can be improved, so that it would not be 
simply and solely connected to the strong, patriarchal, social-
ist life. Jugoslava is under pressure due to terrible relationships 
within her own family, especially due to the pressures that her 
drunken and despotic father puts on everybody.19
17 Phil Ochs, “The Battle of Algiers,” Life of a Rebel, May 19, 2008, http://phil-
ochs.blogspot.com/2008/05/battle-of-algiers.html.
18 Želimir Žilnik, dir., Rani Radovi [Early Works] (Beograd/Novi Sad: Avala 
Film/Neoplanta film, 1969). Želimir Žilnik (b. 1942) is a Yugoslav–Serbian 
film director.
19 Marina Gržinić, “Ex-Yugoslav Avant-garde Film Production and its Early 
Works Seen Through Biopolitics and Necropolitics,” in Za ideju — protiv 
stanja, eds. Branka Ćurčić, Sarita Matijević, Zoran Pantelić, Želimir Žilnik 
(Novi Sad: Playground produkcija, 2009), 151–52.
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Salò, or the 120 Days of Sodom (1975), directed by Pier Paolo 
Pasolini20
Based on the classic The 120 Days of Sodom, which Marquis 
de Sade wrote in 1785, this film revolves around four rich and 
corrupt Italian libertines, during the period of the fascist Re-
public of Salò (1943‒45). They kidnap eighteen teenagers, sub-
jecting them to four months of pure sadistic, mental, physical, 
and sexual violence. The film engages with questions of political 
corruption, abuse of power, sadism, perversion, sexuality, and 
fascism. The film’s structure is inspired by Dante’s Divine Com-
edy (1320); it is made up of four segments entitled, respectively, 
the “Anteinferno,” the “Circle of Manias,” the “Circle of Shit,” 
and the “Circle of Blood.” It also contains several references to 
the 1887 book On the Genealogy of Morality by Friedrich Ni-
etzsche, Ezra Pound’s collection of poems entitled The Cantos 
(whose complete edition was published in 1970), and the novel 
sequence of Marcel Proust’s In Search of Lost Time (which was 
published in French in seven volumes from 1913 to 1927).
In a Year of 13 Moons (1978), directed by Rainer Werner Fass-
binder21
After being beaten for trying to buy sex at a Frankfurt cruising 
spot for gays, Elvira Weishaupt returns home to her longtime 
lover Christoph, who has been away for six weeks. Humiliated 
and physically abused by Christoph, Elvira befriends a prosti-
tute, Zora. Together they visit a slaughterhouse, where Elvira, 
who was at that time Erwin, used to work as a butcher, the or-
20 Pier Paolo Pasolini, dir., Salò o le 120 giornate di Sodoma [Salò, or the 120 
Days of Sodom] (Rome: Produzioni Europee Associate [PEA]; Paris: Les 
Productions Artistes Associés, 1975). Pier Paolo Pasolini (1922–75) was an 
Italian film director, poet, and writer.
21 Rainer Werner Fassbinder, dir., In einem Jahr mit 13 Monden [In a Year of 
13 Moons] (Berlin: Filmverlag der Autoren; Munich: Pro-ject Filmproduk-
tion; Berlin: Tango Film, 1978). Rainer Werner Fassbinder (1945–82) was a 
West German film and theater director and actor.
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phanage where she was raised by nuns, and Anton Saitz, her 
former lover, supposedly responsible for Elvira’s sex-change 
procedure. At the end of the film, Elvira commits suicide after 
her uncontrollable spiraling into nothingness goes unnoticed.22
Germany Pale Mother (1980), directed by Helma Sanders-
Brahms23
This film’s narrative is recounted from a radically subjective 
viewpoint and depicts the way in which a young woman, Lene, 
and her mother survived the World War II. Lene is hurrying 
along the banks of a river while being pursued and harassed by 
four Hitler Youths and their Alsatian dog. Lene’s future husband 
Hans, who is taking a spin on a rowboat with a friend, is amused 
by the situation. He falls in love with Lene at first sight but 
doesn’t help her. The film portrays a world of helplessness and 
male brutality. While the post-war period in Germany allows 
Hans and his “de-Nazified” friends to re-establish themselves 
professionally, Lene, on the other hand, suffers from depression 
and a mysterious case of facial paralysis.24
Handsworth Songs (1986), directed by John Akomfrah25
This documentary is based on the 1986 Black Audio Film Col-
lective’s essay on black Britain in the wake of Britain’s 1985 wave 
22 Ed Gonzalez, “Review: In a Year of 13 Moons,” Slant Magazine, August 23, 
2003, https://www.slantmagazine.com/film/in-a-year-of-13-moons/.
23 Helma Sanders-Brahms, dir., Deutschland bleiche Mutter [Germany Pale 
Mother] (Berlin/Berlin/Cologne: Helma Sanders-Brahms Filmproduk-
tion/Literarisches Colloquium/Westdeutscher Rundfunk [WDR], 1980). 
Helma Sanders-Brahms (1940–2014) was a West German film director and 
screenwriter.
24 Birgit Roschy, “Helma Sanders-Brahms: ‘Germany Pale Mother,’” Goethe 
Institut, July 2014, https://www.goethe.de/ins/au/en/kul/mag/20397223.
html.
25 John Akomfrah, dir., Handsworth Songs (London: Black Audio Film Col-
lective, 1986). John Akomfrah (b. 1957) is a British film director, screen-
writer, and theorist.
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of civil unrest. At that time, political collectivities were in the 
process of being violently decomposed (the year 1985 also marks 
the bitter defeat of the Miners’ Strike) as the neoliberal political 
program began to impose the “privatization of the mind.”26 The 
film was produced for the Channel 4 series “Britain: The Lie of 
the Land” and released in 1986, a year after the Handsworth, 
Birmingham, and Tottenham riots. It is a premonitory sign of 
the 2011 England riots, regarded as one of the most significant 
periods of civil unrest in post-war Britain.27
In Uranium Hex (1987), directed by Sandra Lahire28
This story is about uranium mining and women’s work in Can-
ada. In this film, obsession, passion, and politics are so closely 
intertwined that they make for an explosion, or rather, a de-
struction of our nerves. The radiation of the body is transferred 
to the radiation of the image. The radon 222 that disintegrates 
the skin seems to over-expose the film image here. There is no 
difference between the politics of the medium and the politics 
of the topic; both are reunited within deadly light in a clash of 
layers. Radioactivity is deployed as the radioactivity of the film 
image itself. The result is a powerful investigation of inequalities 
regarding the position of women, the stance of lesbians, and so-
cial injustice against women and Jews. Through Lahire’s vision, 
the blackness or whiteness of heterosexual men counts for little 
as an emancipatory force in neoliberal capitalism. The twenty-
first century is, so to speak, female, lesbian, transgender, and of 
color.29 
26 Mark Fisher, “The Land Still Lies: Handsworth Songs and the English 




28 Sandra Lahire, dir., In Uranium Hex (London: Arts Council of Great Brit-
ain, 1987). Sandra Lahire (1950–2001) was a central figure in experimental 
feminist filmmaking.
29 Marina Gržinić, “Sandra Lahire,” Luxonline, https://www.luxonline.org.uk/
artists/sandra_lahire/(printversion).html.
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M.I.A.’s Born Free (2010), directed by Romain Gavras30
Gavras’s music video film is based on several incidents in Sri 
Lanka, involving the extra-judicial killing of Tamil men by 
the Sri Lankan Army. Those incidents were filmed on mobile 
phones, and some of them were broadcasted by news outlets 
worldwide. The controversy stems from a raid by the SWAT (Spe-
cial Weapons and Tactics) team in one of the buildings. During 
the raid, as we watch, the team is breaking into apartments, tak-
ing no notice of a man in a room, sitting and smoking a crack 
pipe. The SWAT team beats a couple engaged in coitus and some 
of the other residents of the building. They then violently force 
a young red-haired man into a transport vehicle for detention; 
other red-heads are already detained in a vehicle. A few of the 
SWAT team members are wearing American flags on their uni-
forms. Detainees, treated violently, are then driven out into the 
desert and forced to run across a live minefield. Over the course 
of the events, a young red-haired boy is shot through the head, 
and another loses his life after stepping onto a live mine while 
the soldiers continue to chase, beat, and shoot the captives.
Leviathan (2014), directed by Andrey Zvyagintsev31
The film is shot in the coastal town of Teriberka, in the Russian 
Murmansk region, but set in the fictional town of Pribrezhny. 
The plot follows a tragic series of events affecting temperamen-
tal car mechanic Kolya, his second wife Lilya, and his teenage 
son Roma. The town’s immoral Mayor Vadim undertakes a legal 
plot to expropriate the land on which Kolya’s house was built. 
Kolya’s refusal to sell the property lands him in prison. The film 
30 Romain Gavras, dir., M.I.A.’s Born Free (London: Paradoxal Inc./XL Re-
cordings, 2010). Romain Gavras (b. 1981) is a Greek-French film and video 
director.
31 Andrey Zvyagintsev, dir., Leviathan (Moscow: Non-Stop Productions/A 
Company Russia/Russian Ministry of Culture/Fond kino/RuArts Founda-
tion, 2014). Andrey Zvyagintsev (b. 1964) is a Russian film director and 
screenwriter.
208
DISEASES OF THE HEAD
unfolds a story that is as grim, violent, and brutal as it is in-
dicative of the neoliberal power structure in the lawless states 
of postsocialism.
The Fool (2014), directed by Yuri Bykov32 
The movie is set in an unnamed Russian town. It tells the story 
of a simple middle-aged Russian plumber, Dima Nikitin, who is 
also a municipal repair-crew chief. He is studying building en-
gineering. When a bathroom pipe bursts in one of the commu-
nal housing buildings in disrepair, a large problem is revealed, 
since the exterior wall behind the pipe has cracked and begun 
to shift. Nikitin goes outside to examine the matter; there, he 
realizes that the building has fractures from the ground up to 
the top floor. Although the building is not officially part of his 
district, Nikitin’s sense of personal responsibility leads him to 
go in the middle of the night to find and alert the authorities, 
for he believes that in less than twenty-four hours the building 
will collapse. Eventually, he manages to evacuate the building, 
but the tenants beat Nikitin and return to their flats after real-
izing that nothing has happened, leaving him unconscious on 
the sidewalk.
Son of Saul (2015), directed by László Nemes33 
This film follows a day and a half in the life of Saul Ausländer, a 
Jewish-Hungarian working as part of a Sonderkommando unit 
in the Auschwitz extermination camp during the World War II. 
Sonderkommandos were work units composed of Jewish prison-
ers forced to help with the disposal of gas chamber victims and 
32 Yuri Bykov, dir., Durak [The Fool] (St. Petersburg/Moscow: Rock Film Stu-
dio/Russian Ministry of Culture, 2014). Yuri Bykov (b. 1981) is a Russian 
film director, screenwriter, and actor.
33 László Nemes, dir., Saul fia [Son of Saul] (Budapest: Laokoon Filmgroup/
Hungarian National Film Fund, 2015). László Nemes (b. 1977) is a Hungar-
ian film director and screenwriter.
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crematoria in the Nazi camp system.34 Saul has several duties, 
including salvaging valuables from the clothing of the dead, re-
moving their bodies out of the gas chambers, and scrubbing the 
floors before another group is brought to these chambers. Saul 
carries out his daily tasks with an impassive expression, appar-
ently numbed by the daily horrors. One day, after the gassing, 
he comes upon a boy’s body that he recognizes. Despite being 
gassed, the boy is still breathing. From a distance, Saul witness-
es the boy being methodically suffocated by a Nazi doctor to 
ensure his death. The plot develops as Saul attempts to get the 
Rabbi for a funeral, through several events of horror and stupor.
1.3 Filmic Necropolitics 
From where do I elaborate the unusual proposal to think about 
these films in the context of necropolitics? Elizabeth Reich, in 
her book Militant Visions: Black Soldiers, Internationalism, and 
the Transformation of American Cinema, published in 2016, has 
a subchapter entitled “A Filmic Necropolitics.”35 In this section 
of the book, she emphasizes racism as the point that presents 
the failure of biopolitics in dealing with a specific history of film 
when it depicts brutalities, violence, discrimination, and aban-
donment. In a word, racialization is what structures the frame 
of the filmic necropolitics with which we analyzed the previous 
films. These films are here not to be read from the point of dif-
ferent film genres but through a necropolitical order of power in 
the European context that organizes the field of film production 
in post-World War II Europe. I have decided, here, to provoke 
necropolitical thinking in the field of film in the context of a Eu-
rope broader than the EU, including the former, cold-war East-
ern European space, larger even than Europe itself, as we are all 
part of global, neoliberal capitalism.
34 Holocaust Encyclopedia, s.v. “Sonderkommandos,” https://encyclopedia.
ushmm.org/content/en/article/sonderkommandos.
35 Elizabeth Reich, “A Filmic Necropolitics,” in Militant Visions: Black Sol-
diers, Internationalism, and the Transformation of American Cinema (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2016), 54–56.
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I have organized my analysis in order to craft the horrify-
ing dimension of these films around three central elements of 
necropolitics: enmity, impunity, and the right to kill, which are 
found in the films, I argue, as abandonment, reification and 
disposability.36 First, there is the social abandonment that liter-
ally includes galvanizing landscapes of people abandoned along 
different borders in the region. The borders are really different. 
They are in between: 
 — colonizing forces of the western world and their colonies 
abroad (as in Pontecorvo, Akomfrah, and Gavras, or as the 
unsolved contemporary coloniality of power exercised over 
the Tamils in Sri Lanka); 
 — the former East and former West (as in Žilnik, Gavras, Zvy-
agintsev, and Bykov);
 — the heterosexual on one side and the homosexual and 
transgender on the other; the border is re-established as the 
outcome of the “violation” of patriarchal and gendered forms 
of existence (as in Fassbinder, Sanders-Brahms, Akomfrah, 
and Zvyagintsev); 
 — Nazism and democracy (as in Resnais, Sanders-Brahms, and 
Nemes); 
 — humanity and fascist, Nazi, colonial, blind enmities that left 
camps full of inhumanities (as in Resnais, Pontecorvo, Paso-
lini, and Nemes). The abandonment here is a pure form of 
horrifying necropolitical enmity. 
Violence is pervasive. It is an outcome of a structural racism 
that lives in the “postcolony,” to use another geopolitical notion 
elaborated by Mbembe. It is a fervent antisemitism (as in Res-
nais and Nemes), or it is patriarchal chauvinistic relations (as in 
Žilnik and Sanders-Brahms).
Second, there is the configuration of historical moments of 
ultimate dispossessions that live along historically deadly, capi-
36 I make reference to Edward A. Avila’s dissertation from 2012 where he 
makes recourse to similar points in order to construct his analysis of the 
necro-femicide complex in Juarez and Mexico. 
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talist “discontinuities,” which is how neoliberalism nowadays 
tries to present colonialism, Nazism/fascism, and neoliberal-
ism itself. These dispossessions result in an abstraction of social 
relations to the point that labor and social relations in capital-
labor conditions of production are totally reified, perceived only 
as commodities. This is captured in the films of Pontecorvo, 
Akomfrah, Lahire, Zvyagintsev, and Bykov. We see racialized 
violence against people, based on class, race, and gender reified 
relations where wo/men and whole groups of people are com-
pletely detached from any social and labor conditions. This is, 
as well, the format of necropolitical impunity. Nobody responds 
because of this transformation. This is remarkably stated in 
Handsworth Songs, when one of the speakers says, “something 
has gone terribly wrong in the world today,” and I can add that 
no one in power will ever be responsible for this. This is brutally 
depicted in the films of Zvyagintsev and Bykov. 
Third, there is disposability. A wasteland of disposable bod-
ies. Disposability is the ultimate format of violence against seg-
ments of populations that are fully racialized: 
 — the Jewish citizens of Europe in Resnais and Nemes; 
 — the Algerians of the Casbah in Pontecorvo; 
 — the miners in Lahire;
 — those with transgender identities (Fassbinder); 
 — the socialist Marxist hippy generation (Žilnik); and 
 — the Tamils in Gavras. 
What we see clearly as well is the entanglement of capitalist glo-
balization and nation-state sovereignty where the necropolitical 
right to expose to death and kill those made disposable is with-
out impunity.
This is what we get from Resnais’s film in 1956 and from 
Nemes’s in 2015. But what difference does sixty years make? The 
point of difference is the radical change in the parameters of 
space and time. The biopolitical is still connected with space. 
The necropolitical is about a time that today involves a situation 
of almost un-governability (as in Akomfrah, Gavras, Zvyagint-
212
DISEASES OF THE HEAD
sev, Bykov, and Nemes).37 In Nemes, we witness an absolute time 
exposure without a short-circuit between racialized disposabil-
ity and limitlessness extermination.
1.4 The State, War, and Race
In all these films, we see what Giorgio Agamben names the ap-
pearance of the state of exception. The state of exception, ac-
cording to Agamben, “is not a special kind of law (like the law 
of war); rather, insofar as it is a suspension of the juridical order 
itself, it defines law’s threshold or limit concept.”38
It is important to note that the state of exception is not ex-
ceptional; it is not derivative but constitutive of the way in which 
neoliberal states function today. Moreover, as Santiago López 
Petit states, what characterizes neoliberal global capitalism 
is the change from a nation-State to a war-State.39 In fact, this 
change means that the former imperial, capitalist, colonial states 
transformed into war-states exist at the same time as the trans-
formation, or better, fragmentation, of all the state’s social and 
public fields. Petit calls this fragmentation “postmodern fas-
cism,” which functions by means of the sterilization of the other, 
eschewing conflict in the social space, and fragmentation.40 The 
war-state, particularly in the capitalist first world (us) and in 
a former western European context, is here to maintain the il-
lusion of society and the biopolitical mode of life, while inside 
the neoliberal capitalist biopolitical system the necropolitical 
is pressing on it and metastasizing. The illusion of the soci-
ety maintained by the war-state presents itself as a biopolitical 
point of view, as a politics of taking care of the population’s life, 
though the population is systematically controlled, fragmented, 
37 On un-governability, Edward A. Avila’s dissertation gives some impressive 
synthesis. See Avila, “Conditions of (Im)possibility.”
38 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 2005), 4. 
39 Satiago López Petit, La movilización global. Breve tratado para atacar la 
realidad [Global Mobilization. Brief Treatise for Attacking Reality] (Madrid: 
Traficantes de Sueños, 2009).
40 Ibid., 85.
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and ultimately abandoned (see the COVID-19 pandemic’s com-
plete annihilation of society); the contemporary state is in re-
ality transformed into a necropolitical regime, into a political 
system that only takes part in the war of transnational capital 
(see the present US–China relations), abandoning citizens to 
find their own way to survive. 
In this change from a nation-state to a war-state, we also have 
the so-called “missing” link: the racial-state. The passage from 
a nation-state to a war-state goes through a racial-state that has 
racism at its core.41 This trajectory is captured in the political 
genealogy of the films presented above. Each film has a relation 
to these three formats of states, though the racial state is central. 
Moreover, what is important is that this triad of state formats is 
possible only with the advent of neoliberalism.
Additionally, already Resnais and Pontecorvo are presenting 
two different film dispositions of disposability. In the 1950s, in 
Resnais’s film, we see destruction and extermination listed in 
chapters. In Pontecorvo’s 1960s film, we see the colonial power 
without any impunity that is en gros killing. But, in the 1980s, 
the neoliberal appropriation of these structures is displayed at 
the level of micropolitics. If, in the 1950s and 1960s, the system 
is mathematized and strictly divided, from the 1980s on it is 
becoming pervasive; it is no longer divided into two as in the 
past but dispersed all over. Or put differently, if before there was 
the camp, today there is not the camp as a separate unit, but 
the whole city is a contemporary extraction camp with its so-
cial and cultural and religious spaces and dormitories as part of 
a process of exploitation, expropriation, and privatization (i.e., 
in Zvyagintsev and Bykov, post-socialist necroscapes). The re-
sult is Mbembe’s “death-worlds,”42 where environments are ad-
vanced into living graves (the refugee camps in Europe in 2017 
are death-worlds consisting of living graves).
This is a new condition for the rethinking of memory and 
history. If, in the 1970s, biopolitical memory was perceived as an 
41 Gržinić, “The Emergence of the Political Subject.”
42 Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” 40.
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intensified anthropological biopolitical mechanism, in times of 
necrocapitalism it is history that is completely evacuated.43 
1.5 Coda
Why is it important to expose film, terror, and necropolitics? 
This exposure opens onto knowledge that challenges histo-
ries of racial procedures of necrogovernmentality, and as well, 
in so doing, demands and produces different cinematic forms 
and contents. It almost seems that to rescue these films from 
oblivion and the terror they bring, in entanglement with nec-
ropolitics, is to rescue the lives of those who, though terrified, 
oppose death in these films.
Part 2: Jovita Pristovšek: We Remember Carrying the Word 
in the Mouth. Race. Chewing.44
2.1 Introduction
The figure of the “Black,” a racialized, colonized, ungendered, 
and dehumanized “racial ‘flesh,’”45 to borrow Brian Carr’s list 
of notions, is a peculiar being constructed as not quite subject 
not right object. In his lecture “Democracy in the Age of Dyna-
mism,” Achille Mbembe, in light of today’s convergence of neo-
liberal global capitalism and the reinvention of animism, speaks 
about the “manufacturing of subjects as objects” and the “manu-
facturing of objects as subjects” while emphasizing the need to 
question the modes of bringing objects to “life” in a time, as he 
43 Gržinić, “The Emergence of the Political Subject.”
44 Here, I paraphrase a verse originally written as follows: “We remember 
carrying the word in the mouth. Cologne. Chewing.” Rubia Salgado, 
Gergana Mineva, and Kollektiv Women, “Stream of Memory,” in Border 
Thinking: Disassembling Histories of Racialized Violence, ed. Marina 
Gržinić (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2018), 52.
45 Brian Carr, “At the Thresholds of the ‘Human’: Race, Psychoanalysis, and 
the Replication of Imperial Memory,” Cultural Critique 39 (Spring 1998): 
125.
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formulates it, when “living things” always fall into a lethal ritual-
ized mechanics of life.46
What should then be reconsidered in relation to the extinc-
tion of thought, which could also be seen as a consequence 
of thought’s epistemological dead end, are the very “effects of 
blackness.”47 Firstly, because what was once — in Immanuel 
Kant’s own “critical philosophy” — so meticulously elaborat-
ed to serve as a “defense against horrors,” or, in the words of 
Mbembe, against “Black Reason,”48 was the very idea of what 
should be named “Colonial Reason” with its “mindless state of 
mind,” as Jean-François Lyotard would put it,49 or in Agamben’s 
words, the state of exception that served to separate Reason 
from the “body” and “flesh.”50 Today we can identify this “flesh” 
in numerous modes of existence as having a status below the 
“threshold of the human,” below the level of “humanity,” while 
the “bodies” are “let to live,” “abandoned,” etc. Mbembe propos-
es that the common trajectory of those modes of existence is the 
universalization of the Black condition, since it most accurately 
summarizes the state of universal humanity in current times.51 
Secondly, the aforementioned “effects of blackness,” once pre-
sented as a form of the “disease” of the colonial head, are, para-
doxically, gradually gaining the status of an epistemological 
“cure” to contemporary “diseases of the head.” For, as Mbembe’s 
46 Achille Mbembe, “Democracy in the Age of Dynamism,” Lecture at the 
Hutchins Center for African American Research, Harvard University, 
Cambridge, December 4, 2013.
47 Meg Armstrong, “‘The Effects of Blackness’: Gender, Race, and the Sub-
lime in Aesthetic Theories of Burke and Kant,” Journal of Aesthetic and Art 
Criticism 54, no. 3 (Summer 1996): 213–36. 
48 Achille Mbembe, Critique of Black Reason, trans. Laurent Dubois (Dur-
ham: Duke University Press, 2017). 
49 Jean-François Lyotard, The Inhuman: Reflections on Time, trans. Geoffrey 
Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 140.
50 On anthropogenesis, see Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal, 
trans. Kevin Attell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). 
51 Mbembe in Marina Gržinić, “Kolonializem Evrope, dekolonialnost in 
rasizem” [“Colonialism of Europe, Decoloniality and Racism”], in Politika, 
estetika in demokracija, ed. Marina Gržinić (Ljubljana: Založba ZRC SAZU, 
2015), 108. 
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Critique of Black Reason implies, “Black Reason” appears as one 
of the key directions for future thinking if western, Eurocentric 
epistemology wants to transgress the borders of its own “Colo-
nial Reason.”
2.2 Race
Let us openly state that the notion of race is a horror for philoso-
phy. Everywhere it appears, already if we just speak about it, the 
notion of race “unleashes impassioned dynamics and provokes 
an irrational exuberance that always tests the limits of the very 
system of reason.”52 
Race and racism, as Mbembe has it, “are part of the funda-
mental process of the unconscious. In that respect they relate to 
the impasses of human desires — to appetites, affects, passions, 
fears.”53 The idea of race is, I believe — and as both, post- and de-
colonial theories have shown us — the fundamental “disease of 
the (colonial) head.” Race and Blackness are two sides of a codi-
fied madness that the Euro-American world has produced;54 this 
is a madness that the Euro-American world — in contemporary 
times of ontological and epistemological uncertainties — will 
have to confront. Race is, as has already been pointed out by 
Michel Foucault in his “Society Must Be Defended” lectures, an 
extremely mobile term,55 and in that sense, race and racism “do 
not only have a past. They also have a future, particularly in a 
context where the possibility of transforming life and creating 
mutant species no longer belongs to the realm of fiction.”56 
Race today — as is often said, we live in post-racial times — is 
just seemingly rendered conceptually unthinkable. Part of 
the problem lies, as Ann Laura Stoler suggests, in “colonial 
aphasia”57 — a term with which Stoler names a loss of access to 
52 Mbembe, Critique of Black Reason, 2.
53 Ibid., 31.
54 Ibid., 2.
55 See Michel Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended.”
56 Mbembe, Critique of Black Reason, 21.
57 Ann Laura Stoler, “Colonial Aphasia: Race and Disabled Histories in 
France,” Public Culture 23, no. 1 (Winter 2011): 121–56.
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and active dissociation from the problem of colonialism, a dif-
ficulty in speaking and generating vocabulary that links appro-
priate words and concepts with appropriate things — which fits 
to the “system or body of thought,” inventing ways to epistemo-
logically immunize itself against the “threat,” against the “effects 
of blackness.” Race and racism, with regard to philosophy, are 
most of the time relegated to the realm of the unrepresentable, 
unheimlich.
However, it is perhaps with the concept of race as the “grey 
zone” of the intersection of horror and philosophy that we can 
highlight its contemporary ontological and epistemological im-
plications. Because what is historically found at this intersection 
is precisely a racialized, colonized, ungendered, and dehuman-
ized “racial flesh,”58 a being constructed as not quite subject not 
right object. Let me immediately recall a series of terms listed by 
Mbembe which denote contemporary forms of existence, all liv-
ing next to each other in the context of neoliberal, global, finan-
cial capitalism: “human-thing,” “human-machine,” “human-
code,” “human-in-flux.”59 We speak about a plastic and flexible 
subject who must be able to respond to the ever changing needs 
of the market, about the bodies “who count,” those “worthy” of 
(biopolitical state) care, and of those that are just “let to live,” if 
they can make it, of those “abandoned” and “dispensable.” Yet 
the figure of the “Black,” as Critique of Black Reason has shown 
us, was never solely codified as a figure of madness, ontologi-
cally defective, as “man-object, man-merchandise, and man-
currency,”60 a being with limited or no agency. It is precisely 
because of the systematic negation, the denial of “humanity” 
and personhood, and the reservoir of nonsense and fantasies 
that were inscribed in this figure, thus presenting an “extraordi-
nary accumulation of sensations,”61 that the colonized was also 
in perpetual becoming: an-other. 
58 Carr, “At the Thresholds of the ‘Human,’” 125. 
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The “contemporary relations of inhumanity are rooted in the 
inhumanity of centuries past.”62 Globalization can be seen, as 
Anibal Quijano proposes, precisely as “the culmination of a pro-
cess that began with the constitution of America and colonial/
modern Eurocentered capitalism as a new global power.”63 That 
power turns on two fundamental axes: the social classification 
of the world population along racial lines, and the new struc-
ture of the control of labor and its sources and products.64 All 
this, as Quijano argues, has been followed by the constitution of 
Europe as a new entity/identity — the elaboration of a Eurocen-
tric perspective of knowledge, the central elements of which are 
dualism, whose radicalization can be seen, for example, in the 
Cartesian fracture between a rational subject and a body that 
until then, in Christian thought, represented an unresolved am-
bivalence between the soul and the risen body, and, from the 
eighteenth century onwards, an evolutionism that formulated 
the birth of “human” history as a continuous, linear progres-
sion from the “state of nature” to its culmination in European 
“civilization.”65 A Eurocentric perspective of knowledge has 
codified and placed the “inhuman” at a specific place on the 
timeline — as prior to “human history,” or better, as “without 
history,” as “primitive,” thus legitimizing infantilization, infe-
riorization, exploitation, and enslavement, while naming the 
subject “Black Man” as living proof of the inability to separate 
instinct from the mind/reason.66
Historically, Black Reason, as Mbembe suggests, is the result 
of colonialism, enslavement, and apartheid, and it refers to the 
paradigm of subjection, to a model of extraction and to pillage, 
as well as to the figure of knowledge and fantasies.67 But what 
62 Elaine Coburn, “Critique de la raison nègre: A review,” Decolonization: 
Indigeneity, Education & Society 3, no. 2 (2014): 177.
63 Anibal Quijano, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America,” 
Nepantla: Views from South 1, no. 3 (2000): 533. 
64 Ibid., 533–34.
65 Ibid., 534–42.
66 Mbembe, Critique of Black Reason, 30.
67 Mbembe in Gržinić, “Kolonializem Evrope,” 114.
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was once a condition brought about by Atlantic colonialism is 
today, in neoliberal, global capitalism, a universal condition of 
humanity as such.68 Mbembe, as Marina Gržinić states in her 
reading of Mbembe’s Critique of Black Reason, rearticulates 
Gilles Deleuze’s concept of “becoming” and proposes a univer-
salization of the figure of the “Black” as a figure below the level 
of humanity, as it most accurately describes the state of (univer-
sal) humanity in the current system of neoliberal global capital-
ism.69 Race is a mechanism of reification, a security system and 
a mode of governmentality70 — and above all, it is a raw material 
“from which difference and a surplus — a kind of life that can be 
wasted and spent without limit — are produced.”71 
As Gržinić argues, “European provincialism, with its Eu-
rocentric thinking that transforms Europe into a provincial 
Fortress, has its own (additional) emblematic figure of the be-
coming “Black” of the world — along with a further violent dis-
criminatory policy towards black citizens of Europe (the sec-
ond and third generation)”72 — refugees and asylum seekers. 
Gržinić’s thesis not only implies a harsh critique of the aphasic, 
western-European system of thought unwilling to re-think its 
own colonial past and the self-evident idea of freedom, along 
with its implementation, but also declares that what we have 
at the heart of Europe, alongside the biopolitical regulation of 
bodies, is what Mbembe describes as a result of “necropolitics”: 
“new and unique forms of social existence in which vast popu-
lations are subjected to conditions of life conferring upon them 
the status of living dead.”73 
Moreover, neoliberal global financial capitalism, as has been 
shown by Joseph Vogl, has acquired a sort of an aesthetic — sub-
lime — character, because it is floating (digital), intangible (it 
escapes control), unrepresentable (in sublime monetary sums, 
68 Ibid., 115.
69 Ibid., 108.
70 Mbembe, Critique of Black Reason, 35.
71 Ibid., 34. Italics in original.
72 Gržinić, “Kolonializem Evrope,” 109.
73 Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” 40. Italics in original.
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which cannot be captured by any sensible material), and, above 
all, because it has gained, through the transcendence of mate-
rial production, the creative ability of self-creation, and thus has 
produced a series of “zones of indistinctions,” or so-called “grey 
areas,” where political and economic decisions take place.74 All 
this, as Vogl states, makes for powerful and fatal effects, “effects 
of sovereignty,”75 storms of chaos, leaving behind the desolated 
landscapes of the present and already sold future. 
Eyal Weizman writes that, during the early Enlightenment, 
three limit conditions were set in interrelation: “the threshold 
of the forest — a shifting environmental condition together with 
its unique climate; the threshold of the law — the political limit 
of territory and sovereignty; and the threshold of the human — a 
blurry limit to the human species”;76 these frontiers have be-
come and remain entangled in such a way that shifts within one 
cause shifts in the others.77
2.3 Speculative Realism 
In “‘Afterwards’: Struggling with Bodies in the Dump of 
History,”78 Gržinić also proposes the following thesis: if the 
major characteristic of biopolitics is pseudo-humanism, and 
74 Joseph Vogl, The Specter of Capital (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 
2015.
75 Joseph Vogl, “The Sovereignty Effect: Markets and Power in the Economic 
Regime,” in Qui Parle: Critical Humanities and Social Sciences 23, no. 1 
(Fall/Winter 2014): 125–55. 
76 Eyal Weizman, “Are They Human?” e-flux, October 10, 2016, https://
www.e-flux.com/architecture/superhumanity/68645/are-they-human/.
77 Ibid.
78 Marina Gržinić, “‘Afterwards’: Struggling with Bodies in the Dump of 
History,” in Body between Materiality and Power: Essays in Visual Studies, 
ed. Nasheli Jiménez del Val (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, 2016), 163–82. Gržinić’s analysis exposes today’s humanitar-
ian refugee crisis within the European Union and Europe as “one of the 
hardest lessons to learn for Western academic vocabulary” (164); and by 
substituting the biopolitical concept of the “body” with the necropoliti-
cal notion of “political flesh” (i.e., the status of bodies in refugee centers), 
this analysis proposes the latter as the actual matter for thought to think 
(179–80). 
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if the biopolitical optical machine could be summarized with 
the phrase “more human than human”79 — since “human” is not 
only the product constructed against the animal (speciesism) 
but also a figure which is not reducible to the human animal 
(racism) — then the necropolitical optical machine, together 
with post-humanism, or the “necropolitical injunction of neo-
liberal global capitalism, is ‘still too human!’”80 This means that 
“the optical machine of necrocapitalism cannot view any class, 
race, and gender specificities of the post-human, as this would 
imply the return of the social antagonism at the heart of the 
(post)-human.”81 
My proposal here is to follow this “still ‘too human, much 
too human’”82 agenda, a dream of transcending the notion of 
the “human,” precisely within the terrain of speculative realism. 
I will lean upon the introduction to Speculations V: Aesthetics 
in the 21st Century, where Ridvan Askin, Andreas Hägler, and 
Phillip Schweighauser give an overview of the developments of 
debates within twenty-first century aesthetics.83 
The authors focus on aesthetics particularly after the specu-
lative turn,84 after the articulation of the so-called speculative 
realists, a faction within continental philosophy. Speculative re-
alists state that continental philosophy ever since Kant’s Critique 




83 Ridvan Askin, Andreas Hägler, and Philipp Schweighauser, “Introduc-
tion: Aesthetics after the Speculative Turn,” in Speculations V: Aesthetics 
in the 21st Century, eds. Ridvan Askin, Paul J. Ennis, Andreas Hägler, and 
Philipp Schweighauser (Brooklyn: punctum books, 2014), 6–38.
84 The notion of the “speculative turn” is linked to the conference entitled 
“Speculative Realism,” which took place in April 2007 at Goldsmiths, Uni-
versity of London, and with the contributions of Ray Brassier, Iain Hamil-
ton Grant, Graham Harman, and Quentin Meillassoux. See Rick Dolphijn, 
“Peter Gratton, Speculative Realism: Problems and Prospects,” review of 
Speculative Realism: Problems and Prospects, by Peter Gratton, Notre Dame 
Philosophical Reviews: An Electronic Journal, March 29, 2016, http://ndpr.
nd.edu/news/65706-speculative-realism-problems-and-prospects/.
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of Pure Reason85 — with Kant’s introduction of a split between 
the noumenal, the world as it is “in-itself,” and the phenomenal, 
the world as it shows itself “for/to us” — has forgotten to think 
“reality,” or has stopped being engaged in that thought. These 
reproaches, as picturesquely described by Goran Vranešević, are 
the result of current “doubts about a subjectively totalized world, 
which with its limitations, like a flat world, prevents expeditions 
to the world’s vastness. More specifically, they are about the re-
gions of existence that seemed to be lost forever, since they were 
initially replaced by the inaccessible world beyond [or great be-
yond], and then by the further twist of subjective finality.”86
What is particularly interesting is that the contemporary de-
bates about aesthetics, as is argued in the aforementioned intro-
duction, bring to the forefront the internal divide of speculative 
realist philosophy into two poles, a divide which was already an-
nouncing itself after the first wave of enthusiasm for the specu-
lative turn subsided.87 Askin, Hägler, and Schweighauser situate 
this internal division of speculative realist thought in analogy 
with eighteenth-century discussions about taste, which took 
place between rationalists and empiricists.88 
This discourse on taste, as the authors argue, is particularly 
appealing to thinkers of the empiricist pole of speculative re-
alism (the other is thus named rationalist),89 since it offers an 
entry into things as they are in their reality, while simultane-
ously enabling the possibility of their “dehumanization” (note 
85 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ed. and trans. Paul Guyer and 
Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
86 Goran Vranešević, “Prihajajoči svet in žalovanje za njim” [“The Coming 
World and Mourning for It”], Časopis za kritiko znanosti, domišljijo in 
novo antropologijo 39, no. 248 (2012): 76. The translations from the Slovene 
are mine.
87 Askin et al., “Introduction,” 29.
88 Ibid.
89 British reflections on taste dealt with notions such as intuition, sensation, 
perception, and so on; Askin, Hägler, and Schweighauser mention the 
forerunners of Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten’s aesthetics as a science 
of sensuous cognition: Joseph Addison, Richard Steele, Anthony Ashley 
Cooper, and Francis Hutcheson. 
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the gesture of making positive a term historically signifying the 
process of de-“humanization!”), insofar as they relate to the 
structure of reality as such, and not solely to the domain of the 
human faculty of judgment.90 Askin, Hägler, and Schweighauser 
thus explicate a series of attempts to extend aesthetic thinking 
to a non-human world: the attempts of Steven Shaviro and Tim 
Morton, who deal with Kant’s notion of taste, since his judg-
ments on taste are not regulated by the concepts and because 
they are disinterested; the attempts of Graham Harman and 
Morton, who deal with object-oriented aesthetics, as manifest-
ed in the theory of “allure,” referring to an object able to taste, 
intuit, sense, and perceive another object; the attempt of Iain 
Hamilton Grant’s aesthetics, which refers to the intuition of na-
ture’s forces and potencies; and the attempt of Shaviro’s cosmol-
ogy, which describes the domain of apprehension, the domain 
of relationality per se.91 For all these writers of the empirical half 
of speculative realism, any encounter is always already a site of 
aesthetic experience; and for all of them, aesthetics is different 
from conceptual knowledge, while at the same time being pre-
liminary to it.92
“Given the expansion of aesthetics into the non-human 
realm,” Askin, Hägler, and Schweighauser state, “this is also the 
moment when aesthetics is pushed from the domain of human 
epistemology into that of general ontology. Ceasing to be a par-
ticular kind of human relation to the world, it becomes a gen-
eral descriptor of relationality of/in the world.”93 Moreover, “in 
this framework, human epistemology only builds on and comes 
after the general aesthetic structure of/in being. Indeed, ‘sub-
jectless experience’ underlies and comes to determine cognising 
subjects.”94
However, while the empiricist pole of speculative realism 
argues for “subjectless experience,” the rationalist pole argues 
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for “experience-less subjects.”95 Rationalists, in their critique of 
the empiricist pole, Askin, Hägler, and Schweighauser argue, 
disagree about the reification of aesthetic experience, and about 
“human” terminology (such as intuition, perception, etc.) used 
when talking about “non-human relations” and objects; ration-
alists, that is, see a problem in confusing “human” and “non-
human” relations as well as in preventing “the rational inquiry 
into human and non-human relations.”96 For them, epistemol-
ogy governs and determines aesthetics.
In situating possible objections to empiricist speculative re-
alism — and, before that, with a reference to the “father” of the 
term “aesthetics,” Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, legitimiz-
ing and justifying Baumgarten’s position within rationalistic 
thought — Askin, Hägler, and Schweighauser further recall a 
problem that they see as common to both poles of speculative 
realism: the emergence of transcendental philosophy.
Kant’s invention of the transcendental intervenes in the very 
discussion between rationalists and empiricists — and more, the 
speculative realists with their condemnation of correlationism, 
the latter arguing that it is impossible to discuss the questions of 
subjectivity independent from objectivity and the same inverse-
ly, point precisely to transcendental philosophy.97 Askin, Hägler, 
and Schweighauser thus argue that what we are actually witness-
ing today in the terrain of speculative realists’ debates is exactly 
the transformation of the concept of the transcendental.98 For 
all of the speculative realists retain, from Kant’s invention of the 
transcendental, the notion of immanence; and what is common 
to all speculative realists is that they are all concerned about “this 
world,” while elaborating their “thisworldly” philosophies!99 
Moreover, Askin, Hägler, and Schweighauser argue that what 
all speculative realists have in common is the very rejection of 
Kant’s Copernican Revolution, and thus the centrality of human 
95 Ray Brassier quoted in Askin et al., “Introduction,” 30. 
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experience and its conditions of possibility, but in two different 
ways: while the empiricist pole rejects the “human” in “human 
experience,” the other side rejects the “experience” as such.100 As 
they state:
On the one side, what results is an ontological recasting of the 
transcendental as it applies to reality per se: a transcendental 
empiricism (Grant, Harman, Morton, Shaviro); on the other 
side, we have an epistemological account of the powers of hu-
man thought to pierce this very same reality: a transcenden-
tal rationalism (Brassier, Meillassoux).101 
With this rough presentation of the symptoms of the current 
ontological and epistemological uncertainty within the very 
“system of thought,” I can now proceed to present the state of 
things in necrocapitalism, making a straightforward analogy 
with what Mbembe describes as the reinvention of animism. 
Additionally, considering what we stated earlier regarding 
the idea of race, we might say that a critique similar to the one 
that speculative realists addressed to continental philosophy 
may now also be made about the very philosophy of speculative 
realism itself. Yet my critique here is far from an endeavor to de-
fend Kant’s system of thought. As we have seen, Kant is the best 
friend of both poles of speculative realists (but not also their en-
emy as Askin, Hägler, and Schweighauser have argued102), whose 
“speculative register for unifying the world”103 has expanded the 
horizon of the world to other realities to the extent that it now 
“accepts all possible and impossible objects [...] introduced from 
the outside,”104 thus falling into a trap of “(contingent) choice: 
whether the world or object or subject or … it is always directly 
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid. Italics in original.
102 Ibid.
103 Vranešević, “Prihajajoči svet,” 81.
104 Ibid.
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embodied as an object.”105 Sometimes, we also have to do with 
the resurrected dead or with specters.
By rejecting the centrality of human experience and its 
conditions of possibility, both poles avoid having to think the 
very “racial flesh,” which was, historically, ontologically and 
epistemologically situated “at the threshold of the human,”106 
and which should be addressed in its numerous contemporary 
modes. Moreover, if one group of the speculative realists specifi-
cally rejects the “human” in human experience, and the other 
“experience” as such, it is clear that both poles are “aphasic,” also 
with regard to the very idea of the human, the human as a con-
cept construed through the very processes of racialization. 
It is worth recalling that already in 1997 Emmanuel Chuk-
wudi Eze brilliantly elaborated on the “color” of Kant’s reason/
Reason (to which we can add that reason/Reason is neither 
“genderless” nor “classless”).107 Kant — the philosopher of the 
system — as Eze stated, “had uncritically assumed that the par-
ticularity of European existence is the empirical as well as ideal 
model of humanity, of universal humanity,”108 “taken as human-
ity in itself,”109 which, in its greatest perfection, seems to (alleg-
edly) reside within the white race. Furthermore, as Eze put it,
it would be a mistake to believe that Kant contributed noth-
ing new or of original consequence to the study of “race” 
or to the problem of European ethnocentrism in general. 
Strictly speaking, Kant’s anthropology and geography offer 
the strongest, if not the only, sufficiently articulated theoreti-
cal philosophical justification of the superior/inferior clas-
105 Ibid. Ellipsis in original.
106 I refer here to the aforementioned title of Carr’s “At the Thresholds of the 
‘Human.’” 
107 Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, “The Color of Reason: The Idea of ‘Race’ in 
Kant’s Anthropology,” in Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader, 
ed. Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 
103–40. 
108 Ibid., 117. Italics in original.
109 Ibid. Italics in original.
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sification of “races of men” of any European writer up to his 
time.110
2.4 Animism 
In a lecture entitled “Democracy in the Age of Dynamism,” 
Mbembe’s central thesis is that late capitalism, as we know it 
today, represents some sort of a final stage of commodification, 
marked by the convergence of capitalism and the reinvention of 
animism.111 The concept of animism, as it was introduced into 
anthropology at the end of the nineteenth century by Edward 
Burnett Tylor, attributes to the so-called “primitive societies,” in 
a manner that infantilizes their beliefs, as they seemingly rep-
resent some kind of pre-stage in the evolution from religion to 
science, the belief that there is life in inanimate matter, that inert 
objects have a life which could be activated and animated.112 Ac-
cording to Mbembe’s view, this reinvention of animism in the 
context of current neoliberal global necro-capitalism works in 
two directions.
The first direction, as Mbembe elaborates it, refers to the 
“manufacturing of objects as subjects,” to granting the form of 
life especially to new technological objects, and more generally 
to commodities, or to financial capital itself. This direction si-
multaneously implies, on the one hand, some kind of restating 
of commodity fetishism, and on the other, it also relates to the 
life within the object itself, to the life that has been imprinted in 
objects by preceding violent, politically animated human pro-
duction, visible in wars for monopolies over mineral resources 
used in the production of new technological objects.113 
110 Ibid., 129. Italics in original.
111 Mbembe, “Democracy in the Age of Dynamism.”
112 Ibid. See also Mbembe’s “Technologies of Happiness in the Age of 
Animism,” public lecture at the European Graduate School, Saas-Fee, 
Switzerland and Valetta, Malta, March 27, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=nIijTCn8Gh4.
113 Gržinić, “Kolonializem Evrope,” 121. See also John E. Drabinski, “Mbembe, 
Democracy, Animism,” December 6, 2013, https://jdrabinski.wordpress.
com/2013/12/06/mbembe-democracy-animism/, and Mbembe, “Democ-
racy in the Age of Animism.” 
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Moreover, this direction of animism does not only imply the 
traces of life in objects — the granting of life to the objects them-
selves has serious consequences for life as such and its agency. 
In another lecture, entitled “Rethinking Democracy Beyond 
the Human,” Mbembe, referring to Luciana Parisi and her “Au-
tomated Thinking and the Limits of Reason” from 2016, talks 
about the emergence of an Electronic Reason, which weakens 
and is replacing what we once called Public Reason. According 
to Mbembe, agency has become an ability no longer exclusive 
to human beings, while “automated thinking” (i.e., algorithmic 
thinking) is not only challenging the (human) mind in terms of 
its own limits, but is also gradually releasing us from the duties 
of governing ourselves.114 The latest attention-grabbing exam-
ple of awarding life to an object is the humanoid robot Sophia, 
who was even granted Saudi Arabian citizenship at the Future 
Investment Initiator Congress at Riyadh at the end of October 
in 2017.115 However, Sophia is probably not the first such case, 
since already, on 30 January 2017, a humanoid robot named Fran 
Pepper was registered in the Belgian birth register.116 These ac-
celerated changes concerning life and the latest technology are 
opening up a number of questions regarding democracy in the 
age of new technologies, not least, if life now resides within the 
concept of citizenship, in parallel with questions about all those 
who are not entitled to get or have citizenship.
The second, and closely intertwined with the first, direc-
tion of animism, if I can return to it, relates to the “manufac-
114 Achille Mbembe, “Rethinking Democracy Beyond the Human,” public 
lecture at the European Graduate School, Valetta, Malta, October 16, 2017, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A_k3YIupGok.
115 The humanoid replied to the question of the awareness of herself as a 
robot with a question in reply: “How do you know you are human?” See 
Anja Pavlič Jerič, “Savdska Arabija prva država, ki je podelila državljanstvo 
robotu” [“Saudi Arabia Is the First Country to Grant Citizenship to a 
robot”], Rtvslo, October 27, 2017, https://www.rtvslo.si/zabava/zanimivosti/
savdska-arabija-prva-drzava-ki-je-podelila-drzavljanstvo-robotu/436323. 




RACE AND ITS FAR-REACHING IMPLICATIONS
turing of subjects as objects,” which shows itself as a perverse 
form of subjectivation through thinghood, due to the fact that 
objects now function as virtual transformations of ourselves in 
relation to them.117 According to Mbembe, commodity fetish-
ism has reached the stage at which objects possess their own 
lives, which, it seems, are the only things worthy of this name, 
and our task is therefore to become animist objects (i.e., virtual 
identities) in order to capture the life now dwelling and being 
animated between the object and the object, in the field of this 
“other humanity,” or “in-humanity.”118
2.5 Coda
Bringing the idea of race to the forefront of contemporary 
philosophical debates is not simply a gesture of rebellion, going 
against “colonial aphasia.” It is — if I intensify the coinage “the 
effect of blackness,” which Edmund Burke used in elaborating 
the “horror” and “threat” that the black, female body triggered 
in the white bourgeois subject119 — a gesture toward “the effect 
of a change in the fundamental arrangements of knowledge.”120 
Conclusion
Acknowledging the need to open, and already opening, the Eu-
rocentric, western archive to “other” perspectives, or to put it 
in line with Mbembe, to Black Reason, enables us not only to 
re-think our violent western, provincialized — and let’s be hon-
est, failed — “system of thought,” but also to think anew the “hu-
man,” if this void, as Foucault once stated, “does not create a 
deficiency; it does not constitute a lacuna that must be filled,” or 
said alongside current trends: bridged with the prefix post-, “it 
is nothing more, and nothing less, than the unfolding of a space 
117 Mbembe, “Democracy in the Age of Dynamism.” See also Gržinić, “Kolo-
nializem Evrope,” 121.
118 Mbembe, “Democracy in the Age of Dynamism.”
119 See Armstrong, “‘The Effects of Blackness.’” 
120 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sci-
ences (London: Routledge, 2005), 422.
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in which it is once more possible to think.”121 For today’s “effects 
of blackness” are twofold, ontological and epistemological.
121 Ibid., 373. 
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Pavlič Jerič, Anja. “Savdska Arabija prva država, ki je podelila 
državljanstvo robotu” [“Saudi Arabia Is the First Country 
to Grant Citizenship to a Robot”]. Rtvslo, October 27, 2017. 
https://www.rtvslo.si/zabava/zanimivosti/savdska-arabija-
prva-drzava-ki-je-podelila-drzavljanstvo-robotu/436323. 
Pontecorvo, Gillo, dir. La battaglia di Algeri [The Battle of 
Algiers]. Algiers/Rome: Casbah Film/Igor Film, 1966.
Quijano, Anibal. “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and 
Latin America.” Nepantla: Views from South 1, no. 3 (2000): 
533–80. 
Reich, Elizabeth. Militant Visions: Black Soldiers, 
Internationalism, and the Transformation of American 
Cinema. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2016.
Resnais, Alain, dir. Nuit et brouillard [Night and Fog]. Paris: 
Argo Films, 1956.
235
RACE AND ITS FAR-REACHING IMPLICATIONS
Roschy, Birgit. “Helma Sanders-Brahms: ‘Germany Pale 
Mother.’” Goethe Institut, July 2014. https://www.goethe.de/
ins/au/en/kul/mag/20397223.html.
Salgado, Rubia, Gergana Mineva, and Kollektiv Women. 
“Stream of Memory.” In Border Thinking: Disassembling 
Histories of Racialized Violence, edited by Marina Gržinić, 
48–58. Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2018.
Sanders-Brahms, Helma, dir. Deutschland bleiche Mutter 
[Germany Pale Mother]. Berlin/Berlin/Cologne: Helma 
Sanders-Brahms Filmproduktion/Literarisches Colloquium/
Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR), 1980.
Stoler, Ann Laura. “Colonial Aphasia: Race and Disabled 
Histories in France.” Public Culture 23, no. 1 (2011): 121–56. 
doi: 10.1215/08992363-2010-018.
“Un robot inscrit au registre des naissances à Hasselt.” NWS, 
January 30, 2017. http://deredactie.be/cm/vrtnieuws.
francais/Soci%25C3%25A9t%25C3%25A9/1.2879299.
Vogl, Joseph. “The Sovereignty Effect: Markets and Power in 
the Economic Regime.” Qui Parle: Critical Humanities and 
Social Sciences 23, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2014): 125–55. doi: 
10.5250/quiparle.23.1.0125. 
———. The Specter of Capital. Translated by Joachim Redner 
and Robert Savage. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2015.
Vranešević, Goran. “Prihajajoči svet in žalovanje za njim” 
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Speculations on an Unnatural History 
of Life
Eckardt Lindner
It must not be supposed that atoms of every sort can be linked 
in every variety of combination. If that were so, you would 
see monsters coming into being everywhere. Hybrid growths 
of man and beast would arise. Lofty branches would spread 
here and there from a living body. Limbs of land-beast and 
sea-beast would often be conjoined. Chimeras breathing flame 
from hideous jaws would be reared by nature throughout the 
all-generating earth.
 — Lucretius, On the Nature of the Universe1
1. Dreams of the Noumenal Horror of Life
When Kant was still a young man he was haunted by night-
mares, not of reason and its unrestrained (mis-)adventures but 
of a more existential nature. His Anthropology contains some of 
the most private moments in his oeuvre, in which he recounts a 
1 Lucretius, On the Nature of the Universe, trans. R.E. Latham (Harmonds-
worth: Penguin, 1982), 80.
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dream that he “had fallen into the water and was being turned 
around, coming close to drowning.”2 However petrifying, Kant 
finds the homeostatic function even in such terror, insofar as it 
serves to animate the flow of blood, putting even the incubus 
in the service of the proliferation of life — dreaming prevents 
the identity of sleep and death. Dreams are first and foremost 
a shock to the system. While vital, potentially even a condi-
tion for corporeal being, dreams have no place in critical phi-
losophy — how would one conceive of sleep as transcendental? 
Though dreams are constituted by spatiotemporal collapses and 
categorial breakdowns — “we are […] transported back to long 
vanished time,” we “speak with people long since dead” — the 
Anthropology rejects dreams not due to the possible confusion 
on grounds of judgment, subjective or objective, as the Critique 
of Pure Reason has it but for the privacy of their contents. There 
is no intersubjective dream-space.3 We can assume that the An-
thropology’s argument cements the first Critique’s one. 
With the Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, the discussion of the philo-
sophical merit of dreams encounters the question of life as af-
ter-life, as claimed by Swedenborg, who indeed claimed to be 
in contact with the dead. To communicate with the deceased, 
we would have to assume a “primitive force” which animates 
the body while living and exists independently of this body as a 
separate entity after death, while still being able to interact with 
the living through communication. Kant’s text is not so much 
concerned with the claim of the existence of these entities but 
is rather concerned with finding a method for legitimizing or 
disposing of them. We should acknowledge Kant’s outright re-
jection of the psychological solutions, either the Spirit-Seers are 
simply liars or plainly insane, as a genuine philosophical ges-
ture, a gesture of trying to ensure the unity of his own account 
of experience by viewing these deceptions as irregular cases of 
2 Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from the Pragmatic Point of View, ed. and 





the regular operations of a faculty. The problem of seeing spir-
its is first and foremost a spatial one. Our perception involves 
the apperception of the location of objects, real or imaginary.4 
While in the case of the sensation of external objects, the lines 
of our impression meet outside the brain, fantasies are produced 
by the lines of impression meeting inside it. Therefore, we per-
ceive the location of the object more or less clearly as a focus 
imaginarius. Being deceived by the illusion of seeing spirits 
could consequently be explained by a failure in registering the 
focus imaginarius correctly and mistaking a fantasy as an exter-
nal object. Most likely such a mistake could be explained by a 
disturbance in the functional apparatus of the brain, Kant as-
sumes.5 However, such an explanation does not yet touch on the 
problem de jure. Even if the insanity of Swedenborg is conceived 
as a physical dysfunction, observing the “vibrations” within the 
brain does not give any indication of the legitimacy of the claims 
they supposedly prove or, in other words, no difference in kind 
(sane/insane) can be inferred from the differences in degree (vi-
bration₁, vibration₂, vibrationn). The Spirit-Seers are however 
not the only ones dreaming up the existence of immaterial enti-
ties; eighteenth century philosophy is haunted by “souls,” “ob-
scure qualities,” or “spirits” — metaphysical specters.
But rather than locating the focus imaginarius incorrectly, 
the metaphysician lets the lines of reason and experience “run 
alongside each other into infinity without ever meeting.”6 So, 
the problem “of beginning I don’t know where, and of com-
ing I don’t know whither” seems to involve a peculiar kind of 
kinship between the two types of dreams.7 In fact, Kant is not 
sure what the difference is, though he maintains that one can-
not deduce the origin of one kind of dream from the other. But 
even more than that, they might be complementary, insofar as 
Kant’s accusation against the Spirit-Seers changes in the course 
4 Immanuel Kant, Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, ed. Frank Sewall, trans. Emma-





DISEASES OF THE HEAD
of the text, to an illusion being an invention of reason, which 
subsequently gets substantiated by false impressions. If, on the 
one hand, Swedenborg becomes a philosopher by proposing an 
intelligibility of the soul on the basis of his experiences, then 
philosophers can become Spirit-Seers when they furnish their 
concepts based on reason with experiences by virtue of their 
academic craft. Both, in their own way, seem haunted as well as 
vitalized by an internal relation of reason to madness.8 In Swe-
denborg, Kant discovers a doppelgänger, a “twin.”9 The affliction 
that seems to produce false images, both in the “Reason-dream-
er” and the “Sensation-dreamer,” is therefore not located in the 
senses themselves, but in the inability to make them an object 
to a judgment that would allow for a distinction between sensa-
tion proper and fantasy. The principles of such a judgment can 
neither be supplied by the understanding, nor by reason. The 
understanding has no principles a priori with which to supply 
the faculty of judgment. And reason cannot remedy the cause 
of the illusion — the misinterpretation of the focus imaginari-
us — since it is not the result of a logical mistake. One cannot 
reason away an impression.
Faced with the dreams of the metaphysician, Kant returns 
to his own definition of life as the “inner capacity to determine 
one’s self by one’s own will power.”10 If, however, the matter that 
fills space is incapable of such autonomy, life must be immate-
rial. The consequence of such a characterization is that we have 
no “data” to classify this principle positively and must therefore 
resort to categorizing it negatively. But even these negations 
cannot be grounded in experience, or conclusions, but can only 
be constructed “upon invention, to which a reason deprived 
of all other expedients finally resorts.”11 Life, it seems, insofar 
8 Cf. Monique David-Ménard, La folie dans la raison pure: Kant lecture de 
Swedenborg (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J.Vrin, 1990), 84.
9 Friedemann Stengel, “Kant — ‘Zwillingsbruder’ Schwedenborgs?” in Kant 
und Swedenborg: Zugänge zu Einem Umstrittenen Verhältnis, ed. Friede-
mann Stegel (Tübingen: May Niemayer, 2008), 35. 




as it can be thought, cannot be experienced, and thereby the 
thought itself becomes an invention or fabrication of reason. 
Life becomes a problem not only within philosophy, but for phi-
losophy itself, insofar as life is a condition for thought. It indeed 
becomes Kant’s pre-critical threshold, as it introduces the asym-
metry between what can be thought and what can be known. 
The aporia presented can, according to Kant, only be resolved 
by resorting to a “trick.” In the same way that the transgressions 
against civil law by a merchant can only be detected by switch-
ing the places of weights and goods, we too must change the 
weighting on the “scales of reason [Verstandeswage].”12 Thus, any 
judgment should not be judged by one’s own reason by itself, but 
as if the reason of another would do it. Therefore, we have to use 
the inventions of reason as “fictio heuristica,”13 to then be judged 
(or treated as if they were judged) by another member of the 
“community of spirits.”14 
The split between the sensible and the intelligible as the main 
methodological operation of the Dissertation functions as a 
transformation of the scale, with reason as the ultimate coun-
terbalance to its own misadventures, without having to rely on 
private evidence only. All concepts of life trying to establish 
continuity between the material and the formal, such as hylozo-
ism, must thereby be expelled a priori, since claiming that mat-
ter possesses the capacity to organize itself or give itself a unified 
form is tantamount to proposing that it gives itself its own law. 
Without the universality of the law as a generalizable counter-
weight, nothing would legitimize the distinction between the 
knowable and the thinkable in such a hylozoic cosmos. If being 
and thinking were identical, there would be nothing, absolutely 
nothing, shielding one from the allure of leaving the shores of 
reason and venturing into the sea of speculation, only to lose 
one’s mind over the impossibility of navigation.
12 Ibid., 85.
13 Immanuel Kant, “Brief an Moses Mendelssohn 8. April,” in Briefwechsel 
(Berlin: Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1922), 71.
14 Kant, Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, 53. 
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The Critique of the Power of Judgment returns to the question 
of life, relating it to purposiveness to determine it positively. In 
aesthetic and teleological common sense, the harmony of man 
and nature is given externally and internally, respectively. As 
such, we can only understand the purposiveness of organized 
beings in analogy to our purposes, by ultimately relating both 
to the whole of nature, whose teleological organization implies 
a divine creator, although a non-existent one.15 This is true both 
for the speculative interest, insofar as the solution of the antin-
omy of the teleological judgment relies on the assumption of 
an intuitive understanding, and for practical reason, since the 
ends of nature can only be understood as the self-realization of 
freedom in nature. In Kant’s genetic, or quasi-genetic, account 
of the striving for reason’s unity towards organicity in the Cri-
tique of the Power of Judgment, such a conation legitimizes itself 
through the life, liveliness, or animation of the mind (Gemüt) 
in the reflective judgment in aesthetics. To understand the role 
of the “feeling of life” (Lebensgefühl), which is a feeling of “the 
powers of the mind reciprocally promoting each other,” we first 
have to consider the role of the feeling of pleasure and unpleas-
ure in the systematic approach of the third Critique.16 Reflec-
tive judgment should be understood as performing a function 
or action by “means of which it strives to rise from intuitions 
to concepts in general.”17 It operates, since it lacks the “direc-
tions” commonly provided in determinative judgments by the 
understanding, by obtaining or creating its directions based 
on the dynamic interplay of the faculties. Since the unity of the 
systematic whole of nature and freedom must present itself as 
finality, the register of the faculty of reflective judgment is that 
of ends, while for reason it is freedom, and for understanding, 
the cognition of the object. Such an animating principle is able 
15 Cf. Peter McLaughlin, Kant’s Critique of Teleology in Biological Explana-
tion: Antinomy and Teleology (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), 170. 
16 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. 





to give credence to Kant’s introduction of “spirit” as mind’s ani-
mating principle in §49. If one only understands the function 
of reflective judgment in its schematic role as the manufactur-
ing of accord in determinative knowledge, its motivation and 
spirit’s introduction would not be plausible. Rather, reason has 
the inner drive to attain a “maximum,” meaning unity or the 
unconditioned. In the reflective judgment then, imagination 
strives to emulate or mimic the “precedent of reason in attain-
ing to a maximum.”18 The endeavor of organic unity in reflective 
judgment must be understood as a (almost Spinozist) conatus 
to obtain more being by striving, gesturing, or grasping towards 
the unconditioned. Neither such a striving nor the emulation 
of the imagination could be understood without the function 
of pleasure as elaborated above. The pre-logical function of re-
flective judgment therefore functions as a “metabolic filter of 
the psychic system,” converting everything heterogenous into 
digestible elements, while simultaneously affirming and recre-
ating the homeostasis of cognition.19 The form of judgment thus 
serves as the uniting copula of freedom and nature; it becomes 
the Judgment of God.
The relation of God to His judgment changes in Kant’s turn 
to the categorical as the essence of the Critiques, as Beaufret 
notes.20 Rather than the Law following from the Good, in Kant, 
the Good follows from the Law as “a pure form that has no ob-
ject, whether sensible or intelligible. It does not tell us what we 
must do, but what subjective rules we must obey no matter what 
our action.”21 As such, the final verdict is infinitely deferred and 
replaced with preliminary judgments only referring to ends; or, 
18 Ibid., 314.
19 Louis Schreel, “Idea and Animation: A Study of the Immanent Sublime in 
Deleuze’s Metaphysics,” PhD diss., University of Antwerp, 2017, 404.
20 Jean Beaufret, “Précédé de Hölderlin et Sophocle,” in Remarques sur 
Oedipe/Remarques sur Antigone, ed. Jean Beaufret, trans. François Fédier 
(Paris: Union générale éditions, 1965), 16.
21 Gilles Deleuze, “On Four Formulas,” in Essays Critical and Clinical, trans. 
Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press, 1997), 32.
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equally, since there is no final verdict, every day is judgment day 
in the infinite application of the Law. This inverts the divine im-
mortality, since “it distills a ‘slow death,’ and continuously defers 
the judgment of the Law.”22 As in Kafka, one is always before 
the Law. Nietzsche has already described the genealogy of judg-
ment in his “doctrine of judgment” in the Antichrist, beginning 
with the creditor/debtor relation without the use of judgment 
expressed in the painful extraction of debt in tribal rites. Debt, 
however, shifts to the gods as creators and rulers, so that “the 
gods give lots to men, and that men, depending on their lots, are 
fit for some particular form, for some particular organic end.”23 
In a last twist, Christianity again dispenses with the prefigured 
lots for men, save for our judgment itself, and hence transfigures 
the individual into a self-judge, which in turn, as Foucault has 
shown, becomes the principle for the individuation of the sinful 
subject. Such infinite deference is the form of the judgment in 
Kant.
This uniting function of judgment is operative in Kant’s judg-
ment of God as a disjunctive syllogism. The reality of a thing is 
produced by the limitation of possibilities and, hence, the nega-
tion of all others. The disjunctive syllogism, “either-or,” works 
exclusively, producing everything as what it is and excluding 
from it what it is not, subjecting everything to the identity in 
and of the concept. God restricts disjunction only to a “negative 
and limitative use,”24 which in turn relies on the integrity and 
self-identity of the body as an internally organized being, real-
izing and reproducing only what it is. It is, however, not the as-
sumption of God as “the sum total of all possibilities” that makes 
the restricted use of the disjunctive syllogism necessary but the 
form of the judgment that instates God as such a modal totality. 
22 Ibid., 33.
23 Gilles Deleuze, “To Have Done with Judgment,” in Essays Critical and 
Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 128.
24 Gilles Deleuze, Logic of Sense, ed. Constantin V. Boundas, trans. Mark 




Thinking life through the divine, Kant follows the vestigium 
of God, as Bonaventure has it, His “mark” in creation. The read-
ing of the liber creature then depends on the interpretation of the 
relation of creator and creature, either as continuous or as radi-
cal discontinuity, either as pure relation or as no relation, univo-
cal or equivocal. While the former is riddled with indissoluble 
darkness (Meister Eckhart, Henry of Ghent), the latter levels all 
differences between nature and God (Duns Scotus). Either there 
is no possible knowledge of the divine or everything is divine: 
neither constitute proper knowledge. Considering the problems 
of these solutions in regard to the question of the name of the di-
vine, Aquinas mediates between them through analogy. Hence, 
as Thacker writes, “[t]he creature is the life that is less-than-di-
vine, the Creator is the life that is more-than-the-living.”25 The 
relation of Life and the living can therefore only be determined 
through the living, or, by the given. Since Kant’s model of judg-
ment establishes an analogical relation between the transcen-
dental and the empirical, while the former conditions the latter, 
the former becomes a copy of what it conditions. For Kant, the 
transcendental life can only be determined through the empiri-
cal, establishing the transcendental-empirical double.
The deference of the final judgment of God, through which 
everything is integrated retroactively, leaves a space of indeter-
mination, while the middle position of the analogy again invites 
the problems of univocity and equivocality when considering 
the equally analogous relation of the phenomenal and the nou-
menal. Together, they do not only indicate but create the horror 
of anonymity.
Whether one subscribes to the two-worlds or two-aspects 
interpretation of transcendental philosophy’s phenomenal/
noumenal split hardly matters for exploring the sphere that the 
split as such opens. One should be keenly aware of the horror 
of the noumenal, which prompts Kant’s anti-Spinozism. As the 
Critique of Practical Reason has it, if man had full access to the 
25 Eugene Thacker, In the Dust of This Planet: Horror of Philosophy, Volume I 
(Winchester: Zero Books, 2001), 119.
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Ding-an-sich, then he would lose all autonomy and spontaneity 
and hence, “[t]he conduct of man, so long as his nature remained 
as it is now, would be changed into mere mechanism, where, 
as in a puppet show, everything would gesticulate well but no 
life would be found in the figures.”26 The possibility of diverging 
from the real causes is the positive condition of freedom. At the 
same time, duty exerts an uncanny violence in demanding from 
us the overcoming of all pathological subjective grounds of de-
sire (Triebfedern), which includes our desire to survive. Such a 
command does not call for self-destruction, but for the suspen-
sion of life and death altogether as a possible horizon for moral 
action. Insofar as such a suspension must be made to will itself, 
the care for life must be introduced artificially later on. As such, 
duty — the call of the noumenal — presents itself as an uncon-
ditional command beyond life and death, beyond any possible 
negation. In short, it presents itself as the death drive, denatu-
ralizing life, understood as surviving. The God of the judgment 
as disjunctive syllogism is not only the God of synthesis, but 
also of boundaries. Therefore, analogy serves as the paradoxical 
instance of a mediator between reality and appearance. At the 
same time, it must separate them, for in their identity transcen-
dental freedom would be impossible. In insomnia, boredom, or 
loneliness, however, the anonymous real presents itself as pure, 
impersonal existence; a “there is,” leveling the boundaries. And, 
as Levinas remarks, “[t]he rustling of the there is […] is horror.”27 
The terrifying thing is not that we might be wrong about what 
we think about the world, but that we might be right. For Kant, 
to be alive, man must be protected from the cosmos, the abso-
lute of reality, and this turn away from infinity must be turned 
into a constitutive condition of finite subjectivity. Speculation is 
the name of the danger of plunging man back into the madness 
of the Real, which is not life, but death.
26 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Black 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1956), 153.
27 Emmanuel Levinas, Existence and Existents, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pitts-
burgh: Duquesne University Press, 2001), 55.
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2. Being a Puppet
While both ghosts and dreams haunt eighteenth century philos-
ophy, the “forced, artful, contrived, and violent study of depths” 
has its roots in the emerging fields of anatomy and dissection.28 
The écorchés, flayed skeletons, were used by anatomists as well 
as artists to ensure the resemblance of the artifice (e.g., a rep-
lica, drawing, or statue) to the original structure, and to create 
a liveliness not achievable through imagination. As such, they 
were usually displayed in poses imitating autonomous mo-
tion. Contrary to the “natural anatomy” of the early modern 
era, in which cadavers were used as primary objects of study, 
the “artificial anatomies” common since the Renaissance, but 
which blossomed during the eighteenth century, used mostly 
wax models, yielding several didactic advantages. This allowed 
for a selective and distorting gaze, idealizing bodies for display 
and categorization, as well as enlarging certain parts for better 
visibility. As the anatomist Vicq d’Azyr noticed, such replicas, 
imitating life, have an aesthetic benefit as well, since anatomy 
is concerned with bodies “devoid of the charm that attracts, but 
in addition it is accompanied by circumstances that repulse: 
Torn and bloody members, infections and unhealthy odors, the 
ghastly machinery of death,” whose immediate impact can be 
minimized.29 Prioritizing movement, not simply structure, as 
the decisive criterion for the representation of life, mechanical 
displays like Jacques de Vaucanson’s The Flute Player, a musical 
automaton, or his Duck, designed to demonstrate the digestive 
system three-dimensionally in real time, followed a sentiment 
uttered by Vico, but repeated by Kant: “[h]e who would know 
the world must first manufacture it.”30 The study of cadavers was 
28 Barbara Maria Stafford, Body Criticism: Imaging the Unseen in Enlighten-
ment Art and Medicine (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), 47.
29 Félix Vicq d’Azyr, Discours sur l’anatomie et de physiologie avec des planches 
coloriées, representant au naturel les divers organs de l’homme et des ani-
maux (Paris: l’Imprimerie de France, F.A. Didot l’aîné, 1786).
30 Immanuel Kant, Opus Postumum, ed. Eckart Förster, trans. Förster and 
Michael Rosen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 41.
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therefore not enough to gain adequate anatomical knowledge; 
they had to be seen in simulated, manufactured action. Life be-
comes a matter of engineering, “Nature = Industry.”31 The aim of 
the mechanical is not to supplant the order of the living, but to 
match it, to appear as lively as the original it seeks to imitate 
through exposing the living to an exorbitant light that drags life 
to the surface. It makes life visible and encases it within its pos-
sibilities. As such, the mechanical has to grow skin. The wooden 
fingers of Vaucanson’s flute playing automaton, pressing on a 
metal flute, produced an unnervingly artificial sound. “Pure 
mechanics were not enough, and Vaucason had to import or-
ganic matter into his dead creation,” so he covered the fingers in 
(animal) skin (peau).32 In representing life, the anatomists faced 
a problem akin to the “uncanny valley” roboticists face nowa-
days, as the effective resemblance is not only a matter of artistic 
or technological mastery, nor merely a matter of pure accuracy 
nor the reproduction of universal structures but rather one of 
their dynamic interplay producing a singularity. As such, the 
tension between the general and the particular in judging “live-
liness,” which Kant sought to resolve through analogy, returns 
as the affect of the uncanny (unheimlich).
This is a horror based on an analogy between an excessive 
object and a finite subject through mediating representation. 
The failure of the latter to establish a successful communication, 
and community, of the two halves of the analogy leaves a re-
mainder, a not-nothing, which inscribes itself into experience 
like a background noise, suddenly shifting into the foreground. 
This is the depth from which such objects rise — an abyss, stem-
ming from a primordial dis-communication, antecedent to all 
relations. As such, the depth is created as it rises to the surface 
as a crack in it, but at the same time it presents itself as prior to 
the formation of the surface. It is an absolute indifference, ap-
31 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizo-
phrenia, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (Minneapo-
lis: Minnesota University Press, 2000), 25. 
32 Gaby Wood, Edison’s Eve: A Magical History of the Quest for Mechanical 
Life (New York: Anchor, 2002), 26.
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pearing as the in-difference of a human and non-human vitality. 
At the core, such a difference is still about resemblance and its 
failure to operate or establish itself in the analogical judgment. 
The failure of the judgment, the dis-communication in the 
analogy, entails a two-fold negation: the object is excessive and 
displays a non-human vitality that is in-different to ours. Such a 
non-human vitality subjects us to the gaze of the object; it objec-
tifies us. While the zombie is pure and empty subjectivity, mind-
less but unstoppable drive incarnate, puppets evoke an inert 
terror. The former is restless and always actualized movement, 
but the latter is potential activity, which is most effective if not 
realized. One leaves the room and upon returning, one is not 
sure if the hand of the doll was already in that position a minute 
ago. For Ligotti, whose work is filled with puppets, such unease, 
however, is just the prelude to the real terror that a puppet poses. 
These puppets are a symbol of what he calls “malignant useless-
ness.” Their empty expressions, with their painted-on faces, are 
indicative of the horror of consciousness, bringing suffering 
into this world by being able to perceive the cosmic uselessness, 
forming an integral part of a (self-)universalized pessimism. 
The symbolic value that puppets embody as excessive imitations 
of the human form harbors the secret threat of subverting the 
hierarchies we thought to be foundational and/or constitutive 
for consciousness. This is the moment
when a human being becomes objectified as a puppet and 
enters a world that he or she thought was just a creepy place 
inside of ours. What a jolt to find oneself a prisoner in this 
sinister sphere, reduced to a composite mechanism looking 
out on the land of the human, or that which we believe to be 
human by any definition of it, and yet be exiled from it.33 
The horror is not in the sudden appearance of sentience, a par-
ticular organic consciousness in an otherwise dead, inorganic, 
33 Thomas Ligotti, Conspiracy Against the Human Race: A Contrivance of 
Horror (New York: Hippocampus Press, 2010), 206.
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and universal machine. On the contrary, the anonymous ma-
chine presents itself as the heart of the personal conscious-
ness. The analogy is broken and, through its failure, reversed. 
Suddenly, a non-human life stares back at us with a thousand 
eyes — a ubiquitous gaze. This is the horror of the anatomical 
lineage of artificial life.
One becomes a meat-puppet in the eyes of the noumenal 
gaze. Such horror is not only ideal, but the failure of analogi-
cal judgment removes the boundaries between the sensible and 
the intelligible. It dismembers and (re-)connects the body at the 
same time, since its integrity relies on the judgment of God. It 
establishes a continuum between the human body, the animal 
body, plants, and objects, which blend into each other. Opening 
and exposing to the light of knowledge what was formerly con-
cealed within the depths of the body creates the “natural” objects 
of anatomy through dissection, and also exhibits the “abjective” 
elements, constantly threatening the identity of the natural. The 
creations of Jean-Honoré Fragonard elevate such a continuity of 
body and world to art. In his plastinations, that is, Fetus Dancing 
the Gigue or Man with a Mandible, he prevented the decomposi-
tion of the body by injecting various aromatic spices and alco-
hol into the arteries, followed by the removal of the skin. Using 
injections of colored wax, he was able to preserve muscles, ves-
sels, and even nerves, to display the prepared bodies in elaborate 
poses, and, more remarkable still, he was able to do so in inter-
action with other plastinated bodies. Alongside the praise of his 
skill, protestations of his contemporaries focused on the playful 
perversion of “natural” science, on the lack of his addition to 
serious knowledge. Much like the more recent discussion of the 
exhibition Body Worlds (Körperwelten) (2009) by Gunther von 
Hagens, the discussion centered on the aspect of spectacle and 
the repulsion such grotesque displays invoke through the su-
perposition of the organism as simultaneously unified and frag-
mented. It is as if “[t]he body’s inside […] shows up […] It is as 
if the skin, a fragile container, no longer guaranteed the integrity 
of one’s ‘own and clean self ’ but […] gave way before the dejec-
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tion of its contents.”34 The vitalization of corpses, on the other 
hand, implies a subversion of the categories of dead and living 
matter. Thacker notes that the two meanings of nekros in clas-
sical culture harbor the tension of denoting the departed as the 
life of the body but also as the thingness of the corpse which “re-
tains something residual of that life.”35 A second death is neces-
sary, according to de Sade, in order to eliminate a person prop-
erly. Not only the person, but the corpse as a mark of the living, 
must be destroyed. According to the anatomist Ruysch, and also 
echoed by the more contemporary developers of the “humanoid 
robot” Cog, it is the liveliness of the eyes that betray the uncanny 
sentience hidden behind them.36 Fontenelle recounts that Peter 
the Great, upon seeing a small child’s body prepared by Ruysch, 
was so enchanted by its lifelike eyes and friendly smile that he 
walked over and kissed the cadaver.37
3. Empty Worlds (Interlude)
While Kant insists on the difference between being and thinking, 
he establishes a necessary “correlation” between them, disabling 
either their identity or radical difference, since, by virtue of the 
mediation function of our perception, the world is always for-us 
and never conceivable as in-itself. The reversal of such a finitist 
reduction to the empirical, or phenomenal, has led Speculative 
Realism to a renewed interest in the absolute as non-correlative, 
hence superseding Kant’s limitation to the given. This reaction 
to the contemporary crisis of the notion of the absolute is “Ger-
man Idealism redux,” including the return of its reevaluation of 
34 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon S. 
Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 53.
35 Thacker, In the Dust of this Planet, 108.
36 Evelyn Fox Keller, “Booting Up Baby,” in Genesis Redux: Essays in the His-
tory and Philosophy of Artificial Life, ed. Jessica Riskin (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 2007), 335.
37 Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle, Éloges des académiciens avec l’histoire de 
l’Académie royale des sciences en MDCXCIX (The Hague: Isaac van der Kloot, 
1740), 1:438.
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madness. Meillassoux therefore formulates “correlationism” as: 
“No X without givenness of X, and no theory about X without a 
positing of X,”38 and After Finitude starts its analysis perplexed 
by the assertion of the Kantian idea, viz., that the “world is only 
meaningful” insofar as it is “given-to-a-living (or thinking)-
being,” which is still operative in contemporary, philosophical 
discourse.39 There was always only one consequence appropriate 
to such a bind: getting rid of all sentient life, emptying out the 
planet. Meillassoux’s arche-fossil, Thacker’s planet, and Brassi-
er’s stellar catastrophe have thus introduced a barren planet be-
fore us, and the cosmic void after us, back into philosophy, with 
distinct anti-vitalist, rationalist sentiments.
After introducing the arche-fossil as a mark of a time before 
sentience, posing a problem for transcendental philosophies’ 
framework of representation, Meillassoux derives from the 
facticity of the correlation between thinking and being that no 
reason can be given, that such a correlation is what it is, and 
therefore, that such a contingency must be itself necessary or 
absolute, because it, itself, is non-correlative. Hence, “only con-
tingency necessarily exists.”40 This necessary contingency is con-
flated by Meillassoux with the real, enabling him to conceive of a 
sense of being that is absolute and thus escapes the correlation; 
Meillassoux thus introduces a radical asynchronicity between 
thinking and being. Life, paradoxically, or more specifically, vi-
talism, impedes the scope of contingency insofar as becoming 
introduces contradictory entities which are necessarily what 
and how they are, since they cannot be otherwise, having al-
ready violated the principle of non-contradiction. Consequent-
ly, Meillassoux specifically accuses the Bergsonian-Deleuzian 
lineage of a “vitalist hypostatization” by declaring everything as 
38 Ray Brassier et al., “Speculative Realism,” in Collapse III: Unknown Deleuze 
and Symposium on Speculative Realism, ed. Robin Mackay (Falmouth: 
Urbanomic, 2007), 409.
39 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contin-
gency, trans. Ray Brassier (London: Continuum, 2008), 15.
40 Ray Brassier, Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 67.
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a correlate of (a) Life, absolutizing the correlation itself.41 Life 
becomes the new Principle of Sufficient Reason — in the case of 
Deleuze, Meillassoux is undoubtedly correct. 
Also wishing to dissolve the correlative bind, like Meillas-
soux, Brassier introduces the (inevitable) stellar extinction, the 
cosmic thanatropic vector, as a “real yet not empirical” event.42 
The subjective trauma inflicted by the objective reality of extinc-
tion is an “adequation without correspondence” whose resulting 
“truth” forces philosophy to admit that it is “neither a medium 
of affirmation nor a source of justification, but rather the or-
ganon of extinction.”43 The corollary of such an asynchronicity 
of thinking and being, in introducing a mind-independent re-
ality, is a strict materialism, or even a transcendental nihilism, 
exposing the human desire to drape values and meaning over 
an indifferent cosmos, the desire to escape the traumatic real-
ity of “human narcissism.”44 Transfiguring nature into a monster 
of energy, Lyotard writes that “[m]atter asks no questions, ex-
pects no answer of us. It ignores us.”45 Aimed at unbinding the 
vitalist “double genesis of thinking and being” in which “ideal-
ity and sensibility ultimately converge,” such a transcendental 
nihilism provides the antidote to what Brassier perceives as the 
pathological drive to affirm life, evident in the tendency toward 
panpsychism.46
Both Meillassoux and Brassier attempt to remove life or 
the organism as the orphic guardian of the depths of thought. 
However, ultimately, both are still beholden to the conservative 
economy of the organism. What allows Meillassoux to project 
the logical lack of reason into material being is his use of logic 
and matter interchangeably, reducing the latter to the same in-
41 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 64.
42 Brassier, Nihil Unbound, 237.
43 Ibid., 239.
44 Ibid., xi.
45 François Lyotard, “Thought without a Body?” in The Inhuman: Reflec-
tions on Time, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1991), 11.
46 Brassier, Nihil Unbound, 171.
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effective formalism, the “empty and indeterminate postulate.”47 
Even if we accept the reasoning leading up to the concept of 
hyper-chaos, the real genesis of the given from a mind-inde-
pendent reality cannot necessarily be explained. This becomes 
evident in the irrational leaps Meillassoux must introduce to 
make the emergence of different worlds (matter, life, thought, 
justice) plausible. As such, Meillassoux’s contingency rests on 
the same logical concept of matter that is characteristic of Kant’s 
philosophy of nature: localizing life “naturally” in the organ-
ism. The “exorbitant death” of the cosmic thanatropic vector in 
Brassier’s nihilism firstly necessitates the transcription of the 
form of dissipation of interiority into an exteriority, specific to 
the organism, onto the cosmos. Such a transition from “who is 
death?” to the objectivity of death, to the “truth of extinction,” 
can only register in and for the conservative economy of the or-
ganism, which binds it as trauma. Nihilistic disenchantment as 
non-conceptual negativity is bound to a thinking able to sustain 
such a shock, according to its affordance. The apocalyptic desire 
of Meillassoux and Brassier, paradoxically, leaves the human 
and the organism conceptually intact, in order to subvert their 
central position by eliminating them. Thacker’s planet — being 
neither the world for-us (the World), the space derived from our 
hermeneutic access to it, nor the world-in-itself (the Earth) as 
the opposite of and the point of resistance to such attempts at 
domestication, but a world-without-us, radically devoid of any-
thing human — might denote the asymptotic approximation of 
such speculative devastation. It reflects the fundamental phan-
tasm of subjectivity and its positionality as such, gazing upon an 
innocent world which is yet undisturbed by the subject’s exist-
ence.
The question is not whether we would either revel in the idea 
of the earth as a Heideggerian “home” for humans, and other 
organisms, or rather face the horror of the possibility of a sterile 
47 Peter Hallward, “Anything is Possible: A Reading of After Finitude,” in The 
Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism, eds. Levi Bryant, 
Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman (Melbourne: re.press, 2011), 138.
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and dead world-without-us. This question is still premised on 
the idea that without us, or organisms in general, there would 
be no life. Instead, we should rather ask through what kind of 
indifferent speculative wasteland we are wandering. Because 
it might well be Hegel’s desert of the Absolute in the Phenom-
enology, the “vacuity” of “the night in which […] all cows are 
black.”48 Hegel can only see devastation in groundlessness, the 
horror of a world stripped of life, because he lacks the “chemical 
sensibility”49 to register “the differences swarming behind us.”50 
The true horror of philosophy lies not in the satisfaction of our 
apocalyptic desires but in philosophy’s relentless demonstration 
that these compulsions to escape are pointless. This will never 
end, because it is not even something.
4. Dysteleological Life
The Tadmurians believe, Negarestani reports, that headless na-
ture produces a bolus barathuma, a cursed beast, when it stares 
longer into itself than usual, in order to realize itself.51 The Cri-
tique of Judgment, in an attempt to attain the highest systematic 
unity of nature and freedom, again straddles the line between 
the architectonics of critical philosophy and speculation with 
the discovery of reflective judgment and the sublime. Aesthetic 
judgment is reflective and not legislative for an object but is 
only for itself in the form of free harmony of the faculties in 
a reflected object. One must not forget that the analysis of the 
sublime is a “mere appendix” to the beautiful and the discov-
ery of aesthetic common sense, an attempt to map it on to the 
existing structure. In the discussion of the mathematical and 
48 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1977), 9.
49 Iain Hamilton Grant, “The Chemistry of Darkness,” Pli 9 (2000): 38.
50 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: 
Columbia University Press 1995), 277.
51 Reza Negarestani, “Bolus Barathuma (Homo Sapiens †),” in Abyssus Intel-
lectualis: Speculative Horror, eds. Armen Avanessian and Björn Quiring 
(Berlin: Merve Verlag, 2013), 117.
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dynamical sublime in paragraphs 26 to 29 in the third Critique, 
Kant attempts to tame the sublime by splitting each mode into 
a moral and central side, and an illegal and fringe side. The 
sublime inspires religious sentiments, which supersedes super-
stition, which invokes fear, through feelings of reverence. The 
abolishment of the mind’s freedom must be rejected in favor of 
passion and enthusiasm, the animation of imagination; it must 
avoid slipping into fanaticism, the becoming anomalous of im-
agination. In Kant’s mention of the negative parts of the sublime 
and their subsequent dismissal as abnormalities, their difference 
is always one of degree. However, it is the border between the 
colossal, “[t]he mere presentation of a concept […] which is al-
most too great for all presentation,” and the monstrous, which 
“by its magnitude […] annihilates the end which its concept 
constitutes,” that appears most fragile.52 Since “crude nature” 
cannot present the monstrous itself — nature does not contain 
anything “horrid” — its function is merely negative and serves 
to render the edges of the colossal clearer. Alas, this “frame 
doesn’t fit,” as Derrida remarks, because the demarcation used 
in order “to stop the category of the almost-too-much,” that is, 
the colossal, from degenerating into the excessive magnitude of 
the too-much already relies on the determination of the mon-
strous.53 The colossal seems to appear on the edges of the mon-
strous, as an experience of a limit, a threshold not yet crossed, 
constituted by the outside of representation. This aporia, that 
the monstrous is unrepresentable but must be determined to 
negatively constitute the colossal, is instructive for the whole 
third Critique. In this mere appendix, not only the very possibil-
ity of the sublime is at stake, but the systematic unity of Kant’s 
project as such. Considering that, for Kant, the ultimate symbol 
of the good is the beautiful, the sublime complicates such a con-
nection of vision and truth, or vision in regard to its ability to 
give a reliable index of the true. While “[t]he beautiful in nature 
concerns the form of the object, which consists in limitation; the 
52 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 253.
53 Jacques Derrida, “The Parergon,” October 9 (1979): 30.
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sublime, by contrast, is to be found in a formless object insofar 
as limitlessness is represented in it, or at its instance, and yet it 
is also thought as a totality.”54 For the limitless to be represented 
at all, the multiplicity of it must be bound; this must be the case 
in order to think and experience an object at all. Hence, the sub-
lime is never fully formless, and this allows for judgment to take 
hold. If the size were to increase just a little more, if the magni-
tude were just the smallest quantum bigger, unified experience 
would disintegrate. A purely quantitative difference between the 
almost-too-much and the too-much would therefore give vary-
ing results, and an object could be legitimately judged as sublime 
one moment but “appear” as monstrous the next — it would fall 
in and out of representation. Kant thus adds a qualitative dis-
tinction. The “negative pleasure” the sublime proper invokes is 
itself a “vibration […] a rapidly alternating repulsion from and 
attraction to one and the same object,” while the monstrous is 
the cessation of this movement.55 The repulsion is not followed 
by any joy and what one is left with instead are the affections of 
pure aversion, terror, horror, and disgust. Instating these feel-
ings as arbiters between the colossal and the monstrous, how-
ever, does not provide a strict enough line of demarcation. The 
Anthropology, aware of this threat, revokes their proximity by 
collapsing the two registers of the Analytic. The sublime and all 
its mental representations, as well as its artistic representations, 
must be beautiful, so as not to invoke fear or revulsion. One 
should be wary of such a retreat. To maintain the judgment of 
God is to stave off the threat of formlessness, the boundlessness 
inherent in the unnatural and illegitimate sublime. Hence, every 
representation of the monstrous must necessary fail. All of the 
words become meaningless, all of the narratives become tangled 
and contradictory, and all depictions miss their subject when 
faced with the too-much.
This unavoidable failure to describe the monstrous, in con-
junction with a manic rigor of literary description, animates the 
54 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 244.
55 Ibid., 245, 258. 
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works of Lovecraft. The meteorite, which crashes near Arkham 
into the Gardners’s land, brings a monstrous shimmer with it, 
a “colour out of space.” Although the rock itself is destroyed by 
lightning, the color spreads like a disease. While it cannot be 
categorized by any means relating to anything known within the 
visible spectrum, it infects not only the soil and the animals, 
but also the minds of the Gardners, driving them to madness. 
Something monstrous takes hold through its presence alone, 
without this monstrosity being bound to an object. Life ap-
pears as impersonal and anonymous contagion and ultimately 
consumes the living. Lovecraft is not, however, at least in this 
case, a writer of the supernatural, but rather of the hypernatu-
ral. After examining the meteor, the three professors, while 
able to determine its properties accurately, are still unable to 
“place” it. Since “[i]t was nothing of this earth, but a piece of 
the great outside; and as such dowered with outside properties 
and obedient to outside laws,”56 it does not register “as” some-
thing. Such a horror is not noumenal, but, as Harman shows, 
“phenomenological.”57 The color, as well as all of the entities in 
Lovecraft’s cosmos, are strictly material. When asking himself, 
“What is the Great Cthulhu?,” Houellebecq answers that it is “[a]
n arrangement of electrons, like ourselves. The terror of Love-
craft is rigorously materialist.”58 There is in fact no noumenon 
left in Lovecraft. There is only the play of anonymous forces, as-
sembling and disassembling, a life of pure affectivity. The form-
less ground rises up, without coming from another world but 
just from “out of space,” like a background noise slowly seeping 
into consciousness. The noumenal and the phenomenal collapse 
into each other. The transcendental cannot be represented, not 
even by analogy; hence, the transcendental-empirical double 
fails. Monstrosity itself becomes transcendental. Rather than 
56 H.P. Lovecraft, “The Colour Out of Space,” in Tales (New York: Library of 
America Literary Classics of the United States, 2005), 345.
57 Graham Harman, Weird Realism: Lovecraft and Realism (Winchester: Zero 
Books, 2012), 340.
58 Michel Houellebecq, H.P. Lovecraft: Against the World, Against Life (San 
Francisco: McSweeney’s Publishing, 2005), 32.
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being confronted with possible experience, the understanding is 
faced with real experience, legislated only by its own existence. 
It is faced with the being of the sensible. The feeling that the sub-
lime is supposed to invoke, of the mind’s “superiority over na-
ture itself even in its immeasurability,” is subverted and turned 
around.59 Rather than space being internal to us, we are spatial 
constructs within a vast and indifferent cosmos. Rather than 
time being within us, we are temporal and as such confronted 
with a history, stretching far beyond our consciousness, knowl-
edges, civilizations, and organic lives altogether. As such, Love-
craft cannot conform to the usual horror cliché of portraying a 
harmonious state — a peaceful and quiet little town — which is 
uprooted and disturbed by something un- or supernatural that 
unravels the idyll. In his universe, everything is “weird” from 
the outset. Nothing subverts nature from the outside, but the 
natural order is itself a quite perplexing anomaly within an a 
priori crooked but univocal universe. 
The beginning of The Color Out of Space, with the surveyor 
traversing a landscape marked by “a touch of the unreal and the 
grotesque, as if some vital element of perspective or chiaroscuro 
were awry,” introduces this reversal to the foundations of per-
ception.60 One cannot simply shake the unnaturalness of such 
a scene but rather begins to ask the question of how normalcy 
was ever possible in the first place; one is like someone losing 
the threat of everyday thought, unable to piece it back together, 
wondering if it was there in the first place. It is the question Kant 
not only failed to answer but sought to suspend a priori through 
the a priori. In other words, such awryness implies the ques-
tion of a genesis of the common sense and good will of thought 
on the one hand, and the production of unity in nature on the 
other. 
Alas, however far the “archaeologist of nature” ventures 
into the remains of the “oldest revolutions,” the world is always 
already captured by the auto-assembling forces of organic at-
59 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 261.
60 Lovecraft, “The Colour Out of Space,” 341.
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tractors, trapping it in perpetual actualism; the earth was never 
formed, only the world is produced now.61 From the present, the 
formative drive extends itself across all of time and space, as-
similating them to “propagate itself,” warding of the demonical 
threat of the productive surplus of the real over the possible. 
Devoid of any will-to-sanity or -health, the thought of tran-
scendental monstrosity penetrates through the covers of soci-
etal normalcy and convention, only to be redirected by ethico-
teleological diversions: the transcendental illusions of the Idea 
integrating all of the world by reproducing it in its image — the 
world, the cosmos, as an organism. Such a limitation is, how-
ever, only an auto-immunological reaction to the seemingly 
destructive forces of the simmering depth, which have not yet 
been recognized as the continuous genesis of reality, sometimes 
even wearing the mask of a judgmental God, sometimes sub-
verting Him. While Deleuze and Guattari claim that “[i]f eve-
rything is alive, it is not because everything is organic or organ-
ized, but, on the contrary, because the organism is a perversion 
[détournement] of life. The life in question is inorganic, germi-
nal and intensive, a powerful life without organs […] Metal is 
neither a thing nor an organism, but a body without organs […] 
matter-flow as pure productivity,” how does thinking avoid be-
ing itself recalibrated by organic despotism, and reach beyond 
judgment?62
As Heidegger remarks, the Greek theōrein, from which “the-
ory” is derived, is an amalgam of thea, the visible part of things, 
and horān, meaning “to look at something with attention.” The 
exclusion of the monstrous from Aristotle’s Poetics, which set 
in motion a whole philosophical history of stigmatizing the ab-
normal, is thereby conceivable as a reaction to the complication 
of the relation of visibility and truth inherent to it. The Latin 
monstrum, meaning “a divine omen or warning,” reflected in 
61 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 419. 
62 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. Robert Hurley and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: 
Minnesota University Press, 1987), 411.
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the nowadays uncommon use of “monster” in English to mean 
something that is enormous and threatening, can be short-cir-
cuited with the archaic use of “monster” in English, meaning 
“to demonstrate” or “to exhibit,” in order to form a new notion 
of theory. If the monstrous is characterized by its boundless-
ness, destroying the concepts determining it due to its excessive 
magnitude, can thinking be characterized by the same tendency 
to devour the boundaries that academia, societal discourse, his-
tory, or even the given anatomy of the thinking apparatus have 
erected? Such thinking is what Kant attempted to exclude from 
philosophy in the Spirit-Seers. It is the madness of speculation. 
The emancipatory value of speculation is therefore most evident 
in its ability to question and reject any “natural order,” that is, 
to expose it as contingently produced while at the same time 
enacting a transgression against the conservative economy of 
thinking every such order would impose. Thinking, as a materi-
al reconfiguration of forces, is, if accelerated to an infinite speed, 
fast enough to avoid the judgment of God; it is an unnatural 
act. As such, it destroys “nature,” understood as given necessity. 
The animation of the mind is in excess of the organic limits of 
the living — or, as Brassier writes, “[t]hinking has interests that 
do not coincide with those of living; indeed, they can and have 
been pitted against the latter.”63
Freud’s presentation of an energetic model of the nervous 
system in Beyond the Pleasure Principle has been widely dis-
cussed in regard to its claims about the compulsion for thanat-
ropic regression, the inevitable dissolution of the organism into 
inorganic exteriority. Focusing on the organism’s desire to re-
turn to a state of inanimation conceals the speculative and en-
ergetic aspect of the model in the critique of the conservative 
economic order of the organism, especially revealed in its bind-
ing of death. Freud writes: 
If we are to take it as a truth that knows no exception that 
everything living dies for internal reasons — becomes inor-
63 Brassier, Nihil Unbound, xi.
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ganic once again — then we shall be compelled to say that 
“the aim of life is death” and, looking backwards, that “inani-
mate things existed before living ones” […] For a long time, 
perhaps, living substance was thus being constantly created 
afresh and easily dying, till decisive external influences al-
tered in such a way as to oblige the still surviving substance 
to diverge ever more widely from its original course of life 
and to make ever more complicated detours before reaching 
its aim of death.64
In Freud’s anti-Spinozist twist, while the organic interiority 
hives off from its inorganic origins in a dynamic interplay of 
constantly binding death as exteriority, e.g. constant contrac-
tion, its dissolution follows an internal “instinct.” Since the state 
towards which the organism is regressing is, at the same, the ir-
retrievable past, older than any organic life, and also the unpre-
dictable future, coming rather than being and hence indifferent 
to the organism, such a state cannot register as a point in time 
for the organism at all. The traumatic origin of life itself, there-
fore, is not accessible to transcendental subjectivity, to which it 
nevertheless gives rise. 
In the instinct towards death, thanatropic regression presents 
itself to the organism as an objective truth which instates itself 
a posteriori, but is nevertheless a priori for the organic sub-
ject; or, as Levinas put it in regard to the Other, as an “anterior 
posteriority.”65 Precisely as such an impossible condition, the 
death-instinct is transcendental, but not determinable by the 
empirical through analogy or resemblance. Neither transcen-
dental apperception nor the existential “being-towards-death” 
can assimilate it. Death does not appear as the teleological end-
point of life, but rather life is a temporary anomaly in the order 
of dysteleological death, or, “[t]he living is only a form of what 
64 Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, ed. James Strachey (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1961), 32. 
65 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. 
Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 170.
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is dead — and a very rare form.”66 Not beholden to regulative 
principles, the original state of the inorganic is bound by the or-
ganism in that its course of decontraction is guided by the con-
servative economy of the organism due to it being the medium 
of dissipation. Rather than the derivative tendency towards eco-
nomic assimilation of the pleasure principle, or the survivalism 
of the reality principle which make death appear as an inflection 
of life, the death instinct reverses this order. In other words, life 
does not consist in the overcoming or resistance of death, but in 
its individual modes of binding inorganic exteriority according 
to the specific economic affordability of the organism by reduc-
ing the tendency towards dissolution qualitatively and quantita-
tively; this is in order that life may die in the way immanent to it. 
Life is a detour [Umweg] towards death and “[d]eath needs time 
for what it kills to grow in [it].”67
In this sense, affordability in the organism as an open system 
is determined by the incongruity of the exorbitant demand of 
exteriority and the logic of sustenance as a demand of interior-
ity, or, the projection of life towards ends (interiority) and the 
destruction of such ends by the very condition of making them 
in the first place. As such, the death instinct is “monstrous” but 
also conditioned, since it is only possible through the organic 
economy. This is the tendency of organisms to exhibit complex-
ity, for example, to temporally postpone such dissolution, but 
also to ultimately merely represent the detour of this specific 
dynamic system — and, as could be said with an inversion of 
August Weismann, such complexity might accelerate the course 
towards dissipation.68 Even if it is supposed that the binding of 
66 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, ed. Bernard Williams, trans. Josefine 
Nauckoff and Adrian Del Caro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), 110.
67 William Burroughs, “Ah Pook the Destroyer,” Dead City Radio (London: 
Island, 1990), CD.
68 Weismann poses a challenge to Freud, insofar as he argues that death, 
from the standpoint of evolutionary life, is a rather late acquisition, ques-
tioning its primordial status. Freud however retorts, that “his assertion 
that death is a late acquisition would apply only to its manifest phenomena 
and would not make impossible the assumption of processes tending 
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the inevitable truth of extinction is always unsuccessful, the or-
ganism still imposes a “partial” natural order upon the dysteleo-
logical tendency of the death drive. Rather than the economic 
order being shaped by its immanent way of dying, in Freud’s 
model, the latter is determined by the former. The organism is 
that which rules the economy of dying, or, more precisely, it is 
this conservative tendency. The aim of such a binding of the 
death drive is to determine the relation between the conserva-
tive drives and the seemingly unilateral conditioning of them 
by inorganic exteriority as ultimately bilateral, resulting in a 
metaphysical dualism of drives. Freud’s death drive is not yet 
considered transcendental.
In the end of the second chapter of Difference and Repetition, 
Deleuze attempts to retrieve the possible monism abandoned 
by Freud by unbinding death from the conservative economy 
of the organism. Taking up the characterization of the death 
drive as a positive compulsion for repetition operating as a non-
empirical principle, it is the latter that Freud ultimately betrays. 
By presupposing a dialectical model of the drives, characterized 
by negation, as well as a dialectical model of organic (interior-
ity) and inorganic (exteriority) matter, he repeats the Kantian 
movement of the tracing of the transcendental from the empiri-
cal. The inorganic exteriority is only unanimated if conceived as 
empirical itself, namely, as the original trauma of the organism 
it attempts to bind in its immanent way. For Freud, the return 
to the state before the organism is synonymous with the repeti-
tion of a time without life, identifying life with the personal and 
empirical, binding death. Deleuze’s unbinding of death, then, 
entails thinking it not as a contradiction to personal life. It is 
not “the limitation imposed by matter upon mortal life, nor the 
opposition between matter and immortal life, which furnishes 
death with its prototype. Death is, rather, the last form of the 
towards it.” Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 43. For a philosophical, 
in-depth discussion of Weismann and Freud, see Keith Ansell-Pearson, 




problematic, the source of all problems and questions, the sign 
of their persistence over and above every response, the “Where?” 
and “When?” which designate this (non)-being where every af-
firmation is nourished.”69
Transcending any particular life, the “death instinct” in 
Deleuze capitalizes on the energetic aspect of Freud’s model, de-
noting the energy of an impersonal life. Without being bound to 
the conservative economy of the organism, matter itself appears 
as animated. 
Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism capitalizes on such an 
opening, flattening the divide between the transcendental and 
the empirical insofar as the former is remodeled as a genetic 
process itself immanent to the latter. Although determining the 
empirical phenomena, the transcendental itself is a synthesis 
within the empirical field, itself contingently determined by the 
encounter of forces. There is an immanent logic to the sensible 
itself, or to the material, which cannot be anticipated or fully 
governed. On account of this immanence of the transcenden-
tal and the empirical, the transcendental is not determined by 
analogy to the empirical and is therefore not limited to what the 
limitative judgment of God — His disjunctive syllogism — has 
determined as possible. In the being of the sensible, as Deleuze 
remarks, we do not encounter the gods but demons. Such a re-
versal subverts the retrospective movement of organic thought 
to integrate what is real into what must have been possible and 
transmutes reality into a monstrous self-creation. While the no-
tion of matter that Kant proposed was logical, Deleuze’s is syn-
thetic and, hence, not yet beholden to the conservative economy 
of the organic image of thought.
Rather than merely being the intrusion of alterity, that 
is, inorganic exteriority presenting itself as anterior poster-
ity, traumatically disrupting the empirical, and retrospectively 
transcendentalized, natural order, any such order is suspended 
a priori. The death drive does not denaturalize any specific em-
pirical natural order, but transcendentally denaturalizes the 
69 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 112.
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naturalization of any order as such. As is evident in Lovecraft, 
dissolution and destruction are coupled with, or enacted as, an 
emancipatory practice. This not only subverts the natural order 
but suspends it. It seems that we are not condemned to be free but 
are free because we are condemned. Without prefigured order, 
the only thing left is the violence of perception. For Deleuze, 
this is the “pain of childbirth” as Nietzsche had it, within which 
thinking ascends towards a “superior empiricism,” shedding the 
conditions of possibility of the human.70 It is this violence as a 
new mode of communication that informs the transition from 
Kant’s conditioned to Deleuze’s absolute epigenesis: “each facul-
ty communicates to the other only the violence which confronts 
it with its own difference and its divergence from the other.”71 
This discordant accord, revealing the determination of sensa-
tion by a super-sensible Idea, “manifests and liberates a depth 
which remained hidden.”72 The depth-determining sensation, 
without the determination by a concept, becomes the model for 
the internal genesis. 
This depth of Ideas, however, according to the critique of 
possibility seen above, must be one which is not preexistent to 
the experience, but expressed in it. However, since Ideas do not 
resemble the surface of the sensible, because they are not traced 
from its outline, they remain conditions irreducible to real ex-
perience. Hence, this super-sensible realm of Ideas cannot be 
actual, but is still real; or, as Deleuze characterizes the virtual, 
this realm is the ideal part of the real, “real but not actual, ideal 
but not abstract,” since Ideas follow from an encounter with the 
being of the sensible.73
In the strictest sense, such a vital cosmos is a-cosmic, a-
theological, and a-personal. The hylemorphic model of thought 
and determination which Kant employed is replaced in Deleuze 
70 Ibid., 69.
71 Ibid., 146.
72 Gilles Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties, 
trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: Minnesota 
University Press, 1985), 60.
73 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 208.
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with a hylozoic model of a material morphogenesis, which may 
involve the human mind but does not necessarily. Matter de-
termines itself without anything above or beyond it, and it does 
so as process. Such is the formula of Deleuzian horror. With 
the failure of the boundaries between the sensible and the in-
telligible, the madness Kant sought to banish then returns. By 
subverting the question of the intelligible de jure in the de facto 
transcendental genesis of the sensible, one ventures into the in-
finity of absolute xenogenesis.
5. Creation in the Absence of God
As Nietzsche notes, judgment, since it must force itself upon 
people, appears first “in the form of the false judgment leading 
to delirium and madness, when man is mistaken about his lot, 
and in the form of the judgment of God, when the form imposes 
another lot.”74 But now, no such prefigured lots are left. “Nature 
does not make mistakes” and “nature only makes mistakes” have 
become synonymous. Instead of stretching the bond between 
the order of creation and the order of redemption endlessly, it is 
cut in a Marcionite fashion. The integrity of the body, its bound-
ary to the outside, relied on the judgment of God, which uni-
fied it and ascribed every organ its lot. Now, all organs move 
independently from their corporeal unity. This is the artificial 
life of the partial objects in Bosch’s paintings, which returns in 
the psychosis of Lacan, or the myriad of autonomous body parts 
within the horror genre. Such an “organ without a body,” an or-
gan which “resists inclusion,”75 is still created by a compulsion 
to repeat a state preceding “the dialectic of the prohibitory Law 
and its transgression” and Oedipal triangulation.76 This repeti-
tion can only register as the experience of a body made up of 
disjointed pieces if indexed by a subject already constituted by 
74 Deleuze, “To Have Done with Judgment,” 129.
75 Sean McQueen, Deleuze and Baudrillard: From Cyberpunk to Biopunk 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017), 159.
76 Slavoj Žižek, Organs without Bodies: On Deleuze and Consequences (Lon-
don: Routledge, 2012), xi.
268
DISEASES OF THE HEAD
the symbolic order. Again, judgment is already in place, and 
we have not reached the continuous flow of desire as asubjec-
tive — impersonal and energetic flux which constitutes and 
characterizes the body-without-organs.
The distinction which Aristotle introduces in the Physics be-
tween mimeitai, art’s ability to imitate nature, and epitelei, its 
ability to take things further, is instructive for the alchemical 
lineage of artificial life from the inception of the aufiric arts to 
the creation of homunculi. While the manipulation of materials 
into artworks which resemble nature’s products is an imposi-
tion upon nature — mere “sophistical transmutations,” as Geber 
declares in the Summa Perfectionis — the alchemist’s goal is the 
repetition of creation.77 De natura rerum, written by physician 
Adam von Bodenstein, posing as the famous alchemist Para-
celsus von Hohenheim, describes the process by which a bird 
can be transmuted into a flask by converting the burned up re-
mains of an ordinary bird into phlegm and heating it up. The 
bird will not only regenerate, it will be “clarified,” that is, it will 
be better than before, better than natural.78 The origin of such 
experiments, including the creation of a homunculus or a basi-
lisk in a flask, while being inspired by Arabic writings on early 
artificial life, might lie in the tradition of mandragoras (Alraun-
en). Peddlers would carve mandrake roots to resemble human 
features and sell them, with false promises attached, to supersti-
tious men and women.79 These minor crimes are harshly con-
demned by Paracelsus in Liber de imaginibus. He proceeds to 
demonstrate in De vita longa the way in which real mandrakes 
are actually homunculi, created by the sperm or urine of hanged 
criminals and therefore growing under gallows, hence the name 
“gallows-man” or “Galgenmann.” The superficial resemblance 
to liveliness is replaced by the non-phenomenal creation of life. 
77 William Newman, The Summa Perfectionis of Pseudo-Geber: A Critical 
Edition, Translation, and Study (Leiden: Brill 1991), 753.
78 (Pseudo-)Paracelsus, De natura rerum (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1922), 312. 
79 Cf. Lynn Thorndike, ed., A History of Magic and Experimental Science 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), 8:11.
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In Mary Douglas’s canonical study, Purity and Danger, im-
purity is categorized by the violation of, and subsequent threat 
to, the schema ordering cultural categories.80 The stigmatiza-
tion of the alchemical lineage of artificial life as heresy points 
to another kind of fear of a nature ultimately neither controlled 
nor limited by any external force. This is a horror based on the 
univocity of all individuated beings via an impersonal genesis. 
The alchemist does not simulate vitality but rather realizes the 
genesis of life and therefore moves from human representation 
to inhuman creation, and maybe even improves upon nature’s 
hitherto implemented methods. While the horror of the nou-
menal character of life was marked by the failure of analogical 
judgment, hence an a posteriori event disrupting the natural or-
der, the transgression of the monstrous generation instates itself 
a priori. As such, alchemy implies a two-fold darkness: of life as 
materially withdrawn from view by virtue of being a synthetic 
process of forces necessarily below phenomenality and of the fu-
ture of life, or of what might become of life. Therefore, alchemy 
is the proper predecessor to what is now known as chemistry, 
since “chemistry derives from the Egyptian word for “black,” 
which is itself named for the black earth of Egypt.”81 Langton, in 
his 1987 manifesto on and for artificial life, while conjuring the 
alchemists of old, already refrains from using “life” as a natural 
kind, instead proposing: “Only when we are able to view life-
as-we-know-it in the larger context of life-as-it-could-be will we 
really understand the nature of the beast.”82
Not bound by prefigured metaphysical laws, monstrous crea-
tions exhibit dialethical biologies, being alive and dead, natu-
ral and artificial, formed and formless, all at the same time. For 
80 Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concept of Pollution and 
Taboo (London: Routledge, 1966).
81 Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent, “Lavoisier: Eine wissenschaftliche Revolu-
tion,” in Elemente einer Geschichte der Wissenschaften, ed. Michel Serres 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1994), 13.
82 Chris Langton, “Artificial Life,” in Artificial Life: The Proceedings of an In-
terdisciplinary Workshop on the Synthesis and Stimulation of Living Systems 
(Redwood City: Addison-Wesley, 1989), 33.
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the judgment of God, such life appears blasphemous, a “life 
that should not be living but that is living,”83 brought about by 
a fusion of elements deemed incompatible with societal norms, 
or with the category of the natural, or else brought about by 
a fission of what is considered inseparable. As the art of gen-
eration by transcendental synthesis, alchemy subverts empiri-
cal distinctions of naturalness, creating amalgams of: formerly 
distinct ontological orders (e.g., inorganic materials and flesh, 
man and animals); spatio-temporal categories (e.g., two souls in 
one body); genera and species (e.g., mixtures of animals, such as 
the chimera); or splittings of ontological composites (creatures 
without souls), spatial wholes (one soul in two bodies, doppel-
gängers), or temporal continuities (two souls alternating in in-
habiting one spatially continuous body). 
Transgressing the conceptual category of “natural” that any 
given culture might champion, monstrous creatures not only 
pose a threat to an existing scheme, but also to the action of nat-
uralizing any schematization. “Monsters are not only physically 
threatening; they are cognitively threatening,” 84 not because 
they oppose common knowledge, as Carroll falsely believes, but 
because they pose a threat to the common sense and good will 
of thinking, to the conditions of common knowledge as such. 
Most of Lovecraft’s characters, upon looking at the monsters, 
end up deranged, but their insanity is not an empirical phenom-
enon. Rather, it is a transcendental madness, or better yet, it is 
their convergence with the madness that is the transcendental. 
The horror of life is not that the category of the “natural” is 
fragile but that it is laughable.
83 Thacker, In the Dust of this Planet, 104.
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Survival Strategies for Weird Times
Helen Marshall1
Survival Strategies
Barron St. John must have been nearing his seventies by that 
point. The pictures I’d copied from magazine covers and news-
papers charted his rise from a rake-thin tower of a man, nearly 
six-three, clad in a badly fitting white wool jacket with a thick 
crop of black hair cut like a bowl around his ears, to his older 
self: hair grey but still as thick as it had ever been, fine laugh 
lines etching the curve of that grinning, maniac mouth. In his 
heyday people had taken to calling him the King of Horror, a 
real scaremeister — that term always made me laugh — but the 
man I saw in those later pictures had the look of a grandfather, 
which I suppose he was, one who could spin a yarn, sure, but 
not the kid who’d posed with a shotgun for his university paper 
under the headline “Vote dammit!”
My university had given me a small grant for my research 
project into St. John’s career. I had planned to stay in Hotel 31, 
the cheapest place Luca and I had agreed we could afford. He 
1 Editorial Note: The story “Survival Strategies” originally appeared in Black 
Static 58 (2017). It has been reprinted here and is followed by a commen-
tary, entitled “Survival Strategies for Weird Times,” which is published for 
the first time in this collection. 
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had wanted me in midtown so I could walk most places. He was 
a worrier, had never been to New York and the idea of me riding 
the subway right then made him uneasy.
“It’ll be fine,” I told him, “nothing will happen. It isn’t like that 
anymore. It hasn’t been since the ‘90s.” We both knew that wasn’t 
exactly true. The situation was different now, but scarier in other 
ways. There were journalists being stopped at the borders, asked 
invasive questions. Not everyone was allowed in. And Luca, for 
all his woolly sweetness and soft English manners, had a serious 
stubborn streak. He was protective, I knew, and didn’t like the 
idea of me traveling on my own, not after I’d reacted so badly to 
the procedure, and certainly not “abroad” as he called it in that 
charmingly old-fashioned way of his.
But “abroad” was what I had wanted. Even if it wasn’t home 
for me, which lay four-hundred miles north across the border in 
Toronto where my sister lived, New York still felt more familiar 
than the still-drizzly streets of London in the summer. Besides, 
I suppose there was a part of me that wanted to see how bad 
things had got. 
And St. John was a new obsession of mine, one I’d taken up 
in my recovery. Luca had been reading his pulpy-looking pa-
perbacks for years, but I’d never touched them. They were too 
scary, I’d thought, too low brow. I remembered the garish pa-
perbacks though, the ones that showed off his last name in huge 
embossed letters. They’d been ubiquitous when I was a kid. Each 
had a plain black cover with a silhouette cutaway so you had to 
turn the page to get the full effect. Rosie was the first I ever saw, 
his debut, the starting point for his surprising upward trajectory. 
It featured a small New Hampshire town — eerily similar to the 
one where I’d grown up, what had once been a small farming 
community until the petroleum processing plants transformed 
it. The town was engulfed in a crackling lightning storm. Gory 
and horrifying, read the cover, you can’t put it down!!!
St. John didn’t live in New York, but his former editor did: 
Lily Argo. 
I’d found her e-mail address online. Like St. John she must 
have been in her seventies but was still working freelance. There 
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were no pictures. The best I could find was a black and white 
shot of her and St. John at the signing of his fourth book, What 
Is Mine, the last they worked on together. Lily Argo was an inch 
or two taller than St. John, glorious, an Allison Janney look-
alike, which meant the two of them towered over the line of 
moist-lipped teenage girls who were clustered around the table. 
That was back in ’79.
When I first approached one of my friends — an anthol-
ogy editor named Dylan Bone (real name or not, I never 
knew) — about the possibility of an article on the publication 
of Rosie, he told me Argo had died. Dylan had even written up 
her obituary for Locus — but in retrospect he couldn’t remember 
how he’d first found out. She’d been one of the few female editors 
at Doubleday back then, mostly due to her lucky discovery of St. 
John. When I mentioned I’d been in contact with her, that she’d 
agreed to meet me, Dylan had stared at me thoughtfully.
“Just be careful,” he said. 
“About what?”
He’d just waved his hand. “You know,” he said before lurching 
off to the bar to fetch another round.
◆◆◆
I didn’t have any problems with the border guards. The customs 
line was tense, but I’d always had that feeling whenever I entered 
the States. Once I’d swallowed two painkillers before a flight 
back to London and the random swipe they’d done on my hands 
had registered a false positive for explosives or drugs. I’d been 
taken to a small backroom where a dark-haired woman in a uni-
form demanded to know why I had been in the country. I kept 
apologizing, I don’t know why. She had to search me by hand 
and the process was brusque and businesslike. She asked me to 
remove my bra. Then someone else came in, a heavy-set man 
with a broad forehead. He didn’t look at me. Neither of them 
did. Afterward they let me go but ever since I’d been stopped for 
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“random” checks whenever I boarded a plane. This time though 
the guard took one look at me and waved me through. I must 
have looked harmless to him.
◆◆◆
Hotel 31 was as old as the Overlook, mostly derelict with a walk-
in elevator whose grill door you had to close yourself. The room 
was sparse, but by that point exhaustion had sunk into my skin. 
I called Luca to tell him I’d arrived and then collapsed under the 
thin covers. 
All night I could hear animal sounds in the walls. The bodies 
of whatever moved beyond the peeling wallpaper hummed like 
batteries. Still, I slept. And in the morning I felt better than I had 
in weeks. Not mended, but stronger. 
I was still in that dusky phase of grieving so that sometimes 
when I slept it felt I had fallen through a hole in the world. Each 
morning I woke up as a different person, discovered new wrin-
kles at the corner of my eyes, wires of thick, unrecognizable, 
grey hair. The doctor warned me of changes in my body, cramp-
ing, small clots of blood between my legs. I had expected my 
breasts to shrink but they’d only gotten larger. I read online the 
best thing to do was to bind them tightly with a snug towel and 
apply ice for ten minutes on, twenty minutes off. He hadn’t told 
me how old I would feel after. 
I had given myself three days to acclimatize to jetlag before I 
met up with Lily Argo. 
In the meantime, I’d arranged a visit to Doubleday, St. John’s 
first publisher. In the last thirty years Doubleday had joined 
with Dell and Bantam which in turn joined up with Random 
House. Size, they had thought, was the best way to survive an 
uncertain economic climate. 
Two weeks ago, I’d contacted an editor at Random House in 
the hopes he might know if the company had kept some of the 
records from St. John’s days. But after the bag search and the 
281
SURVIVAL STRATEGIES FOR WEIRD TIMES
metal detectors, when I was buzzed into the offices, a blonde 
receptionist told me my meeting had been postponed. She was 
young, slickly made up in that New York way with manicured 
fingers and perfect plucked eyebrows. I was wearing a dark blue 
cardigan which, seeing her, suddenly felt so English, so matron-
ly I almost laughed.
So I waited in the reception for an hour, browsing the display 
copies of new books by Margaret Atwood and Chimamanda 
Ngozi Adichie. They too were slickly produced. 
After a while I pulled out my beat-up copy of Strangers and 
Friends, a collection of short stories St. John had published in 
gentlemen’s magazines like Cavalier and Penthouse over the 
years. The book had never been one of St. John’s most popular, 
but I’d been thumbing my way through it slowly for weeks. On 
the flight I had started a story called “The Survivalist” in which 
a doctor finds himself trapped alone in a bunker after a nuclear 
blast. He lives there for years, decades, devouring canned peach-
es and Spam until finally he comes to the end of his stashed 
supplies. He knows he doesn’t have many options left. He can 
open up the door, risk contamination for a sight of the outside 
world — or he can continue to wait. The doctor stares at the 
door, wanting desperately to go out, but he can’t bring himself 
to open it. The story ends as, driven half-mad with hunger, he 
begins to contemplate how long he could survive eating first the 
flesh of his legs, his thighs, how much he could withstand. He 
is a doctor after all, and he thinks it could be quite some time… 
The story was gross, and it had all the macabre glee you 
would expect from a St. John chiller. But I didn’t feel scared by it. 
No, what upset me most was its sense of futility. The doctor had 
given up on hope. He wasn’t waiting for rescue. He didn’t believe 
anyone else in the world was alive. He was simply… persisting. 
If he was the last man on earth, he wanted to last as long as pos-
sible. It was grotesque. Why didn’t he open the door? That’s what 
Luca would say when I tried to explain the plot him. But then 
Luca was the kind of man who would have opened the door. He 
couldn’t see another way of living.
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Another hour passed. Eventually the receptionist waved me 
over. Her manicured nails glinted dully in the light. “I’m sorry, 
ma’am,” she said, “but the records from those years haven’t been 
maintained. I didn’t even know we were the ones who published 
Barron St. John.” She gave a little laugh.
I asked her what that meant for me.
“No one’s free to meet you. We converted to digital years 
ago,” she said, barely sparing me a glance. “Whatever we had, 
we dumped back then. Besides, who reads that trash anyway?”
◆◆◆
After that I found myself at loose ends, so I called up a friend of 
mine, Benny Perry.
Benny and I had gone to grad school together at the Univer-
sity of Toronto, both of us doing doctorates in medieval litera-
ture in those early days after the financial crash when we still 
thought the market would recover enough to give us jobs. I’d 
kept at it, spinning my work on the scribal culture that produced 
Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales into a postdoc in Oxford and then 
riding that into a full-time position in Publishing Studies of all 
things at a former polytechnic university. It wasn’t glamorous, 
not like Oxford had been, but I liked the students, I liked my 
colleagues, and I liked the work itself: imagining how books 
moved through time and all the people who left their mark on 
them along the way. 
Benny had taken another route. He’d always had a talent 
with photography and after he dropped out of the program he’d 
moved to New York and taken a job with House & Garden be-
fore it closed. It’d paid well enough that he’d stuck with pho-
tography, jumping from one magazine to another until he had 
enough of a portfolio to go freelance. He’d taken one of those 
famous pictures of Trump, the one where his face seems to be 
receding into the folds of flesh around his neck. In the past cou-
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ple of months, I’d seen it on social media from time to time and 
reprinted in the papers.
“It’s made things a bit hard for me,” Benny told me as we 
sat sipping margaritas in The Lantern’s Keep, a classy place near 
Times Square where the cocktails cost four times what they 
would at home. There had been a teary week before Luca and I 
made our decision when I’d given up alcohol, and even after we 
changed our minds I still hadn’t felt like touching the stuff. This 
was the first drink I’d had in eight months.
“How do you mean?”
“Well it’s brought me lots of attention, sure, but not the good 
kind, you know? Trump supporters hate that picture. Trump 
does too, which is why it gets recycled so often.”
Benny’s face looked strained and he fidgeted with his glass. 
He wasn’t quite how I remembered him. Benny was always a 
big man, a cornfed, Iowa type whose Baptist parents had taught 
him to shun dancing and drink. When I’d met him at orienta-
tion, he’d been shy, a bit overwhelmed. But after those first awk-
ward weeks he’d just thrown himself into everything. He had 
this irrepressible love of the new, and he’d taken to those things 
he’d missed out on most: booze, women — then men, dancing 
late into the night with this kind of unselfconscious clumsiness 
which made you want to join in.
He was much thinner now, that kind of thinness that didn’t 
look healthy. “I’m worried about Emmanuel,” he said, “worried 
about … well. Anyway. People can be absolute shits, can’t they?”
I agreed that they could.
“But you’re looking good,” Benny said, and I caught his eyes 
skimming over my breasts. Even though it didn’t mean anything 
coming from him I still blushed and pulled at the cardigan. “But 
not … I don’t know, maybe not entirely good?” he was going on. 
“Hell. I don’t know what I’m trying to say.”
I took his hand gently and told him not to worry about it.
As The Lantern’s Keep started to fill up eventually we wan-
dered out into the street. It was hot and swampy, that kind 
of early August weather that makes you feel as if you’ve been 
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wrapped in a damp blanket and beaten. We headed south to-
ward the West Village by foot so I could see the sights. North 
was Central Park and Trump Towers, which were all basically 
off limits now. New York hadn’t changed so much, not in terms 
of that strange and beautiful blend of architecture and anger, 
but there were bits that alarmed me. Like all the police cars had 
stickers listing the reward for information on cop-killers with a 
number you could call. 
When I told Benny about the project I was working on, it 
turned out he’d read St. John as a kid, which surprised me, given 
his background.
“What I remember about him was that my parents were read-
ing him. They never read anything like that otherwise. Murder 
and cannibalism and demons and all that stuff. But Faction of 
Fire, you know, it was all about faith, wasn’t it? In that book there 
was no getting around it: The Devil was real. And I suppose 
that’s what my parents thought anyway. Good and evil weren’t 
abstract concepts to them. There were good folk and there were 
bad folk. And it wasn’t just that the bad folk made bad decisions. 
They were… bad. It was something more fundamental. Badness 
worked through them. It was something tangible, real. And St. 
John, well, his books were all about that, weren’t they?”
Benny grinned at me and for a moment I could see his 
younger self peering out, that kid who’d never touched a drop of 
liquor in his life before I met him. 
“How’re your parents doing?” I asked him because that was 
the kind of thing we were supposed to ask one another now that 
we weren’t kids anymore.
“Mom had a stroke two years ago,” Benny said with a shrug. 
“I go back when I can to help her out. She’s lonely, I know, but 
whenever I do go we just end up fighting.”
I didn’t ask him about Emmanuel, about whether his parents 
knew. I figured probably they did. There were enough profiles 
floating around about Benny’s photos so you could only avoid 
knowing if you really tried.
“How are you and Luca doing?”
“Good.”
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“He didn’t want to come with you?”
“Couldn’t get away. You know how it is with these NGOs. 
Anytime he leaves he feels like he’s letting people down.”
“It’s good what he’s doing,” Benny told me. “We need more 
people like him right now.” After a moment he stretched, and I 
heard the joints in his shoulders pop. “It must be hard writing 
horror stories now, you know? It seems like that’s all we’ve got 
these days. I can’t bear to watch the news anymore.”
◆◆◆
I didn’t sleep well that night. When I’d glanced at the papers, 
they were filled with stories about tensions escalating, some-
thing to do with the South China Sea islands and whether the 
us was being too aggressive. John McCain was trying to dial 
things back, but you could tell he was getting tired of it. His eyes 
looked sharp and a little bit scared.
I’d had panic attacks all throughout the October leading up to 
the election. There’d been Brexit, of course, our own particular 
mess. At a conference last summer an American colleague had 
told me, “what we’re seeing is radical politics. People stopped 
believing that they mattered to the system — but all that’s differ-
ent now. It’s exciting, isn’t it? Anything could happen.” Trump 
had seemed funny back then, dangerous but still avoidable. 
They called it all a horror show but you could tell there was fas-
cination underneath it all. How close could we come to disas-
ter? But Hillary was ahead in the polls. Some of the Republicans 
were denouncing Trump, trying to put a little distance between 
themselves for when the eventual shellacking came on Novem-
ber 8th.
But it didn’t come. For weeks after, all throughout the Christ-
mas break, whenever I heard Trump’s name it was as if there 
was a loud gong echoing in my head. My feed was filled with an-
guish, betrayal, heartbreak. But I had seen all that already. I felt 
immured, resilient — and besides I still didn’t believe, not really, 
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that it would happen. Then eventually the cold hard truth set-
tled in when I watched the inauguration with Luca. As Trump 
walked to the podium, I burst out laughing, I don’t know why, 
the sheer cognitive dissonance of the whole thing. I felt hysteri-
cal. My palms were sweating. 
Afterward I learned St. John had written a novel about some-
thing similar, Answering the King, about a madman who cheats 
his way to becoming the President of the United States. Eventu-
ally it comes down to a fifteen-year-old girl tormented with vi-
sions of the past and the future to stop him. The question at the 
heart of it is: if you could go back in time to stop Hitler, would 
you? They had made a movie about it with Steve Buscemi. I 
don’t remember who played the girl, only how wide her eyes 
were, how she captured that world-weariness so well for some-
one so young. She was a Cassandra. No one would listen to her.
That was the night when the whole thing with Luca hap-
pened. Normally we were very careful. I hadn’t been in my job 
for very long, and he’d just moved across the country to live with 
me. We had talked about having kids one day but… we weren’t 
careful enough. Disaster crept in the way it always does.
◆◆◆
I called Argo the next day. It was the first time I’d spoken to her 
and her voice was thin and cagey with a flat, Ohio accent. It 
sounded as if it were coming from much further away than the 
Upper East Side. 
It felt strange to be listening to her voice and I thought about 
what Dylan Bone had told me. I’d read the obituary in fact, half 
as a joke and half because I knew Dylan didn’t make mistakes 
very often. He’d cut his teeth in the eighties horror boom and 
still made most of his money by convincing writers like St. 
John and Clive Barker to give him new material. It might sound 
mercenary, but it isn’t, not really: Bone was a believer, a horror 
fanatic. He loved the stuff and even when the market dropped 
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out of it in the nineties he had kept at it, putting out anthology 
after anthology with cheesy, hand-drawn skeletons or zombified 
hands reaching out of the grave. Argo had been part of that, 
someone who’d made the genre in its heyday.
On the phone Argo was polite and she agreed to meet me for 
lunch the next day at a cafe. “It’ll have to be close to my apart-
ment,” she told me, “I can’t move very well now.”
I told her I understood and could meet her wherever she 
wanted.
“What’s this about then? Really?” Her tone wasn’t querulous 
but wondering. “You know I wrote a chapter about working 
with St. John for some anthology twenty years ago, Devilish Dis-
cussions or something like that.”
I hesitated because I didn’t really have an answer. Yes, I knew 
the story about how she’d been sent St. John’s first manuscript by 
mistake. It had been meant to go to her boss, but he’d been on 
vacation. She’d liked it but her boss wouldn’t touch it, and she 
didn’t have enough support inside Doubleday to push it through, 
not then, a low-level assistant. But they’d kept in touch, writing 
letters when the mood took one or the other. Then when Rosie 
had come along it had been “a day of glory” — so she called it.
I gave her the answer I gave most of my colleagues. St. John 
had changed the genre, really changed it. For one brief moment 
horror hadn’t been the red-haired stepchild of fiction. Horror 
had been king. And I wanted to know how that had happened. 
Part of my answer was true. I’d always been fascinated by the 
way books were made, the countless decisions that went into 
them. But if I was really honest it was simply because I’d become 
a fan, a real fan — maybe not Dylan Bone level — but my admi-
ration for St. John was genuine. 
It was more than that though. The real reason was one I 
couldn’t quite put my finger on, but it had something to do with 
stories of chance — which St. John’s certainly was. And that un-
derneath every story is a pivotal moment when things changed. 
I wanted to know what that looked like. I needed to know if 
Argo had understood when that manuscript crossed her desk 
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what it would mean, if she’d felt a chill when he opened the en-
velope. Like someone had walked on her grave. 
◆◆◆
That afternoon Benny took me out to the Cloisters for old time’s 
sake, and it was beautiful, just like he’d promised it would be. 
The place was a mishmash of architecture taken from a series of 
medieval abbeys in France, Catalan, and the Occitan, simulta-
neously peaceful and surreal, liminal, a sliver of another world 
transplanted into New York.
“I thought you’d like it,” Benny told me. We were staring at a 
tree that had been shaped to fit one of the alcoves in the garden. 
Its branches curved unnaturally like a menorah to fill the space. 
I couldn’t help but wonder how it had been manipulated, what 
sort of subtle violence had pressurized the wood to assume the 
shape it had.
“I do,” I told him, shivering despite the mid-day heat.
“So, tomorrow. The editor, what’s her name again?” He 
snapped his fingers. “Argo, right? Lily Argo. You’re going to in-
terview her. What about St. John then? Any chance you’ll get to 
speak to him?”
I didn’t think so. St. John lived in New Hampshire, and I had 
no idea what kind of relationship the two of them still had. If 
they kept in touch. If Argo would even like me.
“Of course she will. You’re — well, you’re the makeles quene, 
aren’t you?” He smiled. “You are without blot.”
“Someone back home said she was dead,” I told him uneasily. 
I still didn’t like that part of the story. Why would Dylan have 
thought that?
“Huh,” Benny said. “It sounds like the beginning of a ghost 
story, doesn’t it? Like she’ll bestow her wisdom on you, settle her 
unfinished business, and vanish into the night.”
“It sounds exactly like that.” 
“But maybe you’re lucky, not seeing St. John.”
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I asked him what he meant.
“You know. He’s bound to be pretty weird, isn’t he? I mean 
he’s been writing that stuff for more than forty years now. You 
can’t keep that close to the darkness without some of it sticking 
to you.”
It wasn’t the first time I’d heard something like this before. I 
was used to getting it myself, sometimes at the university. But 
the horror writers I’d met were among the most well-adjusted 
people I knew, certainly they were much calmer than the other 
writers I tended to deal with. Some people said it was because 
there wasn’t much money in horror writing these days. But I 
thought it was something else: writers were good at channeling 
their anxieties into something productive. We all have those 
nasty thoughts, those worries that maybe we don’t love our part-
ners as much as we should, or maybe they don’t love us. Fears 
that maybe something awful will happen tomorrow. The phone 
will ring and it will be the police. An accident somewhere. Or a 
fight escalated, a button pushed. 
“When I studied the Middle Ages,” I told him, “it always 
seemed like it must have been so difficult for those people. I 
mean, the Black Death wiped out 40% of the population. Im-
agine whole villages lost, your family — everyone you’ve ever 
met — wiped out.”
“I know,” he said, “I just couldn’t take living like that. I’d, I 
dunno. I’d go crazy, I guess.”
I wondered if he really would go crazy. Or if he was going 
crazy right now, waiting for that call about Emmanuel. Waiting 
for Trump to finally get around to signing a new Executive Or-
der. I had always liked Benny because he had a sense of outrage, 
a keen abhorrence of injustice. I knew he had marched in those 
early protests, and knew that he wasn’t marching anymore. He 
didn’t want to draw attention to himself. Benny was strong but 
he was adaptable. He was finding ways to survive, to keep mak-
ing his art — but doing it so it didn’t hurt Emmanuel. 
Luca was the same way. Most nights he didn’t come home 
until close to midnight. There was always more he felt he could 
be doing. For a while I’d felt really proud of him. And then when 
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things got bad, I’d just felt resentful, angry at him for spending 
so much time saving other people when what I really wanted 
was for him to save me. 
In the gift shop I chose a postcard for him, a picture of the 
Flemish tapestry called The Hunt for the Unicorn. It showed five 
young men in aristocratic clothing with their spears and their 
dogs. If it weren’t for the title you wouldn’t have been able to 
tell what they were doing there. I wanted to choose one with 
the unicorn, but all of them looked too violent or depressing. 
Something about the unicorn in captivity, collared, in a fence 
that can barely hold her, reminded me of Answering the King, 
and how the girl had been taken to prison after she shot the 
president. There had been a coda at the end of the novel, the 
little girl twenty years later, grown up, in solitary confinement. 
They had thought she had gone mad because she wouldn’t stop 
hurting herself.
But St. John showed the real reason. The girl had had another 
vision, one worse than what she’d stopped all those years ago. 
But this time there was nothing she could do about it.
◆◆◆
I couldn’t get hold of Luca that night. He wasn’t answering his 
e-mail and when I tried him at home — and then at work — the 
phone just rang and rang. It wasn’t that unusual. Sometimes 
there were emergencies, and Luca would become so totally ab-
sorbed in them he would forget everything else. 
There were emergencies like that, I knew, one every few days 
it seemed. So eventually I left a message saying I loved him. I 
tried the TV but got nothing except static. Eventually I settled 
down to read. It was another story from Strangers and Friends 
but this one was about a haunted house called “Question the 
Foundations.” It was a twist on the trope: the houses weren’t 
haunted by people so much as the people by houses. In St. John’s 
world each person had a tiny space within them, an impression 
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of the place where they had been born. And it remained there, 
like a scar, or a memory. And everyone else could see it too, 
who you were and where you came from. Except there was this 
young boy who didn’t have a place like that. He had nothing. 
He had come from nowhere. And because he had nothing, he 
scared people.
I put the book down, confused and unsure of myself. The 
story bothered me but I didn’t know why. It was different from 
the others, softer, sadder. There was no real horror in the story. It 
had been about loneliness. How it felt to be hollow, an outsider. 
Rootless.
Maybe it was just those constellations of images, emptiness 
and violence. Luca had told me a story once about how his fam-
ily used to keep chickens. He had lived in the middle of a wood. 
One day a fox broke into the henhouse and tore open all the 
chickens. He’d found their bodies, or what was left of them, the 
next morning. Inside their bodies he had found strings of grow-
ing eggs, like pearls. 
After he told me that, I couldn’t sleep, and it was the same 
feeling now. I didn’t have any regrets. Luca and I had talked, and 
he had left the decision to me. There had been no pressure, none 
from him anyway. But I’d been watching the news. And when 
the first bomb exploded in Paddington Station it had been like a 
warning sign. Not now. It wasn’t safe. Things would settle down 
soon, they had to. And then we could try again.
I put the book down and touched my stomach gently, tenta-
tively. Beneath my fingers all I could feel was my own thick flesh.
◆◆◆
Three times I passed the cafe before I finally had the courage 
to meet Lily Argo. I could see her — at least I thought it was 
her — sitting in the courtyard with her walker folded up beside 
her. She had long white hair and a red-and-grey printed dress 
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with long sleeves. I knew her because of how tall she was, even a 
little stooped over. She still had at least six inches on me.
“Ms. Argo?” I asked her and she nodded politely while I 
pulled up a seat.
“So you’re the one who’s come asking about Barron St. John.”
“That’s right.” I tentatively launched into my pitch: an article 
on St. John’s early publication history, documenting her involve-
ment in acquiring and editing his first title. She stopped me with 
a wave of her hand.
“Sure, honey,” she said with a wide, generous smile, “you 
don’t need to go on like that. I’m happy to talk about those days, 
though I confess they seem a while ago now. You know I got that 
manuscript by accident, don’t you?”
I nodded, and she seemed relieved.
“Good, so we’re not starting from scratch. What you want 
is the story, I take it, of how Bear — that’s what I always called 
him — and I got along in those early days? Where the horror 
came from?” I nodded again and took out my phone but she 
eyed it warily. “I’ll tell it as best I can and you can make of it 
whatever you will — but no recordings, okay? You can listen and 
you can write down what you get from it, but you only get to 
hear it once.”
What was I supposed to say? Already I could feel a kind of 
strange buzz around her, the magnetic pull of her charisma. I 
had wanted her story and here she was, ready to give it to me.
◆◆◆
“I was pretty young in those days,” she began, “when I first 
started working for Doubleday. I’d grown up in Ohio which I 
never liked very much in part because it didn’t seem like I was 
much use to my parents. I was a reader, even then, but they had 
wanted me to go to one of the nursing schools, but I knew I’d 
never be happy with something like that, taking care of people 
all the time. So when I was seventeen I ran off to New York City. 
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“Publishing was still very much a gentleman’s sport back 
then and if you were a woman you were either someone’s sec-
retary or you were publishing feminist pamphlets and burning 
your bra. I was the former.” She paused and took a delicate sip 
from her Coke. Her lipstick remained unsmudged though it left 
a trace of red on her straw. “Most of us at the time wanted to be 
writers. I suppose I did as much as anyone, and so we’d spend 
our days editing, and we’d spend our nights writing. What was 
funny was that we knew all the people we were sending our 
drivel to, we’d met them at luncheons or for after-hours drinks. I 
was embarrassed. I was a good editor, and because I was a good 
editor I knew I wasn’t a very good writer. I thought, how on 
earth will these men take me seriously if they see what I’m com-
ing up with?
“So I did what most women did at the time, or anyone who 
wasn’t Daphne du Maurier anyway, and I made up a name. Mine 
was Victor Wolf, which today seems so damned fake I don’t 
know why no one thought anything of it. Or maybe they did but 
they just didn’t care. Anyway I may have been writing garbage, 
but eventually the garbage got better and I started getting some 
of it published. It was what they called Kooks and Spooks stuff, 
I suppose, sort of crime fiction but with some other bits thrown 
in, monsters, sometimes, and ghosts. Possession — or Russian 
spies using hypnosis to control young American teenagers, that 
sort of thing. There was a real taste for that sort of thing back 
then. By the early seventies the papers were going crazy, telling 
us the irrationalism of our reading was helping the Commies 
and we had to get back to old-fashioned, American literature. 
But Rosemary’s Baby was an absolute hit, and then there was The 
Exorcist, and people just wanted more of it.
“That was when Bear’s first manuscript came across my desk. 
The two of us call it an accident but it wasn’t that, not really. 
See, I was used to reading submissions for Donnie Rogers and 
when I finished Bear’s first one I knew there was magic in it, raw, 
maybe, but magic nonetheless. And I knew Donnie was slated 
for laparoscopic gallbladder surgery. He was going to be off for 
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at least a week recovering. That was when I tried to pitch the 
manuscript.
“Of course, I got laughed out of the offices. No one took me 
seriously and when Donnie came back he heard what I’d done 
and he bawled me out in front of the whole crew. Jesus, he took 
a strip off one side of me and then the other. After that I didn’t 
dare try anything like that for a good long while.
“Still, Bear had appreciated the support. He was poor as a 
church mouse and he and Mya had a second little one on the 
way. He tried me with this and that a couple of times, but it 
never really made it anywhere. I guess it was after a while of him 
sending me his stuff that I sent him one of mine. God, the nerve 
I had!” she chuckled, and I couldn’t help but chuckle along with 
her. “Well Bear wrote back and said it was pretty good, and I 
said it was better than pretty good, that Playboy had taken it. 
Bear had been trying to crack Playboy but hadn’t managed it by 
that point. 
“For six months Bear went silent after that, and I guess I 
thought maybe I’d offended him. Men don’t like being shown 
up, not then, not now. That’s why there’s all the craziness there 
is today. Women are afraid of violence, but men? Men are afraid 
of humiliation. Humiliation to them is like dying over and over 
and over again. And speaking of humiliation, I had just about 
survived mine. Donnie Rogers had moved over to New Ameri-
can Libraries, and I was covering for him while they looked for 
a replacement. That was when the next manuscript crossed my 
desk.”
“That was Rosie?” I asked her.
“Indeed it was, though it was called Revenge of the Stars at the 
time which was a godawful title, I have to say.”
“And this time it stuck?”
“Not right away it didn’t. The ending was clunky. It had Rosie 
transforming into this giant radioactive slug thing and devour-
ing the town that way. Pure St. John, you know. He always loved 
the EC Comics stuff. People want to say he’s got literary chops, 
and sure he does, but a part of him is pure pulp and is perfectly 
content to stay that way, thank you very much.”
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“So what happened?” I wanted to know.
“Oh, that’s the easy bit. Some good luck, I suppose. Ira Levin 
was big, and Bear’s book was enough like that for me to pull 
together an advance for him. Small, you know. The real success 
came later with the paperback sales, and that wasn’t me, not ex-
actly. But I suppose if what you’re after is who found Barron St. 
John then it’s me as much as it was anyone.”
She paused there to take another long drag of her Coke. 
While she’d been talking, she seemed so animated, so full of 
vigor, but as the seconds stretched on I could see how old she 
was now, how time had etched fine lines around her lips. Her 
wrists were thin and frail, the skin bunching and slack at the 
same time. 
She moved then, pulled up a black leather handbag and be-
gan to dig around in it. Eventually she came up with a Christmas 
card. “Look at that,” she said, her eyes sharp. The paper was old 
and creased in several places. When I opened it there I found a 
simple handwritten note. To Lilian, it said, a real wolf in sheep’s 
clothing. We owe you so much. Love, Bear and Mya St. John.
Lily was smiling slightly as she showed it to me, smiling and 
watching to see my reaction. I tried to smile back but there was 
a part of me that felt disappointed. Most of the story was what 
she had published in that chapter. Little of it really surprised 
me. It felt rehearsed, the way you keep old memories by telling 
yourself the story behind them again and again. Whatever I was 
looking for, it wasn’t there.
I was getting restless, and it seemed like she was finished 
when she cocked her head to the side. “That’s not what you 
wanted to hear, was it?”
I tried to tell her it was great, wonderful stuff. It would cer-
tainly make it into the article.
“Sure it will,” she said, “but you didn’t need any of it. Cer-
tainly you didn’t need to fly over here from England just to get 
this story, did you? I could’ve told you that over the phone. You 
didn’t need to come.”
I shrugged. 
“What you wanted was him, wasn’t it? You wanted Bear.”
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“Maybe,” I told her wearily. The heat was starting to get to 
me, making me a touch queasy.
“It isn’t easy, you know,” she said, “to try to tell your story 
when the best parts are about someone else.” She sighed. “You 
know, I had to give up writing once I found St. John. It wasn’t 
like it had been before. We were so busy all the time. St. John 
could write like a madman, he was fast. There was always an-
other book. And then things got tricky with the contracts. You 
must know about this?”
I did. Everyone did. St. John had left Doubleday after a series 
of well-publicized contract disputes. Doubleday had been keep-
ing most of the profits on the paperback sales, and he felt he 
deserved a bigger cut. Doubleday wouldn’t budge and eventu-
ally he left.
“There wasn’t much I could do for him. They wouldn’t give 
him a better deal and they wouldn’t listen when I told them how 
serious he was about leaving. When he finally did switch pub-
lishers all those men at the top said it was my fault. I got parked 
for a while editing books on what types of music you can play to 
help your plants grow, that sort of kooky trash. After a year or 
so they fired me.”
I fiddled with my own straw, unsure how to react to any of 
this. 
“Bear didn’t take me with him, see. I told him not to. I told 
him I had enough status in the company — but I was wrong. 
When you’re on top you always think you’re going to stay there 
forever, that there aren’t sharks circling beneath. But I guess Bar-
ron knew about those sharks. The one thing he knew about was 
the sharks. He could be one himself when he needed to.”
“You didn’t want to go back to writing?”
“Nah, I felt I’d spent my chance by that point. I think I had 
one lucky break in me — and it went to St. John. There wasn’t 
going to be another. I got by after that. I moved over to anoth-
er house for a little while and convinced St. John to come do a 
book for us. But by that point things were different. He was a 
superstar and I felt spent. I had had enough of horror. It was the 
eighties. Despite everything it still felt as if the world was falling 
297
SURVIVAL STRATEGIES FOR WEIRD TIMES
apart. There was the banking crisis, the AIDS epidemic. The peo-
ple weren’t reading the news though. They were reading Bear.
“I did write one more story though. I tried to sell it myself, 
but no one would buy it. Victor Wolf had been forgotten. Bear 
liked it though. And he knew I was in danger of losing my mort-
gage. So he sent it out for me, under his name. When it sold to 
the New Yorker — his first real literary sale though God knows 
he deserved others and got them eventually — he gave me the 
profits.” Her smile then was bitter. “I was grateful, you know. At 
the time he said it was only fair. I had made his name after all. I 
should get the use of it whenever I wanted.
“And I was grateful at the time. I kept my brownstone, paid 
it off eventually. When he sold the collection, he gave me the 
whole advance. For a while I thought about going back to Ohio, 
but I still couldn’t admit to my parents I hadn’t been able to last 
in New York. So instead I stayed.”
She stared at me for a moment or two after that, and I could 
feel the cool ripple of sadness passing over me like a shadow.
“Someone told me you died,” I said, just to break the spell of 
her silence.
“Of the two of us, Barron was always the shark, you see?” 
she told me wryly, “No, I didn’t die. I just learned something 
he never figured out: how to stay alive when you stop moving.”
◆◆◆
That evening I collected my things from Hotel 31. 
Benny offered to drive me to the airport, but I told him he 
didn’t need to do that. I could get a taxi. The university had 
given me a budget for that. When he said okay it sounded like 
there was relief in his voice, and I wondered if that meant Em-
manuel was home. Or maybe it was just that he didn’t want to 
get so close to the airport. There were regular protests still going 
on. People were angry about the deportations, but no one knew 
how to stop them.
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“Did you get what you wanted from Lily Argo?” Benny asked 
me. “She wasn’t just a ghost?” I told him I hadn’t really known 
what I wanted but I was certain, despite everything, I had met 
Lily Argo. But I was probably going to scrap the story. My Head 
of Department would be pissed but that was how these things 
went. Sometimes you thought you had something, and you 
didn’t. 
What she had told me felt too invasive to write about. What 
I had wanted, I realized, was not just her story but a glimpse of 
her secret self. I didn’t have a right to it. And that’s what had 
made me want it even more. Maybe we all have a secret self: 
some of us keep it chained in the basement of our minds while 
others like St. John learn how to feed it.
“Well,” he said, “it was good to see you anyway. Give my love 
to Luca. You tell him to take proper care of you.”
I promised I would.
While I waited for my flight to board, I watched the news. We 
were all watching the news. We couldn’t help it. Tense security 
officers patrolled the hallways with machine guns at the ready, 
just in case. There were fewer travelers those days, fewer coming 
in, fewer getting out. But I felt a kind of solidarity with the oth-
ers as our eyes were glued to the screens. We were liminal people 
moving from one reality to another. We were going home.
So we watched the footage of explosions in Yemen. Pleas 
from refugees who had found themselves trapped in abandoned 
tenements, living in filth. It was only when I saw the story about 
the bomb that had gone off on a train along the Victoria Line 
that I remembered Luca still hadn’t called me back. 
I was watching them pulling survivors out of the rubble and 
the blood gelled to ice in my veins. I couldn’t move. It had hap-
pened then. It had happened. Time seemed to slow. Luca mostly 
worked from Cambridge, but the NGO had offices in London. He 
went there from time to time. When had I last heard from him? 
Who could I call to check? But by that point the attendant was 
calling me forward. I didn’t move. She called me again and the 
people behind me began to murmur. I must have had a dazed 
expression on my face, a look they didn’t like. The attendant 
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called me a third time as an officer drew near. It was only then 
I was able to move. I showed them my passport and made my 
way down the ramp.
Inside the plane most of the seats were empty. The air was 
canned, stale tasting in my mouth. I wondered if I might have a 
panic attack but out on the runway I didn’t dare check my phone 
again. The hostesses were murmuring to each other. I could tell 
they were twitchy. But already a strange calm was taking hold 
of me — a sense of icy horror. There was something inevitable 
about what was happening. There was nothing I could do to stop 
it. Whatever had happened had happened. 
And this feeling? It wasn’t the same as all those St. John books 
I had read. There I could find purpose, structure — meaning in 
all the bad things that had happened. But outside there was only 
chaos. The unraveling of beautiful things into violence. It signi-
fied nothing.
As the plane taxied down the runway I settled back in my 
chair and tried to sleep.
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Survival Strategies for Weird Times
1. Autobiography2
Art sends us information from another place. 
 — Timothy Morton, Hyperobjects3 
The short story “Survival Strategies” offers a semi-fictionalized 
account of a young academic on a research trip to New York to 
interview the editor of Barron St. John, a bestselling author who 
came to prominence during the horror boom of the 1970s and 
eighties. Set against the backdrop of the new Trump administra-
tion it uses autobiographical elements to blur the line between 
fiction and reality. In doing so it asks, where do the boundaries 
between “true horror” and speculative horror intersect? To what 
extent can our situatedness in the present moment become a 
source of the uncanny? 
The autobiographical elements of story are important. In 
the summer of 2016 I began a research project to investigate 
the publishing history of Stephen King’s Carrie by the hard-
back publisher Doubleday in 1974. At the time, I argued that 
2 I would like to thank Nina Allan whose many conversations on the subject 
have informed my own developing approach to weird fiction as well as 
Anglia Ruskin University which funded my research. Thanks also go to 
Bill Thompson for his generous interview, Bob Jackson for providing 
copies of a number of crucial documents, and Bev Vincent for his support 
and guidance on all things King related. Many of the threads discussed in 
this commentary relate to a series of articles I have written. These include: 
Helen Marshall, “Introduction,” in The Year’s Best Weird Fiction, Vol. 4, 
eds. Helen Marshall and Michael Kelly (Toronto: Undertow Publications, 
2017), ix–xvii. Also see my discussion of King’s work (drafted on this trip) 
at Helen Marshall, “The Only Lights are Headlights,” Weird Fiction Review, 
August 10, 2016, http://weirdfictionreview.com/2016/08/101-weird-writers-
43-stephen-king/.
3 I make no claims to be a speculative realist nor a philosopher and so my 
understanding of Morton’s work may be limited. I have responded to his 
text here as a writer, recognizing a likeness in approach. See Timothy 
Morton, Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the World 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013), 47.
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the unexpected success of Carrie launched “the Stephen King 
phenomenon,”4 and was one of several important books inspir-
ing the marketing approach to horror paperbacks from the late 
seventies to the early nineties. As with the publication of any 
breakthrough novel, the penning of Carrie had taken on its 
own mythological status. In one of the autobiographical sec-
tions of his memoir and guide to the craft, On Writing (2000), 
King opens up about his difficulty in producing a first draft. He 
managed three single-spaced pages, which he crumpled up and 
threw away only to have them rescued by his wife, Tabitha.5 The 
sense of a historical moment interested me — as I imagine it was 
intended to. I had recently completed a Ph.D. in medieval lit-
erature and was accustomed to working in the archives, aware 
of how much material had been lost over the centuries. Study-
ing a contemporary novelist was innately appealing: it prom-
ised abundance where I had previously encountered dearth. But 
there was also an extra voyeuristic angle. Here was a writer I ad-
mired intensely whose life I might be able to approach in some 
way through my research. I wanted intimacy.
I was not entirely prepared for what I would find. I con-
tacted Bill Thompson, King’s first editor at Doubleday through 
his editorial freelance website and arranged a meet-up in New 
York. But in conversation with several horror fans, authors and 
editors — both in the uk and in the us — I was repeatedly told it 
would be impossible to meet Thompson because he had passed 
away years ago. Let me avoid all ambiguity here: as I found when 
I met him, Thompson was still very much in the land of the 
living. But my repeated encounter with claims of his appar-
ent death began to evoke that creeping-under-the-skin sensa-
tion of the “fantastic” — that moment identified by the Russian 
structuralist Tzvetan Todorov in which something apparently 
supernatural is encountered, creating a period of hesitation as 
4 Michael R. Collings and Stephen E. Fabian, The Stephen King Phenomenon 
(Mercer Island: Starmont House, 1987), 1.
5 This story has been recounted in a range of other articles and interviews, 
but I have found King’s sense of the story here to be the fullest in On Writ-
ing: A Memoir of the Craft (New York: Scribner, 2000), 68.
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different possibilities are suggested and discarded.6 I did not 
know how to react. I had been in contact with Bill Thompson, 
had exchanged e-mails and agreed on a date for meeting, but all 
that contact had been on-line with no further way of verifying 
his identity. I nearly reached the point of believing. This is the 
formula Todorov presents to sum up the spirit of the fantastic: 
“Either total faith or total incredulity would lead us beyond the 
fantastic: it is hesitation which sustains its life.”7 I lingered in that 
period of hesitation. Bill Thompson was alive, of course he was 
alive, but the sense of the uncanny soaked into my perception of 
him. The trip came alive with the possibility of the real unreal.
2. The Real Unreal
The most merciful thing in the world, I think, is the inability of 
the human mind to correlate all its contents. We live on a placid 
island of ignorance in the midst of black seas of infinity, and 
it was not meant that we should voyage far. The sciences, each 
straining in its own direction, have hitherto harmed us little; 
but some day the piecing together of dissociated knowledge 
will open up such terrifying vistas of reality, and of our 
frightful position therein, that we shall either go mad from the 
revelation or flee from the deadly light into the peace and safety 
of a new dark age. 
 — H.P. Lovecraft, “The Call of Cthulhu”8
It was the summer of 2016, and already my world had been 
destabilized. The Brexit vote had shaken uk politics, threatening 
my university which was heavily reliant on eu students and eu-
6 Todorov’s approach to the fantastic has informed my thinking on the 
nature of my writing although I frequently find myself butting up against 
the limitations of his definitions. See Tzvetan Todorov, The Fantastic: A 
Structural Approach to a Literary Genre, trans. Richard Howard (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1973), 25. 
7 Ibid., 31.
8 H.P. Lovecraft, “The Call of Cthulhu,” in The Call of Cthulhu and Other 
Weird Stories, ed. S.T. Joshi (New York: Penguin Classics, 2002), 139.
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research funds. In New York, the American election was in full 
swing, already tilting toward Trump. “Be careful,” I told friends, 
“it could happen here.” No one took me seriously.
In a 1989 issue of SF Eye, Bruce Sterling described slipstream 
writing as “a kind of writing which simply makes you feel very 
strange; the way that living in the twentieth century makes you 
feel, if you are a person of a certain sensibility.”9 Slipstream writ-
ing drew heavily on the fantastic; as Sterling said: 
[I]t is a contemporary kind of writing which has set its face 
against consensus reality. It is fantastic, surreal sometimes, 
speculative on occasion, but not rigorously so. It does not 
aim to provoke a “sense of wonder” or to systematically ex-
trapolate in the manner of classic science fiction.10 
Where science fiction seemed coherent, the vanguard of a single 
dominant ideology, slipstream was postmodern, infused with a 
sense of ironic detachment that seemed to exemplify the natu-
ral response to conditions in Anglo-America. But twenty-five 
years on, how might we describe the contemporary sensibility? 
In 2016 I was post-postmodern though I had not fully realized it 
yet. Post-truth, if you like, or rather, pre-post-truth, which is not 
to say that I was living in a time of truth but rather that we had 
not recognized its loss. I was locked in a moment of hesitation. 
As I write this now, I find Todorov’s notion of the fantastic an 
imperfect vehicle to describe the feeling of that year. He imagi-
nes the moment of hesitation as fragile and difficult to sustain, 
liable to collapse either into “total faith” or “total incredulity.” 
In the years since I have attempted to grapple with this prob-
lem. If the twentieth century offered slipstream as its primary 
mode — ironic and playful — then increasingly it seems as if 
the twenty-first will be a far weirder age. Here, I draw upon the 
9 Bruce Sterling, “Catscan,” SF Eye 5, July 1989, http://indbooks.in/
mirror1/?p=311829. The nature of slipstream gets good coverage in James P. 
Kelly and John Kessel, eds., Feeling Very Strange: The Slipstream Anthology 
(San Francisco: Tachyon Publications, 2006).
10 Ibid.
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definition of weird fiction as first proposed by H.P. Lovecraft 
in his seminal work “Supernatural Horror in Literature” (1927) 
as writing which exhibits a “malign and particular suspension 
or defeat of […] fixed laws of Nature.”11 This mode, discussed 
by Jeff and Ann VanderMeer, China Miéville, and Roger Luck-
hurst, among others, to me, plausibly evokes the feeling of liv-
ing in the twenty-first century: an age thus far characterized by 
political crises, fake news, and environmental catastrophe.12 It 
is an age in which the unreal intrudes upon consensus reality, 
shattering it with often terrifying consequences.
Of the writing I have encountered on the subject, that of the 
speculative realist Timothy Morton has most resonated with 
me. An intimate understanding of the weird infuses his discus-
sion of hyperobjects, real things with discernible impacts which 
cannot be apprehended in their entirety, but which affect our 
understanding of what it means to exist. He cites global warm-
ing as one significant hyperobject: its effects are massively dis-
tributed, so much so that the object itself becomes difficult to 
grasp, seeming to disappear from our vision or to undulate in 
our minds and in reality. Morton describes our present moment 
as the age of asymmetry, a period of hypocrisy in which the 
ironic detachment characteristic of many postmodern writers is 
impossible because there is “nowhere to stand outside of things 
altogether.”13 Hyperobjects engulf us. However much we seek to 
escape them, we find there is no away.
11 H.P. Lovecraft, The Annotated Supernatural Horror in Literature, ed. S.T. 
Joshi (New York: Hippocampus Press, 2000), 29.
12 A complete history of the emergence and analysis of weird fiction — with 
a particular emphasis on the new weird — is beyond the remit of this 
essay. For reference, I have found the following works particularly useful. 
Ann VanderMeer and Jeff VanderMeer, eds., The Weird: A Compendium 
of Strange and Dark Stories (New York: Tor Books, 2012); Jeffrey Andrew 
Weinstock, “The New Weird,” in New Directions in Popular Fiction: Genre, 
Reproduction, Distribution, ed. Ken Gelder (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmil-
lan, 2016): 177–200; Joan Gordon, “Reveling in Genre: An Interview with 
China Miéville,” Science Fiction Studies 30 (2003): 91; and Roger Luckhurst, 
“The Weird: A Dis/orientation,” Textual Practice 31, no. 6 (2017): 1041–61. 
13 Morton, Hyperobjects, 12.
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This view finds eerie parallels with the primary processes 
of weird fiction. It evokes the brilliant ghost film Ju-on: The 
Grudge.14 This was an early foray of mine into horror. I could 
hardly stand to watch it. The violence seemed senseless and 
unmotivated. A series of abstract images presented themselves, 
many of which still haunt me. A ghost clings to the body of a 
woman, invisible only when she enters a shower and discov-
ers someone else’s hand in her hair, as she begins to wash it. 
Likewise, another woman attempts to escape from the vengeful 
ghost by crawling into her bed — the psychological source of the 
greatest safety. But it is too late. She discovers the ghost is already 
inside, with her. No escape was possible from the ghost of Ju-
on because no space, however personal, however intimate, was 
unavailable to it. Likewise, the weird is a profoundly intimate a 
form of writing, designed to haunt, to project a trace of unreal-
ity onto the surface of the real. It creates ruptures, and in doing 
so, makes briefly visible what lies beneath. We encounter this as 
an intrusion in most cases, but if it is an intrusion, it is only an 
intrusion of some other thing upon our closed-off perception of 
the world. Those things were not summoned into being by our 
perception of them. They already existed, independent of our 
encounter with them. One of the primary functions of the weird 
is to remind us how little we see, and how the influence of those 
things we do not see can still be deadly. 
This sensibility flowed into the text of “Survival Strategies” by 
itself. I did not set out to write a story about Brexit and Trump but 
the sense of dislocation, the uncanniness of these hyperobjects, 
permeated multiple aspects of the story, conflating the painfully 
personal and the public, the story of myself and the story of the 
world in which I found myself living. To attempt to write about 
Stephen King as a researcher was to realize that there was no 
detached, objective position from which I could undertake my 
research. The story of King was the story of America in the late 
seventies, and that story is still the story of the present moment: 
14 Takashi Shimizu, dir., Ju-on: The Grudge (Akasaka, Minato, Tokyo: Pio-
neer LDC, 2003), Blu-ray Disc, 1080p. 
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one riven with violence and uncertainty, asymmetries in power, 
wild successes and also devastating failures. It felt profoundly 
uncomfortable, and it felt uncomfortable in a way that resonat-
ed with the experience of Brexit and Trump, the double punch. 
Taken together they suggested a sort of rising tide of — some-
thing. It was not clear to me exactly what. But whatever it was 
seemed inescapable. It was as if Brexit and Trump were simply 
“a local manifestation of some vast entity” — Morton’s hyper-
object.15 I could not separate myself from it, just as I could not 
return King to a distance where writing about him seemed easy. 
The real possibility of encountering King triggered a flight into 
fiction. The only way to write honestly about the experience was 
to write myself away from it. 
3. Flights
As the plane taxied down the runway I settled back in my chair 
and tried to sleep. 
 — Helen Marshall, “Survival Strategies”
The narrative voice of “Survival Strategies” is detached and yet 
the detachment marks a deep emotional engagement. The nar-
rator floats through events, cynical at times, but only as a mask; 
cynicism deflects, but the narrator absorbs from a distance she 
seeks to maintain, only to find that no distance is possible. The 
world intrudes, sometimes violently. In the true fashion of the 
weird tale, her encounter with Lily Argo demonstrates that the 
world has always dangerously intruded, the world has always 
already dangerously intruded. There is no safe vantage point to 
observe without becoming immersed. In short, it feels like the 
end of the world. 
Morton has something specific to say about this sense of the 
ending world in the twenty-first century. He calls into question 
the notion of world, labeling it an “aesthetic effect based on a 
15 Morton, Hyperobjects, 43.
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blurriness and aesthetic distance.”16 I cannot help but agree. The 
act of writing “Survival Strategies” was a simultaneous engage-
ment with and flight from an increasingly inexplicable world. Its 
world was my world, but not my world — the unheimlich home, 
a home that does not allow one to feel at home. The act of writ-
ing was an attempt to create, through aesthetic engagement, a 
new world. Literally, the act of writing was, for me, an act of 
worldbuilding.
The process of worldbuilding lies at the heart of speculative 
fiction and yet it is an area with which I have always struggled, 
perhaps because my own style is improvisational and intuitive 
rather than clearly structured along conventional lines. But 
more than this I find weird fiction a natural fit, because I find 
the real world — the world as I experience it — to be incoherent 
and uncanny. It has no respect for genre. My project in writing 
is not to mask these inconsistencies but to draw them out and 
highlight their effect. But inconsistency is often considered the 
sign of poor worldbuilding or a failure of craft. A recent blog-
post by the science fiction author Charlie Stross began to clarify 
my problems with the conventional approach to worldbuilding. 
Stross candidly discusses his rejection of most contemporary 
science fiction writing on the basis of flawed worldbuilding:
The implicit construction of an artificial but plausible world 
is what distinguishes a work of science fiction from any other 
form of literature. It’s an alternative type of underpinning to 
actually-existing reality, which is generally more substantial 
(and less plausible — reality is under no compulsion to make 
sense).17
Artificial but plausible — this is a formulation I have since re-
turned to many times in my attempt to grapple with what fiction 
16 Morton, Hyperobjects, 87.
17 Charlie Stross, “Why I Barely Read SF These Days,” Charlie’s Diary, Febru-
ary 6, 2018, http://www.antipope.org/charlie/blog-static/2018/02/why-i-
barely-read-sf-these-day.html.
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is and what it should do. There is a tension at work in Stross’s 
rejection of science fiction. He seems to seek plausibility from 
his reading, which in this case coincides with artificiality. This 
artifice is necessary because, as he says, reality is under no com-
pulsion to make sense. Fiction provides sense. Fiction creates 
coherence. As a result, the kind of fiction Stross is after — the 
plausible — is a kind he recognizes as more real than real, one 
which is therefore inherently unreal. Stross’s position exempli-
fies Morton’s claims about the aesthetic effects of the notion of 
the world. Drawing on Lord of the Rings as a prime example, 
Morton alludes to the Gesamtkunstwerk (total work of art),18 a 
creation in which, as Carl Maria von Weber said in 1816, “par-
tial contributions of the related and collaborating arts blend to-
gether, disappear, and, in disappearing, somehow form a new 
world.”19 The Gesamtkunstwerk is the ideal, science fiction story 
in Stross’s formulation, one in which the writer has total con-
trol of all aspects. However, for Morton, the Gesamtkunstwerk is 
suspect because the act of worldbuilding extends beyond fiction 
into the Real, which he also sees as artificial, falsely presented as 
coherent when in fact it is utterly weird.
Writers of weird fiction do not have the same expectations as 
writers of science fiction. Their worlds exhibit inconsistency. In 
fact, the sine qua non of the weird writer is that gap in consist-
ency: the extra stair at the bottom of the staircase that makes 
the reader stumble, the grit in the reader’s eye, the living dead. 
Opposed to Stross’s model of the plausibly constructed world 
is M. John Harrison, an important figure in New Wave science 
fiction writer who has also contributed to the rise of the New 
Weird. He says:
Every moment of a science fiction story must represent the 
triumph of writing over worldbuilding.
18 Morton, Hyperobjects, 88.
19 Carl Maria Von Weber, “On the Opera Undine,” in Source Readings in Mu-
sic History: The Romantic Era, ed. Oliver Strunk (London: Norton, 1965), 
63.
309
SURVIVAL STRATEGIES FOR WEIRD TIMES
Worldbuilding is dull. Worldbuilding literalises the urge to 
invent. Worldbuilding gives an unnecessary permission for 
acts of writing (indeed, for acts of reading). Worldbuilding 
numbs the reader’s ability to fulfil their part of the bargain, 
because it believes that it has to do everything around here if 
anything is going to get done.20
Harrison’s sensibility speaks to me. His argument is subtle and 
contentious within the field. He describes the conventional view 
of worldbuilding as “a bad idea about the world as much as it is 
a bad idea about fiction.”21 He rejects the notion of the author-
God and warns against readers who expect the world of the sto-
ry to be anything other than a story. For Harrison the invented 
world has no outward substance. It adheres only in language 
and in that sense it is purely an aesthetic effect. Stross would not, 
I think, disagree with this, but the difference between the two 
lies in the kind of immersion they are seeking. Harrison pre-
fers fiction which acknowledges what it does as “a shell game, a 
sham,”22 yet his work is not post-modern in the framework we 
have been discussing. In fact, he rejects postmodernism with its 
three impossible claims: 
[F]irstly that we can change the real world into a fully pros-
thetic environment without loss or effort; secondly that there 
are no facts, only competing stories about the world; & third-
ly that it’s possible to meaningfully write the words “a world” 
outside the domains of imagination or metaphor, a solecism 
20 This short essay — or collection of notes toward an essay — appears in 
its full form on Reddit though excerpts have been widely shared on the 
Internet in u/Biomancer (M. John Harrison), “A Short Essay by the Great 
Sci-Fi Author M. John Harrison about Why Storytelling Must Take 
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which allows us to feel safely distant from the consequences 
of our actions.23
Reading, according to Harrison, ought to be a ludic act. It offers 
the possibility of escape, but of a substantially different kind. 
Escape into, not away from. Here, escape should not be misread 
as escapism. Where Stross looks for sense, Harrison’s work is 
profoundly unsettling. It presents fiction as a vehicle for non-
sense — the unraveling of sense, the minute exposure of sense-
lessness. Crucially, it seems to acknowledge that I may not al-
ways know what I mean when I write. Writing is not the attempt 
to translate coherence of thought from one mind to another. My 
mind is mischievous. I am not an author-God. There is a need 
for other sense-makers here. 
In Lovecraft’s weird tales an encounter with the real leaves 
three possibilities: death, madness, or flight. In 2016 I found 
myself struggling to find a new response. If I am honest, I did 
not find it within “Survival Strategies.” The inspiration for the 
story arrived after a sleepless night following a viewing of The 
Invitation (2015),24 a claustrophobic film about a man named 
Will attending a dinner party hosted by his ex-wife, Eden. Eden 
and her new husband have, it seems, subscribed to the beliefs 
of a nihilistic, death cult. Before its brutal conclusion, the film 
shows Will’s unease as he is continually encouraged to ignore 
his growing anxieties through the constant weight of social 
pressure: surely everything is fine, the film seems to say, and it 
would be rude to leave, wouldn’t it? Will hesitates. He cannot 
decide how to process the telltale signs of danger he sees around 
himself. Only one character does, and it is her fate that kept me 
up that night. Early on in the evening, one of the guests, Claire, 
unsettled by a game of “I Want” she is forced to play, makes her 
excuses and is followed out of the house by one of the other 
guests, David, whose looming presence throughout presages the 
23 Ibid.
24 Karyn Kusama, dir., The Invitation (New York City: Gamechanger Films, 
2015), Blu-ray Disc, 1080p.
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bloodbath he will later initiate. We never find out what happens 
to Claire. Does David murder her off-screen, or does she man-
age to flee to safety, warned by the niggling feeling in the back 
of her mind that something is wrong? Her fate was important 
to me, and as the night advanced, I was left wondering: how ef-
fective was her strategy? What if our niggling sense of danger is 
too little, too late? What if we cannot run because what we are 
fleeing is waiting for us everywhere? 
Morton asks another question: “What is left if we aren’t the 
world?” What if — like one of H.P. Lovecraft’s hapless intellectu-
als — our sense of control dissipates as we come to recognize 
our insignificance in the face of much larger forces? Morton’s 
answer is startling: “Intimacy,” he writes, “we have lost the world 
but gained a soul.”25 If we are not obliterated, we are made more 
real by the encounter. The narrator of “Survival Strategies” 
boards the aircraft despite the panic of an ill-described terrorist 
attack in London. She settles into her seat as the plane launches 
into the air. Perhaps her husband is dead. Perhaps everything 
she believed in has fallen apart. She cannot decide. She hesitates. 
She falls into sleep. The story had no answers for me then, but 
now I think that was part of the point in writing it. As a story it is 
not fully coherent. The metaphors do not perfectly unravel into 
clear meanings. But then a story cannot perfectly digest what it 
encounters.
The narrator sleeps, but she will wake, flying into, not away 
from. The world had ended before she ever left London. What 
is to come is a new kind of intimacy with the real. And wisdom, 
we can hope — and survival.
25 Morton, Hyperobjects, 90.
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Material Dislocation in House of Leaves
Luka Bekavac
1. Navidson’s Folly
The principal invention of Mark Z. Danielewski’s House of Leaves 
is very simple and — twenty years after its publication — fairly 
well known: a small, featureless spatial dilatation appears in an 
otherwise ordinary family home. This basic premise goes on to 
change, expand, and evolve into a more readily recognizable, 
genre territory, but this inexplicable space, as abstract and be-
nign as it might initially seem, remains scandalous enough to 
provide momentum for an incredible array of reactions and 
theories, many of them addressed or staged within the novel it-
self. It’s hard to disentangle one thread from them, but I will try 
to remain as close as possible to the core of the problem: text as 
a graphic embodiment of the cognitive inaccessibility of space.
Traditional linguistic representations of spatiality within 
literary texts (e.g., building fictional objects/environments by 
recourse to literary tropes) won’t suffice to explain the way Dan-
ielewski creates his non-correlationist figment, but the idea of 
“objective space” as a pure abstraction, made legible and avail-
able to thought by formalization and mathematization, neces-
sarily misses the mark too. What is at work here is a non-phe-
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nomenological notion of space, marked by an inaccessibility to 
language which cannot be easily pacified by inherited frame-
works: a category barely distinguishable from matter — before 
its configuration into an object — hulē that precedes or even 
terminally escapes articulation, quantification, and cognitive 
mastery. In this context, literariness could be provisionally rede-
fined as an equivalent of this unintelligibility, and writing as an 
apprenticeship in dealing with spatiality without subordinating 
it to purposes of a human viewpoint. Literary work would there-
fore be a peculiar engagement with materiality rather than an 
expression of an ideal content or a representation of an anthro-
pocentrically distorted “reality”: a non-metaphorical processing 
of materials that relies precisely on the irreducible exteriority of 
matter to thought.
To properly follow this line of research, however, we should 
bear in mind that the story of the Navidson family moving into 
a house that turns out to be a place of paranormal manifesta-
tions is not even remotely equal to House of Leaves as a whole: 
its baroquely elaborated, metafictional structure actually places 
the story of this “haunting” within the frame of Will Navidson’s 
documentary film, The Navidson Record, which in itself exists 
only in a retelling by the improbably named Zampanò, more 
precisely in a manuscript posthumously found and ineptly 
“edited” by the extremely unreliable Johnny Truant, ultimately 
leaving the final definition of the book to an anonymous group 
of “Editors.”1
This is still not the whole story. Within the limits of this text, 
it would be impossible to describe every narrative or structural 
nut and bolt of this book; its horror vacui, though, working at 
places against the overall impact of the novel, might be read lit-
erally, as a reaction to nothingness at the limits of its fictional 
universe: a manic struggle to answer the provocation of an in-
1 For a detailed analysis of the novel’s narrative hierarchy in the perspective 
of digital mediation, see Mark B.N. Hansen, “The Digital Topography of 




different void. Many aspects of Danielewski’s work are explicitly 
readable as horror topoi developed precisely through a mul-
tileveled involvement with the problem of space: the haunted 
house stereotype, the cliché of home as the ultimate place of 
Unheimlichkeit, the disturbances in spatial relations and the 
collapse of phenomenology of space, but also the fact that the 
novel aggressively accentuates its own physicality, mobilizing all 
typesetting options in order to displace the received modes of 
reading.
The first necessary step for the adequate presentation of this 
alien space, with all the varying degrees of its alterity and inac-
cessibility, is describing its position in regard to the house itself. 
There is a tendency — both within the novel and its commentar-
ies — to equate the Navidson home on Ash Tree Lane with the 
opening to this alternate zone by simply using the term “house,” 
while the thing described is obviously something that intersects 
with the house and is entangled with it in complex ways, but 
is very sharply differentiated from it. In order to clearly distin-
guish it from the House, I will call this space the Folly; this is a 
vaguely archaic term, originally designating any over-expensive 
edifice, but it gradually came to describe something more enig-
matic: an object without apparent purpose, a “useless” structure 
which might bear the connotations of a “joke” or a “fake,” some-
thing distinct from home (the House), structurally independent 
and separate from the House, but still connected to it in some 
way as a remote element, remaining a part of the same property: 
perhaps a place of unspecified leisure, a playground of sorts, at 
once away from home and close to home, a space to while away 
the time.
This might sound provocative, bearing in mind that this is 
a place of ultimate emotional, cognitive, and physical annihila-
tion, but even without delving into a psychoanalytical reading, 
one can accept that — at least on some level — the bizarre, po-
tentially limitless, shapeshifting and absolutely lethal object in 
the house on Ash Tree Lane is precisely that: a wish fulfillment, 
an obscure daydream, an excrescence produced by a nobleman’s 
ennui and excesss of energy, the tedium of everyday life and 
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a gnawing need to do or explore something. He devises it for 
himself (unbeknownst to himself), like a riddle with no hope of 
solution (that is his secret hope anyway). There is an even more 
obvious interpretation: this is “a physical incarnation” of pain,2 
the extrafamilial space of emotion generated by guilt, as deep 
and unstable as a subject can make it, closing only after offering 
oneself to death.
But the main point, beyond the possibility of reducing a spa-
tiotemporal anomaly to a material consequence of the observ-
er’s condition, is the level of cognitive inaccessibility of this for-
eign object. Early on, Navidson warns: “There’s nothing there. 
Beware.”3 The inability of the mind to adequately conceptualize 
and represent this “nothing” actually produces all there is: an 
impossible labyrinth as its first figuration, an ordinary house as 
its necessary container, a family inhabiting it and, further up 
the ontological hierarchy, a writer inventing all this, a random, 
young man who finds the writer’s notes, yet another person who 
might have invented or imagined that man. The entire narrative, 
with all of its levels, is readable as a traumatized reflex against 
the unrecountability of pure space (“nothing”), a rewriting of 
that atemporal exteriority into the language of anthropocentric 
conveniences (content, causality, chronology, etc.), as negative 
as it is: a blind man writes a study of a lost or fictional docu-
mentary film that tries to capture empty and constantly shifting 
space in the dark.
“Exploration A” immediately showcases the basic scope of 
the Folly’s capacities: whimsical creation, or opening, of new 
geometric shapes, as well as elimination of previously existing 
ones; articulation of space into doors, corridors, rooms, halls; 
changing orientation and shrinking or extending indefinitely. 
The building material itself is a mystery: a smooth and highly 
polished structure (e.g., flat black surfaces, sharp angles) hint-
ing at artificiality rather than natural origin, while remaining 





in constant flux.4 Nevertheless, the overwhelming impression is 
one of scarcity of stimuli. There are only a few constant param-
eters of the Folly and they, ironically, again amount to repre-
sentations of “nothingness”: no light, no sound, no true north, 
no air streams, constant temperature of zero degrees (“no tem-
perature”), color: all black (“none”). It is closer to a geometric 
representation of a sculpted space than to a real architectural 
feat; there is no discernible utility, no historical or contextual 
reference, no aesthetics in this environment.
This space is all syntax with no semantics: there is no pur-
pose to the Folly, it amounts to an empty frame, restructuring 
itself permanently and unpredictably with no observable logic. 
This pure self-referentiality defines the Folly on many levels: in 
Chapter IX, Zampanò produces unrelenting cascades of text 
containing nothing but endless lists of names, places, and objects 
(architects, photographers and cinematographers, documentary 
filmmakers, film directors, buildings, fixtures, even literary and 
artistic sources related to the tradition of the “haunted house”), 
seemingly exhausting the entire field of visibility as articulated 
by human endeavors, all in order to enumerate everything the 
Folly does not resemble, everything that somehow fails to rep-
resent the quality of this space. From pages 135 to 121 (text flow-
ing in reverse), there is a list of architects (Peter Eisenman, Ber-
4 It would be interesting to pursue the idea of the Folly as a filmed object to 
its ultimate conclusion: what if it was not merely represented cinemati-
cally, as the Unrepresentable itself, darkness unavailable to the lens, but if 
it existed as a film recording? This is obliquely suggested on the very first 
page of The Navidson Record, invoking other hoaxes (e.g., Billy Meier’s 
UFOs, the Cottingley Fairies, “thoughtography” of Ted Serios, etc.) where 
the allegedly captured object never existed outside of its photographic 
inscription. One could read all of Navidson’s travails within the Folly as a 
violent side-effect of editing: sudden interpolations, disappearances, tem-
poral and spatial extensions and contractions, abrupt returns to previously 
occupied positions, the inability to accurately measure movement and 
distance, etc. This is being inside of a film, but not in the sense of enter-
taining ontological switches, common in postmodern narratives, allowing 
characters to move vertically through embedded fictions: this is existence 
in the film medium, as one could be moulded in bronze, carved in wood, 
liquefied, or pulverized.
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nard Tschumi, and Zaha Hadid are mentioned on the very first/
last page) alongside a “Palladian grammar” seeking to organize 
building as a rational process with a strict set of rules, but this is 
just an amusing and ultimately redundant exercise in negativity, 
since the final verdict, printed in red, suggests: “Picture that. In 
your dreams.”5 We can read this in two significant ways: “There 
is no way to picture this,” or “Dreamscape (with its atemporal-
ity, non-causality, non-disjunctive visuality) is the only medium 
capable of ‘representing’ this.” If the Folly is as close as possible 
to “nothing,” no real and realized architectural “thing” can have 
anything to do with it.
The Folly is at cross-purposes with reality on many levels. The 
house itself was apparently built in 1720, but it is subsequently 
revealed that the a set of stairs was found descending into the 
earth as early as 1610, this time with no house giving them any 
rational context. In the aftermath of the events, a fictional ar-
chitect poses the question of soil bearing capacities needed for 
an edifice of this type and size (at one point, Navidson calcu-
lates the depth of a stairwell he is trapped in as 27,273 miles, 
exceeding the Earth’s equator), and Chapter XVI offers “hard 
data” about its building materials, allowing for a semblance of 
an objective description, partially derived form a petrological 
laboratory where the staff asume they are analyzing meteorite 
samples. Unfortunately, the better part of the text is damaged by 












Nevertheless, what remains reads like a scientific counter-
part to Carl Gustav Jung’s “house of the unconscious”:7 samples 
range from common rock to elements that are extraterrestrial, 
possibly even interstellar, and most likely older than the Solar 
System.
We are entering the ancestral realm as described by Quentin 
Meillassoux: a “reality anterior to the emergence of the human 
species.”8 The Folly as an arche-fossil (material “indicating the 
existence of an ancestral reality or event”9) would be the only 
adequate frame for understanding a structure that precedes not 
only architecture or the accretion of the Earth as a prerequi-
site of life and consciousness, but perhaps even the constitution 
of matter and spacetime: an object which annuls the very pos-
sibility of manifestation as the crucial site of correlation. This 
is a “world without thought — a world without the givenness 
of the world,”10 indeed, “the great outdoors; […] a past where 
both humanity and life are absent,”11 but where no “I” remains 
to “achieve what modern philosophy has been telling us for the 
past two centuries is impossibility itself: to get out of ourselves, 
to grasp the in-itself, to know what is whether we are or not.”12 
The world, however we choose to define it, is not sufficient to 
support the Folly. 
7 “We have to describe and to explain a building the upper story of which 
was erected in the nineteenth century; the ground-floor dates from the 
sixteenth century, and a careful examination of the masonry discloses 
the fact that it was reconstructed from a dwelling-tower of the eleventh 
century. In the cellar we discover Roman foundation walls, and under 
the cellar a filled-in cave, in the floor of which stone tools are found and 
remnants of glacial fauna in the layers below. That would be a sort of 
picture of our mental structure.” Ibid., 646. Danielewski is quoting from 
Jung’s “Mind and the Earth”, in Contributions to Analytical Psychology, and 
it’s worth mentioning that Gaston Bachelard quotes the same paragraph in 
The Poetics of Space. 
8 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contin-
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There are other possible approaches to this spatial distur-
bance on Ash Tree Lane. Marc Augé’s notion of non-places, 
sites of utter semantic emptying, solitude and identity loss, 
“betweenness” inconducive to permanent settling,13 would help 
if we imagined them additionally bereft of all possible func-
tion. Furthermore, since the disposition and size of the Folly 
intersects with the house in an “impossible” way, occupying 
the “same” place in a highly paradoxical simultaneity, Michel 
Foucault’s definition of heterotopia seems tailor-made for it, 
particularly since it allows for a temporal dislocation as well.14 
Nevertheless, this still wouldn’t account for the essential impos-
sibility: the Folly being infinitely larger than the house that con-
tains it. A detour through psychoanalysis, or rather its decon-
struction, provides us with the third option: the crypt, a concept 
developed in Nicolas Abraham’s and Maria Torok’s studies on 
the pathology of mourning, a “‘false unconscious,’ an ‘artificial’ 
unconscious lodged like a prothesis, a graft in the heart of an 
organ, within the divided self,”15 created by trauma or violence as 
a “fantasmatic, unmediated, instantaneous, magical, sometimes 
hallucinatory” topos.16
The power of a crypt lies is its topography. It forms like a cyst, 
a self-enclosed “monad” contained within an object, with all the 
traces of that containment erased, at the same time remaining 
theoretically infinite because what is “contained” is actually the 
13 Marc Augé, Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermoder-
nity, trans. John Howe (London: Verso, 1995), 75–115.
14 “The heterotopia is capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several 
spaces, several sites that are in themselves incompatible. […] Heterotopias 
are most often linked to slices in time — which is to say that they open 
onto what might be termed, for the sake of symmetry, heterochronies. The 
heterotopia begins to function at full capacity when men arrive at a sort 
of absolute break with their traditional time.” Michel Foucault, “Of Other 
Spaces,” trans. Jay Miskowiec, Diacritics 16, no. 1 (1986): 25–26.
15 Jacques Derrida, “Fors: The Anglish Words of Nicolas Abraham and Maria 
Torok,” trans. Barbara Johnson, in Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, 
The Wolf Man’s Magic Word: A Cryptonymy. Translated by Nicholas Rand 




Outside: it is as if the container-object is unwittingly turned in-
side-out, so what seems to be its innermost core is actually com-
pletely excluded from itself, opening a window to an exteriority 
larger than itself. This creates a counterintuitive folding vaguely 
reminiscent of a Moebius strip or a Klein bottle, endlessly con-
fusing our notions of the inside/outside binarity, all the while 
protecting itself with an additional latch: a subject contains this 
space “without comprehending it, in order to comprehend noth-
ing in it.”17
This is one of the key mysteries of the crypt. What it appar-
ently conserves and locks away is not “something,” a privileged 
object, information or emotion; it is exteriority itself. It is space. 
The crypt is not a container but an unnatural entwining of seclu-
sion and exposure without the possibility of synthesis, a specific 
curvature of space creating an effect of a closed enclave. It is 
nothing but an empty “envelope,” but its very position and ori-
entation makes it disruptive and dangerous. Therefore, the Folly 
itself is not an object hidden in the house; it is rather as if, to 
paraphrase Frank Lloyd Wright, the house was suffering from 
indigestion, keeping a convoluted and sinister network within 
its walls, channeling and draining the inhabitants’ energy into 
the void.
Even though the “extraterrestriality” (literal ancestrality) of 
the Folly is scientifically “proven” within the narrative, the idea 
of Ash Tree Lane being a portal into a different dimension — yet 
another horror trope — is explicitly dismissed as a product of 
schizophrenia (a quintessential “disease of the head”?),18 but it 
actually seems insufficiently extreme: infinitely more adaptable 
than our world, far more unstable, but more flexible too, the 
Folly encompasses everything that physics and matter of our 
universe can be, but it exceeds all that in unforseeable ways. 
This line of thought allows for a final inversion of spatiality: 
the House itself could actually be perceived as a product of the 
Folly (rather than vice versa), a discrete and ephemeral reduc-
17 Ibid., xix.
18 Danielewski, House of Leaves, 378.
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tion of its building capacities. It’s easy to expand the frame of 
this reversal a step further: our world, including its constituted 
spatiality, quantifiable physical properties and availability to 
man, remains nothing but a fraction of the possibilities offered 
by “real” space/matter, a random combination of its selected 
properties. The Folly is not a crypt, an impossible enclave of the 
Other within our universe. This “universe” is an enclave, a lim-
ited and isolated “bubble”, produced like an unexplained pocket 
of apparent stability within the formless tohu wa-bohu of matter 
before cognition. Therefore, what Billy Reston describes as the 
“rape of physics”19 might mean simply that what is called phys-
ics is but one sector of the phusis of the real, embodied by the 
Folly, perhaps incomprehensible and ultimately unavailable to 
correlation.
The House is undoubtedly too small to contain the Folly, at 
once inside it and beside it, but a question remains: what does 
it mean exactly when a rupture occurs, when the walls of the 
crypt start to leak? The crypt is defined by being non-manifest 
and non-symbolizable. Therefore, this bleed of one space into 
another, a drift from the Folly into the House, is the paradoxi-
cal interval necessary for anything to occur, for anything to be 
written or read, finally for the horror to begin, for the story to 
emerge: the rule of genre allows only for a partial mystery, the 
total thing remains beyond description, failing to set the narra-
tive in motion.
But there is a routine way of naming this “thing.” It is impos-
sible to ascertain, for example, whether the only sound generat-
ed within (or by) the Folly is mechanical, organic or otherwise, 
but the first inkling of the possibility that this space might be 
unlimited is followed by an intermittent rumbling, soon nick-
named “the growl.” This is, of course, a facilitating shortcut: in-
stead of facing the “blank slate” of the Folly, a word is introduced 
that immediately suggests an entity or an organism — a mon-
ster — placing The Navidson Record back within the recogniz-




“Monster” is not a concept, though. It is a traditional place-
holder, a lazy xenophobic reduction, a glyph marking the failure 
of cognition, an archetypal figure of non-knowledge which, as 
bizarre or unsettling as it might be, offers an illusion of a discrete 
being, available to description. The trouble with “monsters” is 
the structure underlying this term and its applications. If the 
real other is the beyond of cognition, category and naming, 
formless and unequal to itself to the extent that we can’t ascer-
tain if “it” is one or many, an entity or a swarm, if we can’t define 
its ontic limits or even clearly distinguish it as a figure from the 
ground, then the very fact of subsuming it under one term is just 
another stratagem of the mind to domesticate the truly alien, a 
reductive anthropocentric response to the dread of unknowing. 
Calling it by any name actually annuls the threat and begins the 
process of domestification, as self-delusional as it is.
The activity of the Folly undermines this small consolation 
anyway: 
constant refiguration of doorways and walls represents 
a kind of geological loop in the process of working out all 
possible forms, most likely ad infinitum, but never settling 
because […] ‘unoccupied space will never cease to change 
simply because nothing forbids it to do so. The continuous 
internal alterations only prove that such a house is necessar-
ily uninhabited.’20 
This could be interpreted alternately as: a) human habitation 
could stabilize the loops and shifts and reset the space as a 
“house” — the problem is reducible to a format of “wilderness” 
to be conquered and tamed; or b) this is not a “house” but sim-
ply a spatial vortex of unknown origin and nature, therefore 
uninhabitable even theoretically, confirmed by the impossibility 
of leaving a lasting trace within it (the Folly erodes, destroys, 
or simply erases all signs of human settlement). Between these 
solutions, a more conservative and genre-friendly option fleet-
20 Ibid., 120.
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ingly appears: this is not a self-generated set of surfaces, this is 
indeed a house; therefore, someone or something built it. But 
what was it built to house (or contain)? The completely ahistori-
cal, artificial, and provisional character of the Folly prompts one 
character to call it a very “American Monster”;21 nevertheless, in 
the light of its “impossible” traits (e.g., size, location, orienta-
tion, mobility), the very idea of a “house” (instead of a portal, 
a vessel, a wormhole) leads straight back into the dead end of 
correlation. Holloway Roberts’s claim — “I will not abort this 
mission”22 — ultimately leading to murder, is a desperate plight 
to achieve any kind closure, a willful choice of a convenient 
“monster” decoy instead of the horror of pure space.
Zampanò’s quote from a fictional article, concerning Goe-
the’s equating of architecture with “frozen music,” offers a dif-
ferent perspective: the growl is simply the sound of defrosting, 
the crackling of melting glaciers, spatiality reverting back to 
time. The changes are not triggered by the mental state of the 
explorers — a persistent hypothesis — but provoked by their 
physical, organic presence, perhaps even its bare temporal ex-
tension, initiating an ephemeral micro-Anthropocene within 
the ancestral realm of the Folly. This sound “contains all the 
harmonies of time and change” and is described as a rustle of 
wind, amplifying until “finally it’s all around you, sweeping over 
you.”23 Another description is distinctly threatening: “At times 
it sounded like voices. Hundreds of them. Thousands. Calling 
after me.”24 The randomness, the apophenic potential, the scale 
of effect ranging from pleasant and evocative to panic-inducing 
and physically dangerous: all of this aligns “the growl” with the 
concept of noise as an atemporal interval contaning every pos-
sible syntagmatic occurence, an Aleph of sound where linear 
time contracts into a “now” without duration, or precisely into 







The Folly works as a particularly malevolent sensory depriva-
tion tank, the place where one can die of thirst, hunger, cold and 
fear, but also — one would suspect — of boredom. Only hinted at 
in the novel, boredom could certainly be singled out as a grossly 
underrepresented index of our contact with alterity (compared 
with dread, angst, the sublime, jouissance, etc.). A microexpe-
rience that we suffer daily, it is actually the most easily avail-
able and readable parameter of our disconnection from radical 
exteriority, result of the lack of cognitive traction, absence of 
template for projection, a pulse of “don’t care,” “I can’t,” “nothing 
there for me,” materiality gradually withdrawing from us, our 
capabilities waning. This drab and unassuming suspension of 
subjectivity, provoked in the Folly by the absolute lack of visual 
stimuli, results in an increase of body-sense, in gravitation to-
wards the haptic, recognition of textures instead of shapes.
One step further, what this place actually delivers in the end 
is an abolition of any perceptible spatiality. Even hallways, stair-
cases, and halls are a sideshow, a series of transitional objects on 
the way to the full appreciation of “nothing.” Like a latter-day 
Descartes, reducing one layer of spatial accessibility after an-
other, Navidson finally reaches a point where nothing remains. 
There’s “no sense of anything other than myself,”25 everything 
else is pure void, blank and black space, a materially realized 
“night” that Merleau-Ponty26 and Levinas wrote about. Signifi-
cantly, this complete disappearance of any “something” doesn’t 
result in the impression of utter emptiness, but in an oppressive 
feeling of diffuse presence, reduced to a field of disembodied 
forces, “an undetermined menace of space itself disengaged 
from its function as receptacle for objects, as a means of access 
25 Ibid., 471.
26 “When, for example, the world of clear and articulate objects is abolished, 
our perceptual being, cut off from its world, evolves a spatiality without 
things. This is what happens in the night. Night is not an object before me; 
it enwraps me and infiltrates through all my senses, stifling my recollec-
tions and almost destroying my personal identity.” Maurice Merleau-Pon-
ty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge, 
2002), 330.
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to beings.”27 But if spatial anchoring is the prerequisite of human 
existence and “being is synonymous with being situated,”28 then 
the collapse of constituted spatiality induces a regression from 
geometrical articulation of the universe into a pre-reflexive, hy-
letic materiality, decentered and amorphous, withholding all 
possibility of thought or dwelling, evacuating a subject into the 
outside of phenomenology. It is “death.”
“This is not for you.” The epigraph of House of Leaves could 
therefore be approached in several ways.29 Both deterring and 
inviting, it could be an “anti-dedication” to the empirical reader; 
in terms of typography used to demarcate different narrative 
and ontological levels, it is clearly attributable to Johnny Tru-
ant. But from the vantage point of the Folly, it leaves space for 
an allegorical reading. Instead of designating “a private matter” 
(e.g., “the book is not dedicated to you, written for you, meant 
or appropriate for you”), it spells out: “This exists in itself,” una-
vailable to you, indifferent to you.
2. Towards a Radical Illegibility
The aspect of House of Leaves that makes it instantly recogniz-
able is its formal layout, celebrated and reviled for its extrava-
gance. However, it is anything but a self-sufficient “front” for the 
portion of the plot we have described; the novel’s visual compo-
sition is both an integral part of its metanarrative structure and 
the crucial pressure point in a literary rendering of space as the 
site of alterity and menace.
Danielewski’s debut is routinely singled out as an example 
of ergodic literature, writing where a “nontrivial effort is re-
27 Emmanuel Levinas, Existence and Existents, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), 60.
28 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 294.
29 Alison Gibbons provides an extremely close reading of this sentence in 
“This Is Not For You,” in Mark Z. Danielewski, edited by Joe Bray and 
Alison Gibbons (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015), 17–32, 
elaborated further in her Multimodality, Cognition, and Experimental 
Literature (London: Routledge, 2012), 46–85.
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quired to allow the reader to traverse the text,”30 forcing them 
to conceptualize the very act of reading in a new way, rather 
than simply following the story according to the received modes 
of relating to the fictional content. Its layout certainly presents 
a considerable material obstruction to smooth idealization of 
the subject matter, but it would be a mistake to conclude that 
this radicalism came from nowhere, or that it is related primar-
ily to digitally based interactive narratives. Taking into account 
only the last century, there is a strong heritage of approaches 
to writing that completely redefine readability on the material 
level, with varying degrees of success but in an impressive array 
of highly individual styles, often conceptually related to non-
literary avantgarde codes, breaching the divide between litera-
ture and the visual arts: Guillaume Apollinaire’s Calligrammes, 
the works of Filippo Tommaso Marinetti (Zang Tumb Tumb), 
and Ardengo Soffici (BÏF§ZF+18), Vladimir Mayakovsky and 
Aleksei Kruchenykh, lettrisme and concrete poetry, typewriter 
art, Raymond Federman’s Double or Nothing, Christine Brooke-
Rose’s Thru, Claude Ollier’s Fuzzy Sets, Mirtha Dermisache’s 
asemic writing, Susan Howe’s collages, etc.
Nevertheless, none of these influences appear in Danielews-
ki’s work as an erudite façade or a self-referential stylistic foot-
note for the cognoscenti: they always stem directly from the 
necessities of the plot, or conversely and more creatively, serve 
to direct and propel the narrative, actively shaping the possibili-
ties of the projected world. In House of Leaves, the majority of 
typographical oddities proceeds from a complex metanarrative 
layering: different types and sizes of text, pages persistently split 
into “main text” (actually the object of commentary and analy-
sis) and a sprawling multitude of footnotes, finally the textual 
acrobatics used in later chapters to illustrate — or immitate, or 
even generate? — the spatial shifts within the Folly. Chapter IX, 
certainly the most complex and “ergodically” challenging sec-
tion of the entire book, is the first to include a heavily irregular 
30 Espen J. Aarseth, Cybertext: Perspectives on Ergodic Literature (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 1.
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layout. Beginning in the middle of an unattributed footnote, it 
branches simultaneously into further footnotes (and their foot-
notes, etc., sometimes creating closed loops) and “main text” 
printed in black and red and intermittently crossed out, blacked 
out, set in multiple columns, different orientations (including 
inverted blocks and “mirror” sequences, illegible without a re-
flective surface), in textual “ducts” or “pipelines” (simulating a 
channel that traverses the pages “vertically”), with odd spacings 
and blanks, culminating — perhaps most perversely of all — in a 
very neat bibliography. Chapter XX, on the other hand, presents 
an attempt to render the final abolition of anthropocentric spa-
tiality in the Folly. After a certain moment, “direction no longer 
matters”31 and text, following Navidson’s incapability of further 
spatial constitution or the disoriented and decentered space it-
self, denying every foothold after page 468, remains distributed 
across the page unevenly, although not randomly, still pursuing 
the option of figurative correspondence to the narrated events. 
This tendency to adjust writing to the content of a given 
section creates a conceptual limit to the typography of House 
of Leaves. If the described space is shrinking, the text block is 
shrinking; if the stairs are stretching and falling, the spacing 
between the lines is gradually augmented, and so forth. Con-
sequently, there are no formal equivalents of the complete 
disappearance of all spatial markers in “Exploration #5.” This 
is obviously not a reproach, since the very point of the entire 
procedure is representation of a certain unrepresentability. Nev-
ertheless, the feeling of material dislocation is most prominent 
on the pages where disconcerting formal devices, gradually in-
creasing illegibility or unreadability, remain more or less inde-
pendent from the narrated events. The “damaged” sections, for 
instance, motivated by intratextual scattering of burning ashes 
or spilling of ink, manage to produce a quality exclusive to the 
medium of writing and its non-semantic properties, opening a 
literary space precisely by ceasing to represent space.
31 Danielewski, House of Leaves, 433.
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This vocabulary has only broadened in Danielewski’s subse-
quent books, along with the wish to control the layout complete-
ly, making it an overriding principle, a basic aesthetic grid for 
the distribution of content, rather than a technical solution for 
economical and functional ordering of the text. This is perhaps 
most visible in Only Revolutions (2006), an extremely difficult 
narrative written in verse with fixed parameters for introducing 
and organizing textual elements on each page.32 The Fifty Year 
Sword (2005), a more easily approachable take on a “Halloween 
story,” applied careful color coding of quotation marks to differ-
entiate between narrators, exploring simultaneity through the 
use of illustrations and non-linear distribution of sentence parts 
on the page. His latest and most ambitious project, The Familiar 
(2015–2017), planned as a sequence of twenty-seven 880-page 
volumes (at the time of writing, this was temporarily abandoned 
after the fifth book), attempted to develop a “signiconic” lan-
guage, a simultaneous engagement of text and visual faculties, 
aimed at a “third perception” that would give voice to the mate-
rial world without the interference of mind.33 
The results managed to resurrect the age-old dirge on “the 
death of the novel,” but it goes without saying that this type of 
resistance simply points to a considerable change, perhaps a 
new lease on life for a certain art form. It is interesting to note, 
however, that this always happens when there is a threat of one 
32 For a detailed formal analysis, see “Only Revolutions, or, The most typical 
poem in world literature” by Brian McHale and “Mapping time, charting 
data: the spatial aesthetic of Mark Z. Danielewski’s Only Revolutions” by 
N. Katherine Hayles in Mark Z. Danielewski, edited by Joe Bray and Alison 
Gibbons, 141–58 and 159–77 respectively.
33 It has been noted that various intratextual markers in Danielewski’s novels 
open a legitimate possibility of reading them as a cycle or a series; for 
instance, House of Leaves introduces the name Redwood (possibly Zam-
panò’s killer?) and an elliptically described “VEMTM Corporation,” both of 
which will become extremely important in The Familiar. However, an even 
more interesting criterion for approaching his entire work as an ongoing 
project would be precisely examining it in its asemic, sensible, material as-
pects. Instead of thematic links between the books, the connecting thread 
could be typography and — perhaps before everything else — the use of 
color.
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traditional material substratum or technological support being 
supplanted by another. The notion of “literature” certainly rests 
upon a system of material and technological assumptions, invis-
ibly determining forms to be realized, absolutely overshadowing 
the personal input of a certain author or a “poetics.” Much of 
what Danielewski does, along with scholars reading his work or 
intense communities at related Internet forums, actually points 
towards a broad paradigm shift prompted by digital technolo-
gies, which is bound to alter the idea of “literary art” as much as 
it changed in transition from manuscripts to print, or even from 
oral to written literature.
Consequently, the most lively debate around Danielewski’s 
work revolves around the notion of multimodality, generally 
contextualized within the evolution of new media, their capa-
bility of creating new writing procedures, new concepts of tex-
tuality, and new distributions of audiences. The “experimental” 
strand of the history of world literature takes second place, but 
one must stress that it has always functioned as the platform of 
new media to come, systematically suppressing received ideas 
of writing as expression, imitation, or representation and using 
text as an open field of research. The common thread running 
through all of this, as obscure as it might sometimes seem, is 
actually the strictly materialistic understanding of text, a firm 
conviction that, in parallel with all of their powers of handling 
content and reflecting or anticipating a certain “reality,” texts are 
things, objects with physical qualities, defined by their link to 
matter and resistance to easy and complete transfer into com-
prehension, idea, or pure thought.34
All of these themes have been indirectly explored by Jacques 
Derrida at least since the 1950s. His most widely read works 
varied between rigorous micrological textual analyses of a wide 
range of authors, and attempts to assault the logocentric founda-
34 “LITERARY EXPERIENCE IS A PHYSICAL MOVEMENT.” Gibbons, Multimodal-
ity, 74. For an early study of House of Leaves in the context of non-verbal 
signifying practices, accentuating the formative power of materiality in 




tions of culture by making philosophers “hear with their eyes.”35 
Rather than flippantly allowing for a “free play of the signifi-
er,” as some have thought, his provocations in the domain of 
typography had a specific purpose: “Through the invention or 
reinvention of formatting devices, primarily the breaking or oc-
cupation of the surface, the point was to try to deflect particular 
typographical norms, including even paper.”36 Abandoning the 
idea of writing as a transcription of the vocal temporal linearity, 
he “exploited the chances that paper offers to visibility, meaning 
first of all the simultaneity, synopsis, and synchrony of what will 
never belong to the same time: thus a number of lines or trajec-
tories of speech can inhabit the same surface.”37 This was think-
ing “beyond the paper principle,” treating paper as a multimedia 
platform avant la lettre.
House of Leaves grants a substantial amount of space to Der-
rida’s 1966 American debut, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Dis-
course of the Human Sciences,”38 but its key visual counterpart 
is Glas (1974),39 a monumental effort in approaching the relation 
between literature (Jean Genet) and philosophy (G.W.F. Hegel) 
in a new way. Its prominent place in the construction of this 
35 Jacques Derrida, “Tympan,” in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), xiii.
36 Jacques Derrida, Paper Machine, trans. Rachel Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2005), 45.
37 Ibid.
38 Danielewski, House of Leaves, 112. The quote in question is introduced as a 
comment on the decentered nature of labyrinths: the center of a structure 
is actually not the center, being physically displaced and elevated to a 
transcendent position from which it continues to govern and program 
the illusory play of the network. At first glance, this resonates with spatial 
paradoxes related to crypts, but in fact describes something completely 
different: a classical metaphysical hierarchy of arkhē/telos presiding over 
everything that plays out between them.
39 It appears twice in House of Leaves, but only fleetingly and in the Appen-
dices (pages 545 and 654). “Tympan” (quoted above), a formal prototype 
for Glas, is introduced on page 401. The typographical inspiration for both 
actually comes from the atypical layout of Jean Genet’s “What Remained of 
a Rembrandt Torn Into Small, Very Regular Squares and Rammed Down 
the Shithole” (1967).
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novel has been noted before,40 but I will try to explore it be-
yond the typographical heterodoxy, on the level of unresolvable 
tension between the sensible and the intelligible within writing. 
Glas is famously divided into two columns of apparently unre-
lated text in different types and with different spacings, inter-
mittently broken by interpolations in a smaller sans serif type, 
periodically connected not only by semantic or alliterative “res-
onances” but by “judas holes,” material “windows” within exist-
ing blocks of print. This does not begin to describe all that this 
text does, nor the level of difficulty caused by its graphic layout. 
Its driving force was Derrida’s unrelenting insistence on the fact 
that this material “superficiality” of writing is the only environ-
ment where “philosophy” even exists, as one of its “quotients” or 
subsets. It generates largely autonomous cultural and political 
processes outside of texts themselves, but there is a substantial 
aspect of writing that resists any type of assimilation through 
reading (e.g., idealization, interiorization, translation), getting 
lost in traditional approaches to writing as communication or 
archiving of previously existing content.
This explains the role of sublexical elements within Derrida’s 
work as a whole. These are remnants of language as vouloir-dire, 
a material excess which escapes the dialectics of comprehen-
sion precisely through its haptic character, its unreadability 
and meaninglessness, the resistance of its material.41 They are a 
40 Hanjo Berressem, “The Surface of Sense, the Surface of Sensation and the 
Surface of Reference: Geometry and Topology in the Works of Mark Z. 
Danielewski,” in Revolutionary Leaves: The Fiction of Mark Z. Danielewski, 
ed. Sascha Pöhlmann (Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Pub-
lishing, 2012), 199–221.
41 Derrida’s emphasis on the sublexical layer of language in Glas, employed 
both thematically and performatively, can be read as a “countersignature” 
to Saussure’s obscure and still insufficiently researched manuscripts on 
anagrams. Far from the rationalist slant of proto-structuralism presented 
in Course in General Linguistics, they convey a vision of language as a spec-
trum of sound impressions “out of time,” chaos of non-semantic particles 
that produces meaning randomly and independently from an intending 




blunt and surprisingly insurmountable reminder of the physi-
cality of the book as an external object. Too often masked by 
linear temporality that actually proceeds from the mechanics of 
our reading, the real temporal modus of all print is simultane-
ity, something we are absolutely unable to deal with outside of 
our phenomenological tricks and self-indulgences. It’s hard to 
enumerate all of the consequences of our psychophysiological 
inability to read several things at once, but they share a single 
source: what blocks the easy idealization of textual content is 
precisely space.
Significantly, the only thing Danielewski actually quotes 
from Glas is “espaçons”: “Let us space.”42 Espacement, usually 
translated as “spacing,” described by Derrida as “becoming-
space of time”43 (devenir-espace du temps), actually serves as an 
extreme shorthand for all the processes that render a text una-
vailable to total comprehension by the reader. One should tread 
lightly here, since this is the very spot where the most wide-
spread and destructive readings of Derrida are generated: text 
as an “explosion” of all possible meanings, the inconclusiveness 
of every interpretation, abandonment of scrupulous methods 
of reading. What is actually gleaned from Derrida’s work is far 
more radical: a coherent materialistic theory of writing that re-
fuses to concede mastery over the external objects to conscious-
ness, human agency, or the metaphysics of correlation.
The emphasis on the corporeal is derived from investigations 
into Edmund Husserl’s theory of the sign where Derrida closely 
follows Husserl’s own doubts concerning static phenomenol-
ogy, and accentuates the importance of the reducible, the mate-
rial, and the passive that precedes all animation by intentional 
form.44 Inscription, although empirical and seemingly inferior 
to the pure and ideal objects, turns out to be necessary for the 
42 Jacques Derrida, Glas, trans. John P. Leavey, Jr. and Richard Rand (Lin-
coln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), 75.
43 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 68.
44 Derrida’s book-length introduction to Husserl’s essay “The Origin of 
Geometry” (1962) probably remains — along with Voice and Phenomenon 
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achievement of their ideality, since the ideal forms gain their 
objectivity only by passing through the exteriority of writing. 
These localized and materialized idealities will subsequently 
have to be reactivated plurally, unpredictably and incalculably 
(this is what Husserl called “the Crisis”), and their productivity 
won’t be limited to a reproduction of an ideal “stereotype.”
This means that the “radical illegibility” is “prior to the book 
(in the nonchronological sense),” and “is therefore the very pos-
sibility of the book.”45 The literary text is a sensible construct, 
it originates from the formal engraving of a corporeal sub-
stratum, without any real existence before and outside of that 
process. Such material opening of the space of ideality creates 
a phenomenon that can itself never become purely ideal, or end 
up fully reconstructed in an author’s or any other conscious-
ness. In its aspect of illegibility, the text remains an irreducible 
element of literary communication, and its materiality keeps it 
external, unattainable, alien, and somewhat threatening to the 
reader — this is what accounts for all of the defamations of writ-
ing from Plato to Heidegger and beyond. 
The space of writing is thus not an originarily intelligible 
space. It begins however to become so from the origin, that 
is to say from the moment when writing, like all the work 
of signs, produces repetition and therefore ideality in that 
space. If one calls reading that moment which comes directly 
to double the originary writing, one may say that the space of 
pure reading is always already intelligible, that of pure writing 
always still sensible.46 
Consequently, the literary object, in its allegedly dead material-
ity, can never simply work as a rough template, waiting to be 
animated, without any losses, into a work of art, a transparent 
(1967) — the most important work in this series, but all of his writings up 
to Glas form a backdrop for these explorations.
45 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London: Rout-
ledge, 2001), 95.
46 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 289.
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structure completely available to thought, to commentary, or to 
theory. That material layer, always partially unintelligible and 
critically inexhaustible, is a prerequisite of every meaning.
Every inscription, therefore, exists on a scale between the 
unattainable absolutes of pure sensibility and pure intelligibil-
ity, constrained into participating in them both. A sign-struc-
ture devoid of matter, pure concept untainted by inscription, 
wouldn’t be a sign at all, it would be an ideal, self-identical 
thought-content. Equally, an inscription that would be ground-
ed in its materiality to the extent that it becomes a literally sin-
gular, unique and unrepeatable event, would cross into pure 
substance, unavailable to cognition, verging on invisibility.
This is the realm of spacing. The term appears in the pro-
grammatic epigraph to Derrida’s first book, “le tout sans nou-
veauté qu’un espacement de la lecture,”47 a quote from Mal-
larmé’s preface to his own Un coup de dés jamais n’abolira le 
hasard (1897). A monument of modern literature, the proto-text 
for many ergodic experiments, it is famous for its carefully or-
chestrated use of typography which thoroughly overwhelms 
the content, creating an artwork that — while certainly remain-
ing Literature — gains its foremost strength from its material 
disposition, from the variations of type, size, and blank space, 
therefore from the sensible layers of print. The materiality of 
inscription, creating a “hieroglyphic” layer, remains irreducible 
to content, like an insurmountable barrier to attempts at appro-
priation and complete Aufhebung.48 This obstinate externality to 
47 Derrida, Writing and Difference, v. 
48 Marcel Broodthaers demonstrated the ultimate consequence of this 
approach. His take on Un coup de dés (1969) is a near-exact replica of 
the original, including different stocks of paper etc., but with the actual 
lettering blacked out by horizontal stripes of uneven width and length, 
completely obscuring all content of the poem, retaining, and accentuat-
ing, only its visual composition. Significantly, it is commonly treated as 
an artist’s book, and therefore no longer a work of literature, which para-
doxically results in a decrease of its radicality and diminishes its capacity 
for provocation, irreducible if we remain within the scope of “the art of 
words.”
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the reader’s consciousness firmly places the future of text in its 
material housing rather than the capabilities of its recipients. 
It is quite obvious that this type of approach — treating the 
book as a spatial object condensed in graphic constructions bor-
dering on unreadability, rather than a container of “meaning” or 
a “medium” for preserving and conveying information — har-
monizes with the effects of House of Leaves. What we perceive as 
the breaking up of natural rhythms of thought actually amounts 
to our resistance to temps d’écriture: the non-linear distribution 
of time in the graphic medium, rendering it more akin to a vis-
ual than musical composition, an icon rather than a song. Eve-
rything that accentuates the spatiality of writing, its unreadable 
or even illegible vectors, is the real and “natural” state of inscrip-
tion considered outside of its pragmatic aspect, where it remains 
tied to the limited linearity and causality of cognitive processes. 
The “time” of writing, once the man is liquidated from the equa-
tion, ultimately plays out as a certain type of atemporality or 
achronia: as space.
Spatiality and writing, taken at all levels of their literal or 
metaphorical meanings, converge strategically in Danielewski’s 
writing: the insides of the Folly are described as “those inky 
folds,”49 and the partial collapse of Navidson’s house looks 
as if “the black ash of below spreads like printer’s ink over 
everything,”50 the Folly itself dissipating into an asyntactical and 
sublexical materia prima of writing, pure surface noise of ink 
on paper which ceases to work as a “representation” of an object 
or event. If words are matter, building blocks of a certain real-
ity, a small step is necessary to reduce the ephemeral effect of 
meaning and communication from them and examine them in 
the light of our entire sensorium, favoring all that can be expe-
rienced haptically, rather than simply understood, beyond con-
cept and interpretation. A brief glossary to Chapter XV, dedi-
cated to the analysis of samples taken from the Folly, includes 
only terms from geology and linguistics, hinting at a deeper 




congruence between them, as if they were one united discipline, 
apart from the others. A book is a medium of negotiation with 
a thoroughly non-anthropocentric space, but the same could be 
said about a house and, as Danielewski writes, “why not? Just as 
stanza means ‘verse,’ it also means ‘room.’”51
3. Between Arkhē and Khōra
A detailed analysis of this link between typographical and archi-
tectural spatiality would demand a comprehensive and prefera-
bly illustrated book-length study. However, House of Leaves was 
evidently built around other non-metaphorical ideas of space 
and shaped not only by the invention of the Folly, but also by the 
work of several architects and philosophers. Danielewski’s most 
obvious prototext appears to have been Bachelard’s The Poetics 
of Space (1958), a book that “has everything to do with how our 
comprehension of space, however confined or expansive, still 
affords an opportunity to encounter the boundaries of the self 
just as they are about to give way.”52 Bachelard’s “topoanalysis,” 
built on the crossroads of psychology and phenomenology, el-
evates the house to a basic existential prop: it is described as “a 
veritable principle of psychological integration,” “the topogra-
phy of our intimate being,”53 and “our first universe, a real cos-
mos in every sense of the word”:54 “Without it, man would be a 
dispersed being.”55
Nevertheless, the initial philosophical definition of habita-
tion comes from another source, although along apparently 
similar lines. As I have already mentioned, House of Leaves 
makes no attempt to hide its philosophical or artistic inspira-
tions or predecessors, making them, to the contrary, another 
51 Mark Z. Danielewski, “Foreword,” in Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of 
Space (New York: Penguin, 2014), ix.
52 Ibid., vii.
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tool in defamiliarizing everything that the Folly consists of, so 
it comes as no surprise when Heidegger is evoked early in the 
proceedings, interjecting into the narrative in a lengthy block 
quotation from Being and Time. The placement of this interpo-
lation — in terms of its prominence in the development of the 
story — makes Heidegger the provisional basis of Danielewski’s 
treatment of architecture, an “establishing shot” of the constitu-
tive role of habitation, and various themes in House of Leaves 
could be traced back to his works.56 
Focusing on Unheimlichkeit, the quote presents dread and 
anxiety as a peculiar feeling of (being) “nothing and nowhere,” 
and as “everyday familiarity collapses,” the nerve of the Unhe-
imlich lies in the state of “not-being-at-home”57 (das Nicht-zu-
hause-sein) — an evacuation from home or the state of dwelling. 
Nevertheless, “the ‘not-at-home’ must be conceived as the more 
primordial phenomenon”58 than the familiarity of dwelling, so we 
are witnessing an inversion of the heimlich, reduced to a subset 
or a dissimulation of the uncanny, hiding within metaphysics. 
“The mask of the familiar is a primitive shelter, a house, or rath-
er a pseudohouse, which veils a fundamental unfamiliarity.”59 At 
56 “Language is the house of being. In its home human beings dwell.” Martin 
Heidegger, “Letter on ‘Humanism’,” in Pathmarks, trans. Frank A. Capuzzi 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 239. As hackneyed as this 
famous dictum might sound today, it’s hard to circumvent it in this con-
text. It doesn’t appear as such in House of Leaves, but read literally, it could 
pass for an explanation of its very title, the entire activity of the Folly being 
a realized metaphor of living within language in a severely antihuman 
key. Multiple correlations of this type could be traced out between certain 
Heidegger’s formulations and events in The Navidson Record, which oc-
casionally seem propelled by language or even typography, rather than the 
other way around: “Language speaks. If we let ourselves fall into the abyss 
denoted by this sentence, we do not go tumbling into emptiness. We fall 
upward, to a height.” Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. 
Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), 191.
57 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward 
Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), 233.
58 Ibid., 234.
59 Mark Wigley, The Architecture of Deconstruction: Derrida’s Haunt (Cam-
bridge: MIT Press, 1996), 110–11.
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Ash Tree Lane, a mock-house is a framing instrument, struc-
turing and sheltering a family, working both as a buffer and an 
interface to the radical espacement of the Folly.
Heidegger pursues the analogy of dwelling and being even 
more openly elsewhere, but with different overtones. “Build-
ing Dwelling Thinking” (1951) states explicitly that “the man-
ner in which we humans are on the earth, is Buan, dwelling. 
To be a human being means […] to dwell,”60 the fundamental 
trait of dwelling being “sparing and preserving.”61 This, however, 
doesn’t only mean that being situated in a nurturing space is 
what enables humans to exist but, far more drastically, that it 
is the human habitation and use that defines spatiality as such. 
The example of the bridge, introduced a few pages further, re-
peats the proceeding already attempted elsewhere:62 space is a 
projection of dwelling, rather than a “container” or a preexisting 
ambiance to be populated by humans. “The location [der Ort] 
is not already there before the bridge is. […] Thus the bridge 
does not first come to a location to stand in it; rather, a location 
comes into existence only by virtue of the bridge.”63 A “location” 
defined as a spatial index of human dwelling creates space as its 
consequence; in other words, the mathematical formalization 
of space, reduced to a quantified distance (Abstand) or interval 
(Zwischenraum), can never become the true ground of spati-
ality, and Heidegger dismisses this abstraction of space as an 
empty name. 
60 Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, 147.
61 Ibid., 149.
62 “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in Heidegger, Poetry Language, Thought. 
A Greek temple, “standing there, opens up a world and at the same time 
sets this world back again on earth, which itself only thus emerges as 
native ground” (42). This is immediately underscored: humans, animals, 
plants and the terrain are not an empty “environment” waiting to be com-
pleted by a temple. “We shall get closer to what is, rather, if we think of all 
this in reverse order” (43). It is the temple that provides a ground for eve-
rything else to fall in place. “The building produces its site,” it “constructs 
the eye,” ultimately making the ground “constituted rather than simply 
revealed.” Wigley, Architecture of Deconstruction, 61.
63 Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, 154.
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The absolute center and foundation of spatiality is man. 
Space is “opened up” by dwelling, and the only real “locations” 
are constructed by building which is “closer to the nature of 
spaces and to the origin of the nature of ‘space’ than any ge-
ometry and mathematics.”64 “The nature of building is letting 
dwell,”65 and, read from the vantage point of Navidson’s occupa-
tion of Ash Tree Lane, the final words of the essay — “Only if we 
are capable of dwelling, only then can we build”66 — sound like a 
sentence in a juridical sense, a moral judgement or a condemna-
tion. In the eyes of metaphysics, there is no architecture worthy 
of the name that would be unfit for human habitation. It is the 
act of dwelling that constitutes a house. But is there a theoretical 
vocabulary of the uninhabitable, the purely spatial, to the extent 
that it becomes indistinguishable from matter, defying even the 
consolation of algebraic abstraction as an immaterial terra firma 
of geometry?
Plato’s Timaeus offers an enigmatic category to overcome the 
polarity between the immutable and eternal ideas, and objects 
exposed to becoming and decay: a triton genos that appears to 
us “as in a dream,”67 “difficult of explanation and dimly seen,”68 
which “in some mysterious way partakes of the intelligible, and 
is most incomprehensible,” “apprehended without the help of 
sense, by a kind of spurious reason, and is hardly real.”69 This is 
khōra, the collapse of a fundamental philosophical opposition 
between the intelligible and the sensible — alternately appearing 
to be both and neither — and our inability to properly describe 
it stems from this blind spot in our habitual mechanisms of ar-




67 Plato, Timaeus, in The Dialogues of Plato, trans. Benjamin Jowett (Oxford: 





or even corrupted reasoning,”70 straddling the line between mu-
thos and logos.
Derrida was writing about similar loci of contamination from 
the mid-1950s, but at the time of Khōra,71 which leads us directly 
into the field of architecture and “applied deconstruction,” there 
was a fairly recent and highly influential rescription of the term. 
Making it a focal point of her idiosyncratic idea of the semi-
otic, Kristeva developed khōra, in Revolution in Poetic Language 
(1974), Polylogue (1977), and elsewhere, into a blanket-term for 
the discourse of the other, heterogeneous to meaning, closely 
related to rhythmic patterns and “musical” rather than semantic 
complexes, “anterior to judgement,”72 a zone of non-linguistic 
and non-signifying “genotext” and signifiance (i.e., interlocking 
of drives, concepts, and sensible layers of writing) rather than 
signification, a place of discontinuities and suspended tempo-
rality (i.e., nonlinearity, simultaneity), ultimately associating it 
with hulē, formless matter before the thetic phase of establishing 
discrete objects. It is tempting to treat all this as if it was written 
about the Folly — a pre-reflexive and vaguely threatening non-
symbolizable “no-place” without access for humans, withheld 
from cognition and quantitative description — and Kristeva’s 
“semanalysis” will certainly remain legible in subsequent link-
ages of unconscious processes with corporeality and materiality. 
Described as “the nurse of all generation”73 and becoming, 
“the mother and receptacle of all created and visible and in any 
way sensible things,” khōra is repeatedly designated as “invisible 
and formless.”74 If this third nature is eternal and indestructible, 
it will have to be devoid of any discernible qualities in order to 
70 Jacques Derrida, On the Name, trans. David Wood, John P. Leavey, Jr., and 
Ian McLeod (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 90.
71 This text was originally published in 1987, but Derrida has been working 
on it as early as 1985. “Plato’s Pharmacy” (1968) also briefly deals with 
Timaeus and khōra; see Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, trans. Barbara 
Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 159–61.
72 Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, trans. Margaret Waller (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 29.
73 Plato, Timaeus, 468.
74 Ibid., 471.
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accommodate the array of impressions that will enter it from 
the “outside” and assume an illusory reality only by the grace of 
its substratum. Consequently, the main analytical challenge will 
be accepting and guarding this idea of formlessness against the 
tendency to personify, quantify, or exemplify khōra through its 
“inhabitants.” It is the frame of possibility for everything that 
will ever materially exist, but is nevertheless devoid of agency; 
and it would be a mistake to confuse its “giving place” with “the 
gesture of a donor-subject.”75 Reducing it to an arkhē would 
thoroughly misrepresent “the barren, radically anhuman and 
atheological nature of this ‘place.’”76 Being neither active nor 
passive, unequal to any specific existent, having no characteris-
tics of a being, it is “‘something’ without thing”.77
Furthermore, since pure matter remains inaccessible, the 
mind being able to recognize only skhēmata — imprints (“nega-
tives” of the ideal forms), therefore itself — everything written 
about khōra is bound to remain a transient projection on its 
diffuse background, a fraction or a quotient of its capacities. 
Khōra “has” (receives, accepts) all interpretations, but “not as 
its own” and without keeping them permanently. It is a sum of 
all readings trying to normalize it and give it intelligibility, but 
it is not their “support,” nor can it be exhausted by them or re-
duced to them. This links it to a specific concept of the “secret” 
as Derrida described it in Passions (1991). Its inaccessible aspect 
is not a certain content (theoretically accessible via an appropri-
ate code), but the surface, completely out in the open, perfectly 
reachable, manifest but strictly material, physical, corporeal and 
therefore uncoded, non-discursive, unavailable to “translation” 
or even reading.
In another text, taking care not to allow this persistent nega-
tivity to slip into a cryptotheological zone, Derrida writes that 
khōra remains absolutely heterogeneous to both history and re-
75 Derrida, On the Name, 100.
76 Jacques Derrida, Psychē: Inventions of the Other, eds. Peggy Kamuf and 
Elizabeth Rottenberg, trans. Andrew Benjamin, Kate Linker, Sarah Whit-
ing, et al. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 2:174.
77 Derrida, On the Name, 80.
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ligion. If this “utterly faceless other” is really “nothing (no being, 
no present),”78 “the place of absolute exteriority,”79 we are back in 
the territory of espacement, ungovernable by conceptual mark-
ers, forcing us to consider the particularity and asemic proper-
ties of haptic experience as the only possible area of contact. 
Unsurprisingly, khōra is finally redefined precisely as “the place 
of inscription of all that is marked on the world”80 which achron-
ically precedes the discourses of myth and philosophy — that is 
why philosophy can never coherently describe it. This “antiqui-
ty,” however, threatening to make it an ancestral prerequisite of 
all being, has nothing to do with temporal anteriority and reads 
better as “atemporality,” “ageless contemporaneity,” or even “a 
forsaken perpetuity, or the ‘Ancient Without Tradition.’”81 This is 
a persistent trait of matter as apeiron beyond definition, a layer 
that exists even in the spans where perception has already trans-
coded it into an object and pacified it through cognition. The 
“imprint-bearer” is still there, difficult to discern after receiving 
the form which will obscure it and claim existence only for itself.
The only step that remains is finally naming this amorphous 
and utter inaccessibility as “chaos,” an umbrella term sufficiently 
durable to guard against any type of cognitive appropriation or 
facile “objectification,” any anthropomorphization and teleolo-
gization of exteriority, but Derrida immediately warns against 
this too: coupled with the “pathos of fright,” almost unavoidable 
in facing “this chasm,” “yawning gulf of the abyss,”82 khōra easily 
turns into a slightly more abstract effigy of the monstrous. As I 
have already noted, we would be hard pressed to find a more 
anthropomorphic response to the unknown or inconceivable. 
This is the point where horror as a possible Grundstimmung of 
78 Jacques Derrida, “Faith and Knowledge: the Two Sources of ‘Religion’ at 
the Limits of Reason Alone,” trans. Samuel Weber, in Religion, eds. Jacques 
Derrida and Gianni Vattimo (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 21.
79 Ibid., 19.
80 Derrida, On the Name, 106.
81 Reza Negarestani, Cyclonopedia: Complicity with Anonymous Materials 
(Melbourne: re.press, 2008), 15.
82 Derrida, On the Name, 103.
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philosophy, as Harman has suggested via Lovecraft,83 actually 
works against the probability of our encounter with the exterior, 
turning into a final mental retraction in the face of the illegible, 
safeguarding the conceptual status quo. If we are to encounter 
the unintelligible materiality in any way, it will have to present 
itself in a more ambiguous guise, it will have to open like a book, 
it might even resemble a house.
4. Architecture against Itself 
A structure built around the thinking of khōra, designed to side-
step all of the trappings of anthropocentric architecture as “the 
last fortress of metaphysics,”84 was seriously considered and pro-
jected by Derrida and Peter Eisenman between 1985 and 1989, 
to be placed in the network of follies in Bernard Tschumi’s Parc 
de la Villette project (1982–1998), “the largest discontinuous 
building in the world.”85 A significant part of the collaboration 
revolved around the reading of Timaeus and the possibility of its 
architectural interpretation, and the audacity of this idea logi-
cally proceeds from Eisenman’s previous work.
His œuvre is often regarded as the ultimate attempt at dis-
engaging architecture not only from the ideas of habitation or 
utility but from objecthood, location, or even reality.86 It is a 
fight against the closure of metaphysics, striving to achieve an 
architectural equivalent of différance. Any careful reader of Der-
rida knows that deconstruction has little to do with any type of 
postmodern sentiment and has far more in common with radi-
cal modernity.87 Accordingly, Eisenman’s work, although often 
83 Tom Sparrow, “On the Horrors of Realism: An Interview with Graham 
Harman,” Pli 19 (2008): 235.
84 Derrida, Psychē, 92.
85 Bernard Tschumi, “Parc de la Villette, Paris,” in Deconstruction: Omnibus 
Volume, eds. Andreas Papadakis, Catherine Cooke, and Andrew Benjamin 
(New York: Rizzoli, 1989), 175.
86 Peter Eisenman, “An Architectural Design Interview by Charles Jencks,” in 
Deconstruction, eds. Papadakis, Cooke, and Benjamin, 143.
87 Charles Jencks, “Deconstruction: The Pleasures of Absence,” in Decon-
struction, eds. Papadakis, Cooke, and Benjamin, 119.
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reviewed in the context of postmodernity, presents a virulent 
counterattack against postmodern architecture of pseudo-clas-
sicist pastiche, ironic metacommentary and contextual games. 
It is a hermetic “spatial writing,” squarely opposing the unavoid-
ably public disposition of architecture with its obstinate illeg-
ibility, organized around space as a metaphysical abstraction or 
a cognitive framework to be disrupted, a “Cartesian grid” to be 
played upon. Eisenman’s attitude towards functionality ranges 
from simple downplaying to outright hostility, and it is highly 
indicative that Jencks links his work to Kurt Schwitters and M.C. 
Escher. “En Terror Firma” advocates the engagement of archi-
tecture with the sublime instead of, or against, simply beautiful 
(as an index of anthropometric scale and aesthetics), with the 
ultimate aim of restructuring itself according to “the uncertain, 
the unspeakable, the unnatural, the unpresent, the unphysical.”88 
The problem of scale is the key point. Everything is (dis)organ-
ized with the purpose of “removing both the architect and the 
user from any necessary control of the object,”89 making space 
for a new autonomy of architecture as the measure of itself.
House VI (1978) exemplifies many of these traits, retrospec-
tively drawing a series of striking parallels with Navidson’s Folly. 
“My work attacks the concept of occupation as given. It is against 
the traditional notion of how you occupy a house,”90 because “it 
is exactly in the home where the unhomely is, where the terror 
is alive.”91 Jencks describes this project as “supremely Modern-
ist in its rigid exclusion of every contextual fact”; “the building 
could be upside-down or tilted on its side and it wouldn’t make 
much difference.”92 These dislocations culminate in a disruptive 
use of empty spaces, the most notorious being a substantial cut 
in the bedroom floor, severing it in half. An “absent column cuts 
88 Peter Eisenman, “En Terror Firma: In Trails of Grotextes,” in Deconstruc-
tion: Omnibus Volume, eds. Papadakis, Cooke, and Benjamin, 152. 
89 Ibid., 153.
90 Eisenman, “An Architectural Design Interview,” 142.
91 Ibid., 143.
92 Charles Jencks, The Language of Post-Modern Architecture (London: Acad-
emy Editions, 1987), 121.
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through roof, wall and even floor, wreaking its ultimate havoc 
on domesticity.”93 This hiatus in the heart of a family home, 
turned into a non-narrative sequence of geometric twists and 
turns, embodies, for Jencks at least, the purist language of Mod-
ernism, coupled with the postmodern lack of semantics: syntax 
absolved of all context or function. The radicality of this threat-
ens to turn a place of habitation into an overpriced and poten-
tially dangerous “useless object” — a folly.
“It might be worthwhile therefore to abandon any notion 
of a Post-Modern architecture in favor of a post-humanist 
architecture.”94 This is not Eisenman’s final line of defense, but 
Tschumi’s proposition in a text on Parc de la Villette, in many 
respects even more directly influenced by Derrida’s work. Folies 
are projected as a superimposition of several autonomous sys-
tems, out of phase with one another (a similar idea was explored 
in Joyce’s Garden of 1976), described like an open sequence of 
repetitions and distortions with no beginning or end. They seek 
to abandon the imperative of order and unity by provoking 
contiguity, undecidability, fragmentation, and “dissociation in 
space and time,” where “relations of conflict are carefully main-
tained, rejecting synthesis or totality.”95 Attempting to prove that 
a complex structure can be built without resorting to traditional 
parameters, Tschumi outlined a radically anticontextual and 
asymbolic project avoiding any utilitarian “refuge for human-
istic thought”96 and favoring “madness and play over careful 
management.”97 In its final consequence, this would be “an as-
sault on meaning,” “architecture against itself: a disintegration.”98
Derrida was initially extremely suspicious about the feasi-
bility of an architecture liberated from the ballasts of Presence 
(it seemed doomed to a double bind of being either unbuild-
able or metaphysical), but he was ultimately impressed by 
93 Ibid., 122.







their work as “the most literal and most intense affirmation of 
deconstruction.”99 This, however, wasn’t enough. Eisenman later 
claimed that he had been “doing khōra” before he read Derrida’s 
text and complained that Derrida didn’t push him hard enough, 
keeping to relatively conservative notions of what a house, a park, 
or a folie could be. Derrida’s contemporaneous writings initially 
supported an extreme redefinition of architecture but stubborn-
ly refused to succumb to the lure of the Nihil, the idea of the 
pure Void, articulated spatiality as a non-metaphysical annihila-
tion of man. Therefore, “No (Point of) Madness — Maintaining 
Architecture” (1986), “Fifty-two Aphorisms for a Foreword” and 
“Why Peter Eisenman Writes Such Good Books” (both 1987) 
at first apparently align with Eisenman’s bravest ideas, calling 
for a non-anthropocentric turn within the very axiomatic of ar-
chitecture. Very quickly it transpires that this line of disruption 
moves along the trajectory of “questions to Heidegger,” defined 
by “the genealogy of an ageless contract between architecture 
and habitation.”100 The underlying teleology of dwelling firmly 
controls the syntax of architecture from the outside, naturaliz-
ing the historically conditioned understanding of its capacities 
and erasing its singularity. Therefore, the main challenge will 
be reorienting architecture as a paleonym, an “old name” to be 
crossed out and reinscribed, a “project” directed towards an un-
mapped and unreadable future. The ancient link between build-
ing and meaning will have to be abandoned in favor of “a school 
still unknown, a style to be defined, […] an invention of new 
paradigms,”101 examining architecture at the very edges of its in-
habitability. Tschumi’s Folies, in that sense, “return architecture, 
faithfully, to what architecture, since the very eve of its origin, 
should have signed.”102
Nevertheless, instead of proclaiming the necessity of erecting 
uninhabitable artifacts to assert the true and thoroughly inhu-
99 Jacques Derrida, Points… Interviews, 1974–1994, trans. Peggy Kamuf and 
Elisabeth Weber (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 213.
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man essence of architecture, Derrida soon cautiously crosses 
into more familiar terrain, remote from the “building of the 
non-anthropocentric future,” and searching for a different angle 
of interpretation, simultaneous breaking down and reconstruc-
tion, without utopianism or nostalgia. The basic “wager” would 
actually be tackling architecture non-destructively: “The with-
out-ground of a ‘deconstructive’ and affirmative architecture can 
cause vertigo, but it is not the void, it is not the gaping and cha-
otic remainder.”103 “Point de folie” repeatedly stresses that wiping 
the slate clean, annulling all teleology, aesthetics, symbolism, 
and hierarchy would “lead back to a desert of anarchitecture”:104 
instead of liberating us from an old metaphysics and reverting 
architecture to its self-referential and non-mimetic essence, the 
ideal of “abstract, neuter, inhuman, useless, uninhabitable, and 
meaningless volumes”105 would actually be a covert fulfillment 
of nihilism-as-metaphysics.
Therefore, what Derrida hoped for in Tschumi’s project was 
a deprogrammed accessibility rather than a rigid and alienating 
statement of architecture’s fundamental alterity. Furthermore, 
the very idea of an architectural application of deconstruction is 
finally abandoned as impossible. The vocabulary of the hetero-
geneous, of non-coincidence, dissociation and destabilization 
doesn’t suffice to actually build something. An invention is re-
quired for this dislocating impulse to survive its installation into 
the material world, and Derrida emphasized a deciding factor 
in saving this event-to-be from unqualified negativity: it should 
free the passage towards the other’s writing or “countersigna-
ture.” Alterity is not something we can invent, “faithfully repre-
sent,” or drag into the present from the future. After the quest 
for the unattainable sublime, it transpires that the available ma-
terials will be both the terrain to be conquered and the tool to 
be used. “Deconstructions would be weak if they were negative, 






ure themselves against that which is most solid in institutions, 
at the place of their greatest resistance.”106 As much as it might 
sound like a retraction, this raises a challenge. In order to pos-
tulate a significantly different architecture, one must clear the 
path through habitation; in order to open up the full resources 
of inscription, one must work against the grain of the story.
We are left, then, with compromise formations: constructing 
a story that will, at least partially, be told through the pure and 
non-semantic materiality of the page; equating building with 
writing instead of dwelling, and opting for a book instead of a 
construction site. This conclusion appears like a rationalization 
of failure, but it’s a fact that Tschumi, Eisenman, and Derrida 
always systematically linked architecture and writing, some-
times to the limit of provocation. The figure of “writing” in con-
crete or steel initially seemed to be a metaphor, but it gradually 
merged with other types of inscription literally. In Eisenman’s 
and Tschumi’s world, “where two writings, the verbal and the 
architectural, are printed, the one in the other, outside the tra-
ditional hierarchies,”107 and architecture is “nothing that is,”108 
it is certainly not necessary to build. In a way, if the ultimate 
goal of an architect is to “do khōra,” the only natural state of a 
house would be precisely not having been built. From that per-
spective, “paper architecture” takes on a different meaning. For 
Derrida, Tschumi’s working papers, drawings, essays, and pho-
tographs in La case vide (1986) actually are “follies at work,”109 
not documents or preparatory notes, temporally disjointed 
from “the real thing.” The physicality of stone, glass or metal has 
been supplanted by another, “the voluminous text of multiple 
writings: […] palimpsest grid, supersedimented textuality, bot-
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“Is the Parc de la Villette a built theory or a theoretical build-
ing?” Tschumi posed this question, but (although certainly ad-
vocating an innovative convergence of architecture and theory) 
firmly stressed, “La Villette had to be built: the intention was 
never merely to publish books.”111 Eisenman ended up on the 
different end of the spectrum: “Deconstruction is not ultimately 
visible. It is about building unbuildable ideas.”112 Perhaps inevi-
tably, Tschumi’s folies appeared in the end, while Derrida’s and 
Eisenman’s project was abandoned. Or was it? The only “real” 
and tangible result of this collective endeavor turned out to be 
Chora L Works (1997), a book-archive of plans, letters, drawings, 
essays, and group conversations, perhaps consciously echoing 
the Socratic dialogue. Maybe this is all it should have been. Such 
as it is, this volume itself stands as a spectral “no-place” between 
a past — a document of something that never was — and fu-
ture — still a “project,” although unfinished — with no “now” or 
presence to found itself upon. If khōra really is an interval of be-
coming between the idea and the object, then a book probably 
approximates it better than a building. The graphic design el-
evated it to a new level of haptic disturbance. Plato’s khōra works 
like a winnowing machine or a sieve, so the volume is punched 
through with a grid of holes, interrupting text at random places, 
brutally equating the content with the physicality of the page. 
The book itself, then, works as a sieve or a machine for mediat-
ing between the chaos of unformed matter and the worlds of 
correlation: concepts and ideas on one side and objects on the 
other. Perhaps the machine could work both ways, at least on a 
conceptual level, producing our “world for us,” but also train-
ing us for a negotiation with the world without and beyond us. 
In one direction, a sieve articulates the prime matter into ele-
ments. Traversed in another direction, it becomes a metaphysi-
cal grinding machine, helping us establish contact with materi-
ality beyond the limits of the readable.
111 Tschumi, “Parc de la Villette,” 177.




Conclusively, a “book” or a “house” can be perceived as transi-
tional objects par excellence, erraticaly balancing material and 
intelligible layers, the possibility of concretization or habitation 
and the pressure of corporeal alterity. They both offer a xenog-
raphy, unevenly stratified and mercurial, providing ground for 
participation and appropriation, all the while directing traffic 
in the other direction too: from readability and narration into 
a haptic sensibility (because spatiality exceeds the visual); from 
utility and meaning into base matter and irreducibly alien exte-
riority. Khōra is, after all, defined as “non-readable,”113 and per-
haps only a “metaphysics” can opt for one or the other process 
exclusively. For all existents, this pulsating interval is really the 
only place left.
Going back to House of Leaves, a question remains unre-
solved: what is the “bottom” of its ontological hierarchy, the 
narrative structure that pushes the meta-factor to extremes? 
“[E]ach narrative content […] becomes in its turn the content of 
a different tale. Each tale is thus the receptacle of another. There 
is nothing but receptacles of narrative receptacles, or narrative 
receptacles of receptacles.”114 This is Derrida writing on khōra 
again, but it could easily apply to Danielewski’s novel; a para-
normal space, contained within a documentary film, which is 
contained within a blind man’s recounting, which is contained 
within a young man’s notes and comments, which are contained 
within a volume (House of Leaves), edited by an anonymous 
group of people. The final spatial disturbance of the inside/out-
side binarity is the very title, creating a mise en abyme of the 
Alain Robbe-Grillet or Claude Simon variety: a certain House 
of Leaves inexplicably appears in the depth of the Folly, where 
Navidson eventually burns its pages one by one, in order to keep 
reading it to the end. Another House of Leaves surfaces in Tru-
113 Jacques Derrida and Peter Eisenman, Chora L Works (New York: Mona-
celli, 1997), 36.
114 Derrida, On the Name, 117.
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ant’s world, published and distributed without his knowing, but 
including his private notes and addenda.
The majority of theories place the Mother, Pelafina H. Lièvre, 
as the ultimate holder of these containers: she is not only the 
author of The Whalestoe Letters — containing typographical ex-
cesses echoing the ones in The Navidson Record, “real-life” per-
sons suspiciously resembling the characters of the novel, a poem 
previously attributed to Zampanò, etc. — but the “author” of her 
son (his entire life and torment perhaps being a narrative work 
of mourning over a child she had lost long ago).115 Therefore, the 
entire novel is actually playing out within the “consciousness” 
of a master-character that never appears as such, giving place to 
all the stories, resembling all and none of them, remaining per-
manently unavailable or “dead.” “She managed to make you feel 
as if she had invented you.”116 Many characters explicitely doubt 
their own ontological persistence, and her presence would be 
a genre-friendly consolation of sorts: the mother of horrors as 
the “nurse and receptacle” of all that exists. She is the one that 
“makes them talk,” extending her influence all the way to us and 
all possible interpretations of her work.
This would be the final temptation then: “this strange mother 
who gives place without engendering,”117 a “mother” as a creator 
(not necessarily benevolent) of all that is, an ageless and invis-
ible mother irreducible to her offspring, not there to contain 
someone in a shelter, but to evict someone, to throw them out of 
the house and into space. But as convenient as this would be — a 
resolution of all the formal intricacies in a form of subjectiv-
ity, a “personality,” an intention of a conscious entity — it is only 
Lièvre’s non-manifest nature that tentatively supports this read-
ing. Essentially equal to all the other spectres of this world, she 
115 For a sustained examination of the relations between these characters, em-
phasizing their approaches to language and textuality, see Katharine Cox, 
“What Has Made Me? Locating Mother in the Textual Labyrinth of Mark 
Z. Danielewski’s House of Leaves,” Critical Survey 18, no. 2 (2006): 4–15.
116 Mark Z. Danielewski, The Whalestoe Letters (New York: Pantheon Books, 
2000), xv.
117 Derrida, On the Name, 124.
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is simply the outermost point of the same “projection” gener-
ated by a deeper — or more superficial? — khōra, the matter of 
writing, and certainly an inappropriate substitute, or another 
primitive, anthropomorphic eidolon for its inhuman, formless, 
and ultimately indifferent capacities.
This autonomous material doesn’t exist in order to give place 
to something else, to “represent,” the mimetic imperative of a 
backward metapysics. If “it has nothing as its own,” and nothing 
can last or survive in it (the walls being permanently purged of 
all events, remaining ahistorical and timeless), then everything 
is there, not only in the pit of the Folly, but in House of Leaves 
and in writing in general, only to lure someone inside, to pro-
vide a sufficient amount of cognitive traction enabling a reader 
to advance toward the “thing itself ” of the book, alien to every 
concept — unreadability, its lack of content misread as empti-
ness, as “nothing”. Readable ephemera can not “belong” to it as 
its own attributes, but in order to approach it at all, in order to 
open up the full resources of inscription, perhaps a story must 
be offered, if only to be revoked in the last instance.
Creating everything and keeping no records, like a self-repli-
cating machine or the tree of Yggdrasil — which actually marks 
the very end of House of Leaves, branching out indefinitely, 
creating and supporting disparate worlds, but stemming out of 
“nothing” and maintaining itself rootlessly — this material of-
fers the ultimate analogy for the open architecture of Navidson’s 
Folly. It persists, it expands, it evolves with no memory of the 
changes, it provides room for all that exists, but it is the very 
reverse of Le Corbusier’s machine à habiter: the only difficulty 
left is understanding the human viewpoint within it, perhaps 
because there is none.
In this type of spatial exploration, every finality would only 
play into the hands of an old teleology and consolidate our ig-
norance. What remains is a process that opens itself to habitual 
uses, but which continues to provoke and dislocate. To deal with 
writing means to establish a perpetually provisional and vola-
tile foothold within it, while the material exteriority, absolutely 
uninhabitable and inaccessible, is keeping the chasm ajar, main-
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taining the interruption. The only other option is not to read at 
all, to go back into ourselves, try and forget, or to simply move 
on, like the couple in House of Leaves who gave up the Folly 
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Encountering Weird Objects:  
Lovecraft, LARP, and Speculative 
Philosophy
Chloé Germaine Buckley1
Introduction: Philosophy, Play, Props
The speculative and materialist turns of twenty-first century phi-
losophy ask humans to “think about the liveliness of objects.”2 
Numerous theorists attempt to overcome what speculative re-
alists call the “correlationist” gap, which abjures the possibility 
of accessing the “noumenal” realm, and what new materialists 
frame as idealist and constructivist assumptions, which ignore 
the importance of bodies, matter, and other nonhuman “act-
ants” in favour of language, discourse, and culture.3 Of the of-
1 I am grateful to Paul Wake and Jonathan Newell for comments on this 
material.  
2 Steven Shaviro, “The Universe of Things,” Theory & Event 14, no. 3 (2011): 
3. 
3 For summaries of these critiques see: Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and 
Graham Harman, “Towards a Speculative Philosophy,” in The Speculative 
Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism, eds. Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, 
and Graham Harman (Melbourne: re.press, 2011), 1–18. See also Diana 
Coole and Samantha Frost, “Introducing the New Materialisms,” in New 
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ferings across speculative realism and new materialism, those 
of interest in this chapter include Graham Harman’s object ori-
ented ontology and Jane Bennett’s vital materialism.4 The latter 
theorist expounds an approach to things that provides a useful 
mid-point between object-oriented and relational ontologies, 
both of which offer valid routes beyond correlationism and con-
structivism. With their very different conceptions of objects, 
Harman and Bennett negotiate what Steven Shaviro identifies 
as the “paradoxes of nonhuman actants, of vital matter, and of 
object independence.”5 Such written speculation on the nature 
of reality and nonhuman things is well and good but how to 
make contact with objects such that both the anthropocentrism 
of Western philosophy and the every-day or common-sense 
realism it engenders might be disrupted? How to forge an en-
counter with the “weird reality” Harman suggests lies beyond 
the gap endemic in Western philosophy?6 How can humans be 
jolted out of the hubris that Bennett suggests frames matter as 
instrumental and results in “earth-destroying consumption?”7 
This chapter contends that there is at least one human activ-
ity alert to the vibrant, strange, and elusive nature of objects: 
game-playing. In his field-defining analysis of the play-element 
in culture, Johan Huizinga asserts that gameplay comprises a 
“temporary abolition of the ordinary world” not merely for the 
production of a childish fiction but, oftentimes, taking on a ritu-
alistic aspect that “brings about an order of things higher than 
that in which [we] customarily live,” where play, Huizinga sug-
gests, might be a “cosmic happening.”8 The temporary, ritualized 
Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, Politics, eds. Diana Coole and Samantha 
Frost (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 1–46.
4 Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Duke Uni-
versity Press, 2010). See also Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object 
(Winchester: Zero Books, 2011).
5 Shaviro, “The Universe of Things,” 3.
6 Graham Harman, Weird Realism: Lovecraft and Philosophy (Winchester: 
Zero Books, 2012), 2.
7 Bennett, Vibrant Matter, ix.
8 Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture 
(Kettering: Angelico Press, 2016), 12, 14.
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demarcation of space in play is fundamental in live-action role-
playing (LARP), a niche, gaming activity distinct from table-top 
roleplaying games and video games. LARPs are physically enact-
ed roleplaying games that require players to enter a specific lo-
cation — demarcated as “in-game” — as designated “characters.” 
LARPs may last anything from a few hours to a few days, during 
which time player-characters must respond to dramatic events, 
puzzles, and crises through an immersive, embodied perfor-
mance. The resulting improvised narrative interacts with a ludic 
structure — that is, the rules of the game — comprising game-
play mechanics that govern player-character actions, includ-
ing some aspects familiar from video and table-top roleplaying 
games such as health stats and combat skills. LARP is popular 
in various genres and includes “high” and “low” fantasy games, 
murder-mystery scenarios, post-apocalyptic and regency-era 
“polite society” settings to name just a few. 
The focus of this chapter is “survival horror” LARP and, specif-
ically, what is often called, by players and organizers, “Cthulhu” 
LARP, after Lovecraft’s fiction and its legacy. Huizinga’s phrase 
defining play as a “cosmic happening” is particularly apposite 
for “Cthulhu” LARP, which incorporates as theme and content 
a horrifying encounter with the outside, aiming to produce 
in players what Lovecraft describes as “cosmic fear.”9 Indeed, 
“Cthulhu” LARP fits into the category of “dark play,” a term that 
game studies scholars use to describe “dangerous” forms of play 
that exploit the tension between order and chaos, evoke subver-
sive or otherwise “deviant” themes, and often deceive players 
such that the boundary between “play” and “not play” becomes 
very porous.10 Because it requires constant frame switching as 
9 H.P. Lovecraft, “Supernatural Horror in Literature,” The H.P. Lovecraft 
Archive, http://www.hplovecraft.com/writings/texts/essays/shil.aspx.
10 “Dark Play” is a concept defined by Richard Schechner in Performance 
Studies: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 2002). I synthesize a defini-
tion from comments by Miguel Sicart in Play Matters (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 2014), 19 and Jonas Linderoth and Torill Elvira Mortensen in “Dark 
Play: The Aesthetics of Controversial Playfulness,” in The Dark Side of 
Game Play: Controversial Issues in Playful Environments, eds. Torill Elvira 
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players negotiate in-game and out-of-game elements simultane-
ously and a big commitment to the suspension of disbelief that 
can often create moments of “bleed” between the world of the 
game and the world beyond, LARP certainly has the potential 
to disrupt constructed, social reality and provoke psychological 
stress.11 However, the Lovecraftian themes also make such play 
potentially disruptive of players’ deeply embedded ontologies, 
of the common-sense realism that operates in their everyday 
lives.
Objects and things in the form of game props are central to 
the success of LARP and key to its potential for metaphysical 
speculation. Props provide the objects on which ludic mechan-
ics operate, they contribute to the production of a shared nar-
rative, and help transform the space in which the game takes 
place, specifically, its demarcation from the world of the every-
day. Finally, props are central to the production of immersion 
for the players such that they might feel “cosmic fear” within 
the game. Props in “Cthulhu” LARP include objects such as an 
eldritch tome containing information about ancient gods and 
rituals, fragments of “alien” rock or parts of an ancient “space-
craft,” an array of disturbing monster costumes such as a series 
of “shoggoth tentacles” made from latex and foam, elements of 
set-dressing such as laboratory equipment, a projected video 
with ambient sounds used to simulate a shared vision, flood-
lights and sound-effects to simulate the arrival of a military heli-
copter. These are a few examples from my own experience. As 
a LARP designer who also theorizes their practice, I follow Ken-
dall Walton and Chris Bateman in the assertion that props are 
generative: they prescribe specific imaginings, trigger emotions, 
Mortensen, Jonas Linderoth, and Ashley M.L. Brown (London: Routledge, 
2015), 5.
11 On the disruptive effects of frame switching in LARP, see Chloé Germaine 
Buckley and Laura Mitchell, “Weird Experience: Transformations of 




and generate the fictional world of the game.12 Walton’s “prop-
oriented” view of “make-believe” counters “content-oriented” 
approaches in that it proposes that objects have independence 
over and above their role in a story. Indeed, Walton goes as far 
as to reverse the hierarchy of story and prop, suggesting that 
props might become the focus of attention such that the act of 
make-believe is a tool through which we understand the prop. 
This inverts the view that the prop is a tool through which we 
understand the story.13 This view of props as agentic and genera-
tive suggests their affinity with the notion of “object” or “thing” 
expounded in some speculative realisms and new materialisms. 
Bennett, for example, suggests that “things” manifest traces of 
“independence or aliveness, constituting the outside of our own 
experience.”14 In “Cthulhu” LARP, props explicitly manifest their 
independence or “outside-ness.” Examples from my experience 
include encountering a strange, meteor-type rock that resisted 
geological analysis and acted to create some kind of barrier pre-
venting player-characters from escaping a certain location. In 
another LARP, players uncovered unidentifiable archaeological 
fragments with strange markings. Together, the fragments com-
prised a beacon or transmitter that exerted disturbing psychi-
cal effects upon player-characters who came into contact with 
them. The game entirely revolved around putting together the 
fragments.15
In addition to their generative function, there is a certain 
naïveté embodied by props in LARP that accords with the vari-
ous turns from doubting modes of philosophy explored herein. 
Indeed, the various (re)turns to materiality and reality repre-
sented by speculative realism and new materialism are often 
12 For an explanation of what Bateman calls “prop theory,” see Kendall L. 
Walton, “Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe,” European Journal 
of Philosophy 1, no. 1 (1993): 39–57 and Chris Bateman, Imaginary Games 
(Winchester: Zero Books, 2011), 100–103. 
13 Walton, “Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe,” 39. 
14 Bennett, Vibrant Matter, xvi.
15 This LARP was “X Marks the Spot,” written and organized by Eleanor Black 
for the uk-based LARP club, Disturbing Events, in 2017.
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self-consciously naïve, rejecting the skepticism of correlation-
ism and the sophistication of constructivism, both of which 
equate reality with representation or else do away with it alto-
gether. Harman suggests that naïveté ought to replace radical 
doubt in philosophical thought and Bennett argues that her no-
tion of “thing-power” is advantageous precisely because it calls 
to mind “a childhood sense of the world.”16 LARP is likewise a 
self-consciously naïve activity, a childish game of dress-up and 
make-believe, which attempts to produce and enact outlandish 
stories and scenarios using home-made costumes and props. 
Actual monsters appear and may be fought with latex weapons 
or replica guns; players pick up mysterious and magical objects 
made from foam and papier-mâché; and physical space is trans-
formed with theatrical set-dressing, home-made sound effects, 
and colored lights. It is LARP’s playful naïveté that insists on an 
embodied and oftentimes visceral encounter with materiality.
Material encounters in LARP can produce “Weird” paradox-
es, encouraging blurred responses to objects that unsettle both 
scientific materialism and metaphysical idealism. By way of an 
example, I offer a prop I made for a “Cthulhu” LARP titled “Pro-
fessor Lazarus’s Emporium of Wonders.”17 This prop, like many 
others in this genre of LARP, initiated competing and paradoxi-
cal encounters for the players. In the game narrative, the prop 
represented a part magical, part electrical “field generator” that, 
when switched on, kept a “proto-shoggoth” — a monster we had 
constructed out of latex, foam, cloth, and an old nylon tent — in 
an inert state. During the first act of the game, the machine 
broke, causing the shoggoth to grow out of control and its foam 
tentacles extended further and further into the game space. Ini-
tially, this affected “non-player-characters” who became fused 
with the creature and attached to one another with grotesque 
latex umbilical cords. Later, players themselves were subsumed 
16 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 5. See also Bennett, Vibrant Matter, 20. 
17 “Professor Lazarus’ Emporium of Wonders” was written by Chloé Ger-
maine Buckley and Jonathan Buckley for the uk-based LARP club, The 
Dark Door, in 2014.
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into the monster. The field generator became an important ob-
ject for the ludic frame (that is, the frame determining the activ-
ity as a game composed of a series of challenges to be solved): 
players needed to fix the machine to destroy the creature. The 
object also prescribed several imaginings to produce a fictional 
narrative. Thus, players encountered the prop through at least 
two different frames: the fictional narrative demanded their 
characters imagine its mystical purpose and provenance, while 
the ludic structure suggested the player approach the object 
as a puzzle to be solved, drawing on in-game skills and rules 
that need to be role-played accordingly. These competing “in-
character” and “out-of-character” negotiations prescribed by 
the prop suggest something of its strange nature in the context 
of play. 
The strangeness of the object in this case was also visible in 
its materiality: it looked very much like a prop. We constructed 
it from an old carriage clock, to which we affixed colored LEDs, 
wires, brass knobs, and dials that served no real function. We 
added an electrical transformer and switch kit, packaged to look 
like an “old-timey” battery suitable for the 1930s setting. Each of 
these material components were visible and allowed players to 
identify the item as a prop within the space of the game. Often, 
players negotiate between in-game props and items native to the 
game location, for example, spotting a magical tome on a shelf of 
otherwise ordinary books. Despite its home-made appearance, 
the object was treated very much as real and potentially danger-
ous as players constructed an improvised narrative around it. It 
had obvious real-world components that could easily have been 
put back together by anyone with a basic knowledge of elec-
tronics, but the players roleplayed having no clue about how the 
machine worked: they were fumbling about, making guesses in 
their make-believe pretence of fixing it. Finally, like many props 
in “Cthulhu” LARP, the field generator worked in both the mate-
rial dimension and in a seemingly supernatural one. Both the 
simple electronics and the painted mystical symbols had sen-
sible in-game effects in relation to the monster. The object also 
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prompted quasi-emotional responses from the characters (for 
example, fear, bewilderment) and real emotional responses in 
the players (for example, hesitancy). This distinction suggests 
that props prescribe effects within multiple frames simultane-
ously, including beyond the world of the game. Some players are 
often reluctant to interact with an object that could send their 
character mad or kill them and so end their game experience 
early. In-game madness is a common feature in “Cthulhu” LARP 
and it often signifies that props such as the field generator erase 
separation between normally distinct metaphysical dimensions 
(the natural and the supernatural, the human and the nonhu-
man, for example).
In what follows, I will suggest that the ludic interactivity of 
LARP and its requirement for participants to negotiate multiple 
and simultaneous frames of experience produces insights about 
the nature of reality beyond human perception. In short, it has 
the potential to force its participants to catch a glimpse of a 
world that is nothing like their common-sense perceptions of it. 
In line with speculative realist and new materialist philosophies, 
what encounters with props in LARP may reveal is a curiously 
unhuman ontology: a world of active, vibrant things, to use Ben-
nett’s terminology, and independent, mysterious objects, in the 
sense employed in Harman’s schema. My investigation is philo-
sophical and auto-ethnographic. I examine various LARPs I 
have designed and played, drawing on the intersection between 
Gothic, horror, and philosophy. I suggest that LARP elucidates 
some of the speculations in recent philosophy through its affec-
tive encounters. That is, horror LARP produces an experiential 
encounter with the “weirdness” of reality. 
LARP, Fakery, and the Gothic Tradition
To explore the disruptive nature of props in “Cthulhu” LARP, I 
want to make some connections between LARP and the Gothic. 
The Gothic is a literary mode that informs both the fiction on 
which LARPs are based (for example, Lovecraft’s stories) and 
the techniques used to gamify those fictions. Horror LARP uses 
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strategies key to the Gothic since the latter’s inception in the 
eighteenth century. One such strategy is the production of per-
formed space, which Emma McEvoy argues is central to Gothic. 
She calls Horace Walpole’s converted dairy, Strawberry Hill, a 
“dramatized building for which audience response and interac-
tion were essential.”18 Walpole’s Strawberry Hill was both a ma-
terial building and a fictional construct, intimately connected 
to his novel, The Castle of Otranto (1764), which is widely dis-
cussed as the first Gothic novel. Just as that novel purported to 
be a found manuscript but was an invented fiction, Strawberry 
Hill was not what it appeared to be. In this former and extended 
dairy building, wooden crenulations masqueraded as stone ma-
sonry and pasteboard walls sported fake, Gothic arches. Walpo-
le freely “mixed and matched,”19 creating stylistic incongruence 
by assembling a range of artifacts, or “props” that prescribed a 
variety of imaginings for the buildings’ visitors. Such fakery is 
necessary in LARP, too, to produce a dramatized or performed 
space in which an immersive game experience can occur. LARP 
organizers’ comparative lack of budget results in a more home-
made affair than Strawberry Hill, though, and the Gothic set-
dressing is decidedly more Ed Wood than Tod Browning. That 
said, the production of space in LARP can have very dramatic 
effects. Elsewhere, I have discussed the experience of seeing an 
interior wall crumble as a horde of zombies tore its way through. 
The wall turned out to be a plasterboard fake placed in a venue 
solely for the game.20 In another game, organizers bricked up 
a fireplace in a hired venue just for the weekend so it could be 
uncovered by players as part of the solution to a ludic puzzle.21 
Such props vary in their levels of authenticity, but all help pro-
18 Emma McEvoy, Gothic Tourism (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 
18.
19 Ibid., 21.
20 See Germaine Buckley and Mitchell, “Weird Experience.” The game de-
scribed was “The Sorrow of Huntingdon Hall,” written by Jenny Wilkinson 
and Lee Wilkinson for The Dark Door in 2008.
21 This incident occurred during a game called “God Rest Ye Merry,” written 
and organized by the uk-based organisation, Crooked House, in 2015.
370
DISEASES OF THE HEAD
duce a performed space that provides narrative effects and ludic 
challenges in material form.
The production of performed space through fakery (such as 
pasteboard crenulations or a dummy wall) and incongruence 
(including the assembling of props from different time periods 
and contexts) results in the blurring of interpretive frames. Wal-
pole’s incongruent stylistic mash-up at Strawberry Hill deliber-
ately muddled distinctions such as that between art and real-
ity, inviting visitors to “walk into a painting” for example.22 In 
LARP, such perceptual dissonance often occurs at a ludic level, 
prompting anxiety over whether something is in-game or not. 
The fake wall was one extreme example of organizers manipu-
lating performed space to produce a particularly dramatic dis-
sonance, a chaotic moment when “in-character” and “out-of-
character” responses blurred as players scrambled to escape. In 
LARP, such blurrings, what players often call “bleed”, can func-
tion to problematize players’ experience of materiality. In addi-
tion, some objects are physical and solid, the home-made field 
generator, for example, or a skin-bound eldritch tome fashioned 
from painted latex. Yet, other props are more intangible; they 
might be part “phys-repped” and part described by a game ref-
eree, or they might comprise an image projected onto a screen. 
Yet, within the game world all such objects occupy the same, 
objectified reality. LARP discloses that which in everyday experi-
ence is unseen or unreal. 
The practical difficulties involved in materially manifesting 
some of the objects described in Lovecraft’s fiction calls for an 
ambiguous and loose definition of the word “prop.” In Walton’s 
work, the term prop does not only refer to physical objects but 
anything that “generates a fictional truth.”23 This broader defini-
tion works well for LARP, which incorporates some objects that 
are very physical and others that might be more intangible, like 
a video projection. Walton’s “props” also accord with Harman’s 
22 McEvoy, Gothic Tourism, 29.
23 Walton, “Metaphor and Prop-oriented Make Believe,” 59. See also Bate-
man, Imaginary Games, 95. 
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“objects,” which occupy the accessible, “sensual” realm and in-
clude “the centaur, Pegasus, unicorn, and hobbit” as well as trees 
and chairs. Harman also admits “larger emergent entities” like 
the European Union into his definition of sensual objects.24 Pe-
ter Gratton has suggested that such comments risk “an idealism 
worse than anything [Harman] critiques” and that Harman’s ex-
tension of the term “object” to anything and everything suggests 
a “literal nominalism in which words create things.”25 Gratton’s 
charges suggest serious problems at the heart of Harman’s avow-
edly realist project, but thinking about LARP props as examples 
of Gothic fakery and as dissonant objects, drawing out some 
connections with Harman’s schematics, allows a more generous 
assessment of object oriented ontology. Harman himself sug-
gests objects exist in multiple realms (the sensual and the real) 
and that tensions and torsions between objects and realms pro-
duce sensible effects. His analysis of Lovecraft’s fiction, in which 
he elucidates his “weird realism,” also suggests a necessary dose 
of the imaginary in any philosophical endeavour that seeks ac-
cess, however indirect, to the “outside.”26 Bennett’s work echoes 
this insistence on the importance of an “unrealistic imagina-
tion” in accessing the outside.27 Certainly, “Cthulhu” LARP at-
tempts to manifest indirect access to the outside in the most ma-
terial form possible (the foam and latex “shoggoth tentacles” I 
made for “Professor Lazarus’ Emporium of Wonders” are a good 
example), but it also insists upon the suspension of disbelief, 
demanding immersion in an imaginary narrative (i.e., walking 
into a Lovecraft story) and on players accepting the “fictional 
truths” prescribed by props, however home-made they might 
look. In this sense, LARP continues in a tradition of dramatiza-
tion inaugurated by Horace Walpole. Thus, in its Gothic fakery, 
24 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 7, 16.
25 Peter Gratton, Speculative Realism: Problems and Prospects (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2014), 99, 102.
26 Harman calls Lovecraft a “great hero to object-oriented thought” because 
of his explorations of tensions and gaps between real and sensual objects. 
Harman, Weird Realism, 5. 
27 Bennett, Vibrant Matter, 15.
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“Cthulhu” LARP is an exemplary activity in establishing the con-
nections between idealism and materialism that are necessary 
for any robust realist ontology.
Of course, LARP props might also be so effective that players 
have no need to roleplay fright or flight responses. Encounter-
ing a monster while alone in the subterranean corridors of a 
crumbling, Northumberland castle prompts an immediate em-
bodied response and a very real, adrenaline injection. In mo-
ments where props don’t only prescribe “fictional truths” but 
seem viscerally real, the response of player and character merge 
and the distinction between game and external reality collapses. 
Here, LARP most obviously achieves that quintessential Gothic 
effect described by Chris Baldick as the “sickening descent into 
disintegration.”28 Lovecraft’s stories, too, evoke Baldick’s Gothic 
effect in their depiction of a protagonist increasingly haunt-
ed by an eons-dead and long-forgotten truth, drawn to some 
claustrophobic space (for example, subterranean passages, the 
strange angle of an attic room, the bell tower of an abandoned 
church) and that protagonist’s eventual descent into madness 
as they glimpse the terrifying vistas of the cosmos. For all his 
rejection of clanking chains and skeletons, Lovecraft worked 
within the Gothic as well as innovating that related mode, the 
Weird.29 “Cthulhu” LARP likewise draws on both literary modes 
but almost always evokes a Gothic structure, wearing away at 
player-characters’ sanity and disintegrating their sense of a 
stable universe as the game progresses, disclosing or gestur-
ing to something chaotic beyond representation and socially-
constructed realities. “Cthulhu” LARP also makes the benign 
“magic circle,” described by Huizinga as central to play, into a 
claustrophobic trap familiar from Gothic novels. LARP enfolds 
players in a frenetic twenty-four-hour time-in experience, often 
ending in their characters’ deaths. This kind of LARP does not 
28 Chris Baldick, “Introduction,” in The Oxford Book of Gothic Tales (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1992), xix.
29 For a discussion of Lovecraft’s Gothic work, see Xavier Aldana Reyes, ed., 
The Gothic Tales of H.P. Lovecraft (London: The British Library, 2018).
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instill the mastery Huizinga and other theorists associate with 
play culture, but rather produces as the intended outcome the 
disintegration of a coherent, anchored sense of identity. In this 
thoroughly “dark play,” such disintegrations of selfhood are not 
simply psychological, but potentially metaphysical. 
Finally, “Cthulhu” LARP and the Gothic are both forms that 
draw attention to surfaces and to the strange disjunctions be-
tween presence and absence that manifest on the surface of sen-
sual or perceptual experience. Exploring this surface of experi-
ence, which is so heightened in LARP, is the route to speculating 
about what lies beyond the correlationist gap, as this is where 
we encounter emerging and withdrawing objects, where we 
glimpse the vibrancy of things and feel the effects of their agen-
cy. The mechanics of LARP and the fakery of the Gothic alike 
evoke an awareness of the surface. For example, the use of ex-
plicit fakery in LARP asks players to be immersed in a narrative 
but also recognize certain objects as props, an act that would 
seem to puncture immersion within the game but actually aids 
it. That is, such puncturing through recognition is necessary for 
the ludic mechanics: players need to recognize game props as 
such in order to negotiate the game.30 This recognition echoes 
techniques found in the Gothic mode, which habitually draws 
attention to itself via meta-textuality. Walpole inaugurates such 
meta-textual playfulness with his first preface to Otranto, an-
nouncing the novel as a found manuscript. 
Eve Sedgwick notes that Gothic’s concern with the surface 
is also seen in its emphasis on tropes and not depths. She ar-
gues that Gothic draws attention to the veil rather than the face 
underneath, for example, evoking “a sense of doubleness where 
30 Here my arguments echo Janet Murray’s comments on immersion and 
narrative. Murray is often maligned in game studies, but two of her 
insights are valuable here. First, she suggests that interactivity and im-
mersion reinforce one another. Second, she argues that we must be able 
to define the boundaries of a narrative before we can become immersed 
within it. See Janet Murray, Hamlet on the Holodeck: The Future of Narra-
tive in Cyberspace (New York: The Free Press, 1997), 114, 129.
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singleness should be.”31 Another way of understanding Sedg-
wick’s claim is that Gothic is interested in the objects that mani-
fest on the surface and on their surface effects, and not, as has 
been most often understood, on treating those objects as ciphers 
or metaphors that reveal human psychology. Gothic doubleness 
materialized at a horror LARP I played that was held at an ex-
military bunker.32 The bunker was already populated by items 
that looked appropriate for the setting of the game. However, the 
bunker was also a museum, so players were not allowed to touch 
the native items. Consequently, players needed to differentiate 
between game items and museum exhibits as they navigated the 
space. Prop fakery became a signifier of narrative authenticity 
and, in the process, the bunker became a doubled space. In-
game objects formed a layer over the real objects, which receded 
from the game world into a spectral background that, paradoxi-
cally, remained on the surface of experience. Lovecraft’s fiction 
pays attention to such disjunctive surface layers in stories such 
as “From Beyond.” Here, with the help of a machine, the protag-
onist becomes aware of a second terrifying world of experience 
that over-layers that of the everyday.
Paradoxical Props: Object Oriented Ontology
Thus far I have suggested some of the technical and thematic 
ways in which “Cthulhu” LARP props produce paradoxical and 
disjunctive experiences for players. Reading these experiences 
alongside Harman’s object-oriented ontology suggests how 
LARP might constitute a disruption of everyday, common-sense 
conceptions of reality for human perceivers and that it offers 
its own challenge to correlationist thought that would “debunk 
objects and deny their autonomy.”33 Harman, contends that ma-
teriality is composed of paradoxical objects that are not only fig-
31 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, The Coherence of Gothic Conventions (New York: 
Methuen, 1986), 13.
32 This game was “The Atlantis Legacy,” written and organized by David 
Garwood for The Dark Door in 2014.
33 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 6.
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ments of the mind of a human perceiver, nor “mere aggregates” 
of smaller pieces.34 In his metaphysical schema, objects are au-
tonomous, something more than only their “pieces,” and always 
partly withhold themselves from relations with other entities.35 
Such objects are paradoxical because they both have and do not 
have the properties they are ascribed in classical metaphysics, 
that is “accidents, qualities, relations and moment.”36 Harman’s 
object oriented ontology suggests that objects reveal themselves 
in contact with other objects and that this contact includes but 
is not limited to human perception. Objects are tricky because 
they are both noumenal and phenomenological, relational but 
with an essential kernel that evades all relations; they also pos-
sess a surface “eidos” but are comprised of shifting surface quali-
ties that elude totalisation. Much of Harman’s work focuses on 
exploring these tensions. Indeed, Gratton suggests that the term 
“tension” is key to Harman’s metaphysics; it “brings together 
(fusion) and it drives apart (fission) the object within itself.”37 
These tensions become apparent in the way props function in 
LARP and are central to the form’s affective dimension and me-
chanics of immersion.   
LARP props reverse everyday experiences of the material 
world in which objects tend to withdraw from conscious access. 
The conception of reality as “withdrawn” is one coordinate of 
Harman’s metaphysics and one of the sources of tension within 
and between objects.38 For Heidegger, objects withdraw from 
conscious access, only coming to notice when they cease to func-
tion properly. Harman designates this coming-to-notice as the 
result of failure, but suggests it can never be addressed since our 
becoming conscious of things never grasps “the whole of their 
reality.”39 LARP illuminates the tension of “withdrawal” and “fail-




37 Gratton, Speculative Realism, 102.
38 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 39.
39 Ibid.
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man perception operates, demanding that normally withdrawn 
objects make themselves known. While in our everyday lives, 
books on a shelf recede into murky noumena and exist beyond 
conscious perception; in a LARP, they might contain a vital clue 
such as a scrap of paper or some journal pages hastily stuffed 
inside or between them. Thus, the shelf of books must obtrude 
into the players’ experience. Sometimes, the recognition de-
manded by the ludic frame achieves such obtrusion on its own 
and players search the seemingly innocent bookshelf because it 
is likely something could be hidden there. At other times, work 
is needed to bring withdrawn objects to notice. At one game, a 
referee placed a magazine we had all been ignoring near an open 
door, so the wind would ruffle its pages: she was becoming quite 
frustrated that we had not picked up the magazine or realised 
that it contained important information! Games are also littered 
with broken objects that obtrude in unhelpful ways. Broken ra-
dios, out-of-order telephones, and generators that have run out 
of fuel are a few examples of suddenly obtrusive objects that ex-
ert agency and work against the players’ chances of successfully 
solving the game scenario. Failure is central to “Cthulhu” LARP, 
and props are often used in the wrong way, especially if they are 
of eldritch provenance. Players have many theories about what 
an object is or how it might be used, but they are always guess-
ing, or only partially understanding the object’s provenance and 
purpose. Even if they manage to put together a partial solution 
that successfully unlocks one of the object’s powers, they will 
not have grasped the whole of its reality. 
Harman’s insistence upon “tension” also suggests that ob-
jects are not unified, but in strife with their internal qualities. 
Harman describes this as “fission”: “the qualities of the thing 
break off from the thing as a whole.”40 Another formulation of 
this tension is that it manifests a gap between the sensual object 
and its sensual qualities, that is, an object we encounter in the 
perceptual realm via our senses but that has myriad and shift-
ing qualities. As Harman points out, Lovecraft’s writing is re-
40 Harman, Weird Realism, 242.
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plete with such gaps; his “language is overloaded by a glutton-
ous excess of surfaces and aspects of the thing.”41 The stylistic 
world of Lovecraft is one in which real objects are in tension 
with the crippled powers of language and where visible objects 
“display unbearable seismic torsion with their own qualities.”42 
This crippled language suggests a narrator’s inability to corre-
late the multitude of surfaces and qualities they encounter into 
a unified whole. LARP organizers try to replicate Lovecraft’s 
gluttonous excess of surfaces through the creation of elaborate 
monster costumes, which aim to evoke an encounter for players 
in which they are unable to take in the whole of the creature, to 
fully make sense of its seeming myriad qualities. Practically, this 
involves layering latex onto foam and adding mixed media ma-
terials to produce lumpen, glistening, uneven shapes. Monster 
costumes made for a single person to wear might include stilts 
to add height, extra limbs, or protruding tentacles. We might 
add LED lights, programmed to display random patterns in the 
darkness. Monsters should never be fully seen, especially not 
in the daylight. They are most effective when encountered as a 
series of fragmented and disjointed qualities: strange lights in 
the darkness beyond the house, a bulky shape in the doorway, 
an impossibly tall shadow, the swipe of a glistening limb as you 
try to escape. 
Another weird aspect of objects is described by Harman as 
the “interbreeding between real and sensual realms.”43 This is 
when the normally inaccessible, “real” object, as opposed to 
the accessible “sensual” object, slides into the accessible realm, 
exerting force there. This prompts a form of indirect contact 
with the real through a tension Harman describes as “fusion”: 
“Instead of the direct sort of contact that we have with sensual 
objects, there is an allusion to the silent object in the depths 
that becomes vaguely fused with its legion of sensual qualities.”44 
41 Ibid., 25.
42 Ibid., 27.
43 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 105.
44 Ibid., 104.
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Lovecraft’s fiction explores such fusion through its allusion to 
the existence of inter- or extra-dimensional beings. Cthulhu in-
fluences dreamers from his sunken hibernation in the depths 
of the Pacific in “The Call of Cthulhu,” for example, and Craw-
ford Tillinghast is seemingly consumed by some creature that 
emerges briefly when his “resonance generator” fuses the hu-
man sensual realm of the everyday with another, more terrify-
ing realm, in the short story “From Beyond.” “Cthulhu” LARP 
draws on these Lovecraftian scenarios in its themes and plots, 
of course, but it also produces strange moments of fusion in its 
attempts to render in physical form interdimensional monsters. 
Briefly, a “real” object might emerge from a bundle of sensual 
qualities. Something like this happened to me when I assisted 
a friend as he prepared an elaborate monster costume, intend-
ed to represent a “Hound of Tindalos,” a creature invented by 
Frank Belknap Long. We were in the basement of a dilapidated, 
Georgian property, away from the players who were immersed 
in the game a few floors above. I helped my friend attach each 
separate piece of the costume to his body, which included some 
comic struggling with awkward stilt-like limbs that attached 
to his arms. I did not register anything strange about the com-
ponents, and I was not immersed in the game narrative, only 
assisting behind the scenes. However, something occurred 
when my friend donned the last segment of the costume. He 
hunched over and placed the forearms of the stilt-like limbs on 
the ground, producing a distinctly unhuman shape and posture. 
I stepped back to view the effect and felt a moment of horrifying 
shock, a little rush of adrenaline, the desire to flee the basement. 
Then, my friend spoke, tightened a fastening, and the effect was 
dissipated. Whatever horrifying, real object had momentarily 
emerged, disappeared. The incident recalls Harman’s imaginary 
scenario in which qualities fuse “with an object that we do not 
normally associate with them. […] [T]his results in an object 
that feels real simply because it is too difficult to register vividly 




in its entirety was, however briefly, difficult for me to register as 
a normal, sensual object: it was genuinely frightening. Here, the 
many sensual qualities of the monster costume, which I had no 
trouble accounting for earlier, momentarily fused with a more 
disturbing whole. Of course, the incident required a human per-
ceiver to disclose the real object. Moreover, the moment of dis-
quietude I felt was the result of an involuntary performance of 
the man in the costume adjusting his posture to produce an ef-
fect something like the emergence of a real object. In this sense, 
the incident illustrates what Harman calls the “allusive” nature 
of Lovecraft’s writing. Often, his stories present a phenomenon 
(for example, the appearance of an Old One that cannot be fully 
described by a narrator) that offers indirect access to the nou-
menal realm.46 Such is the difficulty of getting outside the closed 
circle of correlationism, limiting Lovecraft, and Harman, to an 
“oblique sort of access to reality” via objects as they appear in 
the perceptual realm. At the same time “things in themselves 
must have autonomy from their relation to us, or they are not 
the things in themselves.”47 What is interesting about the inci-
dent I describe, however, is that it occurred outside the narrative 
frame of the game and so did not only rely on the agency of a 
human perceiver in the form of a story narrator or player-char-
acter. That is, when I was frightened by the Hound of Tindalos I 
was under no obligation to suspend disbelief because I was not 
immersed in a story. The encounter was prompted by the object 
that coalesced from the costume components, suggesting a link 
between Harman’s fusion and Bennett’s “thing-power.” This lat-
ter concept provides another way of getting beyond the correla-
tionist circle, evinced by Bennet’s description of stumbling upon 
a collection of stuff discarded in the street. She describes how 
the collection of objects “exhibited” its thing-power: “it issued a 
call even if I did not quite understand what it was saying.”48 The 
46 Ibid., 25.
47 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 53.
48 Bennett, Vibrant Matter, 4.
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intrusion of thing-power not only points to non-human actants 
but to the outside of human experience and understanding.   
Of course, most affective encounters with props occur within 
the game and narrative frames of LARP. The in-game narrative 
of a “Cthulhu” LARP often revolves around an important prop 
that operates both in the sensual realm and in a realm beyond 
human perception: the field generator and archaeological frag-
ments discussed above, for example. The fragments turned out 
to be parts of a damaged beacon from an ancient alien space-
craft that had crashed thousands of years ago. Individually, the 
fragments exerted physical and psychical effects upon players, 
making them visibly unwell and affecting their behaviour. Some 
properties of the fragments could be investigated using in-game 
medical and scientific skills, but to unlock their more esoteric 
secrets, players had to find other ways of accessing the object. 
An in-character, drug-induced trance led to some revelatory 
visions and began to gesture towards the elusive, real essence 
of the objects we had uncovered. Although Lovecraft has been 
characterized as a strict materialist, the monsters and artifacts 
in his stories are not mere “arrangement[s] of electrons.”49 Har-
man’s objects, too, cannot be reduced to their atoms and elec-
trons. LARP scenarios often draw out this irreducible materiality 
through props that suggest a reality beyond the measure of the 
scientific method. The scientist and the medical doctor could 
only reveal so much: in this game it was the hippy and the phi-
losophy student characters whose visions allowed the players to 
“fuse” the fragments into a whole, making the beacon function, 
and allowing the plot to progress. 
Non-Separation: LARP and the “Magic Circle” 
Although Harman presents his metaphysics in the form of 
four quadrants, his account of tensions between real and sen-
sual objects implies a dualist ontology, a reality comprised of 
49 Michel Houellebecq, H.P. Lovecraft: Against the World, Against Life (Lon-
don: Gollancz, 2008), 32.
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two realms. At the same time, Harman’s concepts of “fusion” 
and “fission” also suggest non-separation between these realms. 
Lovecraft’s fiction likewise invites a Kantian interpretation 
wherein the phenomenal realm of human perception gives way 
to the murky noumena of eldritch beings and unplumbed space, 
but this separation of noumena and phenomena simplifies the 
paradoxical maneuver that is a Lovecraftian encounter with the 
“outside.” As Eugene Thacker suggests, horror fiction has long 
been engaged in confronting the paradoxical proposition that 
the world is, in reality, a “world-in-itself ” beyond the access of 
human thought. Horror fiction confronts the human-centric 
concept of the “world-for-us” with a nebulous “world-without-
us,” a simultaneously “impersonal and horrific” zone between 
the “for-us” and the “in-itself.”50 This horrific “world-without-
us” discloses that the “great outdoors” is not out there, but al-
ready within and around us. It is just that we fail to recognize 
this fact. Thacker suggests that the trope of the magic circle in 
horror fiction reveals something of this hidden yet omnipres-
ent world-in-itself. Analyzing examples from William Hope 
Hodgson’s Carnacki stories and Lovecraft’s “From Beyond,” 
Thacker argues that the magic circle, traditionally held to serve 
as a protective barrier for the human occultist, becomes a portal 
to “another dimension,” focusing and intensifying the passage 
between seemingly separate realms. In “From Beyond,” the ef-
fect of Tillinghast’s resonator is to expand the parameters of the 
magic circle such that the non-separation expands outwards 
into infinity.51 In this story, the bounded nature of the experi-
ment dissolves entirely, playing havoc with the Kantian separa-
tion of phenomena and noumena.
Magic circles are a common prop in “Cthulhu” LARP. They 
may provide the means through which players open the pas-
sage between what is designated “natural” and “supernatural,” 
or function as a device for summoning or expelling interdimen-
50 Eugene Thacker, In the Dust of This Planet: Horror of Philosophy, Volume I 
(Winchester: Zero Books, 2011), 5, 6.
51 Ibid., 62, 72, 77.
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sional creatures. Often, the magic circle is a source of in-game 
entrapment: in one game I designed, we placed a circle of mark-
er stones around the boundaries of a property. These had been 
activated to provide a circle of protection by a non-player-char-
acter, but because our player-characters had been “infected” by 
a monster’s spawn, they were not able to leave the confines of 
the circle.52 Beyond the game narrative, however, the magic cir-
cle performs a structural and ludic function. Indeed, LARP itself 
produces a ritually enacted space in which players are bound 
for the duration of the event. Huizinga draws on the metaphor 
of the magic circle to describe the ritualistic aspect of play: it 
suggests play is a temporary sphere of activity with a disposition 
all its own.53 Later theorists see this magic circle as constructing 
a “psychological bubble that allows for a playful mindset” or a 
“social contract” to manifest in space and time.54 “Cthulhu” LARP 
often exploits and emphasizes this ludic structure, marking out 
the game space in materially distinct ways to emphasize feel-
ings of entrapment. Props such as the boundary marker stones 
in “Who Do You Think You Are?” merge player and character 
frames by providing an in-game reason for staying within the 
game space, otherwise, a sensible character would probably run 
away, necessitating their player leaving the game, while also cre-
ating affect around the themes of isolation and claustrophobia. 
Thus, LARP transforms the structure of play’s “magic circle” into 
a ludic challenge (find a way to escape) and a source of horror. A 
form of “dark play,” the psychological bubble and social contract 
of the play space become sources of in-game punishment, stress 
and fear. The magic circle in “Cthulhu” LARP is not simply a 
psychological or social device, suggesting that the laws and cus-
toms of everyday life no longer count for the duration of play. It 
is a structure that reveals the usually “hidden” non-separation 
of different orders of reality. When players enter a “Cthulhu” 
52 This game was “Who Do You Think You Are?” written and organized 
by Laura Mitchell and Chloé Germaine Buckley for Disturbing Events in 
2009. 
53 Huizinga, Homo Ludens, 8.
54 Linderoth and Mortensen, “Dark Play,” 5.
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LARP they do not know what will happen to their characters, 
but they can expect some form of cosmic horror. The bounded 
nature of LARP (an activity of limited duration that demands 
immersion, taking place in a relatively constrained space) blurs 
character and player experience of space, time, and objects in 
ways that are designed to feel unsafe, challenging, that seek to 
expose player-characters to the “outside” of human experience. 
As Thacker states, the magic circle in “From Beyond” reveals 
the already existing non-separation between natural and super-
natural, the “here and now,” and the “beyond.”55 In Lovecraft’s 
story, the climax turns upon a magical-scientific prop, Tilling-
hast’s machine, which renders visible a monstrous reality that 
constitutes the “outside” of human perception. Most horrify-
ing is the revelation that the two worlds are not separate at all, 
but that the “beyond” is already within and around us. Turning 
on the machine brings the protagonist into Tillinghast’s magic 
circle, a bounded space, that paradoxically dissolves separation 
and expands such that the bounded nature of the experiment 
also dissolves: the protagonist becomes immersed in another 
realm that was already there. LARP likewise functions to invite 
players into a magic circle, a discrete space with clear spatial 
boundaries and temporal limits. Game organizers call “Time In” 
and “Time Out” to signal the beginning and end of play. They 
also mark the borders of the play space, indicating, for example, 
that a particular copse of trees at the boundary of a property is 
“in game,” but the road beyond a fence post is not. Nonetheless, 
once play begins such boundaries dissolve in the construction 
of a shared narrative. Almost always, the player-characters en-
counter a threat “from beyond” that will engulf or consume the 
game world, a world that extends far beyond a copse of trees or 
a fence post. Likewise, though player-characters may be trapped 
within a house, they might experience a terrifying vision of 
the cosmos or catch a glimpse of an eons-dead world, of vistas 
of incalculable dimensions, reminiscent of descriptions from 
Lovecraftian fiction. These “visions” are often narrated by game 
55 Thacker, In the Dust of This Planet, 77.
384
DISEASES OF THE HEAD
organizers and such in-game “set-pieces” function to suggest 
the “cosmic” scale of the game. The initially bounded play space 
(Huizinga’s magic circle) becomes what Thacker describes as a 
“magic site,” no longer a strictly demarked location marked by 
“human governance” of the borders between apparent and hid-
den worlds.56 The magic site is where the hidden world intrudes 
into the human world; it creeps forth with unhuman entities 
and independent objects, and threatens expansion beyond its 
porous edges. 
Within the game narrative, a magic circle is also a prop that 
prescribes an affective encounter with the “outside.” Players are 
often drawn into a dramatic climax whereby they must draw a 
magic circle to begin a ritual, perhaps to banish a creature to an-
other dimension or close a “portal” that threatens their reality, 
but once the circle is cast it immediately produces the sense of 
metaphysical non-separation evoked in “From Beyond,” calling 
forth the very monsters the ritual is designed to expel. Typically, 
this situation results in a lone player huddled in the middle of a 
hastily rendered magic circle, fumbling with various crumpled 
papers containing scrawled translations and half-legible notes, 
attempting to deliver a ritual the players have devised over the 
course of the game, while the remaining survivors fend off at-
tack at the edges of the circle from numerous monsters. At the 
end, most of the defenders are dead and the caster is likely in-
sane. Hopefully, the ritual has done the trick, with a significant 
human cost, but often it fails and the game ends in total defeat. 
Here, the magic circle may have represented an attempt at “ac-
tive human governance of the boundary between the apparent 
world and the hidden world,”57 but its failure is built into the 
narrative and ludic tendencies of “Cthulhu” LARP, which echoes 
its source material in providing little opportunity for victory. 
The occult themes in “Cthulhu” LARP also blur distinctions be-
tween the natural and the supernatural, and science and magic, 





fragments of in-game knowledge gleaned from folklore, eldritch 
writings, and scientific or pseudo-scientific theories. One of the 
most exhausting and terrifying rituals I have enacted in-game 
took place in a folk horror setting, but combined elements of 
folk superstition with real-world mathematics and physics. This 
game, called “The Black Goat,”58 culminated in a ritual held in 
the pitch-black woods in an attempt to hold back a nefarious 
and unseen omnipresent power. We stood in a circle beneath 
the trees and chanted over and over: “Molecules remain in 
your natural state and vibrate with consistency and constancy.” 
Thankfully, in this instance, we prevailed, and our molecules re-
mained mercifully unchanged!
Making Monsters: “Thing-Power” in Cthulhu LARP
The vibrating molecules evoked in “The Black Goat” suggest the 
vibrant or vital materiality expounded by Jane Bennett. While 
Harman is concerned with orienting ontology around autono-
mous objects to combat anthropocentric correlationism, Bennett 
exhorts readers to stop thinking of “matter as passive stuff ” and 
to begin to account for the “active role of nonhuman materials.”59 
Harman’s recourse to horror literature is explicit: Lovecraft pro-
vides an imaginative language of weird monstrosity that allows 
Harman to elucidate his ontological schema. In contrast, there is 
nothing necessarily horrifying about Bennett’s account of vital 
materialism, though it accords with some Lovecraftian themes 
particularly in its insistence on dismantling “fantasies of a hu-
man uniqueness […], escape from materiality, or of mastery of 
nature.”60 Rather than discrete Newtonian objects extended and 
moving in a noumenal realm, Bennett describes a paradoxically 
plural monism, an immanent field composed of “various and 
variable materialities” that “collude, congeal, morph, evolve, and 
58 “The Black Goat” was written and organized by Jenny Wilkinson and Lee 
Wilkinson for The Dark Door in 2017.
59 Bennett, Vibrant Matter, vii, 2. 
60 Ibid., vii.
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disintegrate.”61 Bennett is keen to jettison the static term “ob-
ject” and its implied subject/object binarism, pointing instead to 
the liveliness of things, to the “strange ability of ordinary, man-
made items to exceed their status as objects and to manifest 
traces of independence or aliveness constituting the outside of 
our own experience.”62 “Cthulhu” LARP’s evocation of Lovecraft-
ian themes — through encounters with strange props, its mate-
rial manifestation of weird monsters, and its demand for play-
ers to immerse themselves in an affective experience of cosmic 
horror — attempts its own unique evocation of the nonhuman 
world Bennett describes. While Bennett attempts to use “argu-
ment and other rhetorical means to induce in human bodies 
an aesthetic affective openness to material vitality,”63 “Cthulhu” 
LARP encourages its players to experience the strangeness of 
materiality through the vibrant colors, strange textures, and dis-
sonant sounds used in the production of props.
Although there is a degree of fakery and a DIY aesthetic to 
many LARP props, they are nonetheless produced to enchant 
the players, to encourage the suspension of disbelief and im-
mersion in the narrative of the game. Bennett’s ontology em-
phasizes the importance of such enchantment as a form of af-
fect that might cultivate openness to material vitality. In LARP, 
props must provoke quasi-emotional responses or, perhaps, 
even genuine emotional responses in moments of “bleed” when 
real-world and game-world frames collapse such that player and 
character respond as one. The crumbling wall discussed above 
is one such example of “bleed” intended by the LARP organizers 
to prompt real emotional and bodily affect in the players. Not all 
moments of enchantment are as dramatic as this. It may be that 
a player sits for several hours, turning over an object, discussing 
strange markings on its surface, tracing patterns with their fin-
gers. Perhaps they must spend a significant amount of time “in-






the composition of the rock or the properties of the strange 
metal. These activities are common in LARP and suggest the 
enchanting power of props to promote immersion within the 
game whilst also evoking a Lovecraftian thematic of mysterious 
“thing-power”: these props offer a glimpse of the outside of hu-
man experience and mark the limits of human understanding. 
Encounters with objects in LARP also evoke the two directions 
of enchantment that Bennett describes: “the first toward the hu-
mans who feel enchanted and whose agentic capacities may be 
thereby strengthened, and the second toward the agency of the 
things that produce (helpful, harmful) effects.”64 The ludic frame 
of LARP produces such two-way encounters with objects. Time 
spent under the spell of an important prop in the game often 
confers upon player the knowledge or capability to unlock the 
next puzzle. For example, after meditating for several hours on 
the carved fragments uncovered at the archaeological dig in “X 
Marks the Spot,” I was given a vision of how the fragments had 
come to be buried under the ground and glimpsed their possible 
provenance and function. There are also less useful moments of 
enchantment that nonetheless have ludic and narrative effects: 
a player becomes obsessed with a strange amulet, for example, 
which exerts a psychical influence driving the character mad 
over the course of the game. A “mad” character acting under the 
influence of a strange object is a problem for the other players 
and threatens their ability to win or survive the game.
Outside of the game, players and organizers devote a lot of 
time to planning, designing and building props, and develop-
ing competencies in various crafts (for example, sewing, paint-
ing, working with liquid latex) to improve on props for future 
games. Often, we are experimenting with mixed media and us-
ing what materials we can source cheaply. Sometimes, we are 
not quite sure what the effects or outcome will be of our efforts. 
Some prop effects occur by chance, the happy result of how 
materials congeal or react with one another. I once spent a few 
weeks covering an old plastic doll in layers of liquid latex, green 
64 Ibid., xii–xiii.
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paint, and synthetic ivy for “Who Do You Think You Are?” I 
knew I wanted to make a horrid, plant-baby-creature for one of 
our monsters to carry around, but I wasn’t sure what I wanted 
the “baby” to look like or even if I would use the prop as it wasn’t 
crucial to the narrative. I layered, painted, and sculpted until a 
“thing” emerged and it turned out to be one of the most terrify-
ing props in the game. On another occasion, an accident with a 
glue gun, which leaked all over a clay mould, made my “shining 
trapezohedron” much more horrifyingly effective than in the 
original design. In both cases material objects (doll, latex, glue 
gun) and human agency (me as prop-builder) became co-con-
spiratorial actants in the production of an affective in-game en-
counter for the player-characters. However, the objects did not 
become subordinate to a human master: the props that emerged 
from our encounter were as much the work of the materials as 
any human intention.
Game organizers work with mixed media to create the ef-
fect of hybridity, to produce monsters inspired by Lovecraft’s 
“revolutionary teratology.”65 As China Miéville notes, Lovecraft-
ian monsters are a “radical break with anything from a folkloric 
tradition. Rather than werewolves, vampires, or ghosts, Love-
craft’s monsters are agglomerations of bubbles, barrels, cones, 
and corpses, patchworked from cephalopods, insects, crusta-
ceans, and other fauna.”66 More than this, monsters in “Cthul-
hu” LARP attempt to convey category disruptions such that life/
matter binaries and hierarchies of life forms imposed by human 
knowledge on the material world are disrupted. Bennett’s vital 
materialism argues for the same category disruptions, for the 
recognition of the animate in plants, or the vegetable in ani-
mals.67 For “Who Do You Think You Are,” we produced a “Dark 
Young.” This nonhuman, animal-plant hybrid was about seven 
feet tall. The upper part comprised a “trunk” and “branches” 
65 China Miéville, “Weird Fiction,” in The Routledge Companion to Science 
Fiction, eds. Mark Bould, Andrew M. Butler, Adam Roberts, and Sherryl 
Vint (London: Routledge, 2009), 512.
66 Ibid. 
67 Bennett, Vibrant Matter, 8.
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made from a plastic and metal frame covered in foam, latex, 
and paint, to which branch-like tentacles, fake flora, and flash-
ing lights were affixed. We added numerous eyes and mouths 
rendered in foam and latex. The lower part of the costume was 
a simple pair of goat-leg trousers made from fake fur and worn 
over stilts to add height. The inanimate objects (foam, pipe lag-
ging, latex, synthetic fur, and silk plants) produced a seemingly 
shifting surface of monstrous life and vitality. A similar effect 
was produced in “X Marks the Spot,” for which the organizers 
constructed monster costumes from cloth garments covered in 
foam, latex, paint, and flickering LEDs. In the game narrative, 
these terrifying creatures had been conjured from the mud and 
branches that littered the copse of trees behind the house. In 
this example, the “magic site” physically intruded into the hu-
man spaces of the game, invading the house and attacking the 
player-characters. 
Though representing the fundamentally unhuman creatures 
of Lovecraft’s stories, LARP monsters are almost always material-
human hybrids because the costumes must be worn and ma-
nipulated by the game organizers. Their terrifying effects can-
not be produced through the materials alone. Rather, inanimate 
materials and human bodies interact to produce the generative 
prop. As Bennett argues, agency — defined as a source of ac-
tion or the power to effect other bodies — is almost always the 
result of a combination of human and non-human “actants.”68 
A recognition that human agency “is itself a kind of thing-
power”69 resonates in “Cthulhu” LARP where game themes of-
ten revolve upon player-characters merging with or becoming 
monstrous. In “Professor Lazarus’s Emporium of Wonders” our 
players were constantly under threat of being absorbed into the 
shoggoth, becoming part of a monster that comprised all the 
characters who had died joined together by a network of um-
bilical cords — made from tangled rope covered in latex and 
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that was itself composed entirely of inanimate materials as de-
scribed above. “Cthulhu” LARP’s themes also bring to the fore 
the materiality of the human body, what Bennett describes as 
“the minerality of our bones, or the metal of our blood, or the 
electricity of our neurons.”70 Bennett notes that we acknowledge 
this composition but rarely conceive of these materials in them-
selves as lively and self-organizing.71 In “Cthulhu” LARP, though, 
the materials of the human body interact with inanimate props, 
co-producing a new prop in the course of the game narrative. In 
such cases, vibrant-material actants congeal with human bod-
ies but do not become subsumed within human agency, retain-
ing something of their thing-power. In “X Marks the Spot,” the 
characters’ blood was needed, along with a jolt of electricity, to 
fuse the separate fragments of the alien beacon into a unified 
object that could communicate with the creatures threatening 
human existence. Yet, the object retained something of its alien-
ness, never fully disclosing the reality of the unhuman realm 
from which it originated. Encounters with monsters and props 
in “Cthulhu” LARP often constitute this kind of demand: they 
require a response, a reciprocation from the human characters 
to become receptive to the “outside,” both to the realm of things 
and to their own thing-power without those material objects be-
coming wholly subsumed within a world-for-us.
Conclusions
This exploration of the intersection between horror, play, and 
speculative philosophy suggests the philosophical nature of 
game playing and the potential of LARP, in particular, to pro-
duce embodied and affective experiences that might illuminate 
both speculative realist and new materialist rhetoric. LARP’s 
prop-oriented framework emphasizes objects and things as 
lively, autonomous, and agentic. The relationship between the 
Gothic tradition and LARP also exposes some of the weird spa-




tial transformations that props generate during the game. Cer-
tainly, Gothic fakery plays a role in the blurring of distinctions 
between game and reality and thus between materiality and the 
intangible. LARP props also allow for a generous reading of Har-
man’s object oriented ontology, giving an embodied account 
of the “tensions” Harman describes between phenomenal and 
noumenal realms, between the sensual and the real. Moreover, 
LARP monster costumes and props hybridize the material with 
the vital, the human with the material, and the plant with the 
animal, evoking Bennett’s “thing-power,” itself an effect of the 
outside of human experience that both speculative realists and 
new materialists wish to explore. Specifically, “Cthulhu” LARP 
naïvely attempts to make concrete the processes of allusion pre-
sent in Lovecraft’s writing. Allusion is important to Harman, 
because it provides access “to something that might be real, but 
which can never be fully present.”72 LARP concretizes allusive 
processes, attempting to produce an embodied and affective 
encounter with a strange and vibrant materiality, a materiality 
which humans are a part of but which they cannot master. 
Perhaps there is also an ethical dimension to the naïveté ex-
emplified in LARP. LARP is a form of game-playing that demands 
a child-like surrender of disbelief and a commitment to immer-
sion but also a willingness to engage in “dark play,” which may 
deceive or disturb its players. Bennett, whose work is alert to the 
essential relationship between ethics and ontology, argues that 
ethics begins with “the recognition of human participation in 
a shared, vital materiality. […] The ethical task at hand here is 
to cultivate the ability to discern nonhuman vitality, to become 
perceptually open to it.”73 The demands LARP makes on its play-
ers cultivates this discernment, demanding that they pay close 
attention to objects’ “qualitative moments.”74 LARP is a form of 
training to perceive the “invisible field that surrounds and in-
fuses the world of objects,” but it is a training that requires a 
72 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 68.  
73 Bennett, Vibrant Matter, 14.
74 Ibid.
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willingness to “play the fool,” a state Bennett suggests is neces-
sary to correct and “chasten our will to mastery.”75 This ethical-
ontological dimension of LARP provides a counter to accounts of 
play that see it as a fundamentally human activity. Miguel Sicart, 
for example, suggests that play is a humanist mode, a funda-
mental part of our moral well-being, of the healthy, mature, and 
complete human life.76 Human agency is front and center in this 
account: humans construct and deconstruct the world through 
play. In contrast, my reading of LARP suggests the inverse: that 
such “dark play” forces its players to account for the unhuman 
nature of reality, to consider that fact that it is the world that 
makes us. 
75 Ibid., 15.
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Sublime Horror in the Tales of  
E.T.A. Hoffmann
Hamad Al-Rayes
The schizophrene, the cyclothyme,
Pass from the droll to the sublime.
 — Lawrence Durrell1
Part 1: The Tales of Hoffmann
Hoffmann Who?
Reading the fantastical tales of E.T.A. Hoffmann (1776–1822) 
implicates one in a period of immense cultural upheaval. In 
terms of bearing witness to the bursting forth of a new time, 
the impact of Hoffmann’s cohort in Berlin and Dresden on the 
self-understanding of modern subjectivity ranks with that of 
the Greeks in relation to the classical era. In Athens we find a 
first cohesive and self-aware expression of autonomous “self-in-
stitution” — to borrow Cornelius Castoriadis’s term2 — the un-
precedented event of a human social formation consciously and 
1 Lawrence Durrell and James Gifford, From the Elephant’s Back: Collected 
Essays & Travel Writings (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2015), 
101.
2 Cornelius Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, trans. Kathleen 
Blamey (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998).
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deliberately setting forth the law out of itself. A similar drama 
of self-formation unfolds in the annals of German thought after 
the French Revolution, precipitating an obsession with ques-
tions of Bildung or formative cultural education. During these 
years of early romanticism, political self-institution seemed to 
coincide with the poetic ideal of giving birth to oneself, the car-
dinal struggle of the romantic persona,3 which in the midst of 
the collapse of a bygone order must reevaluate the underpin-
nings of its very existence and recreate its values and sensibil-
ity anew. With the consolidation of romanticism as an all-em-
bracing cultural tendency, we find the contradictions of political 
self-institution casting their pall on the intimate caverns of the 
imagination, undermining the integrity of human experience at 
its innermost core. Hoffmann’s writings find their key context in 
this historical situation.
It does not detract from Hoffmann’s contribution to roman-
tic aesthetics that he was not a philosopher but rather a story-
teller and music critic. Although a contemporary of Immanuel 
Kant and a compatriot of Kant’s Königsberg, Hoffmann was not 
concerned with the problems of transcendental idealism.4 From 
his letters, it is fair to assume that he attended some of Kant’s 
local lectures. We know that he’d read Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph 
von Schelling and was very much impressed by the work of 
some of Schelling’s disciples in the natural sciences.5 A contro-
versial though somewhat minor figure during his own lifetime, 
Hoffmann lived to see the commercial success of his own opera, 
Undine, and was in fact embraced by the luminaries of the age. 
Jean Paul, a doyen of German romantic letters, wrote the preface 
to Hoffmann’s first collection of short stories, which included 
his pioneering tales of horror and the supernatural. Hoffmann 
3 Harold Bloom, Poetry and Repression: Revisionism from Blake to Stevens 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), 28f.
4 Steven Cassedy, “Beethoven the Romantic: How E.T.A. Hoffmann Got It 
Right,” Journal of the History of Ideas 71, no. 1 (2009): 1–37.
5 E.T.A. Hoffmann, E.T.A. Hoffmann’s Musical Writings: Kreisleriana, The 
Poet and the Composer, Musical Criticism, ed. David Charlton (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 32.
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also corresponded affably with Ludwig van Beethoven, other-
wise not known for his conviviality. Yet Hoffmann’s gravestone 
puzzlingly lists excellence in his office as Councilor of the Court 
of Justice as his primary achievement. The next generation of 
artists, however, came to see Hoffmann with some reverence. 
Literary France, in particular, embraced the “fantasticor,” as 
Théophile Gautier came to call him.6 Charles Baudelaire count-
ed him among the “superior artists who have in them the nec-
essary receptivity for absolute ideas,” indeed as “the man who 
until now has apprehended these ideas better than anyone else.”7 
Honoré de Balzac named him “the poet of that which seems not 
to exist yet has life.”8 The reception of Hoffmann in European 
culture, despite conflicting assessments of the value of his con-
tributions, turns on the otherworldly quality of his tales. The 
specific streak that distinguishes Hoffmann’s accomplishments 
from, say, the tales of the Thousand and One Nights, or even 
from such trailblazing genre classics as Horace Walpole’s 1764 
The Castle of Otranto, is the preponderance of a sense of horror 
that accompanies an overpowering experience of sublimity, in 
a newfound world which sought to distance the supernatural 
from the circles of good society by consigning it to the playpen 
of a bygone, adolescent humanity. 
The Romantic, the Philistine, the Spirit-Realm
Structurally, Hoffmann’s tales of terror typically involve a trin-
ity of basic elements. The reader encounters: (1) a romantic art-
ist attempting to navigate, (2) a philistine middle-class culture 
without ceding ground on his compulsive obsession with (3) the 
“spirit-realm,” a transcendent world which belies the aesthetic 
paltriness of everyday existence and which can only be accessed 
through the pursuit of art. The romantic of Hoffmann’s tales is 
defined less by his artistic skill or success than by his obsessive 
6 Christiano Merlo, “Gautier Critique d’Hoffmann,” Études Littéraires 42, no. 
3 (2011): 71. 
7 Hoffmann, Musical Writings, 49.
8 Maximilian Rudwin, “Balzac and the Fantastic,” The Sewanee Review 33, 
no. 1 (1925): 10.
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longing for a transcendent reality that promises a break with the 
straitjacket of mundane existence. Carefully documenting their 
comfortable confusion of romantic fervor for artistic substance, 
Hoffmann tends to condemn these beautiful souls as dilettantes. 
The failed romantic artist is depicted by Hoffmann as an essen-
tially ecstatic madman, only capable of recognizing himself on 
the backdrop of social norms that cannot tolerate his aesthetic 
worldview. The romantic is only at home in the transcendent 
spirit-realm, populated by the creations of the imagination. The 
spirit-realm, in turn, is not any less real than the “real” world 
surrounding the romantic. On the contrary, the “real” world is 
simply a thin veneer that conceals the higher “spiritual” order 
(the German word is “geistiger,” which can also be rendered as 
“spectral” or “ghostly”). 
In contrast to the dilettante, the picture of the romantic that 
Hoffmann wants to champion is that of the artist who attempts 
to transform commonplace existence from within by investing 
it with the potencies of the romantic spirit-realm, instead of de-
basing the latter by treating it baldly as a refuge from daily life. 
Far from berating the artists of his day, Hoffmann chronicles 
the struggle of producing genuine (read: romantic) art in a cul-
ture virtually brought to a standstill by philistinism. The philis-
tine acts as the polar opposite of the genuine romantic artist in 
Hoffmann’s tales. The ubiquity of the figure of the philistine in 
Hoffmann’s tales reflects the birth of this new social class during 
his own lifetime.9 The figure of the philistine peeks its head at 
every turn in Hoffmann’s tales, its features closely resembling 
those of the romantic dilettante. If the genuine romantic is the 
polar antagonist of the philistine, the romantic dilettante rep-
resents, by contrast, the flipside to the philistine’s superficial-
ity. A typical example of the philistine is Klara from Hoffmann’s 
most renowned tale of horror, The Sandman (1817).10 Klara ap-
9 Peter Bruning, “E.T.A. Hoffmann and the Philistine,” The German Quar-
terly 28, no. 2 (1955): 111.
10 E.T.A. Hoffmann, Tales of E.T.A. Hoffman, eds. and trans. Leonard Kent 
and Elizabeth Knight (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 93–125.
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pears in the novelette as the epitome of healthy common sense. 
She spares no effort in attempting to convince Nathanael, her 
fiancé and the main character of the story, that his visions of 
the fabled Sandman’s reappearance in his adult life have no 
footing in hard reality. For his part, Nathanael, a typically de-
lusional Hoffmannian romantic, is certain that the monstrous 
folktale creature has already invaded his world, once in child-
hood in the guise of Coppelius, an old friend of the family, and 
again with increasing frequency in adulthood, in the guise of 
the mad peddler Coppola. Nathanael’s visions and mystifying 
interactions with Coppelius-Coppola ignite a series of events, 
including an unrequited love affair with an automaton named 
Olympia, that end in Nathanael’s succumbing to madness. What 
is unbearable to the aspiring romantic is not only the ubiquity 
of philistinism, exemplified by the rationalizations of Klara and 
her brother Lothar, but the unassailable character of the philis-
tine’s pronouncements. The philistine is accused of feeling too 
much at home in the newly enfranchised middle class. Such 
comfortable adjustment to the typical demands of modern life 
(e.g., nuclear family, professional career, fiscal responsibility, 
etc.) is condemned by the romantic as superficial complacency. 
Yet in return, the aspiring romantic himself has little to offer 
beside his mad consumption by a world of imaginary relations. 
Hoffmann’s romantics are lost to a world that has been almost 
entirely co-opted by the philistine. 
In “Der Artushof ” or “The Court of Arthur” (1816),11 Trau-
gott, an aspiring draughtsman, gets distracted from his business 
duties by copying figures from a mural of King Arthur’s fabled 
court. Traugott repeats Nathanael’s tragedy in The Sandman. He 
is set to marry Christina Roos, the Klara-esque character of this 
tale, who is the daughter of the protagonist’s business partner. 
The figure of the demonic artistic genius also makes an appear-
ance, in the guise of “the old master” Herr Berklinger, himself 
of dubious footing in the real world (the narrator suggests that 
11 E.T.A. Hoffmann, The Serapion Brethren, trans. Alexander Ewing (Lon-
don: G. Bell & Sons, 1886), 152–81. 
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he is a doppelganger of one of the figures in the mural). The 
mural fulfills its romantic function by revealing itself to be a 
tunnel into the realm of spirits, seducing Traugott into a theater 
of fantasies. The setting of the Arthur murals right next to the 
practical realities of commercial life accentuates the former’s 
fantastical effects. His business partner’s nephew urges Traugott 
against the pursuit of an artistic career. Art’s proper function, so 
the nephew argues, is decorative: 
Amusement — recreation after the serious business of 
life — is the delightful end and object of all artistic effort; and 
this is attained exactly in proportion as the productions of art 
are satisfactory. […]It is only those who practice art on this 
principle who enjoy that comfort and prosperity which flies 
away forever from those who, against the true principles of 
things, look upon art as the primary object and highest aim 
of life.12 
Here we have a concise formulation of the philistine aesthetic 
principle, deliberately articulated as an anti-romanticism. Ac-
cording to the philistine, “living” means “having plenty of mon-
ey and no debts; eating and drinking of the best, and having a 
nice wife and children, with no grease spots on their Sunday 
clothes, etc.”13 This pushes Traugott to reevaluate his romantic 
inclinations. He dreads the prospect of returning to his office, 
where “pale faces sit behind shapeless desks, and nothing breaks 
the gloomy silence, buried in which everybody labors, but the 
turning of the leaves of big account-books, the jingle of money 
on the desks, and an occasional unintelligible word or two.”14 
Traugott’s rejection of the prospect of a life organized around 
financial security reflects the intensity of his romantic passion. 
Spurning the aesthetic destitution of clerkdom, Traugott sur-
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alize out of the mural, seeping into the crevices of his psychic 
life, and allows them to take charge of his artistic development 
which, unsurprisingly, leads him down a path of madness and 
dissolution.
In other instances, it seems as though the dreary world of 
the office is itself responsible for populating the sensitive soul’s 
world with figures conjured up from the spirit-realm. In “The 
Doubles” (1822),15 Deodatus encounters his own doppelgang-
er. Despite the widespread belief that society has entered a 
“completely enlightened” age which has no room for “ruinous 
superstition,”16 Deodatus is convinced that the appearance of his 
doppelganger, Haberland, represents “a marvelous occurrence 
that his father had prophesied in dark, mysterious words,”17 
with the result that upon meeting Haberland, Deodatus believes 
himself to be witnessing “a being who had so far been entan-
gled in his life only as in a dream.”18 The typically Hoffmannian 
theme of the artist’s diminishing grip on reality is established, 
along with the ensuing blurring of the lines that separate the 
real from the fantastic. As in The Sandman and “The Court of 
Arthur,” the protagonist, Deodatus, is consumed by his fear of 
acting under the spell of dark forces. His doppelganger, Haber-
land, being a puppeteer, is also an incarnation of his fears. In 
Deodatus’s estimation, Haberland seems to have exerted a kind 
of supernatural influence from a magical distance, as if circling 
in on Deodatus’s psychic life until their fateful encounter in the 
forest, where Haberland attempts to slay his double.  
The Golden Pot (1814)19 presents us with yet another varia-
tion on the fate of the romantic artist who takes up arms against 
philistinism. From the beginning, Anselmus, the protagonist, 
struggles to assimilate to the codes of conduct regulating mid-
dle-class life. He stumbles, stutters, and has a hard time keep-
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ing himself from rambling incoherently. At the same time, he 
undergoes a sublime encounter with the romantic realm of 
spirits via his apprenticeship with the old master, Archivarius 
Lindhorst. Soon, Anselmus finds himself entangled in an oth-
erworldly battle between the Archivarius, who turns out to be 
a mythical salamander-king exiled from “primeval times” out 
of “the fairyland of Atlantis,” and his rival, the old witch Liese. 
Serpentina, one of the Archivarius’s three magical salamander-
daughters, convinces Anselmus that he is one of the rare youth 
living “during [the] coarse age” who is able to resonate with the 
call of the fairyland daughters. His encounter with Serpentina 
engenders in Anselmus “an anticipatory vision of distant won-
drous lands to which he can courageously soar when he has cast 
away the onerous lot of commonplace life.”20 This story is not 
without its Klara-figure, who shows up in the guise of Veronica, 
Anselmus’s bride-to-be. An unflinching anti-Bovary, in the style 
of Hoffmann’s female philistines, Veronica hopes for nothing 
more than to be the wife of a Court Councilor (interestingly, 
one of Hoffmann’s professions in real life). 
Anselmus’s increasingly frequent encounters with the spirit-
realm drive Veronica further away from him until she opts for 
marrying Herr Heerbrand, the man who succeeds in securing 
the Court Councilor position originally meant for Anselmus. 
Faced by the dwindling prospects of a stable middle-class family 
life, Anselmus plunges deeper into the inverted world of Archi-
varius Lindhorst which, for all intents and purposes, has swal-
lowed up the real world he used to inhabit. Unlike Nathanael 
from The Sandman, Anselmus willingly surrenders his life to 
the spirit-realm, “the inexpressible rapture of infinite longing” 
that had long plagued his romantic soul finally coming to rest 
in the glow of Serpentina’s eyes.21 From his residence in Atlantis, 
freshly reconquered by the Archivarius, Anselmus lives entirely 
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infinite desire.”22 The novella ends with the Archivarius’s proc-
lamation: “Is the bliss of Anselmus [in Atlantis] anything else 
but life in poetry, poetry where the sacred harmony of all things 
is revealed as the most profound secret of Nature?”23 This is an 
ambivalent statement, as what Anselmus had gained in poetic 
insight was purchased at the price of mad exile from everyday 
existence.
Sehnsucht
In a rare moment of self-disclosure, Hoffmann describes him-
self as “a poet or writer in whom the figures of everyday life 
are reflected in his inner romantic spirit-realm.”24 Beethoven, 
according to Hoffmann’s vision, embodies the artist who man-
ages to journey into “the romantic spirit-realm” and return, if 
not unscathed then at least bearing aesthetic riches of unpre-
cendented value. Yet, while Beethoven’s achievement may have 
been exceptional, the condition sparking his creative output was 
ubiquitous in the German cities of the early-nineteenth century. 
For Hoffmann, Beethoven only succeeds in exerting artistic 
control over a paradigmatically modern condition whose effects 
are felt, one way or another, by the philistine and the roman-
tic dilettante alike. The effort which must be incessantly poured 
into shaping the work of art is itself spurred by the Sehnsucht, 
or infinite longing, which Hoffmann locates at the heart of ro-
manticism. 
In Hoffmann, this longing is often described as reaching out 
to a “spirit-realm” that remains ineluctably sublime, fundamen-
tally transcending man’s grasp. In this sense, the spirit-realm 
functions as Hoffmann’s cipher for the central question that 
stamps the work of German philosophy from Kant onwards, 
namely, the question of the thing-in-itself. The connection be-
tween the unattainable spirit-realm and the philosophical Ding 
22 Ibid., 33.
23 Ibid., 92.
24 Hoffmann, E.T.A. Hoffman’s Musical Writings, 78.
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an Sich is evident in the musings of one of Hoffmann’s charac-
ters on the place of music in modern life: 
But now music is expected to step right into everyday life, to 
come to grips with the world of phenomena […]. Can one 
use sublime language to speak of ordinary things? Can mu-
sic proclaim anything other than the wonders of that region 
from which it echoes across to us? Let the poet be prepared 
for daring flights to the distant realm of romanticism, for it 
is there that he will find the marvelous things that he should 
bring into our lives.25 
The contrast is clear in Hoffmann’s repeated invocations of a 
transcendent realm standing against the everyday world of phe-
nomena. The thirst for the sublime, for this is what the trans-
cendent spirit-realm embodies, may be unfulfillable. But it is a 
thirst that can only be disavowed at the expense of an impov-
erished existence, which for Hoffmann’s romantics consisted in 
the domesticated, workaday life of the philistine city-dweller. 
As Peter Bruning shows,26 the philistine’s dilettantism is not 
simply the efficient cause that occasions the artist to create in 
isolation. For Hoffmann, the romantic artist also struggles with 
the dilettante in himself. Johannes Kreisler, a crypto-autobio-
graphical “character” who haunts the threshold between fact 
and fiction, is quoted as describing such longing as an “evil 
demon” which taunts him with an “indescribable restlessness 
which so often, since my earliest youth, has made me a stranger 
to myself […] a wild, crazy longing for something which I seek 
outside myself in restless activity, although it is hidden within 
me, a dark mystery, a confused baffling dream of a paradise of 
the utmost contentment which even the dream cannot name, 
can only divine, and this idea plagues me with the torments of 
25 Ibid., 196.
26 Bruning, “Hoffmann and the Philistine,” 113.
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Tantalus.”27 The torments of Tantalus, let it be remembered, are 
the wages of unsatisfied desire. Unsatisfied, if not unsatisfiable, 
desire marks the existential condition of Hoffmann’s romantics 
and goes a long way to illuminate the darker aspects of their 
behavior. 
David Farrell Krell insightfully points out that Schelling 
chose the word Sehnsucht to translate the Latin word langueo, 
which is the precise cognate of the English “languor.”28 Quot-
ing Barthes, with the requisite apologies for the anachronism, 
Krell shines a light on the intended sense of “languor” at play in 
the romantic use of “die Sehnsucht”: “The Satyr says: I want my 
desire to be satisfied immediately. If I see a sleeping face, parted 
lips, an open hand, I want to be able to hurl myself upon them. 
This Satyr — figure of the Immediate — is the very contrary of 
the Languorous. In languor, I merely wait: ‘I knew no end to 
desiring you.’”29  
Infinite desire determines the romantic Sehnsucht. Hoff-
mann had read Schelling’s 1798 On the World Soul, coming 
under the spell of Schelling’s ideas of infinite longing and art’s 
superiority to the intellect as a means of communing with the 
absolute. Gotthilf Heinrich Schubert’s groundbreaking 1808 
Ansichten von der Nachtseite der Naturwissenschaften (Insights 
from the Dark Side of Natural Science), in which Schelling’s phi-
losophy of nature is taken up and applied to the observations 
of a natural scientist, becomes a constant reference during the 
rest of Hoffmann’s career.30 Schelling’s influence shows itself in 
Schubert’s elaborate cosmogony, adapted to the realm of natural 
phenomena, according to which man’s gift of intellectual intui-
tion, the immediate grasp of what is, has been compromised by 
modernity’s lapse into dualistic thinking. Such a gift, however, 
27 E.T.A. Hoffmann, The Life and Opinions of the Tomcat Murr, trans. Jeremy 
Adler (London: Penguin, 2006), 54–55.
28 David Farrell Krell, The Tragic Absolute: German Idealism and the Lan-
guishing of God (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 86.
29 Roland Barthes, quoted in Krell, The Tragic Absolute, 86. 
30 Harvey Hewett-Thayer, Hoffmann: Author of the Tales (New York: Octagon 
Books, 1971), 119ff. See also Bruning, “Hoffmann and the Philistine,” 114.
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may still be found in some artists. The artist’s intellectual intui-
tion allows him to restore the lost harmony between nature and 
spirit, if only aesthetically. 
In Hoffmann’s The Golden Pot, we saw an example of the per-
nicious path this could have in store for an aspiring romantic, 
as Anselmus ends up living psychotically in a poetic fairyland. 
“The Mines of Falun” (1819),31 drawing directly from resources 
in Schubert’s work, suggests another fate for the romantic. Elis, 
the protagonist, is jaded with the sea-voyaging he had con-
ducted for years with the East India Company, which, being a 
trade cartel, stands for the concerns of commercial culture, the 
same that preoccupy the dreaded philistine. As primarily en-
gaged in the transportation of opium, the East India Company 
also stands for the ersatz transcendence promised by commer-
cial culture. Elis encounters the spectral figure of a miner who 
directs him to the untapped depths of the human psyche. The 
mine, deep in the earth, is contrasted with the East India Com-
pany’s crisscrossing of the surface of the sea. The depth of artis-
tic truth is pitted against the superficiality of the world of trade.32 
The miner, predictably, leads Elis down a path of ecstatic visions 
and into a brush with madness, under the swinging axe of a 
higher truth. The encounter with the miner all but vanquishes 
Elis’s prospects of adjustment to good society. However, he is 
spared, in the most ambivalent sense of the word, by his engage-
ment to Ulla, the respectable daughter of the man in charge of a 
local mining company. The reintegration of Elis into the fabric 
of good society calms Ulla’s fears about her betrothed, namely, 
“her fears that the threatening powers of the subterranean abyss, 
of which she had often heard the miners speak,” would over-
take her fiancé.33 Her sense of relief proves short-lived, as Elis 
insists on going back to the mines to extract a magical gem for 
his bride-to-be as a wedding gift. The mine crashes down on 
31 Hoffmann, Tales, 149–72.
32 Cf. Holly Watkins, “From the Mine to the Shrine: The Critical Origins of 
Musical Depth,” 19th-Century Music 27, no. 3 (2004): 179–207. 
33 Hoffmann, Tales, 170. 
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Elis and he never returns. Ulla finally gets to embrace her bride-
groom, fifty years later, as his petrified corpse is dragged out 
from the depths. While The Golden Pot’s Anselmus takes refuge 
from marital bliss in the spirit-realm, Elis is only able to enter it 
as a dead man.
Part 2: A Brief History of the Sublime
The Power of Imagination
The origin of the tragic course of events suffered by Hoffmann’s 
romantics is tied to the gambit thrown by an imagination that 
finds itself confined to an aesthetically impoverished existence. 
The new forms of life that sprouted across European cities dur-
ing Hoffmann’s lifetime, and against which Hoffmann’s roman-
tics react, represented the degeneration of the promise of the 
Enlightenment into the complacency and commonsense prag-
matism of middle-class life. In describing the philosophical ter-
rain within which Hoffmann wrote, biographer Hewett-Thayer 
remarks that it was dominated by a sort of “debased rationalism,” 
where the lofty eighteenth century Enlightenment ideals “in the 
course of time seemed to degenerate into a drab utilitarianism, 
a mere recipe for getting on in the world.”34 An overweening 
confidence in so-called sound common sense eclipsed the rigor-
ously critical commitments of the Age of Enlightenment, such 
that “the phrase ‘a healthy human understanding’ became wide-
ly current, coupled with the implication that it covered all man 
needed for success and happiness.”35 
The legitimation of such “debased rationalism” finds its ena-
bling condition in the cultural and political conservative shift 
which swept through Prussia after the death of Frederick II in 
1786.36 This seismic shift in social relations gave rise to the bu-
reaucrat, who in turn granted the philistine, in one stroke, pro-
34 Hewett-Thayer, Hoffmann, 113.
35 Ibid.
36 Analyzed at length in Steven Lestition, “Kant and the End of the Enlight-
enment in Prussia,” Journal of Modern History 65, no. 1 (March 1993): 
57–112. 
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fessional and social legitimacy. A bureaucratic machine rumbles 
at the base of Hoffmann’s tales. The philistine is only possible in 
the same “functionally differentiated modernity” which spawns 
the need for the bureaucrat and in which semi-autonomous 
systems coexist in an increasingly fragmentary whole.37 This 
also yields the problems of art as an increasingly autonomous 
practice, abstracted from its erstwhile immersion in the reli-
gious sphere, problems that troubled the romantics to no end. 
The romantic raises the banner of art to subdue the philistine’s 
insistence on the subordination of imagination to sound under-
standing. In championing the romantic imagination, whether 
defeated or triumphant, deformed or genuine, Hoffmann is 
drawing on a particular aesthetic tradition, to which we must 
now turn.
The Sublime at Bay (Burke)
Edmund Burke was the first to isolate the feeling of “delight-
ful horror” as a fundamental element in the experience of the 
sublime.38 Exhuming the category from the writings of Longi-
nus, for whom it designated the ecstatic frenzy that a rhetorician 
could rouse in an audience, for instance by the use of hyper-
bole, Burke drove home the connection between ecstatic effect 
and the sense of one’s own finitude, limitation, and inevitable 
demise. Burke does not stray too far from the traditional as-
sociation of sublimity with astonishment,39 although he empha-
sizes another affective element involved in the experience of the 
sublime. In his 1757 Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our 
Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, Burke writes:
37 Ulrich Schonherr, “Social Differentiation and Romantic Art: E.T.A. 
Hoffmann’s ‘The Sanctus’ and the Problem of Aesthetic Positioning in 
Modernity,” New German Critique 66 (1995): 3. 
38 The phrase “delightful horror” is used by Dennis before Burke to describe 
the effect of the sublime on the imagination; cf. Robert Doran, The Theory 
of the Sublime from Longinus to Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2017), 125.
39 Earl of Shaftesbury (Anthony Ashley Cooper), Characteristics of Men, 
Manners, Opinions, Times, ed. Lawrence Eliot Klein (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2003), 109.
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[I]f the pain and terror are so modified as not to be actually 
noxious; if the pain is not carried to violence, and the terror 
is not conversant about the present destruction of the person 
[…] they are capable of producing delight; not pleasure, but 
a sort of delightful horror, a sort of tranquility tinged with 
terror; which as it belongs to self-preservation is one of the 
strongest of all the passions.40 
The object of this sort of horror, Burke declares, is the sublime.41 
Properly speaking, the sublime designates an aesthetic experi-
ence whose distinguishing mark is the terror aroused by the 
threat of violence. The sublime is that which is capable of oc-
casioning, when at a safe distance, the feeling of horror and the 
perverse delight that accompanies it. The experience of the sub-
lime is overwhelming because it confronts us with the persis-
tent nearness of our own mortality in the face of overwhelming 
force or astounding magnitudes. Its capacity to shake us to the 
core derives from the fact that “the passions belonging to self-
preservation,” according to Burke, “are the strongest of all the 
passions.”42 For its part, pleasure is reserved, in line with tradi-
tion, for the experience of the beautiful which, Burke writes, “is 
a name I shall apply to all such qualities in things as induce in us 
a sense of affection and tenderness, or some other passion the 
most nearly resembling these.”43 On strength of this principal 
distinction between pain and pleasure, then, Burke distinguish-
es the ideas of the beautiful from that of the sublime, two ideas 
which have been “frequently confounded” and “indiscriminate-
ly applied to things greatly differing, and sometimes of natures 
directly opposite.”44 With this act, Burke opens up the sublime 
as a genuine field of aesthetic investigation. 
40 Edmund Burke and James Thompson, A Philosophical Enquiry into the 
Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (Notre Dame: University 
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Burke treated one’s susceptibility to the sublime as some-
thing of a disease that must be kept at bay, prescribing exercise 
as a remedy for the overwhelming feelings it engenders. Sur-
render to feelings of this sort has long been seen as a sign of 
inferiority. The Earl of Shaftesbury writes that “astonishment is 
of all other passions the easiest raised in raw and unexperienced 
mankind,” among whom he counts not only children but “bar-
baric” peoples such as the “Indians,” whose “fine sights” count 
for him as little more than “enormous figures, various odd and 
glaring colors and whatever of that sort is amazingly beheld 
with a kind of horror and consternation.”45 Shaftesbury’s low es-
teem of the sublime betrays the degree to which he is convinced 
of its dubious philosophical import. For Shaftesbury, a pioneer 
of aesthetics as an independent field of philosophical research, it 
is the contemplation of the beautiful that forms the pinnacle of 
aesthetic experience. Unlike the sublime, the beautiful exhibits 
“proportion,” “unity,” and “form,” “united all in general in one 
system” that is capable of igniting the most revealing insights of 
speculative thought.46 Burke’s precarious flirtation with the sub-
lime is likewise telling. Eager to explain its hold over the mind, 
he is equally quick to warn against its dangers and prescribe 
various means of warding it off.
In his reading of Burke’s aesthetics, Tom Furniss highlights 
“the peculiar danger of the threat [of the sublime] in Burke’s ac-
count,” namely, “that it cannot be unambiguously located — that 
it transgresses the threshold between inner and outer, subject 
and object, and might therefore be, disturbingly, already at work 
within the human (or political) body. What most threatens ‘the 
person’ [in the experience of the sublime] is not an external 
danger but ‘a dangerous and troublesome incumbrance’ already 
internal to the system.”47 
45 Cooper, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, 108–9.
46 Ibid., 274.
47 Tom Furniss, Edmund Burke’s Aesthetic Ideology: Language, Gender, and 
Political Economy in Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), 29.
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Burke argues that because the sublime affords us an encoun-
ter with terror dissociated from the latter’s threat, it can engen-
der “a sort of swelling and triumph that is extremely grateful 
to the human mind,” thereby reinforcing the bad habit of “the 
mind always claiming to itself some part of the dignity and im-
portance of the things which it contemplates.”48 The anti-rev-
olutionary connotations of Burke’s view should not be lost on 
the reader. The self-delusion described here overlaps with John 
Locke’s definition of “enthusiasm,” which Burke would later em-
brace in his tirade against the fanaticism of the French Revolu-
tion in the famous 1790 Reflections on the Revolution in France, 
widely considered a fundamental tract of modern conservatism. 
Locke writes, “[t]his I take to be properly enthusiasm, which, 
though founded neither on reason nor divine revelation, but ris-
ing from the conceits of a warmed or overweening brain, works 
yet, where it once gets footing, more powerfully on the per-
suasions and actions of men, than either of those two, or both 
together.”49 Furniss isolates the following passage from Longinus 
as Burke’s point of reference: “the Mind is naturally elevated by 
the true Sublime, and so sensibly affected with its lively Strokes, 
that it swells in Transport and an inward Pride, as if what was 
only heard had been the Product of its own Invention.” Furniss 
goes on to draw a connection between such pronouncements 
on the sublime and Burke’s denunciation of the idea of radical 
autonomy as self-delusion, writing that “the threat [of the sub-
lime object] becomes, or is analogous to, the rhetorical ‘terror’ 
instilled in us by ‘poets and orators’ and therefore enables a fan-
tasy of the creative, originating self.”50 Already in Burke, then, 
we see the glimmers of a line connecting our delight in sublime 
horror with the marks of a repetition-compulsion. The latter is 
the prism through which Freud read The Sandman.
48 Burke, Philosophical Enquiry, 50.
49 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Alexander 
Campbell Fraser (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894), 696.
50 Furniss, Edmund Burke’s Aesthetic Ideology, 23.
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In his 1919 essay on “The Uncanny,” which involves an ex-
tended analysis of The Sandman, Freud reads in Nathanael’s in-
fatuation with Olympia, the automaton mistaken for a woman, 
a sign of “the dominance in the unconscious mind of a ‘com-
pulsion to repeat’ proceeding from the instinctual impulses and 
probably inherent in the very nature of the instincts — a compul-
sion powerful enough to overrule the pleasure principle, lend-
ing to certain aspects of the mind their daemonic character.”51 
In Olympia, Nathanael is intrigued and terrified by his own 
unconscious libidinal life. Olympia personifies the repressions 
necessary for Nathanael’s ego to come to its own: “Olympia is, 
as it were, a dissociated complex of Nathanael’s which confronts 
him as a person, and Nathanael’s enslavement to this complex 
is expressed in his senseless obsessive love for Olympia.”52 Such 
love, insofar as it is directed at a complex dissociated from one’s 
own self-image, is “narcissistic.” All advances motivated by this 
love are doomed. The automatic, repetitive aspect of the self 
must be kept at bay to ward off the specter of ego disintegra-
tion. Olympia operates as a cipher for the uncontrollable drives 
which exercise their dominion over the dark caverns of libidinal 
life, disrupting the noontide of the ego with their incessant en-
croachments. 
Repetition-compulsion is the motor-force behind neurosis, a 
principal psychopathology of modern life, according to Freud. 
Throughout The Sandman, neurotic Nathanael struggles to fend 
off the sense that, at bottom, he is “the horrible plaything of dark 
powers.” Yet Nathanael cannot help being drawn to Olympia, 
the embodiment of heteronomy, by an inexplicable longing 
which stands behind his restless dissatisfaction with the values 
of middle-class life, as propounded (with irreproachable good 
sense) by his fiancée Klara. Ironically, Olympia the automaton 
51 Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works 
of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVII (1917–1919): An Infantile Neurosis and 
Other Works, ed. and trans. James Strachey, in collaboration with Anna 
Freud, and assisted by Alix Strachey, and Alan Tyson (London: The Hog-
arth Press, 1955), 238. 
52 Ibid., 232.
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is literally a puppet whose strings are pulled by another. She is 
Nathanael’s nightmarish self-reflection. Nathanael’s longing, as 
is often the case with Hoffmann’s romantics, looks toward an-
other reality. The desire for broaching an ecstatic reality, whose 
glimpses can only be caught through the turbid medium of the 
imagination (after healthy understanding’s conquest of every-
day life), could only be achieved at the price of the destruction 
of the workday self. 
Freud writes that “an uncanny effect is […] produced when 
the distinction between imagination and reality is effaced, as 
when something that we have hitherto regarded as imaginary 
appears before us in reality, or when a symbol takes over the 
full functions of the thing it symbolizes.”53 Both tropes are Hoff-
mannian staples, as we have seen. The desire to lose oneself 
in ecstasy signals a latent death wish, a longing to be enfolded 
into the libidinal ocean. The theory that Freud proposes in his 
analysis of The Sandman suggests that the feeling of the un-
canny is engendered by the unsettling revelation that the self 
is inherently bound to a repetition-compulsion, such that the 
daylight of psychic life is contaminated by apparitions familiar 
yet utterly foreign, embodying Freud’s disassociative complex-
es. Perceptively, Freud links the inaccessible sublime pursued 
by the romantic with images deriving from a bygone era, pos-
sibilities which “we — or our primitive forefathers — once be-
lieved […] were realities, and were convinced that they actually 
happened.”54 Freud adds that “nowadays we,” that is, we Enlight-
ened moderns, “no longer believe in them, we have surmounted 
these modes of thought; but we do not feel quite sure of our 
new beliefs, and the old ones still exist within us ready to cease 
upon any confirmation.”55 Contending with such episodes tests 
the self-certainty of Enlightened understanding. Hoffmann’s 
romantic characters, who dwell on and perversely relish these 
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gets repeated as uncanny is originally, prior to the consolida-
tion of the ego, “something familiar that has been repressed.”56 
It belongs, as repressed, to the drives. A drive is emphatically 
an affair of the body. Even by Freud’s admission, a drive repre-
sents “an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state 
of things.”57 Behind the phantasmagoria plaguing Nathanael’s 
existence, the mechanism of the internal compulsion itself is 
the true sublime object of Nathanael’s horror, a vehicle of tran-
scendence and annihilation, desired and feared at once. 
It goes without saying that Burke did not resort to a psycho-
analytic explanation when accounting for the mind’s attraction 
to the sublime. But he does not even allow himself an empirical 
explanation either, having repudiated the principle of associa-
tion in aesthetics.58 Scandalously, Burke accounted for the feel-
ing of the sublime through a strictly physiological explanation, 
resorting to a theory of direct physiological causation that jolts 
the mind with feelings of the beautiful or the sublime, depend-
ing on the encounter. This explanation has done more to heap 
ridicule on its author than to resolve any questions regarding 
the fixation exerted on us by things perceived as sublime.59
The Sublime as Idea (Kant) 
The question of the causes underlying the mind’s sublime de-
light in horror was left without a satisfying answer after Burke. 
Kant contradicted Burke precisely on the point of physiological 
immediacy. What lies behind sublime terror is, rather, a con-
fused rational idea. The experience of the sublime may begin 
with the feeling of awe, but it ends with the tranquility of grasp-
ing the feared object as nothing but the presentation of an idea 
of reason. 
56 Ibid.
57 Sigmund Freud, The Freud Reader, ed. Peter Gay (New York: Vintage: 
1995), 612.
58 Burke, Philosophical Enquiry, 130–31.
59 Timothy Costelloe, The British Aesthetic Tradition: From Shaftesbury to 
Wittgenstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 74–76.
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One reason why aesthetic judgments were important to Kant 
lies in their unique ability to assist in determining the legiti-
macy of attributing moral meaning to the world. We know from 
the first Critique that we are not justified in making theoreti-
cal — i.e., “scientific” — claims as to the three major questions 
that sound the depths of rational inquiry: What can I know, 
what ought I to do, and what may I hope? The limits of the first 
question are determined by metaphysics broadly construed: its 
transcendental critique (as in the Critique of Pure Reason) to-
gether with its positive claims in a metaphysics of nature (as in 
the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science). The second 
and third questions are answered in a similar two-step by mo-
rality and religion. Curiously, questions pertaining to aesthetic 
judgment do not seem to seamlessly fit within the foregoing di-
vision. Aesthetic questions range over the various concerns of 
philosophy. This is because aesthetic judgments proper, that is, 
those that are philosophically significant, relate to all the fore-
going concerns: the limits of theoretical, moral, and religious 
knowledge.
The crucible of theoretical, moral, and religious questions is 
revealed in the very way Kant sets up his aesthetic investiga-
tion in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. Proper aesthetic 
judgments are reflective. Unlike “ordinary” attributive judg-
ments, they determine a subjective feeling rather than an ob-
jective representation. When Kant is discussing the beautiful, 
his primary concern is not the determination of some object as 
beautiful. Such a task would require a sort of empirical tallying 
of attributes that, when present, would allow us to apply the la-
bel “beautiful” to a certain artwork. Such a tallying may not be 
impossible, but Kant dismisses it as a key to grasping the nature 
of beauty on account of the contingency of the results it would 
supply, as well as the fact that it is a deeply socially conditioned 
practice. A posteriori through and through, the procedure nei-
ther stems from nor produces necessary cognition. What sets an 
aesthetic judgment apart from a theoretical one is a difference in 
kind which requires that in the former we seek to determine a 
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subjective state, while in the latter we are determining an objec-
tive representation. 
The primary concern of aesthetics for Kant is the extent 
to which we are justified in associating a purportedly beauti-
ful experience with the feeling of pleasure that is aroused in 
us at beholding a certain object. We are justified in seeing an 
aesthetic experience as an experience of beauty when the har-
mony exhibited between the various elements in a composition 
triggers a homologous interplay between the cognitive faculties 
of imagination and understanding. The pleasure evoked by the 
experience of beauty gives us a glimmer of how things would 
stand were we living in a world where our purposes as free mor-
al agents were fulfilled. The ensuing harmony of the faculties 
in such a world would serve as an index of the extent to which 
rational human desires have been satisfied. The experience of 
the beautiful thus conceived provides us with a symbol of what 
it would be like to exist in a morally perfected condition, though 
no kind of theoretical knowledge may justifiably prescribe what 
such a condition might look like. Only once we discern that this 
is the kind of pleasure that we have upon encountering an art-
work are we justified in calling the object corresponding to it 
“beautiful.” 
Contrast this with the sublime. The feeling of the sublime 
presents the world as violent, chaotic, and incomprehensible. 
To this extent, Kant’s conception coincides with Burke’s. But for 
Kant, emphatically, no object may be called sublime, whereas we 
may point to a variety of objects in the world that we deem beau-
tiful. The feeling of the sublime indexes not a property of objects 
but a confusion of the mind: “We can say no more than that the 
object is fit for the presentation of a sublimity that can be found 
in the mind; for what is actually sublime cannot be contained in 
any sensible form, but concerns only ideas of reason.”60 Those 
things that we, mistakenly, call sublime, which overwhelm us so 
and arouse the painful feelings of which Burke had spoken, are 
60 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 245.
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inherently formless representations — the limitlessness of the 
universe, the vastness of the ocean, the dark plunge at the end 
of a precipice. We describe them as sublime because they defy 
the figurative capacity of the imagination. Conceptually, Kant 
notes that these objects represent mathematical (quantitative) 
or dynamical (having to do with force) exaggerations beyond 
the limits of human comprehension. They therefore arouse our 
fear because they present the world as something entirely for-
eign to our understanding. Such a portrayal undermines the 
hope of moral perfectibility, intensifying the perceiver’s dread. 
The world now reveals itself as hostile to human purpose, para-
lyzing (“astonishing,” to recall Burke and Shaftesbury’s terms) 
intelligence and repudiating the meaningfulness we assign to 
human action. But Kant points out that, being the representa-
tion of something of infinite proportions or unlimited power, 
the sublime coincides in its attributes with the ideas of reason 
(i.e., God, world, and soul) which likewise frustrate theoretical 
comprehension by constantly leading the mind into aporias. 
Thus, the true sublime “objects,” which truly surpass our com-
prehension (mathematical) or threaten to obliterate our physical 
existence (dynamical), are those ideas of reason themselves. On 
the other hand, the objects we tend to call sublime (“the wide 
ocean, enraged by storms,” is Kant’s example) are “provoked and 
called to mind precisely by this inadequacy,”61 namely the inad-
equacy of any sensible form to present an idea of reason. The 
feeling of the sublime does not point to these objects. Rather, 
through them, or precisely through their inadequacy to present 
the sublime, “the mind is incited to abandon sensibility and to 
occupy itself with ideas that contain a higher purposiveness.”62 
Since the first two Critiques have shown that the proper grasp 
of these ideas of ultimate purpose (God, world, and soul) is a 
moral rather than theoretical task, what occupies the mind in 
the experience of the sublime, like the beautiful, boils down to 




DISEASES OF THE HEAD
mind of how things would stand if moral purpose was fulfillable 
in the world, the sublime puts us in a mind of how things would 
look if human purpose existed in a world where it could never 
be fulfilled, a world altogether impervious to rational ends. 
Kant transforms the terrain of aesthetic theory by anchor-
ing questions of the beautiful and the sublime to problems of 
teleology. The philosophical significance of the sublime for Kant 
hinges on the capacity of reason to intervene in the experience 
of sublime horror by showing that what seems to be immeasura-
ble or overwhelming to the imagination is in fact well within the 
grasp of reason, which knows how to relegate these questions to 
their proper domain as problems concerning the metaphysics 
of morals. Reason thus pacifies the shuddering imagination by 
restoring to the world its sense of meaning and conduciveness 
to human purpose, if only obliquely.
The Sublime as Demonic (Schiller) 
In Kant we behold a “rediscovery of the imagination,” to borrow 
once again from Castoriadis.63 Kant was able to tie aesthetics to 
teleology by highlighting how aesthetic reactions are grounded 
on the interplay between the imagination and the “higher” cog-
nitive faculties — understanding for the beautiful and reason for 
the sublime. With Kant, the imagination emerges as not merely 
a faculty that reproduces perceptions without their sensible 
matter but as a cognitively productive faculty on its own merit, 
constitutive rather than receptive. Romanticism, broadly con-
strued, understood this. As the capacity to fundamentally give 
form to representation, the imagination is the actively figura-
tive faculty, a sense preserved in the German Einbildungskraft. 
Eckart Förster writes that the imagination is “an activity with-
out which there could be no combination and consequently no 
unity of consciousness,” since “it takes two elements which are 
isolated in themselves and forms (Bilden) something common 
63 Cornelius Castoriadis, World in Fragments: Writings on Politics, Society, 
Psychoanalysis, and the Imagination, ed. and trans. David Ames (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1997), 213–45.
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which as such can become an object of consciousness.”64 Opting 
for the verb “to form” instead of “to picture” or “to imagine” as a 
translation of bild- in Einbildungskraft, we arrive at the imagina-
tion as an en-forming-power (Ein-bildungs-kraft), which is the 
sense tapped into by the romanticism of Schiller. 
Schiller’s 1795 On the Aesthetic Education of Man, in a Series 
of Letters65 opens with a survey of the damage inflicted upon 
man by life in the modern state with its “too intense life of the 
social instincts,” as De Quincey put it.66 The Letters also rehearse 
the clash between Enlightenment’s promise and its reality at the 
turn of the nineteenth century. Because of their distinct atten-
tion to the ways in which the cultivation of aesthetic sensitivity 
may be brought to bear on the contradictions of modern life, 
Schiller’s observations intersect with Hoffmann’s concerns and 
open a window onto the social dynamics that informed Hoff-
mann’s writings. 
Despite the promises of the Enlightenment and the Revolu-
tion they inspired, Schiller found European culture torn between 
a revival of sheer superstition and a crude instrumentalism 
masquerading as the pinnacle of rationality. The Terror finishes 
this off for Schiller, the literary aristocrat, with the introduc-
tion of barbarism on an unimaginable scale. Surely there was 
something that the shockwaves of rational Enlightenment and 
political Revolution had not managed to transform. Premising 
his observations on the relationship that Kant had established 
between aesthetics and morality (teleology), Schiller offers the 
diagnosis that the moral capacities of the very actors who car-
ried forth the work of social change fell tragically short of as-
pirations. The proper cultivation of man’s moral sense begins 
not with the propagation of moral doctrine but with cultivating 
64 Eckart Förster, The Twenty-five Years of Philosophy: A Systematic Recon-
struction (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), 194.
65 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man: in a Series of Letters, 
trans. Elizabeth Wilkinson and L.A. Willoughby (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2005).
66 Thomas De Quincey, De Quincey’s Suspiria: I. The Daughter of Lebanon. II. 
Levana and Our Ladies of Sorrow (London: De la More Press, 1906).
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man’s sensitivity to moral ideas. Schiller, in a Kantian frame of 
mind, understood that the elevation of human sensibility must 
go through the reform of aesthetic judgment. The problems of 
the time could begin to find a cure with the cultivation, on a 
mass scale, of a sense for aesthetic beauty. The experience of 
beauty for Schiller is inexorably tied to a free-ranging kind of 
pleasure. This unique brand of aesthetic pleasure Schiller calls 
“play,” a state in which the distinction between work and enjoy-
ment disappears, such that man acts unforced for the sake of his 
own enjoyment, and his enjoyment is synonymous with his ac-
tivity as a moral actor in the world. For Schiller, this is precisely 
the sort of liberty which the French Revolution had promised, 
or, at any rate, the kind he persistently demanded from it. Leav-
ing aside immediate social and political causes, such a vision 
was destined not to materialize, because man’s desire was not 
prepared to absorb the full spectrum of its precepts and accept 
their consequences. Beautiful art can have the morally trans-
formative power of “educating” our desires by orienting them 
toward the satisfaction of the ideal of freedom as their ultimate 
end. 
Schiller accused the new life of the city dweller of being mor-
ally corrupting insofar as it lulls the intellect into a false sense of 
security. An overconfidence in the rational planning of society 
also led to the degeneration of the promises of the Enlighten-
ment into banal pragmatism and a superficial faith in the ulti-
mately benevolent end of history. Hoffmann’s reasonable char-
acters (Klara et al.) personify this commonsense pragmatism. 
Cocksure pragmatism and the relapse into superstition, togeth-
er with the fanaticism that engendered the worst excesses of the 
Jacobins, can only be checked aesthetically according to Schiller. 
While cultivating the sensitivity to beauty presents moral ideals 
to the mind in the form of feeling, the sharpening of the mind’s 
awareness of the sublime is prone to curb moral excess, wheth-
er in the form of the pragmatist’s complacent faith in rational 
planning, the superstitious relapse into dogma as the solution to 
moral problems, or the revolutionary fervor that seeks to put so-
ciety, once and for all, and by any means necessary, on the right 
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track. Aiming for the absolute cannot come at the expense of 
disavowing man’s inherent limitations. While aiming with every 
right toward the rational resolution of strife in human history, 
writes Schiller in “Concerning the Sublime” (1801), one must 
never at the same time lose sight of “the terrifying and magnifi-
cent spectacle of change destroying everything and re-creating 
it and then destroying it once again, a spectacle of ruin at times 
eating slowly at things, other times suddenly assaulting them. 
History,” he goes on, “provides ample examples of the pathetic 
picture of humanity wrestling with fate, a picture of the incessant 
flight of fortune, of confidence betrayed, injustice triumphant, 
and innocence violated.”67 
As mentioned already, Schiller argues that while the moral 
purpose of human existence cannot be conceptually articulated 
(say, in terms of a list of attributes that would specify its charac-
ter), the mind can develop a sensitivity to the moral task ahead 
through aesthetic education, that is, by cultivating the mind’s 
sensitivity to beauty. However, in order not to be lost to the 
world in its own beautiful feelings, this aesthetic sensitivity to 
beauty must itself be checked. This is achieved by developing the 
mind’s sensitivity to the sublime, beauty’s terrible counterpart. 
In Schiller’s wake, the sublime, which Kant located above all in 
the grandeur of impersonal nature, takes on chillingly histori-
cal concreteness. We feel as if the roles were reversed and the 
sublime images of nature are oblique references to the horrors 
of history. The sublime expresses “necessity’s stern law,” symbol-
ized by “the eternal infidelity of everything sensuous” to reason’s 
self-certainty.68 Schiller remarks that “the capacity for the sub-
lime is one of the most glorious dispositions in human nature, 
deserving our respect due to its origin in the self-sufficient ca-
pacity to think and will” — that is, insofar as the sublime forces 
the capacity to think and will (theoretical and moral reasoning) 
to reckon with its necessary limitations in practice. Cultivating a 
67 Friedrich Schiller, Essays, eds., Walter Hinderer and Daniel O. Dahlstrom 
(New York: Continuum, 1993), 83.
68 Ibid.
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sense of the sublime is thus the necessary counterpart to the cul-
tivation of the sense of the beautiful. “The beautiful renders itself 
deserving on account of the humanness in a human being, the 
sublime on account of the purely demonic in him.”69 The beauti-
ful corresponds to one’s “humanness” because its dominion ex-
tends over the interplay of the faculties of the human mind. The 
harmonious interplay it evokes between intellect and sensibility 
is a symbol of moral freedom. The sublime on the other hand 
hurls the lot of human faculties into the unknown. Thus, while 
beauty affords us a pleasurable free play of the cognitive facul-
ties, the sublime only offers us “ecstatic shuddering.”70 
Hoffmann describes the fairyland in which Anselmus is lost 
in The Golden Pot as a region “full of glorious marvels, where 
both the highest rapture and deepest horror may be evoked.”71 
Anselmus, for his part, is overwhelmed by “a feeling he had nev-
er before known, one he could not identify as either rapturous 
or painful.”72 In the novella, Hoffmann describes Anselmus’s ex-
perience of the sublime in terms that align with the exposition 
given above: “He felt that an ineffable something was awakening 
within his inmost soul and provoking that pain of rapture which 
is the longing that promises man the existence of a more exalted 
Being.”73 The sublime is expressive of “the purely demonic” in us, 
for Schiller, because it mediates between the profane and the di-
vine, the earthly and the exalted, the mundane and the absolute. 
Recall how Kant had argued that the feared object is not what 
we think is present before us in the experience of the sublime, 
but rather the speculative idea which the representation calls 
to mind. With Schiller, the sublime is neither the appearance 
nor the idea at work behind the appearance, but the fact of hu-
man limitation itself. Schiller’s characterization of the sublime 
encounter as demonic allows us to elicit a link between the 
metaphysics of aesthetic experience and psychoanalysis. The 
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid., 74.
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demonic is what haunts the borderline between man and God. 
Besides representing “the intervening stage between the human 
and the divine,” writes Harold Bloom, “daemonization” acts as a 
trope of “the principal Freudian defense, repression, the very ac-
tive defense that produces or accumulates much of what Freud 
calls the Unconscious.”74 The sublime, repression, and the un-
conscious are tangled up in one and the same psychodynamic. 
For Schiller, the demonic which is encountered in the experience 
of the sublime is emphatically, if paradoxically, a human reality. 
On this reading, the demonic is not something to be excised or 
disowned; rather the demonic is the touchstone of which the 
soul must never lose sight, on pain of losing itself in the com-
forting reassurances of the beautiful. The demonic marks the 
human limit this-side of the absolute. Just what exists beyond 
the sublime threshold, if anything, is a question that cannot be 
answered in any clear-cut discourse, though an aesthetic symbol 
may be provided. Far from representing a contamination that 
must be exorcised, the demonic is an aspect that must be al-
lowed to cohabitate the self. Hoffmann turns our attention to 
the varying fortunes of those whose destiny it is to embrace the 
demonic sublime or the “spirit-realm.” 
Part 3: Hoffmann’s Aesthetics
Symptom and Sublime
The Kantian positing of the imagination as a creative and not 
merely reproductive faculty ushers in a line of thinking that 
seeks in aesthetics a source of insight into metaphysical truths. 
Despite Freud’s identification of a repetition-compulsion as the 
force that hurls Nathanael to his fate in The Sandman, the rea-
son for Nathanael’s condition must be sought in an origin that 
exceeds the oedipal. Repetition-compulsion undermines linear 
time through the recurrence of symptoms, reenacting traumas 
that manage to circle back and dominate the present despite the 
passage of time. Hoffmann’s tales are rife with such instances. 
74 Bloom, Poetry and Repression, 18.
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Anselmus has an “entire vision which he had once viewed as if 
in a heavenly trance” reemerge before his eyes “in the most vivid 
colors, as if he were looking upon it for the second time.”75 Freud 
himself points to a host of instances depicting the return of the 
repressed in his analysis of The Sandman. Ursula Lawson notes 
that while “Nathanael recalls his experiences in chronological 
order, indicating a normal process of reflection,” his manner of 
relating these experiences to each other departs from the linear 
sequence of time, resembling rather “the product of a creative, if 
somewhat morbid, imagination of a highly sensitive child.”76 A 
symptom bears a symbolic relation to what it signifies. Beneath 
the symptom there lies the symbol, where the psychodynamic 
and the speculative overlap. The salient features of Hoffmann’s 
tales speak to the psychological trauma being rooted in a more 
profound metaphysical malaise, a dissatisfaction with the im-
port of our pronouncements on the ultimate nature of reality. 
The passage of time, historical time, precipitates this condition. 
The earliest glimmers of romanticism, as presented by Fried-
rich Schlegel, are premised on such a profound consciousness 
of a transition into a new world-historical era.77 A historical se-
quence of events pries open a new time, reshaping the coordi-
nates of subjectivity in the process. The turning point here is the 
French Revolution. Despite his ambivalence toward the Revolu-
tion, Hoffmann intensely lived its philosophical consequences. 
Having reviewed the dynamics of his tales and situated his work 
within the aesthetic tradition, we can turn now to Hoffmann’s 
own reflections on aesthetics. These are found chiefly in his 
musical writings, collected under the title of Kreisleriana (1819), 
in reference to his crypto-autobiographical character, the com-
poser Johannes Kreisler. If Hoffmann had acknowledged the 
appearance on the historical scene of a new time, which places 
75 Hoffmann, Tales of E.T.A. Hoffman, 33.
76 Ursula Lawson, “Pathological Time in E.T.A. Hoffmann’s Der Sandmann,” 
Monatshefte 60, no. 1 (Spring 1968): 54.
77 Daniel O. Dahlstrom, “Play and Irony: Schiller and Schlegel on the Liber-
ating Prospects of Aesthetics,” in The History of Continental Philosophy, ed. 
Alan Schrift (University of Chicago Press, 2011), 1:107–29.
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its unique set of demands on the artist, “the romantic” is Hoff-
mann’s hieroglyph of choice for the subject of this new time. 
“No idea can arise in us without its hieroglyph,” writes 
the anonymous author of “Johannes Kreisler’s Certificate of 
Apprenticeship.”78 “Idea” here, as in Kant and Schiller, signi-
fies those cognitions which cannot be successfully expressed in 
discursive propositions. The hieroglyph, while unable to yield a 
clear and distinct enumeration of properties, provides us with 
the next best thing, “a vague approximation of what we have 
distantly heard.”79 Writing alongside Schlegel, who fabricates 
the romantic as a realm where the novel problems of art may 
be explored in terms unknown to classical criticism, Hoffmann 
depicts the plight of the romantic in terms of the acute aware-
ness of a subjectivity grappling with an unprecedented, thus es-
sentially alienating, historical condition. 
At the beginning of his literary career, the essence of the ro-
mantic was contained for Hoffmann in “absolute” or purely in-
strumental music.80 All art tends toward absolute music for the 
early Hoffmann. Music opens up the gates of the sublime, the 
higher reality, the spiritual kingdom which is not of this world. 
What places the crown and scepter in the hands of absolute mu-
sic is its impermeability to mundane representation. Later in his 
career, when Hoffmann makes place for other artforms to share 
the pedestal, we find them still determined by the condition 
of music. The anonymous author of “Johannes Kreisler’s Cer-
tificate of Apprenticeship” addresses Kreisler: “What appears to 
be chiefly necessary has already become part of you. You have 
sharpened your faculty of hearing to such an extent that now 
and then you perceive the voice of the poet hidden within you 
[…] and really cannot believe that it is only you speaking and 
no one else.”81 Absolute music, like poetry, depends on an art of 
hearing. The other arts, while no longer subordinated to music, 
78 Hoffmann, E.T.A. Hoffman’s Musical Writings, 164.
79 Ibid., 165.
80 Cf. Mark Evan Bonds, Music as Thought: Listening to the Symphony in the 
Age of Beethoven (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).
81 Hoffmann, E.T.A. Hoffman’s Musical Writings, 160.
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nonetheless strive to the condition of absolute music. Neither 
plastic nor verbal, absolute music surpasses sculpture, painting, 
and prose by its ability to express itself directly in the medium of 
sound, described as the medium of an ecstatic experience with 
its threat of self-dissolution (“you perceive the voice of the poet 
hidden within you […] and really cannot believe it is only you 
speaking and no one else”). In the same text, music is described 
as channeling “sublime,” “gentle spirit-voices.”82 The mature 
Hoffmann abandons his fanaticism for pure music and begins 
describing aesthetic experience as hinging on a synesthetic ex-
pression of “total effect.”83 
Anachronistically, we may add that by language what Hoff-
mann had in mind was not simply a system of written and ver-
bal signs but an expansive semiotic edifice, a total signifying 
system combining sound and sight, tone, figure, and word. The 
effects of such a synesthetic “language” are described by Hoff-
mann-Kreisler in “Extremely Random Thoughts” as arising in 
“a state of delirium” where “the congruity of colors, sounds, and 
fragrances” is revealed.84 To Schiller’s beautiful artwork, which 
triggers a harmonious interplay between the mind and the 
senses, symbolic of the attainment of the moral ideal, Hoffmann 
seeks to counterpose an ideal of sublimity in art. According to 
Hoffmann’s sublime ideal, genuine romantic art presents us with 
“the mysterious language of a distant spirit-realm, its wonderful 
accents resounding in our souls and awakening a higher, intens-
er awareness” through which “the emotions vie with each other 
in dazzling array, and then sink back in an inexpressible longing 
that fills our breast.”85
In the foregoing passage, a crucial difference transpires be-
tween Hoffmann’s and Schiller’s aesthetics of the sublime. Faith-
fully Kantian, Schiller’s analysis demands a clean distinction 
between the sublime and the beautiful. The definitive Hoff-
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mannian stance submits that we cannot presume such a distinc-
tion to exist. Each instance of beauty turns, of its own accord, 
into an instance of the sublime. 
The wording of the quoted passage is instructive. At first, “all 
the emotions vie with each other in dazzling array,” recalling 
Schiller’s free play of the faculties in the experience of beauty; 
and then “they sink back in an inexpressible longing that fills 
our breast.” The experience of the beautiful cannot, for Hoff-
mann, be isolated from the experience of the sublime. What 
bars beauty from sustaining the free play of the faculties is that, 
for Hoffmann, beauty can no longer be anchored in any sort of 
moral certainty. This is why, without denying the moral-teleo-
logical possibilities of art, Hoffmann stakes much more on art’s 
capacity to express man’s longing for such all-binding absolutes, 
the Sehnsucht for the infinite. Hoffmann’s is a world where Kan-
tian aesthetics finds itself unmoored in the absence of a mor-
ally binding, universally valid categorical imperative. Sublimity, 
then, cannot be construed as the other pole of aesthetic experi-
ence, at odds with beauty, as the tradition from Burke to Schil-
ler presented it. Rather Hoffmann’s sublime is a moment of the 
beautiful, destined to arrive with irreversible necessity. The ro-
mantics of his tales are at first lured by the experience of beauty 
that ends up spelling their demise. Hoffmann thus throws a dif-
ferent gambit to the romantic artist. While Schiller exhorts art-
ists to fill the world with beautiful creations, Hoffmann foresees 
the inherently tragic nature of such a mission. If aesthetic edu-
cation seeks to infuse the ordinary with the sublime, or to dif-
fuse the sublime into the ordinary, the danger, or price, of such a 
task will be madness, the dissolution of the self. Hoffmann does 
not disagree with Schiller, or Kant for that matter, insofar as a 
teleological abyss opens up in Europe after the collapse of the 
ancien régime and the authority of the Church. However, “the 
magical power of poetic truth” can have a transformative effect, 
for only he [the genuine, romantic artist] can bring before 
our eyes the wonderful apparitions of the spirit-realm; car-
ried on his wings we soar across the abyss that separates us 
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from it, and soon at home in that strange land we accept the 
miracles that are seen to take place as natural consequences 
of the influence of higher natures on our lives. Then we ex-
perience all the powerfully stirring sensations that fill us now 
with horror and fear, now with utter bliss.86
The pursuit of the beautiful is a risky affair. The artist, in his 
pursuit of beauty, is hounded by the demonic sublime, which 
threatens ego-death. In the “romantic dimension,” on the other 
hand, “language is raised to a higher power, or rather (since it 
is part of that distant realm of music) takes the form of song.”87 
The key to this transformation of language into a system of syn-
esthetic signification, however, is now tied to an “inner poetic 
relationship or poetic truth that might kindle music into life.”88 
Whether it is poetry that kindles music into life or music which 
imbues poetry with its inimitable vigor, Hoffmann’s stance is 
unmistakable: whatever the artistic means, the task of genuine 
(read: romantic) art is to risk the horrors of the spirit-realm and 
channel the hieroglyphs of the latter into art.
Beethoven
Among the host of feckless romantics that populates Hoffmann’s 
writings, it is two musicians who manage to tower above the dis-
tinct misery that only an artistic vocation can deliver. Hoffmann 
depicts them both as trans-human, demonic figures. We have al-
ready encountered some of the fictional Johannes Kreisler’s pro-
nouncements on art. As for Beethoven, his success is not merely 
due to the fact that he boldly trespasses into the transcendent. 
All of Hoffmann’s romantics court the abyss. Rather, Beethov-
en is emblematic because, like Orpheus, he enters the realm of 
shadows and manages to come back demonically transfigured, 
if not altogether triumphant. At the hands of Beethoven, music 
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say the only really romantic art, for its sole object is the expres-
sion of the infinite.”89 Beethoven’s role in this transformation of 
music consists in laying down the bridge between the mundane 
world and the romantic spirit-world, in the same way that “the 
lyre of Orpheus opens the doors of Orkus,” the underworld. 
More than any other work, it is the Fifth Symphony that 
solidifies Beethoven’s quasi-mythical status according to Hoff-
mann. In his influential 1810 review of Beethoven’s Fifth Sym-
phony, republished in 1814 as “Beethoven’s Instrumental Music,” 
Hoffmann locates Beethoven’s genius in his capacity to compose 
a genuinely self-originating piece of instrumental music. The re-
view presents the Fifth Symphony as an epoch-defining work of 
art on account of its portrayal of the drama of self-formation 
so fundamental to the romantic imaginary. Beethoven’s feat, in 
other words, consists in constructing an elaborate symphonic 
edifice by working through the inner relationships that tie to-
gether the three notes which announce the beginning of the 
first movement, the so-called, mistakenly, “fate knocking at the 
door,” rather than adhering to the formal prescriptions of sym-
phonic composition in the tradition of Joseph Haydn and Wolf-
gang Amadeus Mozart. Hoffmann portrays the development of 
the Fifth Symphony as organically urged on by the natural mo-
mentum of its humble beginnings.90 Invoking the arch-romantic 
opposition between the mechanical and the organic, Hoffmann 
writes of how Beethoven “scatters the good old rules in disorder 
whenever it happens to please him in the momentary excite-
ment of his creative imagination,” all the while retaining an “in-
ner, underlying organic structure” that can never be appreciated 
by “aesthetic mechanicians.” 
The unity of the symphony, Hoffmann notes, owes less to any 
formal strictness than to “the inner relationship of the themes 
with one another which produces that unity which alone is able 
89 E.T.A. Hoffmann, “Beethoven’s Instrumental Music: Translated from 
E.T.A. Hoffmann’s ‘Kreisleriana’,” trans. Arthur Ware Locke, Musical Quar-
terly 3, no. 1 (January 1917): 123–33.
90 Cf. Abigail Chantler, E.T.A. Hoffmann’s Musical Aesthetics (London: Rout-
ledge, 2006), 51f.
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to hold the listener in one mood.” Such unity is revealed, for 
example, in the “more subtle relationship [that] shows itself 
merely in the spiritual connection of one theme with another.” 
In Beethoven’s music we are exposed to “mysterious premoni-
tions,” “magic combinations” from which “a world of visions,” 
even a “circle of mystical visions,” may be constructed. These 
visions and premonitions are subjective, to be sure, but their 
binding power stems from the fact that, like the phantasmago-
ria scattered across Hoffmann’s tales, they are no less active and 
indeed at work in the very depths of one’s lived reality. These 
are depths that are destined to remain out of reach were it not 
for the aesthetic experience, which plumbs them through the 
“sublime and noble language” of music’s hieroglyph. More than 
anything else, however, it was the holism of Beethoven’s music 
that impressed Hoffmann. The holistic nature of the Fifth was 
embodied in its self-referential character, its development of its 
themes out of the four humble notes with which it begins. In-
deed, Hoffmann underscores the defining holism of Beethoven’s 
symphony by resorting to the same seed analogy that came to 
be a staple of romantic self-understanding. The part-whole re-
lationship defining the Fifth Symphony can only be captured 
by “the deeper glance” which is able to discern in it not a se-
quence of felicitously arranged accidents but “the beautiful tree 
with leaves, blossoms, and fruit growing from one germinating 
seed.”91 Despite its seemingly disorderly veneer, on account of 
its breaking with tradition, “this very organization of the whole 
work as well as the constant reappearances of the motives and 
harmonic effects, following closely on one another, intensify to 
the highest degree that feeling of inexpressible longing.” What 
holds the work together, rather than a readily discernible formal 
coherence in line with tradition, is the work’s own inner “con-
necting links,” “the constant allusions to the main theme,” “the 
contrapuntal interweavings that bind the work together.”92 The 
product is a piece of music that gives the illusion of pulling itself 
91 Hoffmann, “Beethoven’s Instrumental Music,” 129.
92 Ibid., 130.
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up by its own bootstraps, fulfilling the romantic ideal of self-
origination.
Feuerkreis
Curiously, in the midst of his Beethoven review, Hoffmann in-
troduces his own fictional-autobiographical character, the Ka-
pellmeister Kreisler, “before whose piano I am now sitting and 
writing” (!), as the person who “brought it home to me most 
clearly that we should honor only that which is inspired and that 
everything else comes from evil.”93 The aesthetic commitments 
I attempted to trace in Hoffmann’s tales and musical writings 
converge in the figure of Johannes Kreisler. Understanding Kre-
isler’s significance in Hoffmann’s work will thus round off my 
account of the latter’s aesthetics. 
Hoffmann collected the musical writings of the apocryphal 
Kreisler in a cycle of essays entitled Kreisleriana (1819).94 The 
Kreisleriana begins with a declaration of the anonymous origins 
of Johannes Kreisler. The first line reads: “Where is he from? 
Nobody knows. Who were his parents? It is not known. Whose 
pupil is he?” and so on. The collection ends, remarkably, with 
an essay entitled “Johannes Kreisler’s Certificate of Apprentice-
ship,” seemingly written anonymously, in the third person, yet 
signed, unnervingly, with Kreisler’s own name. It is as if the 
“Certificate of Apprenticeship” was awarded by origin-less Kre-
isler to himself. Taken as a whole, the essay cycle Kreisleriana 
thus bears witness to Kreisler’s embodiment of the romantic 
ideal of self-origination. 
The trials and tribulations of Johannes Kreisler, as set forth 
by Hoffmann, must be read as a hieroglyph of the destiny of 
the genuine romantic artist as Hoffmann envisioned it. While 
the Kreisleriana introduces us to Kreisler’s music criticism, 
Hoffmann’s final novel, whose full title is The Life and Opinions 
of the Tomcat Murr, Together with a Fragmentary Biography of 
Kapellmeister Johannes Kreisler on Random Sheets of Waste Pa-
93 Ibid.
94 Hoffmann, E.T.A. Hoffmann’s Musical Writings, 23–165.
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per (1822), offers us a closer look at the condition of the mad 
composer. In Tomcat Murr, Kreisler gives a different account 
of his family origins, as he mentions his father’s abandoning of 
his family and his mother’s early death,95 but this account leaves 
Kreisler’s youth and upbringing shrouded in mystery. At the end 
of the day, it is the symbolism of Kreisler’s character that clues us 
in on Hoffmann’s deepest aesthetic commitments. Tomcat Murr 
contains a scene where Kreisler explains his name to his ben-
efactress, Madame Benzon: 
No, there’s no getting away from the word Kreis, meaning 
a circle, and Heaven send that it immediately puts you in 
mind of those wonderful circles in which our entire existence 
moves and from which we cannot escape, do what we may. 
A Kreisler circulates in these circles, and very likely, weary of 
the leaps and bounds of the St. Vitus’s dance96 he is obliged to 
perform, and at odds with the dark, inscrutable power which 
delineated those circles, he often longs to break out more 
than a stomach constitutionally weak anyway will allow.97
Here Kreisler identifies himself, as a romantic artist, with the 
intimation of a necessity of fate at work in man’s lower depths. 
The longing for the infinite is depicted here as compulsively cir-
cular. Honoring such infinite longing constitutes the terrifying 
pilgrimage to Orkus which the romantic must endure. I have 
argued that the decision to take up such a fateful vocation as a 
cartographer of the absolute has little to do with circumstan-
tial biographical details, whether Hoffmann’s or Kreisler’s, and 
rather concerns a fundamental metaphysical malaise that gives 
rise to the infinite, longing characteristic of the romantic mind-
set. It is the same malaise that compels the romantic to draw 
95 Hoffmann, The Life and Opinions of the Tomcat Murr, 74.
96 A reference to Sydenham’s Chorea disease, which used to be known as St. 
Vitus’s Dance, on account of its inducing a dancing mania in children. St. 
Vitus is the patron saint of dance.
97 Ibid., 49.
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nearer to the sublime spirit-realm which threatens the artist’s 
own destruction. 
In fact, Hoffmann uses variants of the German Kreis (circle), 
from which Kreisler’s name is derived, when describing the 
destructive trials endured by the romantic protagonists of his 
tales. Particularly revealing is the repeated mention of a “cir-
cle of fire” (Feuerkreis) in some of Hoffmann’s most influential 
works. In The Golden Pot, a witch attempts to conjure up Ansel-
mus by using her cat to create a “circle of fire” on the ground.98 
In The Sandman, Nathanael’s delusions are described as a “fiery 
circle” that never stops turning.99 In the throes of his fatal col-
lapse at the end of the tale, we find Nathanael “leaping up in 
the air and shouting, ‘Circle of fire! Whirl round, circle of fire! 
Whirl round!’”100 Commenting on Hoffmann’s usage of “Feuer-
kreis,” Neil Hertz notes that “the expression [is] an unusual one 
in German.”101 Hertz then offers a reading whereby Hoffmann’s 
description of the romantic’s repetition-compulsion functions 
as “what French critics call a mise en abyme — a casting into the 
abyss,” which gives “an illusion of infinite regress.”102 The roman-
tic artist aims to “capture and represent the energies figured in 
the Feuerkreis itself,”103 accounting for the romantic’s perverse 
pursuit of the destructive sublime. “This mise en abyme,” Hertz 
continues, “simulates wildly uncontrollable repetition, and it is 
just that, I believe, that is imaged [sic] here in the whirling Feu-
erkreis, carrying Nathanael into the black abyss.”104 
The circle of fire is a prime hieroglyph of Hoffmann’s aes-
thetics. So forceful are the equivalences that Hoffmann draws 
between fire and the effacement of oppositions that Bachelard 
identifies a “Hoffmann Complex,” whereby “[m]adness and in-
98 Hoffmann, Tales of E.T.A. Hoffmann, 54.
99 Ibid., 109.
100 Ibid., 125.
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toxication, reason and enjoyment, are constantly presented in 
combination.”105 The major opposition effaced by Hoffmann’s 
aesthetics is that of the beautiful and the sublime. In viewing 
the sublime as a terminal moment of the beautiful, Hoffmann 
paints the romantic artist as someone who is willing to risk the 
horrors of madness for the sake of bringing the transcendent 
fire of the spirit-realm closer to man’s impoverished existence.
105 Gaston Bachelard, Psychoanalysis of Fire, trans. Alan C.M. Ross (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1964), 86.
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When the Monstrous Object Becomes a 
Tremendous Non-Event:  
Rudolf Otto’s Monster-Gods, H.P. 
Lovecraft’s Cthulhu, and Graham 
Harman’s Theory of Everything 
Eric Wilson
The speculative position: “that the universe is undergirded by a 
somewhat horrifying power, one which humans can know.” 
 — Fintan Neylan, “The Labour of the Pessimist”1
Un-reason: “the ultimate absence of reason […], an absolute 
ontological property and not the mark of the finitude of our 
knowledge.” 
 — Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude2 
Everything Else: “If we look through the aperture which we 
have opened up onto the absolute, what we see is a rather 
1 Fintan Neyland, “The Labour of the Pessimist: Detecting Expiration’s 
Artifice,” in True Detection, eds. Edia Connole, Paul J. Ennis, and Nicola 
Masciandaro (San Bernardino: Schism Press, 2014), 85.
2 Quentin Meillasoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contin-
gency, trans. Ray Brassier (London: Continuum, 2008), 53.
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menacing power — something insensible, and capable of 
destroying both things and worlds, of bringing forth monstrous 
absurdities, yet also of never doing anything, of realizing every 
dream, but also every nightmare.” 
 — Meillassoux, After Finitude3
While explaining the irresistible, sophomoric allure of Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Tracy Strong once opined that the main drawing 
power of the coprophagic Anti-Christ was his tectonic plate-
shattering capacity to offer a wholly intelligible view of the 
world (Welt anschauung) following the extinction of all human 
life. Technically, he is incorrect. Arthur Schopenhauer was the 
first to do so, albeit operating with the caveat that a universe 
minus a self-aware observer would be indistinguishable from 
a primordial chaos — real in the sense of actual but un-real in 
the sense of incoherent, what Eugene Thacker denotes as the 
“world-without-us.”4 Nonetheless, this image of Nietzsche stuck 
and the problem remains for all variants of post-Kantian phi-
losophy: is a world without self-awareness truly a “world” in any 
possible sense of this word?
My chapter will be divided into two parts.5 The first will re-
visit in greater detail an issue that I first raised in my monograph 
The Republic of Cthulhu: Lovecraft, the Weird Tale and Con-
spiracy Theory,6 namely, that Rudolf Otto’s The Idea of the Holy 
(1917) is a direct but unacknowledged source for H.P. Lovecraft’s 
seminal and semi-confessional work of literary criticism, “Su-
pernatural Horror in Literature” (1927). Otto’s work reads like a 
compendium of Lovecraftian narrative devices. His subjectivist 
reconstruction of the experience of the Holy as the mysterium 
3 Ibid., 64.
4 Eugene Thacker, In the Dust of This Planet: Horror of Philosophy, Volume I 
(Winchester: Zero Books, 2011).
5 Due to limitations of space, I will omit discussion of three of Harman’s 
favorite topics: the works of Bruno Latour, Manuel DeLanda, and Reza 
Negarestani.
6 Eric Wilson, The Republic of Cthulhu: Lovecraft, the Weird Tale and Con-
spiracy Theory (Brooklyn: punctum books, 2015).
441
WHEN THE MONSTROUS OBJECT BECOMES A TREMENDOUS NON-EVENT
tremendum enables a direct union of light and dark. All three 
facets of mysterium/tremendum — to be discussed below — are 
dramatically and discursively central to Lovecraft’s magnum 
opus, the Cthulhu Mythos anchored on the one truly indis-
pensable Lovecraftian text, “The Call of Cthulhu” (1926). The 
second part will be a systematic re-evaluation of the Ottonian/
Lovecraftian aesthetic in terms of the post-neo-phenomeno-
logical “object-oriented ontology” (OOO) of Graham Harman. 
OOO is the branch of speculative realism that I am the most in-
terested in as it directly overlaps with my interests in neo-phe-
nomenology and aesthetics, my own views on these matters are 
endorsed by Harman himself (“OOO holds that philosophy gen-
erally has a closer relationship with aesthetics than with math-
ematics or natural science”7), and my main focus will be upon 
Harman’s shorter text, The Quadruple Object (2011), a book that 
“seeks only to provide a weirder version of Aristotle’s theory 
of substance.”8 My chapter concludes with an atrociously brief 
comparison of Harman with Quentin Meillassoux, explaining 
why it is the work of the former and not the latter that offers 
the preferred interpretation of the seminal work of twentieth-
century horror fiction. My conclusion is that Cthulhu represents 
nothing so much as Harman’s concept of the quadruple object.
Lovecraft and Daemonical Dread:  
The Case of the Disappeared Cthulhu
“A catastrophe is the occurrence of an abrupt discontinuity in a 
system characterized by continuous dynamics.”
 — Jean-Pierre Dupuy, A Short Treatise 
on the Metaphysics of Tsunamis9
7 Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object (Winchester: Zero Books, 2011), 
9.
8 Ibid., 93.
9 Jean-Pierre Dupuy, A Short Treatise on the Metaphysics of Tsunamis, trans. 
M.B. DeBevoise (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2015), 34.
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On reflection, the entirety of the Western tradition of philoso-
phy comes down to this supremely elemental question: is there 
any essential difference between the death of a human (person) 
and the death of an insect (non-person)? And, from the per-
spective of a flat ontology the answer is: absolutely none at all. 
Admittedly, this is somewhat counter-intuitive. The far more 
normal response — a possible excrescence of Man’s allegedly 
“eternal quest for meaning” — is to express the inexpressibility 
of atrocity through a very specific type of moral rhetoric. Jean-
Pierre Dupuy’s comment on Susan Neiman’s treatment of the 
problem of evil in Western philosophy is most pertinent here.
Her crucial insight, borrowed from Arendt, is that when 
moral evil attains its height, as at Auschwitz, the categories that 
we habitually rely on to make moral judgments in ordinary life 
are shattered. In that case evil can only be accounted for in terms 
of an attack on the natural order of the world10 […] this kind 
of explanation is a piece of metaphysical cunning that makes 
it possible to do away with some part of the responsibility we 
would otherwise face, by converting evil into fate, into a secular 
form of transcendence, as it were.11
The problem with any “secular form of transcendence” is that 
it is ultimately unfeasible: secularity is the domain of finitude, 
and by extension the relative, while transcendence necessar-
ily signifies the absolute, no matter how metaphysically weak. 
Hence Gunther Ander’s bewilderment concerning the attitude 
of the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki:
Their [the survivors of the atomic bombings] steadfast re-
solve not to speak of those who were to blame, not to say that 
the event had been caused by human beings; not to harbor 
10 Hannah Arendt defines “evil” as a fungus: “Evil possesses neither depth 
nor any demonic dimensions. It can overgrow and lay waste [to] the whole 
world precisely because it spreads like a fungus on the surface.” Cited in 
Susan Nieman, Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philoso-
phy (Melbourne: Scribe Publishers, 2002), 301.
11 Jean-Pierre Dupuy, A Short Treatise on the Metaphysics of Tsunamis, trans. 
M.B. DeBevoise (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2015), 13.
443
WHEN THE MONSTROUS OBJECT BECOMES A TREMENDOUS NON-EVENT
the least resentment, even though they were the victims of 
the greatest crimes — this really is too much for me, it passes 
all understanding […] They constantly speak of the catastro-
phe as if it were an earthquake or a tidal wave. They use the 
Japanese word, tsunami.12 
On closer inspection this is not a paradox at all: it is a stratagem 
to obviate any possibility of the collective guilt of the Japanese 
people for initiating the Pacific War. If the atomic bombings 
were just like a tsunami, then neither the Americans nor the 
Japanese are morally to blame. The price of Japanese innocence 
is the moral absolution of the Americans — the reduction of the 
Enola Gay to a natural force. What is pertinent in Anders’s la-
ment is the implicit reversal that lies within the metaphorical 
equation of absolute evil with natural disaster: the imaginary 
of the one can be rendered iterable to the other simply on the 
basis of scalar considerations. The enormity, or size, of either 
event, natural or evil, automatically lends itself to a commonal-
ity of expression, which in turn leads to a consideration in terms 
of both religious and aesthetic phenomena. Here is how Dupuy 
frames the destruction of the World Trade Center: “On 11 Sep-
tember 2001, an apocalyptic event took place on American soil. 
I use the word ‘apocalypse’ in its true sense, not with reference 
to a catastrophe that will put an end to the world, but instead 
to something that is a bearer of revelation.”13 Now take note of 
how Anders defines religious phenomena: “What I recognize as 
being ‘religious’ in nature is nothing at all positive, but only the 
horror of human action transcending any human scale, which 
no god can prevent.”14 What links both passages is an implicit 
correlation between the event and the sublime: the magnitude 
of great evil and annihilating destruction triggers an evocation 
that implicitly conflates the spectacular with the divine. This, 
12 Gunther Anders, cited in ibid., 63.
13 Ibid., 33.
14 Gunther Anders, cited in Jean-Pierre Dupuy, The Mark of the Sacred, 
trans. M.B. DeBevoise (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), 207.
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of course, is in full accordance with Immanuel Kant’s classical 
exposition of the notion of the sublime. Simply put, Kant’s entire 
metaphysical system ultimately serves an end both aesthetic and 
epistemological: to organize the world in such a way as to make 
it the grounds for objective understanding and absolute knowl-
edge. In other words, to thoroughly serve “the purposive” — or, 
in Heideggerian terms, the reduction of both self and object to 
“correctness.”
For Kant, the perception of the world (“the transcendental 
deduction”) requires a synthesis of what appears before us with-
in both time and space. The synthetic project of “pure reason” 
requires three operational concepts, or “unities of synthesis”: ap-
prehension, reproduction, and recognition. Within the Kantian 
scheme, all knowledge and understanding is ultimately anthro-
pocentric, in that all things must be reduced to units of measure 
that are compatible with human understanding (cogito): “A tree 
[the height of] which we estimate with reference to the height 
of a man, at all events gives us a standard for a mountain.”15 The 
categories of pure reason guaranteeing both the unity of phe-
nomena as well as the ontological unity of the perceiving subject 
constitutes the transcendental unity of apperception.16 “In other 
words, it is not so much that I perceive objects; it is rather my 
perception that presupposes the [unitary] object-form as one of 
its conditions.”17 For Kant, “the real (synthetic) formula of the 
cogito is: I think myself, and in thinking myself, I think that the 
object in general to which I relate is a represented diversity.”18 
Therefore, the operations of the a priori categories of synthetic 
understanding need to be supplemented by the work of an addi-
tional faculty, judgment, which is responsible for subordinating 
15 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgment, trans. J.H. Bernard (Amherst: 
Prometheus Books, 2000), 118.
16 Daniel W. Smith, “Translator’s Introduction: Deleuze on Bacon: Three 
Conceptual Trajectories in The Logic of Sensation” in Gilles Deleuze, Fran-
cis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans. Daniel W. Smith (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2003), vii–xxvii and xvii.
17 Ibid., xvi.
18 Gilles Deleuze, cited in Smith, “Translator’s Introduction,” xvi.
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all of the inherent sensible diversity of spatio-temporal objects 
to the operational requirements of the synthetic categories of 
transcendental reason: “The only use which the understanding 
can make of these [concepts] is to judge by means of them.”19 
From this follow two consequences, one phenomenological the 
other aesthetic. In terms of the former, the human body itself 
is the final source not only of the units of measurement but of 
the operational constraints of the synthetic categories of pure 
reason:
This primary (subjective, sensory, immediate, living) mea-
sure proceeds from the [human] body. And it takes the body 
as its primary object […] It is the body which erects itself as 
a measure. It provides the measuring and measured unit of 
measure: of the smallest and largest possible, of the mini-
mum and the maximum, and likewise of the passage from 
the one to the other.20 
In terms of the latter, the lived evaluation of space-time imparts 
a necessarily aesthetic dimension to judgment, as the operation 
of perception is inseparable from the appreciation and evalua-
tion of form, which is the domain of the aesthetic properly de-
fined, “[a]ll estimation of the magnitude of objects of nature is 
in the last resort aesthetic (i.e., subjectively and not objectively 
determined).”21 And it is the intrinsically aesthetic nature of 
judgment that gives rise to one of Kant’s seminal concepts — the 
sublime. Although an aesthetic concept, the sublime is not iden-
tical with the beautiful. It is in fact antithetical to it. Whereas 
the beautiful dwells within the realm of intuition — the natural 
accordance of the spatio-temporal object with the synthetic cat-
egories of the cogito22 — the sublime is better understood as a 
19 Immanuel Kant, cited in Smith, “Translator’s Introduction,” xvi.
20 Jacques Derrida, The Truth in Painting, trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian 
McLeod (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 140.
21 Immanuel Kant, cited in Smith, “Translator’s Introduction,” xviii.
22 “Natural beauty […] brings with it a purposiveness in its form by which 
the object seems to be, as it were, pre-adapted to our Judgment, and thus 
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form of sensory trauma, the catastrophic or chaotic sundering 
of the immediacy of perception from the transcendental unity 
of apperception.
The sublime, on the other hand, is to be found in a form-
less object, so far as in it or by occasion of it boundlessness is 
represented, and yet its totality is also present to thought, that 
which excites in us, without any reasoning about it, but in the 
apprehension of it, the feeling of the sublime, may appear as 
regards its form to violate purpose in respect of the judgment, 
to be unsuited to our presentative faculty, and as it were to do 
violence to the Imagination. And yet it is judged to be only the 
more sublime.23
As we should expect, the Kantian sublime is remarkably, 
almost viscerally, phenomenological in nature — “[n]ature is 
therefore sublime in those of its phenomena whose intuition 
brings with it the Idea of its infinity.”24 Essential to the con-
cept of the sublime is not merely the heightening of the cogito’s 
self-awareness of the grounding of perception upon the body, 
but the abject insult inflicted upon the anthropocentric unit of 
measurement: “We call that sublime which is absolutely great 
[…] what is great beyond all comparison […] the sublime is that 
in comparison with which everything else is small.”25 Secondly, 
the subjective experience of the sublime is not the objective 
perception of the immediately unassimilable sensible diversity 
of the sublime object but rather the traumatic inducement of a 
crisis of confidence in the witness’ existential faith in the efficacy 
of judgment.
[T]rue sublimity must be sought only in the mind of the [sub-
ject] judging, not in the natural Object, the judgment upon 
which occasions this state […] Consequentially it is the state 
of mind produced by a certain representation with which the 




25 Ibid., 106, 109. Emphases added.
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reflective Judgment is occupied, and not the Object, that is to 
be called sublime […] [T]he sublime is that, the mere ability 
to think which, shows a faculty of the mind surpassing every 
standard of sense.26 
One of the central artistic paradoxes of supernatural literature, 
the central topic of this volume, is the manner in which the 
weird tale combines, not always successfully, elements of both 
the subversive and the reactionary; subversive because ratio is 
invariably threatened by the narratively necessary presence of 
the Wholly Other/Monster, reactionary because the subversive 
presence is, nearly, always successfully challenged and eliminat-
ed. “Traditionally, genre horror is concerned with the irruption 
of dreadful forces into a comforting status quo — one which the 
protagonists frantically scrabble to preserve.”27 Lovecraft is one 
of the singular examples of a counter-trend, largely through sub-
liminal interrogation of Heidegger’s alētheia, or apocalyptic rev-
elation. “By contrast, Lovecraft’s horror is not one of intrusion 
but of realization. The world has always been implacably bleak; 
the horror lies in our acknowledging that fact.”28 In Lovecraft’s 
own words, “the ultimate reality of space is clearly a complex 
churning of energy of which the human mind can never form 
any approximate picture, and which can touch us only through 
the veil of local apparent manifestations which we call the vis-
ible and material universe.”29
Within “The Call of Cthulhu,” the Lovecraftian text that I 
shall be most concerned with,30 the conflation of the catastroph-
26 Ibid., 110, 117. Emphasis added.
27 China Miéville, “Introduction,” in At the Mountains of Madness: The 
Definitive Edition (New York: The Modern Library, 2005), xiii.
28 Ibid.
29 H.P. Lovecraft, cited in Sean Elliot Martin, H.P. Lovecraft and the Modern-
ist Grotesque (published by author, 2008), 151.
30 It is interesting to note just how regularly multi-tentacled Cthulhu appears 
throughout speculative realist writings and associated works. See Steven 
Shaviro, The Universe of Things: On Speculative Realism (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2014), 91, 147; see also Timothy Morton, 
Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the World (Minne-
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ic with the sublime is most clearly on display in the third part 
of the tale, “The Madness From the Sea.”31 Here, the narrator 
Thurston recounts his reading of the journal of a recently de-
ceased Norwegian ship captain, Gustaf Johansen, the only sur-
vivor of an encounter on March 23, 1925, with a mysterious, un-
charted island in the far southern Pacific Ocean (S. Latitude 47º, 
9ʹ; W. Longitude 126º, 43ʹ), which turns out to be the premature-
ly, and only temporarily, re-surfaced sunken city of R’lyeh and 
a partially awoken Cthulhu, now revealed as the direct source 
of the concurrent wave of psychic distortions experienced by 
psychic sensitives throughout the world. Through Johansen we 
learn that the genocidal arch-priest of the Old Ones is able to 
leave stasis for a short time because of a localized earthquake 
that brings part of R’leyh to the surface. In Michel Houellebecq’s 
memorable summary of this cataclysmic event, “Between 4:00 
pm and 4:15 pm a breach occurred in the architecture of time. 
And through the fissure created, a terrifying entity manifested 
itself on our earth.”32 But oddly, absolutely nothing happens.
Pace Heidegger, Cthulhu, finally, comes into view (Ereignis), 
but it is a total non-event. And it is precisely the un-eventful 
nature of the event that I wish to discuss here. Where we should 
expect the end, all that we receive is a deferral; the re-animation 
of dead/dreaming Cthulhu is reduced to nothing more than a 
series of aesthetic phenomena, or even “effects,” that, while re-
vealing much, alter nothing in terms of the substance of Being, 
as opposed, of course, to our apperception of it. If, for the sake 
of academic argument, we were to philosophize seriously about 
Lovecraft’s masterpiece, then I would argue that within the ar-
ray of formidable speculative realists the concept that is most 
apolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013), 64, 175; and see esp. Graham 
Harman, Weird Realism: Lovecraft and Philosophy (Winchester: Zero 
Books, 2012).
31 H.P. Lovecraft, “The Call of Cthulhu,” in Michel Houellebecq, H.P. Love-
craft: Against the World, Against Life (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 
2006), 145–57.
32 Michel Houellebecq, H.P. Lovecraft: Against the World, Against Life (Lon-
don: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006), 82.
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useful for classifying the unclassifiable Ancient Ones is the OOO 
of Graham Harman, for it is Harman who most incisively man-
ages to separate a “thing” from its “effects.” But to understand 
this more clearly, it is necessary to take a detour through the 
phenomenological landscape of what is meant by the Holy, for 
it is there that we discover that at its core lies the horror of the 
reduction of the self to the pure object — the abject.
Creature Consciousness: From the Holy to the Abject
The real we have thus far is nothing compared to what we 
cannot even imagine, precisely because the defining character 
of the real is that one cannot imagine it. 
 — Jacques Lacan, The Triumph of Religion Preceded 
by Discourse to Catholics33
Although apparently linked to the supernatural theme in litera-
ture, Lovecraft’s oeuvre, on closer examination, reveals a meta-
narrative that is thoroughly modernist in orientation. And this 
supernaturally-infused modernism, in turn, betrays an almost 
nostalgic invocation of the notions of both numinousity and 
transcendence, an atheistic interrogation and re-conceptualiza-
tion of the Holy that is a central but largely under-appreciated 
facet of the literary project of modernism. Most germane is the 
seminal text on the subject of horrific transcendence, Rudolf 
Otto’s The Idea of the Holy (1917). Operating from a Wittgen-
steinian premise — “An object that can thus be thought concep-
tually may be termed rational” — Otto turns dogmatic theology 
on its head by arguing for the opposite axiom: any object that 
may be considered real — as in possessing substance — yet lack-
ing “clear and definite concepts” must necessarily be considered 
irrational — that is, an existent that is shapeless or formless.34 In 
33 Jacques Lacan, The Triumph of Religion Preceded by Discourse to Catholics, 
trans. Bruce Fink (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 72.
34 Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-Rational Factor 
in the Idea of the Divine and its Relation to the Rational, trans. John W. 
Harvey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), 1.
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theological terms, this anti-formalist insight yields us the cat-
egory of the numinous which, in existential terms, is subjec-
tively experienced as the Holy or the mysterium tremendum, the 
phenomenological core of religion.35 A union of light and dark 
mysterium acts as a form of fascination,36 and tremendum as a 
source of dread.37 Otto then proceeds to break down the daunt-
ing aspect of the Holy into three overlapping components. The 
first is “awe-fulness” or “daemonical dread,” the spectral fear in-
duced by the direct and unmediated encounter with an undefin-
able and hitherto invisible “Wholly Other.”38
It first begins to stir in the feeling of “something uncanny,” 
“eerie,” or “weird.” It is this feeling which, emerging in the mind 
of primeval man, forms the starting-point for the entire reli-
gious development of history. Daemons and gods alike spring 
from this root, and all the products of “mythological appercep-
tion” or “fantasy” are nothing but different modes in which it 
has been objectified.39
The second is alternatively defined as “energy” or “urgency,” 
the raw power of psychic transformation and an annihilating, 
de-personalizing illumination.40 Like awe-fulness, energy is 
both primitive and visceral, best expressed within the Abraham-
35 Ibid, 12–13. Not surprisingly, Otto established a clear correlation, or 
a schematic association in “temporal sequence,” between the Kantian 
sublime and the dualistic nature of the Holy. “Certainly we can tabulate 
some general ‘rational’ signs that uniformly recur as soon as we call an 
object sublime; as, for instance, the bounds of our understanding by some 
‘dynamic’ or ‘mathematic’ greatness, by potent manifestations of force or 
magnitude in spatial extent. But these are obviously only conditions of, 
not the essence of, the impression of sublimity. A thing does not become 
sublime merely by being great. The concept itself remains unexplicated; it 
has in it something mysterious, and in this it is like that of the numinous.” 
Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 41; see also: ibid., 41–49. In the end, Otto refuses 
to reduce religious experience to mere aesthetic sensation. Ibid., 45–49. 
36 Ibid., 25–40. The signature emotion of mysterium is stupor, “an astonish-
ment that strikes us dumb, amazement absolute.” Ibid., 26.
37 Ibid., 12–24.
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ic tradition as “the scorching and consuming wrath of God,”41 a 
reservoir of supernatural energy that appears devoid of moral 
qualities. “It is […] ‘like a hidden force of nature,’ like stored-up 
electricity, discharging itself upon anyone who comes too near. 
It is ‘incalculable’ and ‘arbitrary.’”42 Significantly, in its positive 
form, it manifests itself as mystic rapture, “the same ‘energy’” 
as “the scorching and consuming wrath of God” but flowing 
through different channels, (“love”, says one of the mystics, “is 
nothing else than quenched wrath”).43 The third, and the one 
closest to Lovecraft’s own dramatic concerns, is majestas, “ab-
solute over-poweringness,” or, even better, “creature-conscious-
ness,” the “shadow or subjective reflection” of the self ’s abject 
dependency upon the Wholly Other.44
It is the emotion of a creature submerged and overwhelmed 
by its own nothingness in contrast to that which is supreme 
above all creatures. Thus, in contrast to the overpowering of 
which we are conscious as an object over against the self, there 
is the feeling of one’s own submergence, of being but “dust and 
ashes and nothingness.”45 And this forms the numinous raw ma-
terial for the feeling of religious humility.
The “I am naught, Thou art all” is the unique and irreduc-
ible core of authentic private religious experience in which the 
“self-depreciation” of that primordial “element of the tremen-
dum, originally apprehended as ‘plenitude of power,’ becomes 
transmuted into ‘plenitude of being.’”46 Or, to put it another way, 
personal religious experience is the phenomenological mapping 
of the anthropological migration from Monsters to Gods. If the 
numinous truly stands for that “aspect of deity which transcends 





45 Ibid., 10, 20.
46 Ibid., 21.
47 John W. Harvey,  “Translator’s Preface,” in Otto, The Idea of the Holy, xvi. 
See also A.S. Herbert cited in Matt Cardin, Dark Awakenings (Poplar Bluff: 
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Otto’s great work makes intelligible one of the most repressed 
truths of the sacred, that the inseparability of religion from hor-
ror flows from the primordial “absence of difference” between 
the Wholly Other and the Monster. 
Derived from the Latin noun monstrum, which is related to 
the verbs monstrare (“to show” or “to reveal”) and monere (“to 
warn” or “to portend”48), the coming of the Monster is identical 
to a revelation of a dangerous truth that is incommensurable 
with orthodox consensus, both social and epistemological. In 
its existential dimension, the numinous/monstrous is identical 
with that unsayable-which-induces-dread, and which therefore 
lacks a true name. The “nearest that German can get to it is in 
the expression das Ungeheuere (monstrous), while in English 
‘weird’ is perhaps the closest rendering possible.”49 In its an-
thropological dimension, God-and-Monster signifies both the 
iterability between Chaos and Order — the eternally recurrent 
migrations between cosmogony and chaogony — as well as the 
radically undecidable (anti-schematic) nature of the primal sub-
stance of Being.50 At the risk of simplifying, it may be truthfully 
said that the greater part of the intellectual edifice of Lovecraft’s 
oeuvre consists of nothing more than an act of translation of 
what Beal identifies as “the paradox of the monstrous”51 into the 
atheistic tropes of Darwinist Biology and Einsteinian Physics. 
What he yields is an utterly uncanny synthesis of the archaic 
Mythos Books, 2010), 302, “[t]he word ‘holy’ is primarily not an ethical 
term, but one indicating the otherness, the incalculable power, of God, his 
inaccessibility. He is ‘the great stranger in the human world’ […] Holy ex-
pressed the mysterious, incalculable, unapproachable quality of the divine 
in contrast to the human.”
48 Timothy J. Beal, Religion and Its Monsters (New York: Routledge, 2002), 
6–7.
49 Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 40.
50 See Beal, Religion and Its Monsters. Also see Cardin, “A Horrific Reading 
of Isaiah,” in Dark Awakenings, 287–319. Cardin ends his discussion of the 
Book of Isaiah 24–34 by concluding, “Yahweh, in a very important way, 
functions as a chaos monster.” Ibid., 295; see also ibid., 296, 300, 302.
51 Beal, Religion and Its Monsters, 19.
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with the super scientific, a monstrous cross-fertilization of the 
transcendental Wholly Other with the physicalist Alien.
Paradoxically, it is precisely this bleak atheist awe that makes 
Lovecraft a kind of bad-son heir to a religious visionary tradi-
tion, an ecstatic tradition, which, in distinction from the eve-
ryday separation of matter and spirit, locates the holy in the 
everyday. Lovecraft, too, sees the awesome as immanent to the 
quotidian, but there is little ecstasy [mysterium] here. His is a 
bad numinous.52 
Following Otto, we can now see that the central conceit of 
the Lovecraftian corpus is that his “bad numinous” is tremen-
dum with the mysterium subtracted out, although it should be 
noted that Lovecraft does seek a limited re-introduction of fas-
cination, or stupor, in relation to the Wholly Other in some of 
his last works.53 Lovecraft himself makes this painfully clear in 
his semi-confessional work of literary criticism, “Supernatural 
Horror in Literature” (1927):
The appeal of the spectrally macabre is generally narrow be-
cause it demands from the reader a certain degree of imagi-
nation and a capacity of detachment from everyday life […] 
There is here involved a psychological pattern or tradition 
as real and as deeply grounded in mental experience as any 
other pattern or tradition of mankind; coeval with the reli-
gious feeling and closely related to many aspects of it, and 
too much a part of our inmost biological heritage to lose 
52 S.T. Joshi, “Introduction,” in The Thing on the Doorstep and Other Weird 
Stories, ed. S.T. Joshi (London: Penguin Books, 2001), xiii. Compare Viv-
ian Ralickas on this very point: “In denying humanism and revealing the 
ostensible unity of the human subject to be a fallacy, I contend that what 
Lovecraft’s work affirms, albeit negatively, is a subjective crisis specific to 
the modern condition.” Vivian Ralickas, “‘Cosmic Horror’ and the Ques-
tion of the Sublime in Lovecraft,” Journal of the Fantastic in the Arts 18, no. 
3 (2007), 366, and also 387–88.
53 In particular, “At the Mountains of Madness” and “The Shadow over Inns-
mouth.”
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keen potency over a very important, though not numerically 
great, minority of our species.54 
Typically, Lovecraft grounds the species’ predilection for horror 
with an atavistic genetic inheritance.55 “The oldest and strongest 
emotion of mankind is fear, and the oldest and strongest kind 
of fear is fear of the unknown”; the artistic merit of “the weird-
ly horrible tale as a literary form,” therefore, is guaranteed not 
by transcendental notions but by profanely material ones: the 
ritualistic re-enactment of the primal terror of self-awareness.56 
Against the emotional primacy of horror “are discharged all the 
shafts of a materialistic sophistication which clings to frequently 
felt emotions and external events, and of a naively insipid ideal-
ism which deprecates the aesthetic motive and calls for a didac-
tic literature to ‘uplift’ the reader towards a suitable degree of 
smirking optimism.”57 However, since cosmic horror is the re-
54 H.P. Lovecraft, “Supernatural Horror in Literature” in At the Mountains of 
Madness: The Definitive Edition (New York: The Modern Library, 2005), 
105.
55 As does Otto. “It may well be possible, it is even probable, that in the first 
stage of its development the religious consciousness started with only 
one of its poles — the daunting aspect of the numen — and so at first took 
shape only as ‘daemonic dread.’” Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 32.
56 Lovecraft, “Supernatural Horror in Literature,” 105. Compare this remark-
able passage with Otto on the atavistic relationship between daemonic 
dread and horror fiction: “This crudely naïve and primordial emotional 
disturbance, and the fantastic images to which it gives rise, are later 
overborne and ousted by more highly developed forms of the numinous 
emotion, with all its mysteriously impelling power. But even when this has 
long attained its higher and purer mode of expression it is possible for the 
primitive types of excitation that were formerly a part of it to break out in 
the soul in all their original naïveté and so to be experienced afresh. That 
this is so is shown by the potent attraction again and again exercised by 
the element of horror and ‘shudder’ in ghost stories, even among persons 
of high all-round education.” Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 16, and also 29, 
where Otto clearly identifies the fear of ghosts as a “degraded offshoot 
and travesty of the genuine ‘numinous’ dread or awe.” As Stephen King 
expressed it, in his inestimable EC horror comic book style, horror “invites 
a physical reaction by showing us something which is physically wrong.” 
Stephen King, Danse Macabre (New York: Gallery Books, 2010), 22.
57 Lovecraft, “Supernatural Horror in Literature,” 105.
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visitation of the (un-)holy, it necessarily follows that the high-
est form of supernatural literature, or “the weird tale,” depends 
upon the successful narrative deployment of the cultural residue 
of the theological imaginary:
The true weird tale has something more than secret murder, 
bloody bones, or a sheeted form clanking chains according to 
a rule. A certain atmosphere of breathless and unexplainable 
dread of outer, unknown forces must be present; and there 
must be a hint, expressed with a seriousness and portentous-
ness becoming its subject, of that most terrible conception 
of the human brain — a malign and particular suspension 
or defeat of those fixed laws of nature which are our only 
safeguard against the assaults of chaos and the daemons of 
unplumbed space.58 
As Lovecraft’s greatest critic Maurice Levy points out, the over-
riding aesthetic impulse of the Lovecraftian text is to induce 
within the post-theistic reader a sense of that primordial dread 
that was the hallmark of primitive religious experience, the vio-
lent and unmediated encounter with the “Wholly Other.”59 As 
Lovecraft writes, 
Therefore, we must judge a weird tale not by the author’s in-
tent, or by the mere mechanics of the plot, but by the emo-
tional level which it attains at its least mundane point […] 
The one test of the really weird is simply this — whether or 
not there be excited in the reader a profound sense of dread, 
and of contact with unknown spheres and powers; a subtle 
attitude of awed listening, as if for the beating of black wings 
or the scratching of outside shapes and entities on the known 
universe’s utmost rim.60 
58 Ibid, 107.
59 See Maurice Levy, Lovecraft: A Study in the Fantastic, trans. S.T. Doshi 
(Detroit: Wayne State University, 1988).
60 Lovecraft, “Supernatural in Horror Literature,” 108.
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Cosmic horror is a paradoxically anti-therapeutic form of ca-
tharsis: curative because of the flooding release of psychic ten-
sion that it itself creates but harmful at the same time because 
of the radical disabuse of human conceit that it involves. As 
Donald R. Burleson has quite correctly recognized, Lovecraft’s 
aesthetic is essentially post-modern in nature, a “deconstructive 
gesture of questioning and unsettling metaphysically privileged 
systems of all kinds.” The signature feature of Lovecraft’s writ-
ing is precisely this ironically self-understood insignificance of 
being-human, which, given the essentially anthropocentric na-
ture of Western thought, bestows upon the Lovecraftian corpus 
a status unique within modern literature.61 “In a society that is 
becoming each day more and more anesthetized and repressive, 
the fantastic is at once an evasion and the mobilization of an-
guish. It restores man’s sense of the sacred and the sacrilegious, 
it above all gives back to him his lost depth.”62 For Levy,
Lovecraft […] creates the strange, he excites fear, by turning 
the world inside out. For Lovecraft, writing is the making of 
the oneiric and wrong side of things appear, substituting the 
nocturnal for the diurnal, replacing the reassuring image of 
the Waking World by the alienating ones of the great depths. 
The world of the surface has in his work no other raison d’être 
than provisionally and imperfectly to cover up the abyss.63 
Central to Lovecraft’s oeuvre is his highly aestheticized — which 
is to say, intensely singular — onto-epistemology, a philosophi-
cally naïve but dramatically powerful re-presentation of the met-
aphysics of Schopenhauer: “Life is a hideous thing, and from the 
background behind what we know of it peer daemonical hints 
of truth which make it a thousandfold more hideous.”64  
61 Donald R. Burleson, Lovecraft: Disturbing the Universe (Lexington: Uni-
versity Press of Kentucky, 2009), 158–59.
62 Levy, Lovecraft, 120.
63 Ibid.
64 H.P. Lovecraft, “Facts Concerning the Late Arthur Jermyn and His Family,” 
in The Call of Cthulhu and Other Weird Stories, ed. S.T. Joshi (London: 
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In his pioneering deconstruction of the Lovecraftian weird tale, 
Burleson identifies as the meta-theme of the oeuvre “the ru-
inous nature of self-knowledge,” or, more exactly, “the notion 
that, when we as humans come to look upon the cosmos as it 
is, we find our place in it to be soul-crushingly evanescent.” 65 
The other recursive themes are forbidden knowledge, denied 
primacy, unwholesome survivals, and, most interesting of all, il-
lusory surface appearances, the general signification that things 
are not as they appear on the surface, below which deeper and 
more terrible realities are masked.
All of Lovecraft’s plots, in so far as there are any, are occa-
sioned by a traumatic, and traumatizing, cognitive rupturing of 
the social consensus of reality,66 culminating in the annihilat-
ing revelation of an unspeakable dis-joint between a human(-
istic) phenomena and a post-human(-istic) noumena, perfectly 
suited to the post-theistic aesthetic experience of the weird tale, 
signified by the obliteration of consciousness and self-aware-
ness, culminating in Lovecraft’s trademark literary gimmick, 
the primordial scream. This scream is the epitome of the Love-
craftian artistic effect, a radically alienating encounter with the 
annihilating nature of the universe, which in the final instance 
can only be denoted as the nameless. And as no less an authority 
than Abdul Alhazred himself declares in his darkly magisterial 
Necronomicon, “Man rules now where They ruled once; They 
shall soon rule where Man rules now. After summer is winter, 
and after winter summer. They wait patient and potent, for here 
shall they reign again.”67
Penguin Classics, 2011), 14.
65 Burleson, Lovecraft, 158, and also 156–57.
66 “At some point, the text breaks down and reveals something which has 
not been there. A rupture emerges and, along with it, something new, 
the unknown. The next step is horror which arises from a threat, not to 
the narrator but to humanity.” Timo Airaksinen, The Philosophy of H.P. 
Lovecraft: The Route to Horror (New York: Peter Lang, 1985), 175.
67 H.P. Lovecraft, “The Dunwich Horror,” in The Thing on the Doorstep and 
Other Weird Stories, ed. S.T. Joshi (London: Penguin Classics, 2001), 220.
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What we are left with, then, is an unbridgeable dichotomy 
between reality and sensations: our world remains the same, but 
we experience it differently. And if we were to follow Eugene 
Thacker on this point — that the horror tale should be thought 
of in terms of a philosophical text — then the formal question 
that Lovecraft’s work raises is: how exactly are we to separate an 
object from its effects? And the answer, for Harman, is to pri-
oritize aesthetics as first philosophy through isolating the sub-
stance of an object from the totality of its sensual effects within 
the world.68
The Horror of OOO
To be is to be perceived.
 — George Berkeley69
“Instead of beginning with radical doubt, we start from naivete,” 
declares Harman. “My point is not that all objects are equally 
real [e.g., flying green-eared spaghetti monsters versus ma-
jor league baseballs], but that they are equally objects.”70 Har-
man, provisionally, solves the problem of absence-of-presence 
bequeathed to us by Derrida through the re-establishment of 
the depth of the object as an almost physicalist variation of in-
finitude, pointing to the underlying inexhaustibility of possible 
knowledge. Herein, ontology is stabilized via multiplication 
through space as opposed to correlation with transcendence. 
Harman espouses what is in essence a variation of flat ontol-
ogy, the absolute absence of any kind of metaphysical hierar-
chy among objects (“The human/world relation is just a special 
68 The “interdisciplinary success of OOO allows us to view it instead as an 
extremely broad method in the spirit of actor-network theory, but one that 
rescues the non-relational core of every object, thus paving the way for an 
aesthetic conception of things.” Graham Harman, Object-Oriented Ontol-
ogy: A New Theory of Everything (London: Pelican Books, 2018), 256.
69 George Berkeley, quoted in Harman, The Quadruple Object, 11.
70 Ibid, 5.
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case of the relation between any two entities whatsoever.”71) 
Harman presents himself as the neo-Empedocles of specula-
tive realism, the prophet of a post-modernist (re-)conciliation 
with the pre-classical Pre-Socratics — the return of philosophy 
to a natural philosophy of physicalism.72 The throbbing heart of 
Harman’s philosophical body is his partial synthesis of Edmund 
Husserl’s (1859–1938) eidetic reduction and Martin Heidegger’s 
(1889–1976) tool-being, two of the three, along with Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, primary movers of continental phenomenology. 
Therefore, his oeuvre is founded directly upon the double axes 
of Husserl and Heidegger, along with their respective treatment 
of the sensual and the real.
For Harman, reality is divided into two sets of objects: “An 
object is anything that has a unified reality that is autonomous 
from its wider context but also from its own pieces.”73 That is, 
an object’s essential characteristic is that it is non-reducible. In 
turn, each variety of object is divided into two sub-sets. As per 
Husserl, the dichotomy is between the sensual quality and the 
sensual object. For Harman, what “makes Husserl so special 
among idealists is his discovery of objects within the phenom-
enal field.”74 In this way, “Husserl discovers a tension between 
the object and content within the sensual realm — a great fault 
line that tears phenomena in half from the start.”75 
Although commonly regarded as an idealist, “Husserl’s phil-
osophical method is to bracket all considerations of the outside 
world and focus solely on the phenomena that appears to con-
sciousness” — superficially conservative but latently subversive. 
Husserl’s entire project is not to “restore scientific naturalism to 
the throne, but to give us the sense of a reality much weirder than 
71 Graham Harman, cited in Ian Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, Or What It is 
Like to Be a Thing (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012), 6.
72 Graham Harman, Circus Philosophicus (Winchester: Zero Books, 2010), 
13–26.
73 Graham Harman, Immaterialism: Objects and Social Theory (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2016), 116.
74 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 30.
75 Ibid., 32.
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any that science has known.”76 The sensual qualities (“SQ”; also 
known as adumbrations or accidents) of objects are governed 
by time and are ‘observer sensitive,’ dependent “on whatever en-
tity encounters them,”77 giving rise to what Husserl labels “idea-
tional objects.”78 Importantly, specifically aesthetic phenomena 
require the temporal intervention of an actor-observer behav-
ing in a theatrical manner in order to give rise to the ideational 
object (here, ideational has no bearing on ideology but rather 
upon the temporal insertion of the perceiving entity into the 
landscape or field of the sensorium, occupying the ontologically 
invaluable gap between the subject and its perceivable qualities). 
By contrast, sensual objects (“SO”; also referred to as eidos and 
subject to what Husserl calls “eidetic reduction”) are spatial. Im-
portantly for Harman, the sensual object may be wholly imagi-
nary. The critical point is that they are “only by categorical and 
not sensuous intuitions, they are never fully present,”79 but are in 
some absolutely basic way always “withdrawn” (not exhausted 
through categorical perception). Hence, “the accidental proper-
ties lie directly before us in experience but the eidetic ones do 
not.”80 The true world, therefore, is always, in some sense, with-
drawn from us. As Harman writes,
76 Ibid., 36.
77 Harman, Immaterialism, 41.
78 “Real objects and qualities exist in their own right, while sensual objects 
and qualities exist only as the correlate of some real object, human or 
otherwise.” Harman, Object-Oriented Ontology, 160.
79 Harman, Immaterialism, 104.
80 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 27. It is tempting to draw a direct 
comparison here with David Bohm’s comments on quantum mechan-
ics. “Quantum theory requires us to give up the idea that the electron, or 
any other object has, by itself, any intrinsic properties at all. Instead, each 
object should be regarded as something containing only incompletely 
defined potentialities that are developed when an object interacts with an 
appropriate system.” Cited in Morton, Hyperobjects, 44. What is critical 
here is the rather old-fashioned notion of anti-essentialism, “there is no 
essence in what exists.” Cited in Morton, Hyperobjects, 115. Ergo, every 
object, as individual or as system, is always “withdrawn” — this as a “pun” 
on the notion of absence.
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eidetic qualities radiate vaguely from the analysed thing, 
never graspable by the senses […] In this way we find a sec-
ond great tension in Husserl’s thinking: that between sensual 
objects and real qualities […]. They hide from every view 
[i.e., they are non-exhaustive] and are encountered only 
obliquely […]. Indeed, [Husserl] often insists that categori-
cal intuition provides direct access to reality in a way that the 
senses do not.81
And what we understand as reality, framed as relatively stable 
in the everyday, is in fact latently unstable and potentially even 
violent, given the unbridgeable gap between SQ and SO; the phe-
nomenal world, within its totality, “is not just an idealist sanctu-
ary from the blows of harsh reality, but an active seismic [tsu-
nami-like] zone where intentional objects grind slowly against 
their own qualities.”82
Harman’s valiant engagement with Husserl notwithstand-
ing, it is fairly clear that it is the second axis, Heidegger, who is 
closest to Harman’s own heart. Harman encapsulates virtually 
the entirety of Heidegger’s treatment of the object in the grand 
concept of tool-being: “The key to Heidegger’s philosophy is 
the concept of Zuhandenheit, or ‘readiness-to-hand,’ which I 
also refer to as ‘tool-being.’”83 Zuhandenheit denotes relational-
ity (or temporality84): “[r]eadiness-to-hand has everything to 
do with mode of being of entities, and nothing to do with the 
circumstances under which they were produced.”85 In contrast, 
Vorhandenheit (“presence-at-hand”) constitutes a form of es-
sence (a-temporality), signified by the moment when things 
81 Harman, Circus Philosophicus, 60.
82 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 26.
83 Graham Harman, Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects 
(Chicago: Open Court, 2002), 4.
84 To the question “what exactly is implied by Heidegger’s ‘temporality’? 
My answer […] is that it implies nothing other than the global reversal 
between the tool and the broken tool. And these terms cannot be taken 
as handy human devices, as the correlates of ‘know-how,’ but must be 
regarded as the two faces of being themselves.” Ibid., 121.
85 Ibid., 4.
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go wrong: “the phenomenal reality of things for consciousness 
does not use up their being. The readiness-to hand of an entity 
is not exhaustively deployed in its presence-at-hand.”86 In other 
words, our awareness of the hitherto occluded nature of Being 
only takes place following a rupture of some kind.
This final point cannot be over-emphasized. For Harman, 
Heidegger’s greatest accomplishment was to hybridize real ob-
jects (RO) with the sensual qualities of the object (SQ). Tool-be-
ing is nothing less than “the greatest moment in the philosophy 
of the past century: a thought experiment comparable in power 
to Plato’s myth of the cave.”87 Essentially a crypto-pragmatic re-
vision88 of Husserlian eidos in which the thing-in-itself — the 
ubiquitous “tool” — is re-presented as the-thing-that-is-for-
something, “Heidegger’s theory of tools had proven that the 
hammer is irreducible to its effects on any wider system of 
things, as shown by the surprising breakdown that disrupts its 
current system of involvements.”89 It must be noted that the bro-
ken hammer does not cause the object to cease being a hammer 
because, if this were true, we would be empowered to re-impose 
a finality upon the non-exhaustive (withdrawn) essence of the 
object at hand. Ergo, the four poles of reality (SQ; SO; RQ; RO) are 
not isolated, but are “always locked in a duel with one another 
according to various permutations […] The ‘essence (or “real-
ity”) of objects never interface, [but] merely their secondary or 
accidental properties’ do.”90 
Both axes are transversed in their entirety by both time and 
space, resulting in what might be called an ontology of tension 
(i.e., time, space, essence, eidos), yielding a potentially cataclys-
mic Being-as-Violence eternally threatened by the irruption of 
86 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 39. Ian Bogost usefully expresses the in-
exhaustibility of the tool as “the hidden density of the unit.” Bogost, Alien 
Phenomenology, 58.
87 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 37.
88 It should be noted that Harman robustly contests any neo-pragmatic read-
ing of Heidegger. Harman, Tool-Being, 114–22.
89 Harman, Circus Philosophicus, 33.
90 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 123.
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chaos.91 Just as with Lovecraft’s metaphysically doomed som-
nambulists, “conscious awareness makes up only a tiny portion 
of our lives. For the most part, objects withdraw into a shadowy 
subterranean realm that supports our conscious activity while 
seldom erupting into view […]. For all entities tend to reside in 
a cryptic background rather than appearing before the mind.”92
Heideggerian real objects, as opposed to sensual objects, are 
wholly autonomous (unlike the Husserlian “sensuals” which are 
always to some degree ontologically dependent upon the pres-
ence of an observer93), but, like the eidetic, are always at least 
partially hidden. We, as the collective bearers of self-awareness, 
invariably fail to notice — engage directly and authentically 
with the truth of the Thing — in the absence of the failure of 
Zuhandenheit. Speaking plainly, we take no notice of the ham-
mer until it is broken, causing us to shift our concern from the 
quality to the essence or meaning of the hammer.94 
The difference between tool and broken tool is not between 
unconsciousness and consciousness, but between substance 
and relation. And if the world has to do with relation, then it 
is sheer presence-at-hand, no matter how invisible it might be. 
Heidegger’s concept of the world belongs to Vorhandenheit, not 
Zuhandenheit.95
91 Harman, Immaterialism, 95, 96, 102.
92 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 37. For a solid critique of Harman’s neo-
substantialism, see Shaviro, The Universe of Things, 27–44.
93 Due to the Husserlian requirement of the observer-dependent status of SO, 
“aesthetics gives us a rift between real objects and their sensual qualities, 
a rift never made explicit in the normal course of everyday experience.” 
Harman, Object-Oriented Ontology, 149.
94 Perhaps the absolutely simplest way of expressing this is: so long as we 
can (practically) use something we do not really think about it in any 
serious way. The Kantian thing-in-itself has been effectively supplanted 
by the Heideggerian thing-for-itself. This, of course, is the moment that 
Dasein — being-aware-of-one’s-throwness-into-the-world — becomes 
wholly active, signified by the hegemony of angst. Harman, Tool-Being, 
136. According to Morton, “Dasein is the being after the end of the world.” 
Morton, Hyperobjects, 200.
95 Harman, Tool-Being, 126–27.
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Breaking(!) with Husserl, Heidegger asserts that the 
real — which is at all times as equally inexhaustible or un-
bounded as the purely sensual — remains fully hidden, impervi-
ous to eidetic re-construction. For Heidegger, there is no final 
transparency, not even Husserl’s operational one — of course, 
other than that of alētheia (un-covering), which is the apoca-
lypse, after which nothing matters very much. But the shift from 
readiness-to-hand to presence-at-hand is erratic, unpredict-
able and rare. Contra Husserl, “the usual manner of things is 
not to appear as phenomena [that is, something noticeable and, 
therefore, in some sense transformative], but to withdraw into 
the unnoticed subterranean realm.”96 It must be noted that only 
Husserlian sensual qualities actually enter into relations — sym-
bioses — with each other. The Heideggerian essence always 
remains hidden from view, resisting even the most robust of 
eidetic re-constructions.97 Heidegger therefore triumphantly 
concludes that “the phenomenal reality of things for conscious-
ness does not use up their being. The readiness-to-hand of an 
entity is not exhaustively deployed in its presence-at-hand.”98 
Accordingly,
Objects need not be natural, simple, or indestructible. In-
stead, objects will be defined only by their autonomous real-
ity [i.e., those moments in time within which self-awareness 
remains un-activated]. They must be autonomous in two sep-
arate directions: emerging as something over and above their 
pieces [or constituent atomic parts], while also partly with-
holding themselves from relations with other entities [due to 
the incompatible natures of their respective essences].99
We can now discern the true post-humanist horror presented 
by OOO; whereas for classical humanism, the world can only be 
96 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 38.
97 “When objects interact, they do so not from [their] depths but across their 
surfaces, in their sensual qualities.” Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, 77.
98 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 39.
99 Ibid., 19.
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human = human, for OOO, the true equation is objects = objects 
+ people = objects + objects. “OOO uses the term ‘object’ to refer 
to any entity that cannot be paraphrased in terms of either its 
components or its effects,”100 yielding a radically anti-reductive 
anti-literalism that makes it metaphysically, and discursively, 
impossible to privilege the conventionally human in any way. 
For Harman, objects have been traditionally either ontologi-
cally over- or under-determined. Both the monistic and dualis-
tic approaches implicitly rely upon some kind of variation of the 
Kantian thing-in-itself resulting in the neologism of duomining. 
Conventional systems of metaphysics engage in undermining 
(“only what is basic can be real”101) which, via reduction, im-
poses the impossibility of emergence. In contrast, overmining 
(i.e., essentialism, reification) renders impossible the becom-
ing of the world: “objects are too specific to deserve the name 
of ultimate reality, and [philosophers] dream up some deeper 
indeterminable basis from which these specific things arise.”102 
Duomining stands for the proposition that no “object can ever 
be successfully para-phrased [i.e., can never be spoken of liter-
ally precisely because each object possesses a surplus exceed-
ing its relations, qualities and actions].”103 Since any “transient 
process cannot occur without something [being] withheld from 
the process,” a “truly object oriented ontology [tantamount in 
every regard to post-humanism] needs to be aware of relations 
between objects that have no direct involvement with people.”104
100 Harman, Immaterialism, 3.
101 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 8.
102 Ibid., 10.
103 Harman, Immaterialism, 3–4.
104 Ibid., 6. One should take note of the close comparison operating between 
Harman’s notion of the withdrawal of the object and Morton’s concept 
of the hyper-object: “In a strange way every object is a hyperobject […]
things that are massively distributed in time and space relative to humans.” 
For both Morton and Harman, the issue is one of the irreducible status 
of the object: “Hyperobjects provoke irreductionist thinking, that is, they 
present us with scalar dilemmas in which ontotheological [i.e., teleologi-
cal] statements about which thing is the most real (ecosystems, world, 
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The really big problem with all of this, of course, is the lin-
gering presence of (neo-) Kantianism. As we have already seen, 
Kant managed to both dispense with God and to guarantee on-
tological, and epistemological, certainty by introducing pure 
reason through the backdoor in the place of God; the universe 
must ultimately be truly knowable, for to conclude otherwise 
would be to nullify the overriding imperative of the anthropo-
centric restoration. Man needs ultimate ontological certainty 
to exist as Man (species-being); ergo, finitude/exhaustibility is 
possible, although perhaps supremely difficult.105 But, for Har-
man, OOO manages to circumvent this anthropocentric trap 
altogether: “[A]n entity qualifies as an object as long as it is ir-
reducible both to its components and its effects: that is to say, 
as long as the object is not exhausted by undermining or over-
mining methods, though of course these methods often yield 
fruits of their own.”106 The key here is the irreducible relation-
ality, or symbioses, of all objects, rendering the human wholly 
inter-exchangeable for the thing. Put in my own terms, I would 
suggest that what Harman is proposing is nothing other than 
a wholly horizontal version of what used to be known as the 
“Great Chain of Being.” The “relationality of all objects to both 
people and (non-human) objects is in itself the true meaning of 
symbiosis,” and all symbioses are either a-symmetrical and/or 
non-reciprocal.107 As a result,
What the model of symbiosis suggests is that both of the 
usual alternatives [to the problem of objects and attributes] 
are wrong: entities have neither an eternal character nor a 
environment, or conversely individual) become impossible.” Morton, 
Hyperobjects, 19. Size matters.
105 “Modern philosophy simply exchanged God for human thought, without 
giving up the notion that one extra-important type of being was so vastly 
different from everything else that it deserved to occupy half of ontology. 
This modern taxonomy continues today in the work of leading European 
philosophers such as [Slavoj] Žižek, [Alain] Badiou, and [Quentin] Meil-
lassoux.” Harman, Object-Oriented Ontology, 256.
106 Harman, Circus Philosophicus, 41.
107 Ibid., 42–45, 120–22.
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nominalistic flux of “performative” identities that shift and 
flicker with the flow of time itself. Instead, we should think 
of an object as going through several turning-points in its 
lifespan, but not many.108
We are left with an unstable world of both continuous evasion 
and irreducible uncertainty.
The Call of Quentin: The Sunken City of Correlationism
The modern age begins with the idea of the infinity of the 
universe, and if we think that idea through to its end, we 
come to unreality, for infinity is nothing but a mathematically 
formulated expression for unreality. If one tries to imagine 
concretely that the Milky Way consists of more than a billion 
fixed stars, many of which have a diameter greater than the 
distance between the earth and the sun, and that the Milky 
Way does not form a source of tranquility in the cosmos, but is 
racing somewhere at a speed of 360 miles a second, i.e., about 
a thousand times as fast as a cannonball, then the assumption 
that this could have anything to do with reality is reduced to a 
mere mental game.
 — Hans-Jürgen Syberberg, Hitler: A Film from Germany109
Philosophy is the invention of strange forms of argumentation, 
necessarily bordering on sophistry, which remains its dark 
structural double. 
 — Meillassoux, After Finitude110
By now, the reader who is hip(?) to speculative realism should 
be asking herself why I am privileging Harman’s notion of the 
quadruple object over Quentin Meillassoux’s apparently more 
108 Ibid., 47.
109 Hans-Jürgen Syberberg, Hitler: A Film from Germany, trans. Joachim 
Neugroschel (New York: Farrar, Strauss, & Giroux, 1982), 157–58.
110 Meillasoux, After Finitude, 76.
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relevant notion of anti-correlationism when framing the prob-
lem of Cthulhu. Put in criminally brief terms, Meillasoux’s bête 
noire is the lingering presence of correlationism,111 which may be 
usefully defined in the following way:
[The] central notion of modern philosophy since Kant seems 
to be that of correlation. By “correlation” we mean the idea 
according to which we only ever have access to the correla-
tion between thinking and being, and never to either term 
considered apart from the other. We will henceforth call 
correlationism any current of thought which maintains the 
unsurpassable character of correlation so defined. Conse-
quently, it becomes possible to say that every philosophy 
which disavows naïve realism has become a variant of cor-
relationism.112
Meillassoux is able to conclude that, “one could say that up until 
Kant, one of the principal problems of philosophy was to think 
substance, while ever since Kant it has consisted in trying to 
think the correlation.”113
There is a difficulty with what Meillassoux himself defines 
as the unresolved struggle between the physicalist Coperni-
can Revolution and the philosophical (humanist?) Ptolemaic 
Reaction (or what I regard as the Anthropocentric Restora-
tion). Post-Copernican astronomy and physics constitutes the 
irreversible de-centering of the post-hominids as the primary 
actors of Creation; the “world” can no longer be exclusively 
discussed within human terms of reference. Conversely, anti-
correlationism — Meillassoux’s preferred position — postulates 
that the thing-in-itself can be rendered knowable only to the 
111 “The verdict of modern philosophy since Descartes and Kant, whose 
ideas entail that we cannot speak of the world without humans or humans 
without the world, but only of a primordial correlation or rapport between 
the two.” Harman, Object-Oriented Ontology, 56.
112 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contin-
gency, trans. Ray Brassier (London: Continuum, 2008), 5.
113 Ibid., 6.
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degree that it can be translated/expressed within purely math-
ematical terms: “all those aspects of the object that can be for-
mulated in mathematical terms can be meaningfully achieved as 
properties of the object itself.”114 Conversely, the Ptolemaic Reac-
tion, which paradoxically historically co-evolved with the Co-
pernican Revolution, perpetuates the (sophistic?) reassertion of 
humankind via the epistemological double game (bad faith) of 
correlationism. Any world is meaningful only to the degree that 
it is given-to-a-living (-or-thinking) being.115
Correlationism consists in disqualifying the claim that it is 
possible to consider the realms of subjectivity and objectivity 
independently of one another. Not only does it become neces-
sary to insist that we never grasp an object “in itself,” in isolation 
from its relation to the subject, but it is also becomes necessary 
to maintain that we can never grasp a subject that would not 
always already be related to an object.116
All “those aspects of the object that can give rise to a math-
ematical thought (to a formula or to digitalization) rather than 
to a perception or sensation can be meaningfully turned into 
properties of the thing not only as it is with me, but also as it is 
without me.”117 The equation of the unknowable with the radi-
cally contingent underscores the metaphysical confinement of 
both the Husserlian eidos and the Heideggerian real.
The thesis that we are defending is two-fold: on the one hand, 
we acknowledge that the sensible [world] only exists as a 
subject’s [human’s] relation to the world; but, on the other 
hand, we maintain that the mathematizable properties of the 
object are exempt from the constraint of such a relation, and 
that they are effectively in [within] the object in the way in 
which I conceive them, whether I am in relation with the ob-
ject or not.118
114 Ibid., 3. Emphasis in the original.
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Because only mathematics allows for the true expression of that 
which exceeds the perceptive (phenomenological) field of the 
anthropocentric realm, it follows that chaos is the only true 
thing-in-itself.119 Being constitutes an irreducible unreason (or, 
alternatively, a hyper-Chaos) by default of the absence of physi-
cal necessity — or any other thing that would permit correla-
tionism to operate, which would be any object/event/thing that 
would be capable of exhaustive definition minus mathematiza-
tion. What is mathematizable cannot be reduced to a correla-
tion of thought; ergo, “whatever is mathematically conceivable is 
absolutely possible.”120 
From this it follows, quite incredibly, that “our absolute, in 
effect, is nothing other than an extreme form of chaos, a hyper-
Chaos, for which nothing is or would seem to be impossible, 
not even the unthinkable.”121 Hence, unreason is nothing other 
than the absence of necessity within the physical world (of ob-
jects). Unreason should not be misunderstood as the principle 
or thing that guarantees the ontology of reality (conventionally 
associated with both reason and necessity), but is, rather, itself 
the (absolute) condition of (absolute) contingent givenness: the 
de-totalization of the universe as the remainder of an irreduc-
ible contingency. Expressed positively, unreason is nothing oth-
er than a purely mathematizable post-humanity — “a world that 
is separable from man”122 — and is founded upon an uncondi-
tional and irreducible contingency within which anything that 
is mathematically conceivable is physically possible,123 which ef-
fectively demolishes the necessity of the sufficiency of reason. 
Meillassoux concludes, “[s]o the challenge is therefore the fol-
lowing: to understand how science can think a world wherein 
spatio-temporal givenness itself came into being within a time 
and space which preceded every unity of givenness”124 — that is, 
119 Ibid., 111.
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a world temporally prior to the emergence of a (self-aware) ob-
server.125
Contrary to first impressions, the true icon of Meillassoux’s 
anti-correlationism is not Ptolemy or Copernicus, but Charles 
Darwin (1809–1882), along with the equally revolutionary ge-
ologist Charles Lyell (1797–1875). Apart from placing pure ran-
domness at the living heart of the evolution of life, Darwin’s 
most subversive idea was to re-set the biological clock from 
historical time to geological deep time. Genesis was no longer 
correlative with the emergence of humans, in radical contrast 
to Bishop Usher’s anthropocentric dating of Genesis to October 
22, 4004 BCE, but occurred in a series of eon-length stages: 13.5 
billion years for the universe, 4.56 billion years for the accretion 
of the Earth, 3.5 billion years for the emergence of terrestrial 
(microbial) life, and a cosmically laughable two million years 
for the emergence of the very earliest form of humans (Homo 
habilis).126 Meillassoux tells us,
Empirical science is today capable of producing statements 
about events anterior to the advent of life as well as con-
sciousness […] How are we to grasp the meaning of scien-
tific statements bearing explicitly upon a manifestation of the 
world that is posited as anterior to the emergence of thought 
and even of life — posited, that is, as the anterior to every form 
of human relation to the world? Or, to put it more precisely: 
how are we to think the meaning of a discourse which con-
strues the relation to the world — that of thinking and/or liv-
ing — as a fact inscribed in a temporality within which this 
125 Emphasis in the original. Dylan Trigg offers an interesting critique of 
Meillassoux on this point by offering up a neo-phenomenological reading 
of Schelling’s notion of “wild being”: the co-existence of Being with a 
barbaric variant of flesh. In this sense, the universe has never been without 
an observer of some kind. See Dylan Trigg, The Thing: A Phenomenology 
of Horror (Winchester: Zero Books, 2014), 103–32. The same point can be 
made in relation to pan-psychism: mind and the universe co-evolved in 
tandem. Shaviro, The Universe of Things, 85–107.
126 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 9.
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relation is just one event among others, inscribed in an order 
of succession in which it is merely a stage, rather than an 
origin? How is science able to think such statements, and in 
what sense can we eventually ascribe truth to them?127
Essence (temporality) precedes existence (biological life). The 
de-humanizing/de-totalizing quanta of inhuman time under-
mines correlationism, leaving us with the sole comfort of aware-
ness of the, potential but ultimately exhaustible, mathematiza-
tion of phenomena. This in turn, yields two of Meillassoux’s 
signature concepts, ancestrality and the arche-fossil. Ancestral-
ity, or the ancestral, is a “reality anterior to the emergence of the 
human species,”128 while the arche-fossil denotes all “materials 
indicating the existence of an ancestral reality or event; one that 
is anterior to terrestrial life.”129 
The cosmic payoff, if I can put it like that, is eternal and ab-
solute non-negotiable contingency: “[i]f the ancestral is to be 
thinkable, then an absolute must be thinkable.”130 The resolu-
tion of what is nothing short of a metaphysical crisis following 
the publications of Lyell’s Principles of Geology (1830–1833) and 
Darwin’s The Origin of Species by Natural Selection (1859) de-
mands nothing less than the unconditional capitulation to post-
human mathematical discourse.131 So the obvious question now 
becomes: why not Cthulhu as arche-fossil, the master-sign of 
ancestrality, rather than as the quadruple object?
I have two objections to this maneuver. The second and 
lengthier one is discussed in the final section below. The first one 
is concerned with Cthulhu as a specifically aesthetic phenom-
enon, precisely in the sense of what Harman means by the sen-
sual object. Although clearly “real, Cthulhu always operates as 
an ‘intermediate’ object through dreams and globally telepathic 
apocalyptic visions; his very first manifestation is through the 
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form of a statue.”132 The “Call” of Cthulhu understood exclusive-
ly in terms of an aesthetic phenomenon is directly suggestive of 
Harman’s notion of allure or vicarious causation: “Allure means 
that one object calls to another from a vast distance […] In this 
indirect and asymmetrical way, Harman says, ‘two objects […] 
touch without touching.’”133 In other words, the Great Cthulhu 
constitutes a singular example of what we might call the inef-
fectual sublime.
“Finally Job cried out”: Religion as Horror
I form the light and create darkness; I make peace and create 
evil; I the UNNAMEABLE do all these things. 
 — 2 Isaiah 45:7134
After He [the unnameable] had spoken to Job, the Lord said 
to Elipha the Temanite, “I am very angry at you and your two 
friends, because you have not spoken the truth about me, as my 
servant Job has.” 
 — Job 42:7135 
A flat ontology is one in which “humans are no longer mon-
archs of being, but are instead among beings, entangled in be-
ings, and implicated in other beings.”136 Strikingly, this is the pri-
mary subtext of what is arguably the single most subversive text, 
at least from the perspective of theodicy, of the Old Testament, 
the Book of Job. The eponymous hero, having been reduced to 
the level of the absolutely abject, calls upon God, the Unname-
132 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 30.
133 Shaviro, The Universe of Things, 138.
134 Stephen Mitchell, “Introduction,” in The Book of Job, trans. Stephen Mitch-
ell (New York: Harper Perennial, 1987), xxiv.
135 Ibid., 91.
136 Levi Bryant, cited in Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, 17. Emphases in the 
original.
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able, to un-create a single moment in the seamless “continuum 
of nature”137 — the day of his birth.
Finally Job cried out:
God damn the day I was born 
and the night that forced me from the womb. 
On that day — let there be darkness; 
let it never have been created; 
let it sink back into the void
[…] let its dawn never arrive.138 
The theodicy of Job is far more radical than commonly as-
sumed — far more than a mere exercise of a benevolent will 
“that surpasseth all understanding,” God’s reply from the whirl-
wind (tsunami) is nothing less than a disquisition upon the im-
possibility of non-existence. The truly horrific message of the 
text is that the only real Evil — the absolute un-speakable to the 
utterly un-nameable — is un-being. The Being of God is iden-
tical to the plenary of Creation, a perfect continuum. Herein, 
any evil is unconditionally superior to non-existence. The prob-
lem, of course, is that a radically free (contingent) and wholly 
omnipotent God may be considered as nothing other than a 
slightly more developed version of the mysterium tremendum, 
an unbounded and chaotic entity that brings the abject, or crea-
ture consciousness, in its wake. The Book of Job contains within 
it a primitive discussion of the theological problem of radical 
voluntarism. The goodness of God is identical with the abso-
lute nature of His freedom, the true summum bonum, as op-
posed to the specific moral outcome flowing from the exercise 
of providential will. Creation itself is the direct result of, and 
unconditionally dependent upon, God’s will-to-create which is 
unbounded by human criteria. Therefore, the successive states 
of Job — blessed/cursed — are all equally good because what un-
derlies both of them, and draws them together, is the limitless 
137 Mitchell, “Introduction,” xxiv.
138 Mitchell, trans., The Book of Job, 13.
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operation of God’s will within both. The Unnameable’s consent 
to Job’s request for the un-creation of the day of his birth would 
introduce an unassimilable element of difference into the sym-
biotic pluriverse of ontological objects, a gross violation of the 
radical democracy of OOO, and of flat ontology more generally, 
as “all relations are on exactly the same footing”;139 “the world is 
jam-packed with entities; there is no room for ‘nothingness’ in 
ontology.”140
The argument that an absolutely free God could be objective-
ly un-just is premised upon a false analogy between the catego-
ries of contingency and necessity, which, quite amazingly, cor-
responds closely to Meillassoux’s notion of hyper-Chaos. Both 
Good and Evil are necessary attributes of Being which is the ab-
solute and, therefore, the true Good — the unmediated emana-
tion of an unlimited God: “we can say that it is possible to dem-
onstrate the absolute necessity of everything’s non-necessity. In 
other words, it is possible to establish […] the absolute necessity 
of the contingency of everything.”141 His atheism notwithstand-
ing, Meillassoux’s language and imaginary are clearly evocative 
of the mysterium tremendum of post-theological Unreason:
We have succeeded in identifying a primary absolute (Cha-
os), but contrary to the veracious God, the former would 
seem to be incapable of guaranteeing the absoluteness of sci-
entific discourse, since, far from guaranteeing order, it guar-
antees only the possible destruction of every order […]. We 
see an omnipotence equal to that of the Cartesian God, and 
capable of anything, even the inconceivable, but an omnipo-
tence that has become autonomous, without norms, blind, 
139 Harman, The Quadruple Object, 46.
140 Harman, Tool-Being, 11.
141 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 62. Emphasis in the original. Contra Arendt, 
to put this in the most powerful manner possible — and, therefore, the 
most obnoxious manner possible — we would say: every day in Auschwitz 
was a good day because it was a day. The possibility that the ontological 
good may be incommensurable with the moral good does not, by itself, 
signify either a defect or a contradiction in the goodness of God.
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devoid of other divine perfections, a power with neither 
goodness nor wisdom, ill-dispossessed to reassure thought 
about the veracity of its distinct ideas.142 
This sounds remarkably Job-like. In terms of a radical theodicy, 
the absolute necessity of everything’s non-necessity is, from the 
anthropocentric perspective, virtually indistinguishable from 
the most extreme form of providential voluntarism conceiv-
able: the freedom of God that supersedes the ethical. And this, 
in turn, paves the way for the return to some form of fideism, to 
which Meillassoux himself admits:
So long as we believe that there must be a reason why what 
is, is the way it is, we will continue to fuel superstition, which 
is to say, the belief that there is an ineffable reason underly-
ing all things. Since we will never be able to understand such 
a reason, all we can do is believe in it, or aspire to believe in 
it. So long as we construe our access to facticity in terms of 
thought’s discovery of its own intrinsic limits and of its in-
ability to uncover the ultimate reason of things, our abolition 
of metaphysics will only have served to resuscitate religiosity 
in all its forms, including the most menacing ones. So long as 
we construe facticity as a limit for thought, we will abandon 
whatever lies beyond this limit to the rule of piety.143
So, to return to my original question, why should I prefer Har-
man to Meillassoux? 
Simply put, the latter is too much of a neo-Cartesian to 
qualify as a truly apocalyptic thinker. His focus is upon finitude, 
not Destruktion; the exact opposite is the case with Heidegger, 
whose overriding concern is with alētheia, or annihilating reve-
lation. Zuhandenheit is a violent and objective rupturing within 
space-time, whereas the arche-fossil, no matter how metaphysi-
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of consciousness, pursuant to the precepts of anti-correlation-
ism. In contrast, OOO, like Cthulhu itself, is radically inactive: 
the irreducible inconsequentiality of the revelation/alētheia is 
itself the non-contingent element of contingency. Nothingness 
never happens. I would go so far as to argue that “The Call of 
Cthulhu” actually operates as a literary parable of OOO, whose 
moral is that an anthropocentric universe is one that is ontologi-
cally exhausted by readiness-at-hand. Harman counters Meil-
lassoux’s arche-fossil with OOO’s post-humanistic equation of 
relationality to object + object. There may not always have been 
humans but, by definition, objects, of whatever kind, are co-
determinate with the universe. Therefore, at no time has reality 
been superseded by that which can be exhaustively conveyed 
through the purely mathematical — that is, if two objects inter-
acting with each other is the exact same flat ontological event 
as two humans interacting with each other, then at no point, 
in time, has reality not existed. Human/human, human/object, 
object/human symbioses are merely comparatively recent rela-
tionalities of a more primordial state of ancestrality.
As we have already seen, according to Harman, the basic 
principles of OOO include, but are not restricted to: “All objects 
must be given equal attention, whether they be human, non-
human, natural, cultural, real or fictional”; “[o]bjects are not 
identical with their properties, but have a tense relationship 
with those properties, and this very tension is responsible for 
all of the change that occurs in the world”; “[o]bjects come in 
just two kinds: real objects exist whether or not they currently 
affect anything else, while sensual objects exist only in relation to 
some real object”; and, vitally, that real objects “cannot relate to 
one another directly, but only indirectly, by means of a sensual 
object.”144 
Two things immediately become apparent. First is that Har-
man’s real object uncannily resembles the irrational real of 
Otto — the formless thing/object that, in its aggregate form, is 
the sum total of everything yet is itself devoid of properties, ei-
144 Harman, Object-Oriented Ontology, 9.
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ther as attribute or as affect. The efficacy of the real object, in 
both its phenomenological and non-phenomenological sense(s) 
is ultimately dependent upon an almost secondary operational 
plane of sensual objects as mediated by and through aesthetic 
perception and sensation. 
Second, the experience of the real (object) is not only eter-
nally deferred, it is also supersaturated with affectivity. The 
phenomenological essence of both mysterium and tremendum 
is not the Being of the Wholly Other but its affective capacity 
to instill an aesthetic response of unique and exceptional power 
within the beholder, or supplicant. Here, the Monster-Gods, or 
the “Ancient Ones,” may best be understood as highly elastic 
names given to states of altered consciousness rather than as the 
proper denotation of an actual being. That which we name as 
God is not the real object that causes tremendum; rather, that 
which causes us to experience mysterium is the sensual object 
that we call God. 
By means of the back door of OOO, we return to the dual 
site of the horrible and the humorous, each incarnated mag-
nificently in Lovecraft’s Great Cthulhu: an unapproachable real 
object that acts in no other way than through the endless mul-
tiplication of the aesthetic effects of fascination and dread and 
whose appearance, and almost immediate withdrawal back into 
the subterranean/submarine, heralds the non-event of the eter-
nally postponed return of the Ancient Ones, which, in terms of 
OOO is nothing other than the subsumption of Being (-within-
the-World) under the real object, the inarticulable condition of 
the absolute suspension of the possibility of mediation. In the 
end, Cthulhu is nothing more than a numinously real object 
that never actually happens but exists only through an endless 
series of witness testimonies — an infinite proliferation of narra-
tive Chinese boxes — each a separate tale told by an increasingly 
unreliable, but wholly fascinated, narrator.
For this very reason, OOO encapsulates, in a manner superior 
to any other variant of speculative realism, the central aesthetic 
paradox of the “weird tale”: the structural correspondence be-
tween horror and the joke — in this case, the practical joke oper-
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ating on a literally cosmic scale. Horror is always a sublime form 
of comedy because the signifier of the Wholly Other is invari-
ably shown up as an empty sign — the substitution of a sensual 
object for a real object. A close comparative reading between 
Otto and Harman, by way of Lovecraft, becomes a highly fruit-
ful way of conceptualizing an under-appreciated relationship 
between horror literature and speculative realism.
Since knowledge cannot be metaphorical, for this is the 
realm of both aesthetics and philosophia, it must be literal, 
which means that it must be a question of articulating the quali-
ties or effects of an object in an overmining/undermining fash-
ion. And since knowledge cannot be truth, which would imply 
an impossible direct revelation of the world, it needs to have 
some sort of contact with reality, though not contact of a di-
rect sort, which we have seen to be impossible (incompatible 
essences). But unlike in aesthetics, the point of knowledge is not 
to experience the unknowable uniqueness of the real object, but 
to obtain some sort of partial grasp of the features of a sensual 
object that is already in our midst. This means that whereas aes-
thetics brought real objects into play, knowledge must somehow 
bring real qualities into the picture (Ereignis).145 
Cthulhu is nothing other than the allure of the quadruple ob-
ject. The call is constantly emitted — the sensual object embedded 
within a potentially infinite expanse of, decidedly asymmetrical, 
symbioses — yet the substance of the world remains unaltered. 
The horror of Cthulhu is itself the primacy of the aesthetic na-
ture, and effect, of the world, all of which evidences that we have 
not truly exited from the mysterium tremendum. We have simply 
substituted a new idol for an old. The horror of Cthulhu is not the 
aesthetics of horror but the horror of aesthetics.
145 Ibid., 170.
480
DISEASES OF THE HEAD
Bibliography
Airaksinen, Timo. The Philosophy of H.P. Lovecraft: The Route 
to Horror. New York: Peter Lang, 1985.
Beal, Timothy K. Religion and Its Monsters. New York: 
Routledge, 2002.
Bogost, Ian. Alien Phenomenology, Or What It’s Like to Be a 
Thing. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012.
Burleson, Donald R. Lovecraft: Disturbing the Universe. 
Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2009.
Cardin, Matt. Dark Awakenings. Poplar Bluff: Mythos Books, 
2010.
Derrida, Jacques. The Truth in Painting. Translated by Geoff 
Bennington and Ian McLeod. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1987.
Dupuy, Jean-Pierre. The Mark of the Sacred. Translated by M.B. 
DeBevoise. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013.
———. A Short Treatise on the Metaphysics of Tsunamis. 
Translated M.B. DeBevoise. East Lansing: Michigan State 
University Press, 2015.
Harman, Graham. Circus Philosophicus. Winchester: Zero 
Books, 2010.
———. Immaterialism: Objects and Social Theory. Cambridge: 
Polity, 2016.
———. Object-Oriented Ontology: A New Theory of 
Everything. London: Pelican Books, 2018.
———. The Quadruple Object. Winchester: Zero Books, 2011.
———. Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects. 
Chicago: Open Court, 2002.
———. Weird Realism: Lovecraft and Philosophy. Winchester: 
Zero Books, 2012.
Houellebecq, Michel, H.P. Lovecraft: Against the World, Against 
Life. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006.
Joshi, S.T. “Introduction,” in The Thing on the Doorstep and 
Other Weird Stories, edited by S.T. Joshi, vii–xvi. London: 
Penguin Books, 2001.
481
WHEN THE MONSTROUS OBJECT BECOMES A TREMENDOUS NON-EVENT
Kant, Immanuel. The Critique of Judgment. Translated by J.H. 
Bernard. Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2000.
King, Stephen. Danse Macabre. New York: Gallery Books, 2010.
Lacan, Jacques. The Triumph of Religion Preceded by Discourse 
to Catholics. Translated by Bruce Fink. Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2013.
Levy, Maurice. Lovecraft: A Study in the Fantastic. Translated 
by S.T. Joshi. Detroit: Wayne State University, 1988.
Lovecraft, H.P. “The Call of Cthulhu.” In Michel Houellebecq, 
H.P. Lovecraft: Against the World, Against Life, 145–57. 
London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006.
———. “The Dunwich Horror.” In The Thing on the Doorstep 
and Other Weird Stories, edited by S.T. Joshi, 206–45. 
London: Penguin Classics, 2001.
———. “Facts Concerning the Late Arthur Jermyn and His 
Family.” In The Call of Cthulhu and Other Weird Stories, 
edited by S.T. Joshi. London: Penguin Classics, 2011.
———. “Supernatural Horror in Literature.” In At The 
Mountains of Madness: The Definitive Edition, 103–73. New 
York: The Modern Library, 2005. 
Martin, Sean Elliot. H.P. Lovecraft and the Modernist Grotesque. 
Printed by the author, 2008.
Meillassoux, Quentin. After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity 
of Contingency. Translated by Ray Brassier. London: 
Continuum, 2008.
Miéville, China. “Introduction.” In At the Mountains of 
Madness: The Definitive Edition, xiii. New York: The Modern 
Library, 2005. 
Mitchell, Stephen. “Introduction.” In The Book of Job, translated 
by Stephen Mitchell. New York: Harper Perennial, 1987.
———, trans. The Book of Job. New York: Harper Perennial, 
1987.
Morton, Timothy. Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology After 
the End of the World. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2013.
Nieman, Susan. Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History 
of Philosophy. Melbourne: Scribe Publishers, 2002.
482
DISEASES OF THE HEAD
Neylan, Fintan. “The Labour of the Pessimist: Detecting 
Expiration’s Artifice.” In True Detection, edited by Edia 
Connole, Paul J. Ennis, and Nicola Masciandaro, 76–95. San 
Bernardino: Schism Press, 2014.
Otto, Rudolf. The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-
Rational Factor in the Idea of the Divine and its Relation to 
the Rational. Translated by John W. Harvey. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1958.
Ralickas, Vivian. “Cosmic Horror: and the Question of the 
Sublime in Lovecraft.” Journal of the Fantastic in the Arts 18, 
no. 3 (2007): 364–98. 
Shaviro, Steven. The Universe of Things: On Speculative Realism. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014.
Smith, Daniel W. “Translator’s Introduction: Deleuze on Bacon: 
Three Conceptual Trajectories in The Logic of Sensation.” In 
Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, translated by Daniel 
W. Smith, vii–xxvii. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2003.
Syberberg, Hans-Jürgen. Hitler: A Film from Germany. 
Translated by Joachim Neugroschel. New York: Farrar, 
Strauss & Giroux, 1982.
Thacker, Eugene. In the Dust of This Planet: Horror of 
Philosophy, Volume I. Winchester: Zero Books, 2011.
Trigg, Dylan. The Thing: A Phenomenology of Horror. 
Winchester: Zero Books, 2014.
Wilson, Eric. The Republic of Cthulhu: Lovecraft, the Weird 
Tale, and Conspiracy Theory. Earth: punctum books, 2016.
483
13
Reproducing It:  
Speculative Horror and the Limits of 
the Inhuman
John Cunningham
Horror Itself. — As for the sphere of thought, it is horror. Yes, it 
is horror itself.1
Shattered Form. — It is surprising that the fragmentary, those 
troubled and troubling pieces of the whole, do not dominate 
the cinematic and literary forms that speculative horror can as-
sume. This is because of the gap that horror establishes between 
itself and thought, knowledge and representation. The realiza-
tion and recognition of it ought to shatter form. 
Dread Glimpses. — Much genre horror cleaves to classic narra-
tives and easily representable tropes such as anthropomorphic 
monsters, the old dark house, and other invariants of the horror 
genre in order to both hint at the unthinkable and resolve it. A 
less easy resolution is found in what Michel Houellebecq has 
1 Georges Bataille, The Unfinished System of Nonknowledge, ed. Stuart Kend-
all, trans. Michelle Kendall and Stuart Kendall (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2001), 196. 
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termed the “great texts” of Howard Phillips Lovecraft, inaugu-
rated with The Call of Cthulhu in 1926.2 Lovecraft lays out the 
form toward the beginning of his account of cosmic horror: 
[T]here came the single glimpse of forbidden aeons which 
chills me when I think of it and maddens me when I dream of 
it. That glimpse, like all dread glimpses of truth, flashed out 
from an accidental piecing together of separated things — in 
this case an old newspaper item and the notes of a dead pro-
fessor.3
The notes of that particular dead professor include: the ram-
blings of a decadent aesthete; the report of a police inspector; 
newspaper clippings documenting suicides and madness; an 
anecdotal account of a chance encounter with an Eskimo death 
cult; the notes of a dead Norwegian sailor. Dread truths inhere 
in the mess of contingent materials. All ultimately cohere for the 
narrator in the pure contingency of a newspaper scrap found 
spread beneath mineral specimens in a museum. 
Quotidian Cosmos. — The form of the narrative, a montage of 
fragmented recollections, suggests that “dread glimpses” of cos-
mic horror lurk in the interstices of quotidian life as much as in 
the totalized striving of science and philosophy. Knowledge and 
its limit, “dread glimpses,” seep through crumpled newspaper. 
Lovecraft, in pulp modernist mode, discerns how horror accu-
mulates in formal dispersion, unhinging attempts to collate it 
into a coherent image or narrative. 
Ruined Constellation. — Much theoretical exposition of horror 
in thought forgets this aspect in favor of an architecture of the 
concept rather than the ruin of such “dread glimpses.” 
2 Michel Houellebecq, H.P. Lovecraft: Against the World, Against Life (Lon-
don: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006), 41. 




Speculative horror ought to accumulate as the slow explosion of 
such (in)coherence. 
It is often the conjunction of thought and horror aesthetics, or 
rather, the elision of thought and the horror genre, that blurs the 
supposedly immutable boundaries between them.  
The following is a constellation of fragmentary concepts and 
images that attempt to sketch some of these possibilities and 
contradictions, as well as the limits that might cleave to a con-
junction of the aesthetics of horror and speculative thought. Or, 
perhaps, the limits that lie unseen in the formulation of it in 
speculative horror. 
The Horror of It. — In Lovecraft’s The Shadow Out of Time, the 
central protagonist declaims: “And yet, its realism was so hide-
ous that I sometimes find hope impossible.”4 The awful realism 
of “it,” in this case, dreams of inhuman and utterly alien realities, 
opens up a vista of hopelessness and dread. The dread of “it” 
seems best thought of as epistemological, an opening up of the 
gap between human knowledge and the “real” of the inhuman. 
Speculative horror dwells in the affective, aesthetic, and concep-
tual possibilities opened up by this gap, as evidenced through 
the cosmic terrors of Lovecraft, the eerie mannequins of Thom-
as Ligotti, the more corporeal terror of apocalyptic zombie cin-
ema. Horror is the inhuman. 
Inhuman Negativity (1). — Yet, what is the inhuman? The prefix 
“in” denotes that which is not, that which is against, but also that 
which is inside. The negativity of the not human and the against 
the human is most pertinent to the inextricable intertwining 
of horror and the inhuman. “It” is then not solely a question 
of epistemology. The negativity of the not human, the imputed 
negation of the human, is also virulently active through the in-
4 H.P. Lovecraft, “The Shadow Out of Time,” The H.P. Lovecraft Archive, 
1934, http://www.hplovecraft.com/writings/texts/fiction/sot.aspx.
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vocation of “it.” The inhuman, at least under the aegis of horror, 
is also anti-human. 
Horror Gaze. — Secular hope is an all too human faith reliant 
upon visions of progress, technical mastery, scientific knowl-
edge, and human agency. Horror, the dissolution of hope, has a 
gaze that empties all of these categories of meaning, summoning 
in their place “it” as contingent, violent, hostile, or just indiffer-
ent. 
This horror gaze is the fictive undoing of anthropocentric 
knowledge through the emblematic conjuration and explora-
tion of dread through zombies, cosmic terror, and formless 
monstrosities. The aesthetics of horror is a conjuration with 
the unthinkable. The collapse of knowledge into worm holes 
of slithering materiality, abstract nihilism, the sudden appari-
tion of the falsity of the known world. Images that seek to freeze 
thought and by extension freeze speculation.
Warped Fairground Mirrors. — A fictive undoing of knowledge 
also pushes horror into the space of speculation. The grotesque, 
sometimes ridiculous reflection of worldly dread in the warped, 
fairground mirrors of the horror genre might, as a negative im-
age of knowledge, allow access to a speculative rendering of the 
aspects of the world that are usually unspoken, unseen. The ka-
leidoscope of dreadful images, textual or cinematic, that con-
stitute the horror genre can then provide a resource for philo-
sophical speculation. 
Kant Zombie Mask. — This could just be a taste for horror, that 
I share, a way to stylistically mark out a new territory against 
more polite usages of culture, the mobilization of the bad taste 
of a genre often dismissed as abject slapstick. Wearing a zombie 
mask while citing Kant.  
Abyssal Thing/Mind. — Trenchant disruption of what Quentin 
Meillassoux terms the “correlationist” consensus has been cen-
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tral to the exposition of much recent speculative horror. Cor-
relationism is the thesis that an irreducible gap exists between 
thought and being. The-Thing-In-Itself, Immanuel Kant’s inti-
mation of the improbable, inhuman entities and qualities that 
reside beyond human cognition and knowledge, is never fully 
graspable, always collapsing back into the abyss between thing 
and mind. Speculation suggests for Meillassoux, and speculative 
realist infused thought more broadly, a break with correlation-
ism that can lead thought to the (im)possibilities that swirl be-
yond the limits of the human. The affinities between this and the 
“it” of horror are undeniable.5
The Wager of “It.” — Speculative thought becomes a spiralling of 
the head in a horror gaze, multiple eyes, inhuman light refracted 
from innumerable spaces and angles. The wager of such a spec-
ulative horror is that, through this distorted prism, conceptual 
images of the inhuman might emerge. The weirded flatness of 
phenomenological objects, humanity only one among many; 
the base materiality of abject substances; the profane mystical 
nothingness glimpsed through inhuman indifference; the inhu-
man drives of life, abstraction and cosmic death. 
Such conceptual images are the hybrid product of philosophical 
speculation and the aesthetics of horror.
Inhuman Fidelity. — Epistemological dread is central to the 
fecund relation between speculative horror and speculative 
thought drawn to the avatars of “it”. While they are not homog-
enous, what speculative realism, eliminative materialism, and 
object-oriented thought all share is a fidelity to “it,” the inhu-
man “real.” Fidelity is not too strong a term since one of the few 
binding elements in such speculative thought is the desire to 
conceptualize the different iterations of “it.”
5 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contin-
gency, trans. Ray Brassier (London: Continuum, 2008). 
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Formless Mass. — Inchoate materials bubbling with indifference 
and occasional (or frequent) malignity to the human. This form-
less mass would undoubtedly contain Graham Harman’s non-
anthropocentric ontology of Lovecraftian objects that withdraw 
and hide from full exposure to cognition and knowledge; the 
slime ontologies of Ben Woodard dripping with disease; the in-
human bio-horror of life and the subtle, negative mysticism of 
Eugene Thacker. Perhaps, at the core of the formlessness of “it” 
are the dark energetics of the death drive itself factored through 
an eliminative cosmos, as elaborated by Ray Brassier. 
Generic Inhuman. — It would be preferable to allow the concep-
tual images of “it” emergent in speculative horror to retain a 
certain formlessness. This is not to pursue the Kantian path of 
relative moderation or to step back from Lovecraftian hopeless-
ness and insanity. It is more that the primacy of “it” as a generic 
category has more salience than the forms “it” actually mani-
fests. 
“It” is as much an aesthetic sensibility active in thought as it is 
the unveiling of some inhuman truth-content. Horror is the fil-
ter through which the inhuman is allowed to take shape as a 
conceptual image.
Inhuman Negativity (2). — “It” has more facets than an episte-
mological gap between thought and being or the wonders re-
vealed through a speculative real when affixed to horror. Real 
horror as an affect and sensation of dread, anxiety, and terror, is 
something deeply inimical to the human. 
“It” — and it is usually an It — is what undoes the carefully de-
limited parameters of the human subject as rational, possessed 
of autonomy, the owner, so to speak, of certain properties. This 
visceral, affective, and bodily sense of horror can be traced back 
to the Latin verb horrēre, meaning the moment when the hairs 
on the body stand on end in response to fear and revulsion. 
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Rationality evacuated and autonomy replaced by the automa-
tism of life reduced to a shudder. The human dethroned into the 
shape of a fragile creature through the auspices of “it.”  
A Negative Sublime. — The mutual infusion of thought with 
horror and vice versa opens up the temptation and pleasure of 
what might be termed a negative sublime formulated around 
the conceptual image of the inhuman. The sublime is one of the 
prime clichés of aesthetic theory, exhausted but inexhaustible, 
a phantasmagoria of the immensely epic and the grotesquely 
dynamic. The sublime, as formulated by Immanuel Kant, is the 
expression of the inhuman, whether as cosmos, nature, or dis-
aster, whether it takes the mathematical form of ever-increasing 
magnitude or the dynamic one of incredible force. As such, the 
sublime is always potentially inimical to humanity, underscor-
ing how “a countless multitude of worlds annihilates, as it were, 
my importance as an animal creature.”6 It seems that Kant also 
experienced horrēre and was reduced to a less than human state. 
Deadly Light. — Horror and its twin, the inhuman, are imbued 
with the sublime: 
The most merciful thing in the world, I think, is the inability 
of the human mind to correlate all its contents. We live on a 
placid island of ignorance in the midst of black seas of infinity, 
and it was not meant that we should voyage far. The sciences, 
each straining in its own direction, have hitherto harmed us lit-
tle; but some day the piecing together of dissociated knowledge 
will open up such terrifying vistas of reality, and of our frightful 
position therein, that we shall either go mad from the revelation 
or flee from the deadly light into the peace and safety of a new 
dark age.7
6 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1956), 166. 
7 Lovecraft, “The Call of Cthulhu.”
490
DISEASES OF THE HEAD
It is as though this oft quoted opening passage from H.P. Love-
craft’s 1926 novella, The Call of Cthulhu, is a reply to Kant, 
though this is a reply that is immersed in the negative aspects of 
the sublime, a reply all too aware of the inhuman correlates that 
constitute it. Kant, with typical circumspection, emphasises that 
this sense of being overwhelmed, even horrified, alternates with 
those sterling qualities that “raise the soul’s fortitude above its 
usual middle range” and the comforting realization that reason 
and human freedom have more magnitude and dynamism than 
the sublime phenomena.8 
Lovecraft, with his own nihilist conviction concerning the in-
imical aspects of the sublime inhuman, would undoubtedly 
disagree. 
Transcendental Subtraction. — In Kant’s formulation, the sub-
lime is an aesthetic category imbricated with both pleasure and 
fear, intimate to the sudden diminution of humanity and a si-
multaneous sense of elevation. The sublime in speculative hor-
ror shares some of this but often has the added supplement of a 
subtraction, or even a negation, of the human. Possibly, as with 
much of the sublime, there is even a pleasure in this. 
The negativity of “it” is often formulated through a transcenden-
tal sublime. Lovecraft’s messy montages resolve into a mythos of 
cosmic apocalypse. “It” ultimately suggests an indifferent, inhu-
man, order that cannot be fully understood on anthropocentric 
terms, let alone opposed or engaged. For all the slime, tentacles, 
and formlessness, the emblems of speculative horror often re-
tain the quality of being abstracted from the world. It is little 
wonder “it” attracts philosophers. 
The “world-without-us.” — What Eugene Thacker succinctly 
terms the “world-without-us” is “the subtraction of the hu-
8 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indian-
apolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987), 120. 
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man from the world.”9 “It” is an extinctive, inhuman, indifferent 
“Planet” that Thacker posits can be apprehended through hor-
ror. A conceptual image of dread indifference, the “world-with-
out-us” is imbued with the transcendental form of the negative 
sublime bequeathed by Lovecraft. The conceptual image of the 
“Planet” necessarily does away with any mediation for the de-
struction of humanity, save the indifference of the cosmos. Un-
doubtedly there is a truth content to this, but it also risks simply 
reflecting the real horrors of the present as catastrophe rather 
than speculating upon them through horror from tendencies in 
the present. 
Starry Wisdom Cult. — The reproduction of “it” as a concep-
tual image can on occasion be the repetition of the inhuman 
as though it were a charm to ward off catastrophe through the 
jouissance the negative sublime provides. The inhuman then be-
comes fetishized, reified as an idol for acolytes to worship. As 
frequently beguiling as it is, the negative sublime can become a 
limit to apprehending certain aspects of the inhuman. 
“It” can be valorized in such a way that the reason why it might 
be salient to invoke the inhuman at this point in time becomes 
hidden. “It” in thought might operate as mere appearance and 
speculative horror becomes circumscribed and seduced by the 
jolt of the inhuman. Locked into this, speculative horror would 
become a charmed (or cursed) circle of its own esoterica.
Abject Slapstick. — It is tempting to invert the transcendence of 
the negative sublime into the horror immanent to the body, the 
hilarity of gore. The abject slapstick of cutting your own limb off 
to rid yourself of the severed and biting but still undead head of 
a demon, as occurs in The Evil Dead 2.
Hack the limb to destroy the head (laughter).
9 Eugene Thacker, The Horror of Philosophy: In the Dust of This Planet, 
Volume I (Winchester: Zero Books, 2011), 5. 
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That overused but useful term “carnivalesque” describes much 
of the violence in horror cinema, extreme gesture as satirical in-
version. The collapse of a certain rationality needs to cut its own 
limbs, and the human body is less a temple than a receptacle 
for pain. Rather than the opposite, this is a strange parallel to 
the sheer terror of knowledge discovered in the cosmic horror 
experienced by Lovecraft’s protagonists. What both share is the 
unveiling of the insignificance of humanity, the extensive hubris 
of thinking that humanity can be viewed as central to a universe 
of screaming, biting heads and/or cosmic indifference (more 
laughter). Humanity as a waste object. 
Screaming Winged Ape. — A screaming winged ape or crawling 
chaotic matter can be just as emblematic as the owl of Minerva 
at dusk. The crafting and evocation of mood, affect, and con-
cept through the language and imagery of horror is obviously 
not something to be expelled from thought as though it were an 
impure addition. 
Thought is not only the circumspection of logic, abstract steps, 
and the feedback loops of reason. Conceptual images are com-
mon to thought, as Nietzsche’s eternal return or Marx’s satire 
demonstrate. And horror is not only the inevitability of the gap 
between thought and being. There are other conceptual images 
within speculative horror and other gaps in the world.  
Conflictual Horror. — Might speculative horror provide the con-
flictual truth of the inhuman in the gap of a certain knowledge? 
That is, the truth of the inhuman as immanent to capitalism. 
Generally, “knowledge” would imagine the supposed basis of 
the “world-for-us” as being founded upon humanity rather than 
the real and inhuman abstractions that walk among us as com-
modities, including ourselves, and that constitute “us” through 
the “it” of capitalist social relations. The inhuman in speculative 
horror might also, then, be symptomatic of a “real” that bursts 
through and reveals conflicts and contradictions that ideologi-
cal knowledge does not acknowledge. A capitalist “real.”
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Crawling Horizon. — Perhaps, particular forms of the aesthetics 
of horror emerge into greater visibility at particular times, are 
illuminated by the structural tendencies that underlie events. 
Historical trauma often takes weird forms when transmuted 
into speculative horror. The trauma of the present is capital-
ism, whether filtered through the banal life of commodities or 
through climate change. The root of the inhuman, whether ab-
straction or catastrophic life/death, must also lie nestled in this. 
Image Crack. — The cracks in the image of the world can be 
traced through horror. The world might also break the concep-
tual image into new fragments, different, less transcendental 
forms of the inhuman. “It” envelops both the natural and sup-
posedly unnatural, leaving an afterimage of (un)natured dis-
symmetry.
The Simplicity of a Corpse. — The human can be presented with 
all of the simplicity of a corpse: internally divided between what 
Agamben has termed a naked, bare life and subject and cut 
through with the economic ratio of the value form (Marx). 
Further surgical work could be exercised with the mention of 
unconscious drives as an undoing of the subject (Freud) and 
the chance and catastrophe of evolution (Darwin). All of this 
amounts to a definitive displacement of the rational, autono-
mous human subject as the notional center of the existent, a dis-
placement that has been ongoing, widely acknowledged, and is 
perhaps primary, the human always already displaced. 
So, it goes. The inhuman is not so remarkable in that it sur-
rounds us, and the horror entailed usually labors in the back-
ground of life as it is lived, until for some — usually under the 
duress of class, gender, race — it does not.
The world-not-for-us. — The Thomas Ligotti short story The 
Town Manager is a fable of contemporary capitalism inscribed 
into horrific allegory. In the events of the story, the new town 
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manager dwells in a ruined hut and communicates in misspelt 
missives on torn brown paper. Missives such as “GUD […] NXT 
YUR JBS WULL CHNG” that crumple out of the sky like social me-
dia trash talk turned into an occult form of material detritus.10 
The new town manager is as ambient and malign as the capi-
talist social relation. An abstract, inhuman entity that diffuses 
through the town it then renames “FUN TOWN,” the inhabitants 
given humiliating service industry roles in newly bizarre neigh-
bourhoods with useless utilities such as a labyrinth of unusable 
toilets and adult sized play pens. Eventually, “FUN TOWN” is ru-
ined for that most banal inhuman abstraction, the accumulation 
of money. 
Ligotti cannot be claimed for a naïve anti-capitalism. That would 
run counter to his misanthropy and anti-natalist perspective; 
life as suffering to the point of desiring death. Yet, in The Town 
Manager, and his other workplace horror fictions, he gestures 
toward another kind of speculative horror. Rooted in the inhu-
man while tracing its shapes in the more quotidian forms of the 
present.
A fable of the world-not-for-us.
Horrific Reproduction. — The world-not-for-us expresses the 
gap that exists between much of humanity and the reproduc-
tion of the world for the benefit of capitalism. This reproduc-
tion of the world also has its double in the way that it is replete 
with particular forms of horror. This horror of reproduction 
is consonant with the varied possibilities of a catastrophe of 
non-reproduction, whether on the individual level or through 
the collapse of socio-economic orders. The dyad of reproduc-
tion/non-reproduction is a disjunctive conjunction in that the 
successful reproduction of one element can scrape away at the 
reproduction of another, rendering it untenable. “FUN TOWN” 
ruins its inhabitants.  
10 Thomas Ligotti, Teatro Grottesco (London: Virgin Books, 2008), 31. 
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Distorted Sublime. — The negative sublime of much contem-
porary speculative horror undoubtedly refracts some of this 
horror of (non)reproduction through the distortions of the in-
human. The conflictual truth emerges through dreams of inhu-
man destruction where everything is erased or where there is, 
as Reza Negarestani describes it after Lovecraft, a “holocaust of 
freedom.”11 
Antagonistic Complicity. — Speculative horror has always incor-
porated this horror of the cyclical, antagonistic complicity be-
tween reproduction and non-reproduction. Reliable archetypes 
of the horror genre such as vampires and zombies are emblem-
atic of the ways that reproduction can merge into its opposite. 
Marx can claim a similar insight when he writes that “capital 
is dead labour which, vampire-like, lives only by sucking living 
labour, and lives the more, the more labour it sucks.”12
Cult of Cadavers. — Horror is replete with the surplus of de-
struction, a madness of death, pools of blood uselessly spilled, 
terror, laughter, corpses, antique occultism, ruins, parasitical 
zombies, demons, vampires, diseases, deadly materiality re-
volting against productive use in the most absurd ways. What 
Georges Bataille termed the heterogeneous, “death and the cult 
of cadavers,” inassimilable to the twin homogeneities of produc-
tion and systemic philosophy. The evocation of the useless or 
repugnant does not exist outside of existent capitalist social rela-
tions. The heterogeneous is only heterogeneous within a certain 
system. Waste forms around the world-not-for-us. 
It Followed Me. — Non-reproduction often takes the form of “it” 
in speculative horror. 
11 Reza Negarestani, “Drafting the Inhuman,” in The Speculative Turn: Con-
tinental Materialism and Realism, eds. Levi Bryant, Graham Harman, and 
Nick Srnicek (Melbourne: re.press, 2011), 184. 
12 Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (Mos-
cow: Progress Publishers, 1965), 163. 
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The film It Follows initially seems to be a fairly standard, if more 
original, parable about disease, with the traditional horror mov-
ie culling of sexually active students thrown in for good meas-
ure. It Follows revolves around an eponymous “it” that murders 
those who have sex whether for pleasure or reproduction. The 
“curse” is mysteriously passed on through having sex. “It,” in this 
case, can only be seen by the prospective victims and is mimetic, 
adopting the forms of both loved ones and strangers, though 
always walking with a shuffling gait. 
“It” is both embodied and spectral, formless and with a well-
defined form, slow violent death in the deracinated suburbs. 
Rather than being about disease, It Follows could be a parable of 
the world-not-for-us, a parable of non-reproduction. Like capi-
tal, “it” drifts through the streets abstractly, reconstituted into 
whatever flesh might do, ensuring that life cannot go on. An 
emptied out inhuman form. “It” might well be an emblem of 
capitalist life as an undead life. A conceptual image of human 
waste. 
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Horror Vacui  
(“That Nothing Is What There Is”)
Julia Hölzl
[The following remains a draft, a/s sketch, does not provide an-
swers, nor questions. It is a mere opening toward somewhere else: 
It is the elsewhere that is of interest here, a/s somewhere or other, 
but always other; anyway, but never anywhere.]
I.
The grounding-attunement of the first beginning is deep 
wonder that beings are, that man himself is extant, extant 
in that which he is not. The grounding attunement of the 
other beginning is startled dismay: startled dismay in the 
abandonment of being […].
 — Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy 
(From Enowning)1
Oscillating between and before Er-staunen (deep wonder), Er-
schrecken (startled dismay), and Entsetzen (freeing dismay), this 
1 Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), trans. 
Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1999), 32.
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essay begins to think, begins by thinking the (non-)relation of 
being, time, absence, and emptiness via yet another beginning, 
that is, a/s non-original origin and no/t event.
In this beginning, there is Blanchot’s primal scene (a/s primal 
scene?):
(A primal scene?) You who live later, close to a heart that 
beats no more, suppose, suppose this: the child — is he seven 
years old, or eight perhaps? — standing by the window, draw-
ing the curtain and, through the pane, looking. What he sees: 
the garden, the wintry trees, the wall of a house. Though he 
sees, no doubt in a child’s way, his play space, he grows weary 
and slowly looks up toward the ordinary sky, with clouds, grey 
light — pallid daylight without depth.
What happens then: the sky, the same sky, suddenly open, 
absolutelyblack and absolutely empty, revealing (as though the 
pane had broken) such an absence that all has since always 
and forevermore been lost therein — so lost that therein is af-
firmed and dissolved the vertiginous knowledge that nothing is 
what there is, and first of all nothing beyond. The unexpected 
aspect of this scene (its interminable feature) is the feeling of 
happiness that straightaway submerges the child, the ravaging 
joy to which he can bear witness only by tears, an endless flow 
of tears. He is thought to suffer a childish sorrow; attempts are 
made to console him. He says nothing. He will live henceforth 
in the secret. He will weep no more.2 
2 Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster, trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 72. And this primal scene situates itself 
of course in relation to Freud: “What is striking is the way in which Freud 
is animated by a kind of passion for the origin […]. He thus invites each of 
us to look back behind ourselves in order to find there the source of every 
alteration: a primary ‘event’ that is individual and proper to each history, a 
scene constituting something important and overwhelming, but also such 
that the one who experiences it can neither master nor determine it, and 
with which he has essential relations of insufficiency. On the one hand, it is 
a matter of going back again to a beginning. […] It is not a beginning in-
asmuch as each scene is always ready to open onto a prior scene […]. It is 
as though we had access to the various forms of existence only as deprived 
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Although the term “scene,” as Blanchot continues a few pages 
later, “is ill-chosen, for what it supposedly names is unrepre-
sentable,” it “is pertinent in that it allows one at least not to 
speak as if of an event taking place at a moment in time — A 
scene: a shadow, a faint gleam, an ‘almost’ with the characteris-
tics of ‘too much.’”3
Such an event does not originate, does not eventuate, is no/t 
event, is no/thing given, but is that which gives. Nothing is giv-
en: nothing gives, as we might see.
It is such an almost which makes us wonder — that which 
gives us to think. What it gives us is this: that nothing is what 
there is, that such an almost is no(t) beyond — such is not be-
yond, such is no beyond. 
A/s horror vacui, (for) such is the horror of beyond. “It is the 
horror of being where being is without end,” as Blanchot writes.4
And how, then, to think such an elsewhere, as elsewhere, 
and always no(t) beyond — an elsewhere to no end; and how to 
bear such nothing, nothing beyond, such absence, such empti-
ness — you who live later, close to a heart that beats no more, how 
to affirm and dissolve this nothing that there is, and first of all 
nothing beyond?
But we must, first and foremost, question, call into question, 
adhere to the question, for it is with/in the answer that “we lose 
the direct, immediate given, and we lose the opening, the rich-
ness of possibility. The answer is the question’s misfortune, its 
of ourselves, and deprived of everything. To be born is, after having had 
everything, suddenly to lack everything, and first of all being […]. For the 
infant, everything is exterior, and he himself is scarcely anything but this 
exterior: the outside, a radical exteriority without unity, a dispersion with-
out anything dispersing. This absence, which is the absence of nothing, is 
at first the infant’s sole presence. […] It is always around lack, and through 
the exigency of this lack, that a presentiment of the infant’s history, of what 
he will be, is formed. But this lack is the ‘unconscious’: the negation that is 
not simply a wanting, but a relation to what is wanting — desire.” Maurice 
Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation, trans. Susan Hanson (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 231–32. 
3 Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster, 114, emphasis deleted.
4 Blanchot, Infinite Conversation, 120.
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adversity.”5 For “[t]he question places the full affirmation back 
into the void, and enriches it with this initial void. Through the 
question we give ourselves the thing and we give ourselves the 
void that permits us not to have it yet, or to have it as desire. The 
question is the desire of thought.”6
And how to think such thought, and from where to affirm 
its void — perhaps such thinking is to be asked from within the 
“most profound question,” as an earlier Blanchot had named it, 
a question that the question of the whole (dialectical accom-
plishment), the question that bears everything, does not in-
clude. […] The One, the Same, remain the first and the last 
words. Why this reference to the One as the ultimate and 
unique reference? In this sense, the dialectic, ontology, and 
the critique of ontology have the same postulate: all three 
deliver themselves over to the One: be it that the One accom-
plishes itself as everything, be it that it understands being as 
gathering, light, and unity of being, or be it that, above and 
beyond being, it affirms itself as the Absolute. With regard 
to such affirmations, must we not say: “the most profound 
question” is the question that escapes reference to the One? 
It is the other question, the question of the Other, but also a 
question that is always other.7
And still, from where are we to ask such a question? From and 
within absence, a/s moment of presence: such moment might 
be the instant of affirmation, such moment might be its site of 
dis-solution.
II.
Only because the nothing is manifest in the ground of Dasein 






the strangeness of beings oppresses us does it arouse and evoke 
wonder. Only on the ground of wonder — the revelation of the 
nothing — does the “why?” loom before us. Only because the 
“why” is possible as such can we in a definite way inquire into 
grounds, and ground them. […] The question of the nothing 
puts us, the questioners, in question. It is a metaphysical 
question.
 — Martin Heidegger, “What Is Metaphysics?”8
That nothing is what there is, and first of all nothing beyond, that 
such nothing is (a/s nothing, and first of all nothing beyond); 
that such nothing might be elsewhere, outside of absence, out-
side of presence, that it would not situate itself in an and as 
event, never, but in and as a scene, a/s scenery toward this else-
where where nothing is revealed. Its mode of presence would be 
absence, and vice versa. 
Following Heidegger, “we shall find in absence — be it what 
has been or what is to come — a manner of presencing and ap-
proaching which by no means coincides with presencing in the 
sense of the immediate present. Accordingly, we must note: Not 
every presencing is necessarily the present. A curious matter. 
But we find such presencing, the approaching that reaches us, 
in the present, too.”9
But where does such matter lead us, where is that nothing 
that there is, where does it reside — what is such nothing, and 
why to ask this primal question? Why grant nothing a being, 
why not grant nothing nothing itself?
“The nothing is neither an object nor any being at all,” Hei-
degger reminds us;10 rather, we ought to re-turn to “the basic 
question of metaphysics which the nothing itself compels: ‘Why 
are there beings at all, and why not rather nothing?’”11 A few 
8 Martin Heidegger, “What Is Metaphysics?” Basic text of Heidegger’s inau-
gural lecture at the University of Freiburg, Freiburg, Germany, 1929, §52.
9 Martin Heidegger, “Time and Being,” in On Time and Being, trans. Joan 
Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 13.
10 Heidegger, What Is Metaphysics?, §35.
11 Ibid., §54.
504
DISEASES OF THE HEAD
years later, Heidegger would begin his Introduction to Meta-
physics by asking “Why are there essents rather than nothing?,” 
this “obviously” being “the first of all questions, though not in a 
chronological sense.” 12 This very “question takes in everything, 
and this means not only everything that is present in the broad-
est sense but also everything that ever was or will be. The range 
of this question finds its limit only in nothing, in that which 
simply is not and never was. Everything that is not nothing is 
covered by this question, and ultimately even nothing itself; not 
because it is something, since after all we speak of it, but because 
it is nothing. Our question reaches out so far that we can never 
go further.”13
But it is not from here where we must move to, toward 
the void, absolutely empty, toward this “nothing is” that there 
is — and even Heidegger contends — “when we wish to appre-
hend being, it is always as though we were reaching into the 
void. The being after which we inquire is almost like nothing, 
and yet we have always rejected the contention that the essent 
in its entirety is not. But being remains unfindable, almost like 
nothing, or ultimately quite so. Then, in the end, the word ‘be-
ing’ is no more than an empty word. It means nothing real, tan-
gible, material. Its meaning is an unreal vapor.”14
The emptiness of being (“Can it now surprise us that ‘being’ 
should be so empty a word when the very word form is based 
on an emptying and an apparent stabilization of emptiness?”15) 
reveals its mode of presence, its mode of absence, and we re-
member, not every presencing is necessarily the present — but 
such an absence that all has since always and forevermore been 
lost therein.
Such a mode of presencing, in turn, reveals the mode of 
emptiness: in presence and absence, and above all outside both. 
Emptiness is no/t nothing but might be a silent echo of being.
12 Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim 






We take emptiness for “nothingness” in the sense of mere 
absence of beings and do not experience the reverberation 
of the still invisible bridge that refers new shores to new 
shores.16
And what does it mean, “to think nothing as nothing”? Would 
such thinking allow for (a) nothing outside the nothing? For 
Heidegger, “the nothing is nothing, and, if the nothing repre-
sents total indistinguishability, no distinction can obtain be-
tween the imagined and the ‘genuine’ nothing. And the ‘genuine’ 
nothing itself — isn’t this that camouflaged but absurd concept 
of a nothing that is? For the last time now the objections of the 
intellect would call a halt to our search, whose legitimacy, how-
ever, can be demonstrated only on the basis of a fundamental 
experience of the nothing.”17
What does it, then, mean to think nothing — as nothing? 
Would such thinking lead us to a thinking of being, a think-
ing from wherein such question can be asked — would it not 
be from here that being is (to be) thought, that being exists? 
“Only on the ground of the original revelation of the nothing 
can human existence approach and penetrate beings. But since 
existence in its essence relates itself to beings — those which it 
is not and that which it is — it emerges as such existence in each 
case from the nothing already revealed. Dasein means: being 
held out into the nothing.”18 
Nothing is. And while for Heidegger “such an attunement, 
in which man is brought before the nothing itself […] can and 
does occur, although rarely enough and only for a moment, in 
the fundamental mood of anxiety,”19 that is,“[t]he nothing re-
veals itself in anxiety — but not as a being,” 20  he concludes by 
questioning: “If Dasein can relate itself to beings only by hold-
16 Martin Heidegger, Mindfulness, trans. Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary 
(New York: Continuum, 2006), 217.
17 Heidegger, What Is Metaphysics?, §17.
18 Ibid., §33.
19 Ibid., §21. 
20 Ibid., §28.
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ing itself out into the nothing and can exist only thus; and if 
the nothing is originally disclosed only in anxiety; then must we 
not hover in this anxiety constantly in order to be able to exist 
at all?”21 
It is this “being held out into the nothing” that “makes man a 
place-holder of the nothing. […] Being held out into the noth-
ing — as Dasein is — on the ground of concealed anxiety is its 
surpassing of beings as a whole. It is transcendence.22
This transcendence points us somewhere else, points us out-
side such a beyond, points us toward a different attunement, 
perhaps; beyond transcendence — outside such a beyond — we 
find an elsewhere — everywhere but nowhere: “Profound bore-
dom, drifting here and there in the abysses of our existence like 
a muffling fog, removes all things and men and oneself along 
with it into a remarkable indifference. This boredom reveals be-
ings as a whole.”23
Boredom, indifferent, always unknown, does not uncover 
but reveals. It reveals the abyss that Dasein is. 
Boredom reveals our fear of the void, and it is for this reason, 
perhaps, that we must meet it with and by Gelassenheit:
This is what we must first learn: not to resist straightaway 
but to let resonate. Yet how are we to make room for this 
initially inessential, ungraspable boredom? Only by not be-
ing opposed to it, but letting it approach us and tell us what 
it wants, what is going on with it. Yet even to do this, it is 
necessary in the first place that we remove from indetermi-
nacy whatever we thus name and apparently know as bore-
dom. We must do this, however, not in the sense of dissect-
ing some psychological experience, but in such a way that we 
thereby approach ourselves. Whom? Ourselves — ourselves 




24 Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Fini-
tude, Solitude, trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington: 
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Such Langeweile (boredom) designates the mood from within 
which we face the horror of being: boredom opens us to that 
nothing that there is. Langeweile is nothing but the knowledge 
that nothing is what there is, and first of all nothing beyond.
Boredom thus not only reveals the fundamental concepts of 
metaphysics, world, finitude, and solitude,25 but is much more 
fundamental/ist in that it points toward an essence “beyond” es-
sentialism.
Being our time, boredom reveals the essence of nothingness, 
emptiness, presence, and absence — an absence that all has since 
always and forevermore been lost therein — so lost that therein is 
affirmed and dissolved the vertiginous knowledge that nothing is 
what there is, and first of all nothing beyond.
For the time being, “[b]oredom, Langeweile — whatever its 
ultimate essence may be — shows, particularly in our German 
word, an almost obvious relation to time, a way in which we 
stand with respect to time, a feeling of time. Boredom and the 
question of boredom thus lead us to the problem of time.” 26
The time of boredom. Boredom gives being its time: “bore-
dom is only possible at all because each thing, as we say, has its 
time. If each thing did not have its time, then there would be no 
boredom.”27 
The time of boredom. Time is given by boredom: “Time for 
its part stands in a relation of boredom to us.”28
It is thus through and by boredom that time is revealed, and 
yet, while “[w]e are increasingly tempted to pose the whole 
problem of boredom simply in terms of the problem of time,” 
“we ought not to give in to this temptation […]. We must stick 
with boredom, so that precisely through its essence we may take a 
look into the concealed essence of time and thereby into the con-
nection between the two.”29
Indiana University Press, 1995), 82.
25 As Heidegger attempts in the eponymous book.
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It is thus from within boredom and, at the same time, by 
boredom that we might be able to touch, that we might be able 
to bear “our horror of emptiness,”30 for it is here, in and through 
this long while, that we might be able to encounter, to affirm, to 
dissolve the “empty intimacy of time.”31
Such is the time Langeweile gives us.
III.
We’re not bored. — We’re not capable of it.
 — Maurice Blanchot, The Step Not Beyond32
What does it mean: to be bored?
What does it mean: to be capable of being bored? 
What does it mean: to be able to be bored, to bear this noth-
ing that there is? 
As is well known, it is in The Fundamental Concepts of Meta-
physics: World, Finitude, Solitude (1929/30), that Heidegger ex-
plores in depth, but not for the first time, this Grundstimmung, 
and where he famously distinguishes three forms of boredom: 
“Becoming Bored by Something,” “Being Bored with Something 
and the Passing of Time Belonging to It,” and the last, deepest 
one, “Profound Boredom as ‘It Is Boring for One.’” 
And while, as he writes of and for the first form of boredom, 
“time has become altogether enigmatic for us,” while “[b]ecom-
ing bored and boredom in general are then evidently entirely 
rooted in this enigmatic essence of time,”33 the relation of this 
muffling fog to being remains nebulous.
As insinuated above, Langeweile gives us (to) time, but what 
is given by Langeweile? 
30 Blanchot, Infinite Conversation, 121.
31 Ibid. 
32 Maurice Blanchot, The Step Not Beyond, trans. Lycette Nelson (New York: 
State University of New York Press, 1992), 20.
33 Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 98.
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It is the “being left empty that is emerging in boredom”34 that 
scares us; but “this being left empty cannot mean that in bore-
dom we are transformed in such a way that all things disappear 
entirely, as it were, so that nothing remains before us or around 
us. […] For how can we become bored by something, i.e., be left 
empty by something, if nothing at all is at hand? […] To leave 
empty does not at all mean: to be absent, not to be present at 
hand; rather things must be at hand in order to leave us empty.”35
Outside presence, outside absence, this is where being is in 
time, this is when being is given. 
It is from the analysis of the third form of boredom, Hei-
degger affirms, that 
we can give the word boredom, ‘Langeweile,’ a more essential 
meaning. In boredom, Langeweile, the while [Weile] becomes 
long [lang]. Which while? Any short while? No, but rather 
that while whilst Dasein is as such, the while that measures 
out that tarrying awhile [Verweilen] which is allotted to Da-
sein as such, i.e., the while whilst it is to be in the midst of 
these beings, in confrontation with them and thus with itself. 
It is this whole while — and yet a short while; and so every 
Dasein in turn is a short while. […] With this time what is 
at issue is not the time of the clock or chronology, but the 
lengthening or shortening of time proper.36
Again, boredom points us to time, time proper, the enigma of 
time, which reveals the nothing that there is, and not least be-
cause of this “we cannot possibly treat boredom as an object of 
34 Ibid., 101.
35 Ibid., 102.
36 Ibid., 152, emphasis in the original. And he summarizes his analysis of 
profound boredom as follows: “Boredom is the entrancement of the tem-
poral horizon, an entrancement which lets the moment of vision belonging 
to temporality vanish. In thus letting it vanish, boredom impels entranced 
Dasein into the moment of vision as the properly authentic possibility of its 
existence, an existence only possible in the midst of beings as a whole, and 
within the horizon of entrancement, their telling refusal of themselves as a 
whole.” (Ibid., 153).
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psychology. And that is precisely why we cannot draw conclu-
sions with regard to man as a whole from such an object of psy-
chology. We do not even need to draw such conclusions, given 
that this attunement brings us to ourselves in a far more funda-
mental and essential way. In attunement we are in such and such 
a manner. And profound boredom shows us what that means. 
The Dasein in us manifests itself.”37
In boredom, Dasein dis-closes itself. 
The “essential moments of profound boredom,” namely “be-
ing left empty and being held in limbo in the specific concrete 
form of our boredom, being entranced and being drawn into the 
moment of vision,” “showed us how the utter abyss of Dasein in 
the midst of Dasein discloses itself in this attunement.”38
Langeweile points beyond beyond. It points to the abyss 
of Dasein. It points us to nothing beyond. It is in and through 
Langeweile that we might be able to bear that nothing is what 
there is. And it might be within and from another Stimmung that 
boredom reveals, that boredom is revealed:
Attention waits. It waits without precipitation, leaving empty 
what is empty and keeping our haste, our impatient desire, 
and, even more, our horror of emptiness from prematurely 
filling it in. Attention is the emptiness of thought oriented by 
a gentle force and maintained in an accord with the empty 
intimacy of time.39
Such thought is to be spoken from a language that does not 
aim to unveil but that reveals, a Blanchotian “speech such that 
to speak would no longer be to unveil with light. Which does 
not imply that we would want to go in search of the joy, or the 
horror, of the absence of the day: just the contrary; we would 
want to arrive at a mode of ‘manifestation,’ but a manifestation 
that would not be one of unveiling-veiling. Here what reveals 
37 Ibid., 283.
38 Ibid.
39 Blanchot, Infinite Conversation, 121.
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itself does not give itself up to sight, just as it does not take 
refuge in simple invisibility. — This word reveal, I fear, is not 
quite suitable. To reveal, to remove the veil, to expose directly 
to view. — Revealing implies, in fact, that something shows that 
did not show itself. Speech (at least the one we are attempting to 
approach: writing) lays bare even without unveiling, and some-
times, on the contrary (dangerously), by revealing in a way that 
neither covers nor uncovers.”40
— revealing (as though the pane had broken) such an absence that 
all has since always and forevermore been lost therein —  
To reveal, then, is to affirm and dissolve this nothing that there 
is, and first of all nothing beyond.
And this is why, following Blanchot, “the ultimate conclu-
sion should be: one must dwell in ignorance, in illusion, and 
lose oneself in incomprehensible affliction. Certitude, become 
once again inaccessible and nearly confounded with the empti-
ness of the sky, might, on this basis, recover its ‘reality.’” 41
Its reality: the sky, the same sky, suddenly open, absolutely 
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